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Key to maps
Map 1.1
1. 2 January Prospectors attacked in the Florida Mountains.
2. 4 January Major Morrow ordered into the field from Fort Bayard. Apache scouts are 
sent to the Florida Mountains, while at least two companies are sent to 
Fort Cummings.
3. 6 January A large party of Apache warriors, accompanied by some women and chil-
dren and 200 horses, encounters Chapman’s wagon train at Mule Springs.
4. 6 or 7 January Telegraph wire between Fort Cummings and La Mesilla is severed. 
Repair crew find the break near the Goodsight Mountains and report a 
large trail heading north. The location suggests that the Apaches encoun-
tered at Mule Springs are the culprits. There is no effort to conceal either 
the break in the telegraph line or the trail.
5. 8 January Reports received of 40-50 Apaches seen in the vicinity of McEvers’ 
Ranch.
6. 9 January Morrow sets out in pursuit of Victorio from Fort Cummings, picking 
up his trail as it moves north from the telegraph line towards McEvers’ 
Ranch, having ordered the rest of his command to march to Fort 
Cummings and follow his trail.
7. 7 January Colonrl Cisneros, one of General Trevino’s officers, sends word that his 
scouts are moving from the Mexican border in the general direction of La 
Mesilla.
10–13 January Mexican Traders discover a large Apache trail going from the vicinity 
of the Florida Mountains towards Magdalena Canyon, presumably 
Magdalena Gap, in the southern reaches of the Sierra Uvas.
Map 2.1
Key to Map One
1. 6 or 7 
January
Telegraph wire between Fort Cummings and La Mesilla is severed. 
Repair crew find the break near the Goodsight Mountains and report a 
large trail heading north. 
2. 8 January Reports received of 40-50 Apaches seen in the vicinity of McEvers’ 
Ranch.
3. 9 January Morrow sets out in pursuit of Victorio from Fort Cummings, picking 
up Victorio’s trail as it moves north from the telegraph line towards 
McEvers’, Ranch, having ordered the rest of his command to march to 
Fort Cummings and follow his trail.
4. 12 January Morrow, having gathered his scattered detachments together, engages 
Victorio on the Rio Percha between Hillsboro and Kingston. The 
Apaches hold their positions for several hours before the deployment of 
a mountain howitzer breaks the deadlock. The Apaches fade away to the 
north.
5. 13 January One of Morrow’s cavalry companies has a brief skirmish with some 
Apaches.
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6. 16 January Victorio with at least 60 warriors holds a conference with Andrew Kelley 
at Canada Alamosa. The conference is terminated two hours later by the 
arrival of Morrow’s battalion.
7. 16 January Morrow pursues the Apaches to the southern reaches of the San Mateo 
Mountains. That evening he holds a parley with Victorio somewhere 
along Nogal Canyon.
17 January Morrow’s troops engage Victorio’s warriors in the same area. Once again, 
the Apaches hold their positions until the mountain howitzer is brought 
into action. They move north deeper into the San Mateo Mountains.
8. 17 January Morrow leads his battalion to Ojo Caliente to replenish his supplies.
9. 17–22 January Andrew Kelley is sent into the San Mateo Mountains and returns to 
report that Victorio has moved to the northern end of the San Mateo 
Mts.
10. 22 to 26 
January
Victorio leads Morrow’s battalion on a gruelling march through the San 
Mateo Mountains. Inconclusive skirmishing continues as Victorio keeps 
one jump ahead of the US troops.
11. 23 January Andrew Kelley goes back into the San Mateo Mts. in an effort to contact 
Victorio and persuade him to enter into peace negotiations.
12. 27 January Morrow’s battalion arrives at Canada Alamosa having failed to catch 
Victorio.
13. 27 to 29 
January
Kelley appears to have successfully contacted Victorio and a second parley 
between Victorio and Morrow is arranged. It is unclear whether this 
conference took place.
14. 30 January Morrow with dwindling supplies sets out with his command for Fort 
Bayard.
15. 30 January Capt. Rucker, attached to a supply train out of Fort Bayard commanded 
by Capt. Carroll, is detached to pursue Apaches into the Caballo Mts. 
Joined by a number of civilian volunteers they are ambushed (probably in 
or near Mescal Canyon) and driven back across the Rio Grande. 
16. 1 to 2 
February
The news of Rucker’s defeat reaches Morrow who swings his command 
around, crosses the Rio Grande and picks up a trail moving through 
Aleman and on into the San Andres Mts.
17. 3 February Morrow and Victorio’s men engage in a prolonged running battle (prob-
ably in or near Hospital Canyon) on the eastern side of the San Andres 
Mts.
18. 4 February Morrow arrives at Tulerosa. 
19. 4 February Detachments led by Capt’s Carroll & Hooker make for San Augustin 
Pass in an attempt to prevent Victorio making for Mexico
20. 6 February Morrow tracks some Apaches to Malpais Springs where the Apaches 
rendezvoused after scattering out of the San Andres Mts. on 3 February. 
Once again the Apaches scattered and Morrow suspects that the Apaches 
have fresh horses hidden on the Mescalero reservation to the east but fails 
to discover more than a few small trails.
21. 10 February Morrow’s battalion returns to Tulerosa having lost contact with Victorio. 
His command is completely exhausted after a month’s pursuit of the 
Apaches. 
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22. 11 to 20 
February
On hearing rumours of Apache raiders in the Caballo Mts. Morrow’s 
battalion marches west to scout this range. Finding little sign of Apaches 
he moves his forces first to Las Palomas to rest and refit. By 20 February 
he had returned to Ojo Caliente.
Map 4.2
A – The road crosses the main arroyo.
B – The road ascends a steep incline, rising between 50 and 60 feet.
C – The road levels out for approximately 2-300 yards.
D – Finally, the road rises by approximately another 20 feet to complete its ascent from the arroyo. 
As the second of the two wagons entered C, the Apaches had their quarry in a perfect trap. The 
Apaches were probably stationed on the small hillocks at points E, F and G, and along the low ridge 
H, which was no more than 20 feet high. Alternatively, rather than being positioned along Point 
H, some Apaches may have been posted in the small depression marked J. Whichever of these it 
was, they could have remained hidden until they opened fire at point blank range. It is believed that 
the rear wagon attempted to flee between E and H, but was quickly cut off and the occupa
Map 5.1
Note: The three broad green arrows labelled A, B and C indicate Hatch’s plan before the opera-
tion. The narrower green arrows numbered 1–12 outline how the First and Second Battalions, New 
Mexico Troops, executed the Hembrillo Canyon Operation.
Key to Map One:
The Intended Plan
A Major Morrow with the First Battalion, NM Troops, to start from their base at Las 
Palomas and move east to strike the Apaches based in the San Andres Mountains.
B The Second Battalion, NM Troops, commanded by Captain Carroll, to move from Fort 
Stanton to Tulerosa to cover the east side of the San Andres Mountains and support the 
First Battalion when the latter engage the Apaches.
C Captain Hooker with the Third Battalion, NM Troops, to proceed from Annaya 
Springs to Malpais Springs on the Tulerosa Road. Colonel Hatch in three different 
communications instructs Hooker that his battalion should cover the east, north and 
west of the San Andres Mountains.
The Hembrillo Canyon Operation
Captain Carroll’s Second Battalion, NM Troops
Date Event
1. 4 April Carroll Marches his battalion from Tulerosa to Malpais Springs.
2. 5 April Carroll sends Lieutenant Conline’s company ahead of the battalion towards 
the San Andres Mountains. After a march of about 37 miles Conline discovers 
a trail leading into Hembrillo Canyon. He follows the trail a short distance 
into the canyon before he is attacked by Apaches and retreats at nightfall, 
rejoining the rest of the battalion at around 11:00 p.m.
List of Maps xi
3. 6 April Carroll splits his command in two. He leads two companies up Sulphur 
Canyon and enters the Hembrillo Basin from the north, thereby avoiding 
using the Hembrillo Canyon route from the west, as attempted by Lieutenant 
Conline. Late in the afternoon, Carroll is ambushed and trapped by the 
Apaches.
4. 6 April Carroll sends Lieutenant Cusack, with the other two companies, to scout 
south along the San Andres Mountains.
5. 7 April Lieutenant Cusack, with the other two companies, arrives, following Carroll’s 
trail, having been recalled by courier. They arrive at the same time as the 
Apache scouts from the First Battalion, NM Troops, arrive from the west. 
The former having mistakenly been fired upon by the latter, the two sets of 
reinforcements join forces to relieve Carroll’s command.
Major Morrow’s First Battalion, NM Troops
Date Event.
6. 29 March Morrow, with 98 men and 63 Apache scouts, leaves Fort Bayard to rendez-
vous with the rest of his battalion at Las Palomas. The latter is made up of 
a composite company of Sixth Cavalrymen led by Captain McLellan and 
Apache scouts led by Lieutenant Gatewood.
7. 27– March Captain McLellan leaves Camp Ojo Caliente for Las Palomas. 
8. 1–3 April The First Battalion NM Troops congregates at Las Palomas.
9. 4–5 April The First Battalion, plagued by logistical difficulties, finds its departure for 
Aleman Wells delayed. Major Morrow leaves for Aleman on 4 April. Captain 
McLellan leaves for Aleman on 5 April.
10. 6 April On arrival at Aleman Wells, the troops are again delayed by the slow rate 
at which their stock can be watered. Colonel Hatch, having gone ahead of 
the First Battalion to Aleman on 4 April, orders McLellan’s Sixth Cavalry 
detachment and the Apache scouts to draw water first and proceed from 
Aleman across the Jornada and into the San Andres Mountains. They set off 
near midnight on 6 April.
11. 7 April McLellan’s force, having crossed to the eastern rim of the San Andres 
Mountains by dawn, hears the gunfire from the battle between Carroll and 
the Apaches and moves to their relief. (See Note 5.)
12. 7 April The rest of the First Battalion takes on water and between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 
p.m. arrives in Hembrillo Canyon.
Map 5.2
1. Vidette posted to the left and rear of Conline’s position.
2. Videttes stationed on the southern slope of Hembrillo Canyon.
3. Videttes deployed on the northern slope of Hembrillo Canyon.
4. Conline’s skirmish line.
5. Conline’s horse herd.
6. 30-50 Apaches approach Conline’s command by moving rapidly down Hembrillo Canyon.
7. The videttes in advance of Conline’s position skirmish with the Apaches as they withdraw. 
Presumably, the vidette(s) posted above and to the rear of Conline’s position return to the 
skirmish line.
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8.An Apache, identified as Victorio, is seen to be directing the opening moves of his men from 
approximately this point.
9. A few Apaches occupy these positions to engage Conline’s company.
10. Some of the Apaches, using dead ground, occupy positions in front of the Ninth Cavalrymen.
11. A number of Apaches use an arroyo running up the southern side of Hembrillo Canyon to 
work their way to firing positions above and to the left of Conline’s skirmish line.
Map 5.3
Conline’s company (1) engage the Apaches to their front (2) and left and above (3), in a general fire-
fight at an approximate distance of 200 yards. The Apaches then launch an attack (4) on the right 
of Conline’s position by working their way through the rough terrain at that point. This possibly 
distracts the Ninth Cavalrymen from the Apaches working their way around Conline’s right flank 
(5) using the depression created by a dry arroyo. These Apaches successfully infiltrate around to the 
rear (6) and they opened fire on Conline’s horses, some using the arroyo for cover (7), whilst at least 
one Apache climbs up the north side of the Canyon (8) and another moves out of the arroyo (9) to 
take a position directly behind Conline’s first skirmish line. It would appear that some men from 
the first skirmish line and some of the men guarding the horses form a second skirmish line (10) 
to counter this flank attack. Fading light would appear to prevent the Apaches from pressing home 
their advantage, and they withdraw up Hembrillo Canyon.
Map 5.4
Carroll was spotted by Apache lookouts, giving Victorio time to set up a trap for him between 
two converging ridges, each lined with Apache warriors. Once Carroll marched into the trap, the 
Apache warriors opened fire. Instead of retreating, Carroll’s men stormed what is now known as 
Carroll’s Ridge. Other Apache warriors occupied positions between Carroll’s command and Rock 
House Spring.
Maps 5.1–5.4 are derived from Laumbach’s book on the recent archaeological survey of the 
Hembrillo battle field.
Map 5.5
Carrol creates a defensive position along the lower end of Carroll’s Ridge. The Apaches occupy 
positions higher up Carroll’s Ridge. They occupy Victorio Ridge, to the south; and those on 
Apache Ridge shift position southwards to bring Carroll’s position under fire. A number of Apache 
warriors occupy the area around Rock House Spring and the small stream running past and below 
Carroll’s position. These warriors successfully prevent Carroll’s troopers from gaining more than 
a few canteens of water. Finally, other Apaches infiltrated in towards Carroll’s position during the 
night. As first light arrives, the Ninth Cavalrymen come under increasing attack. At one point, the 
Apaches press so close to them that they have to resort to their revolvers to hold their line.
Map 5.6
McLellan’s command arrives from the north west and Cusack links up with Carroll from the 
north. The hostile Apaches abandon their position around Carroll’s Ridge and Rock House Spring 
to form a defence line along Victorio Ridge. It is probably that the Apache Camp scatters initially to 
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the south and south east, before the Mescaleros flee to the east and the Warm Springs/Chiricahuas 
turn and move to the west.
Map 5.7
While McLellan and Cusack launch their cavalrymen in a frontal assault on Victorio Ridge, the 
Apache scouts launch a flanking attack. By 9:00 a.m. Rock House Spring is taken. The Apaches 
detach men from their line to hold back the scouts, but once the US cavalrymen are in position to 
overrun Victorio Ridge, the Apaches fall back. Some mount horses and escape down Hembrillo 
Canyon. Others continue a rearguard action, falling back towards Victorio Peak. Upper Hembrillo 
Spring is secured in the mid-afternoon as the last Apache warriors retreat from Victorio Peak. 
Having covered their dependents’ retreat, the Apache warriors break contact and withdraw from 
Hembrillo Canyon.
Map 7.1
1. The US army reports of this campaign are not detailed enough to pinpoint the movements of 
the various detachments with any certainty; but an effort has been made to pinpoint as many 
of the locations as possible to map Victorio’s raiding and the attempts made to pursue him.
2. We know that Morrow left Ojo Caliente on 4 May and Hooker, with his battalion, left on 
5 May. The clearest hint as to the direction taken by the Ninth Cavalry’s pursuit is given by 
Captain Parker of K Company (Hooker’s battalion), who stated that he had followed a trail 
from Chase’s Ranch on the Rio Cuchillo Negro across the Black Range, the Mogollons, into 
the Negrieta Mountains (possibly the San Francisco Mountains), on to Old Fort Tularosa, and 
back to Ojo Caliente, by 23 May.
3. The sheepherders killed by Victorio appear to have been struck on the northern slopes of the 
Mogollon Mountains, Squares E5 and E6.
4. The mining camps attacked by Victorio in late April would appear to be concentrated in Square 
E5. 
5. The scout by Captain Madden’s Sixth Cavalry and civilian volunteers from Silver City mean-
dered through Squares E, D and C4–5. 
6. Captain Kramer was camped on Ash Creek, but the actual location of Rocky Canyon is 
unclear. It may be somewhere in Square E1, but is probably further west, just off the map. 
Tupper appears to have pursued Washington’s raiders through Squares E1, E2, D3, D4, D5 
and C5.
7. The Apache scouts led by H.K. Parker appear to have started their scout, either from the San 
Francisco River or somewhere between that point and the Datil Mountains, on 17 May. They 
reached Ojo Caliente on 21 May. On 23 May they located Victorio’s camp to the south of Ojo 
Caliente, two to three miles east of Hermosa. At dawn on 24 May, they attacked the camp.
Map 10.1
A – Tinaja de las Palmas
B – Rocky Ridge
C – Devil’s Ridge
E – Eagle Mountains
1. Forts ‘Grierson’ and ‘Beck’.
2. Lieutenant Finlay’s emplacement.
3. Apaches approach from the south.
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4. Lieutenant Finlay’s attack.
5. C and G Companies approach from Eagle Spring.
6. C and G Companies engage both the Apaches and Lieutenant Finlay’s detachment.
7. Apaches infiltrate to Finlay’s rear.
8. Lieutenant Finlay retreats to Rocky Ridge pursued by the Apaches.
9. Apaches pull back to the ridge to the south of the road.
10. C and G Companies move towards Grierson and engage the Apaches to the south.
11. C and G Companies link up with Grierson on Rocky Ridge.
12. Apaches move forward to attempt another flanking attack on Grierson’s position
13. A Company arrives from Fort Quitman.
14. Apaches abort their latest attach and move to the south.
Map 11.1
Date Event
1. Mid July Mexican state and federal troops unsuccessfully attempt to trap Victorio in 
the Sierra el Fierro.
2. 21 July Colonel Valle’s forces clash with Victorio at Ojo del Pino in the Sierra de 
Los Pinos. The Apaches withdraw south towards the Sierro el Fierro.
3. 22 July Colonel Grierson arrives at Vieja Pass.
4. 23 July Colonel Grierson travels to Eagle Spring via Van Horn’s Wells.
5. 25 July Colonel Grierson once again fights Victorio in the Sierra de Los Pinos.
6. 27 July Colonel Grierson travels to Old Fort Quitnam.
7. 28 July Colonel Grierson meets with Colonel Valle at Old Fort Quitnam.
8. 29 July Travelling back to Eagle Spring, Colonel Grierson encounters an Apache 
scout at Tinaja de las Palmas. Reports arriving from scouts out of Old Fort 
Quitnam and Eagle Spring give news of a large party of Apaches moving 
towards Grierson from the Rio Grande.
30 July Skirmish between Victorio and Grierson at Tinaja de las Palmas.
9. 30 July Colonel Grierson moves his forces back to Eagle Spring.
10. 1 August Colonel Grierson sends out scout detachments to scout to the south of Eagle 
Spring. One detachment sent to Alamo Springs.
11. 3 August The detachment at Alamo Springs engages a large party of Apaches in a 
running battle moving north east towards Van Horn Mountains.
12. 3 August Captain Lebo, scouting the Sierra Diablo, captures a camp full of supplies. 
He pursues the Apaches north out of these mountains. 
13. 3–4 August News of the clash between Lebo’s troops and Apaches convinces Colonel 
Grierson to move his troops to Van Horn Wells and beyond.
14. 4 August A detachment of Tenth Cavalry is ambushed in the Guadalupe Mountains, 
probably by the same Apaches who were attacked by Captain Lebo.
15. 5–6 August Very early on 5 August, Colonel Grierson realises that the Apaches have 
outmanoeuvred him. He gathers his command and by the early hours of 6 
August has marched his forces northwards to Rattlesnake Springs.
16. 6 August Inconclusive battle with Victorio at Rattlesnake Springs.
17. 7 August Colonel Grierson sends detachments to picket Apache and Sulphur Springs 
to the north. (Note: the locations of these water holes are approximate.)
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18. 8 August Colonel Grierson is joined by a company from the Eighth Cavalry, with 
Lipan Apache scouts, at Rattlesnake Springs. They are sent to scout to 
the south and later return to confirm that Victorio has retreated from 
Rattlesnake Springs. He has withdrawn into the Sierra Diablo. Texas 
Rangers also join Grierson at Rattlesnake Springs.
19. 9 August Sierra Diablo scouted by Pueblo and Lipan Indian scouts and the infantry 
accompanying Grierson’s battalion.
20. 10 August Colonel Grierson sends troops under Captain Nolan to Fresno Springs to 
scout the southern end of Sierro Diablo.
21. 10 August Grierson travels to Sulphur Springs and orders troops under Captain 
Carpenter to move west, then scout south, along the west side of the Sierra 
Diablo.
22. 11 August Victorio’s trail is finally discovered by Captain Carpenter. It goes west 
towards Fort Bliss, then turns south towards the Rio Grande. Carpenter 
estimates that he is a day and a half behind the Apaches. By the end of the 
day, he has to break off the pursuit, as his horses are exhausted. He sends 
word to Captain Nolan, who joins him at Eagle Spring at around midnight.
23. 12 August Nolan picks up the trail two miles from Tinaja de las Palmas and follows it 
south to the Rio Grande where it turns east and makes for Ojo Caliente.
24. 13 August Nolan confirms that the Apaches have crossed back into Mexico.
Map 11.2
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1. 29–30 July Victorio splits his force into two groups. He takes the first group, made 
up exclusively of warriors, across the Rio Grande in an attempt to decoy 
Grierson’s troops away from Eagle Spring. By attacking Grierson at Tinaja 
de las Palmas, he attracts the attention of forces stationed at Eagle Spring 
and Old Fort Quitman.
2. 29–31 July If Victorio and his group of warriors are successful in drawing the forces 
at Eagle Spring westwards, this should give second group, made up of 
Victorio’s dependents and plunder, escorted by a few warriors, the opportu-
nity to pass northwards towards New Mexico, by passing between the Eagle 
and Van Horn Mountains. This group is camping somewhere between Sierra 
el Alambre and Sierra los Pilares.
Failure No. 1 Victorio fails to move Grierson west, as the latter is already aware, through 
information received from both Mexican army scouts and his own scouts, 
that there is a large group of Apaches just across the border between the 
Sierra el Alambre and Sierra los Pilares.
3. 30 July Grierson quickly moves his forces back to Eagle Spring. This point is rela-
tively high on the northern slope of the Eagle Mountains and affords a good 
view of area between the Eagle and Van Horn Mountains, and north to 
the Carrizo Mountains. From Eagle Spring, Grierson sends small scouting 
patrols southwards to monitor movements of Apaches camped at 2.
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4. 2–4 August Grierson, based on knowledge of location of second group of Apaches, 
decides that next likely spot for a border incursion is to the east of Eagle 
Spring, and moves some of his troops to Van Horn Wells and beyond. Later, 
news of attack on 
patrol sent to Alamo Springs convinces the Colonel to move the rest of his 
force to Van Horn Wells and beyond, in an effort to head off the Apaches.
5. 4 August The telegraph line between Old Fort Quitman and Eagle Spring is cut. Once 
again, this appears to be an attempt to draw Grierson westwards to allow 
second group of Apaches an unimpeded passage north to New Mexico.
Failure No. 2
The scouting party which encountered second group of Apaches near Alamo 
Springs manages to alert Grierson. By the time the telegraph line is cut, 
Grierson is already aware of the approximate location of the second group 
and has moved east in an attempt to intercept them. 
6. 3–5 August Apaches hold off the scouting party and move to north and east, towards 
Van Horn Mountains. Once they have escaped from the patrol, they change 
their line of march to the northwest and make for Fresno Springs. Here they 
probably rendezvous with Victorio’s party of warriors.
Failure No. 3
Grierson’s scout patrols and stagecoach employees warn the Colonel that he 
has probably been outmanoeuvred in sufficient time for him to redeploy his 
forces and move north.
7. 5–6 August Grierson manages to get his forces to Rattlesnake Springs in advance of 
Victorio, forcing Apaches to retreat back to the south. Despite losing track 
of Victorio between 7 and 11 August, this manoeuvre wins the campaign for 
Grierson, as Victorio is forced to return to Mexico with his plunder.
Map 14.2
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1. 6 September A stagecoach is ambushed, and the occupants killed, 16 miles east 
of Fort Cummings. The wreckage is discovered by a detachment 
of Sixteenth Infantrymen escorting a railroad survey team. Their 
commander, Captain Hale, sends a courier to Fort Cummings, who 
arrives there at 10:00 p.m. 
2. 6–7 September At midnight, Captain Parker, with A Company, Fourth Cavalry, and 10 
Apache scouts, proceeds from Fort Cummings to the site of the ambush. 
He is ordered to pursue the Apaches from that point.
3. 6–7 September At 12:00 a.m., Major Noyes departs Fort Cummings with H Company, 
Fourth Cavalry and 10 Apache Scouts for the Florida Mountains, in 
an attempt to intercept the Apache raiders should they make for that 
point. He is also ordered to contact Lieutenants Maney and Goodwin, 
currently scouting in this area with their Apache scouts, and put them 
in pursuit of the Apaches. He arrives at the Little Floridas at dawn and 
works his way down the Floridas, but find insufficient water and returns 
to the Little Floridas
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4. 7 September Parker’s detachment reaches the site of the ambush. At 8:00 a.m., 
he pursues the trail southwards, probably along the eastern side of 
the Goodsight Mountains, until, at approximately 11:00 a.m. he is 
ambushed at the southern end of these mountains. He loses three men 
killed and three wounded. Parker sends a courier to Captain Hale 
requesting that he telegraph for reinforcements from Fort Cummings. 
Unable to shift the Apaches from their positions on the ridge, Parker 
pulls back about eight miles to regroup. 
5. 7 September This request is received at about 1:30 p.m. and Lieutenant Colonel 
Dudley mounts a large battalion of Ninth Cavalry and sets out at about 
2:15 p.m. Colonel Buell also puts some Fifteenth Infantrymen in wagons 
and sets off with them on the road at 2:45 p.m.
6. 7 September Captain Hale marches to the aid of Parker and arrives just before the 
Ninth Cavalry arrive from Fort Cummings.
7. 7 September On the approach of reinforcements, the Apaches scatter and re-congre-
gate at a nearby camp in a canyon running down out of the Goodsight 
Mountains. 
8. 7 September Lieutenant Colonel Dudley takes command and pursues the Apaches to 
a point two miles beyond their camp, before darkness makes it impos-
sible to follow the trail
9. 7 September Seeing that they are still being pursued, the Apaches poison the water 
at their camp using horse entrails and then retreat into Mexico. They 
are earlier spotted by Dudley, from the southern escarpment of the 
Goodsight Mountains, 15 miles distant, making for Mexico.
10. 7–8 September Major Noyes, finding no signs of Apaches in or around the Florida 
Mountains. He is met by a courier from Buell and ordered to march to 
the Goodsight Mountains. By dawn on 8 September he is approximately 
10 miles from the Goodsights.
11. 8 September Buell and Dudley return to Cummings via Hale’s railroad surveying 
camp. They are joined by Major Noyes who, on reaching the Goodsight 
Mountains, had spotted their dust and followed them. Buell and Dudley 
had both concluded that to pursue the Apaches further would be futile, 
given their lack of supplies sufficient for a prolonged pursuit. It would 
also have involved a premature entry into the Republic of Mexico.
Map 15.1
Colonel Terrazas Having gathered his state troops from the townships to the south, he 
would advance north towards Guzman and Santa Maria Lakes and 
attack Victorio from the south.
Colonel Buell Would advance south from Fort Cummings to Palomas Lake. His 
forces would then spread out and advance south towards the lakes and 
attack Victorio from the north.
Colonel Carr Would advance east from Fort Bowie and blockade the passes to the 
east of Guzman and Santa Maria Lakes, to prevent Victorio’s escape to 
the west.
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To the east, Chihuahuan state troops raised from the settlements along the Rio Grande 
and the Carrizal area would form a cordon to prevent Victorio escaping to the east. A small 
group of Texas Rangers were to join this force, as were a small scouting detachment of Tenth 
Cavalrymen under civilian scout Charles Berger. The Tenth Cavalry’s blockade of the water-
holes on the US side of the Rio Grande would be maintained to prevent Victorio getting away, 
should he break through this cordon.
Map 15.2
Part 1: Terrazas’ Campaign (Purple Arrows)
1. 25–26 August Joaquin Terrazas leaves Chihuahua City and progresses through 
northern Chihuahua gathering recruits. He links up with Juan Mata 
Ortiz at Corralitos. The latter has already sent scouts to Guzman and 
Santa Maria Lakes.
2. 27 September The combined forces of Terrazas and Mata Ortiz move to the Vado de 
Santa Maria, where they are joined by Mata Ortiz’s scouts. The latter 
report that the Apaches appear to have left the lakes, moving east.
3. 28 September Terrazas moves on to Ojo Caliente, Mexico, while scouting parties are 
sent to the north.
4. 29 September Terrazas arrives at the Laguna de Patios to rendezvous with state troops 
raised from the Rio Brazos region. He also sends scouts out to check the 
Candelaria Mountains. Other troops raised in his earlier recruitment 
drive catch up with him at this point. 
5. 17 September to 
3 October
A small group of Texas Rangers under Baylor, and a larger group of 
Chihuahua State troops raised from along the Rio Grande, take up a 
position at Aranda’s Ranch, somewhere to the east of the Candelaria 
Mountains. Signal fires are seen to the east, and a trail is discovered 
to the south of the Sierra la Rancheria on 19 September. The troops 
are sent to picket these mountains until being sent to join Terrazas at 
Laguna de Patos, arriving on 3 October. A large trail of Apaches going 
east from the Candelarias is discovered going in the direction of the 
Sierra el Pino on 23 September. 
6. 28 September Charles Berger and six Tenth Cavalrymen arrive at the Tinajas 
de Cantarreccio. They move to join Terrazas, in the vicinity of the 
Candelaria Mountains, probably at San Jose (I).
7. 1 October Terrazas marches to the Sierra la Alcaparra.
8. 1 October Mata Ortiz marches a detachment towards the Tinajas de Cantarrecio 
to meet a supply train from El Paso del Norte.
9. 2–3 October Terrazas searches the vicinity of the Sierra Alcaparra.
10. 4 October En route to the north east and a rendezvous in the Sierra Borracho 
with Juan Mata Ortiz, Terrazas finds the traces of a large Apache camp 
at Lagunita (possibly present-day Laguna las Flores). Assuming that 
Victorio might be making for the Sierra Borracho, and thereby threat-
ening his supply train, Terrazas marches straight to the rendezvous 
point with Mata Ortiz.
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11. 5 October Terrazas and Mata Ortiz reunite somewhere in the Sierra Borracho. 
Scouts are sent on towards the Sierra de Los Pinos.
7 October Terrazas’ command is re-supplied from El Paso del Norte.
12. 8–9 October Terrazas’ command marches down to the Sierra de Los Pinos. 
Confident he is between Victorio and the Rio Grande, he requests 
Buell, via Lieutenants Maney and Schaeffer, to withdraw to the USA. 
Scouts have reached Terrazas from the Laguna el Cuervo (I), stating 
that Apaches have passed by but are now moving south. Terrazas also 
reduces his command to 260 effectives, sending 90 men home.
13. 9–10 October Terrazas marches to the Laguna el Cuervo (I), only to find that the 
tracks left are those of a small party of Apaches.
14. 11–12 October Terrazas moves south to the Ojo del Carrizo. He doles out the 
remaining supplies to his troops.
15. 
& 
16.
12–13 October While Terrazas scouts onto the plains west of Ojo Del Carrizo, Mata 
Ortiz sets off southwards with a detachment, to scout the Sierra 
Tosesihua.
17. 13 October Terrazas’ scouts find signs out on the plain that a large body of Apaches 
has passed, apparently going towards Tres Castillos, a few days previ-
ously. Terrazas sends a courier to Mata Ortiz ordering him to rejoin the 
command. That night, a scouting party is despatched to Tres Castillos, 
but returns to report plenty of tracks but no Apaches.
18. 14 October Terrazas leads a small scouting party to Tres Castillos. From this point, 
he sees dust clouds to the south, and he returns to pick up his command, 
finding that by this time Mata Ortiz has rejoined his command. At 
dusk, the Chihuahua state troops attack Victorio at Tres Castillos….
Part 2: Buell’s Campaign (Green Arrows)
A. 23–24 September Buell’s forces, stationed at Fort Cummings and Knight’s Ranch, 
rendezvous at Palomas Lake. The forces from Fort Cummings depart 
that point between 19 and 21 September.
24 September Lieutenant S. Mills’ company of Apache scouts from Carr’s command 
joins Buell at Palomas Lake.
B. 23–24 September During the night, Maney’s Apache scout company moves from the 
West Potrillo Mountains into Chihuahua.
C. 23 September Under cover of darkness, Captain Beyer, based in the East Potrillo 
Mountains, crosses the border into Mexico.
D. 25 September Buell’s forces march to Laguna de Guzman, where he is joined by 
Lieutenant Maney’s Apache scouts and presumably Captain Beyer’s 
detachment.
E. 26–27 September Buell moves his forces from Laguna de Santa Maria on 26 September 
and waits there for a day to see if Carr’s forces make their appearance.
F. 28–29 September Buell sends out Captain Beyer’s company of Ninth Cavalry to scout 
the Candelaria Mountains. Buell follows and hides his command 
behind (probably) the Sierra los Muertos.
G. 28 September to 2 
October
Buell sends his supply train up the Santa Maria River across to Ojo 
Caliente, Mexico, El Carrizal, the Laguna de Patos and on to El 
Lucero.
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H. 29–30 September Buell’s command reaches the Candelaria Mountains and scouts this 
range, only to find their quarry four days departed.
I. 1 October Buell arrives at El Lucero. 
J. 4 October Buell reaches the Tinajas de Cantarrecio.
K. 5–9 October Buell’s command marches to San Ignacio (5 October), then along the 
Rio Grande to 18 miles south east of Fort Quitman (6–9 October). 
L. 9–10 October Buell receives Terrazas’ request that he return to the USA.
M 8–10 October Lieutenants Maney and Schaeffer, with a mixed detachment of 
Apache scouts and Ninth Cavalrymen, meet Terrazas’ forces in the 
Sierra de Los Pinos.
Map 16.1
Part 1: Terrazas’ Campaign (Purple Arrows)
11. 5 October Terrazas and Mata Ortiz reunite somewhere in the Sierra Borracho. 
Scouts are sent on towards the Sierra de Los Pinos.
7 October Terrazas’ command is re-supplied from El Paso del Norte.
12. 8–9 October Terrazas’ command marches down to the Sierra de Los Pinos. 
Confident he is between Victorio and the Rio Grande, he requests 
Buell, via Lieutenants Maney and Schaeffer, to withdraw to the USA. 
Scouts have reached Terrazas from the Laguna el Cuervo (I), stating 
that Apaches have passed by but are now moving south. Terrazas also 
reduces his command to 260 effectives, sending 90 men home.
13. 9–10 October Terrazas marches to the Laguna el Cuervo (I), only to find that the 
tracks left are those of a small party of Apaches.
14. 11–12 October Terrazas moves south to the Ojo del Carrizo. He doles out the 
remaining supplies to his troops.
15. & 
16.
12–13 October While Terrazas scouts onto the plains west of Ojo Del Carrizo, Mata Ortiz 
sets off southwards with a detachment, to scout the Sierra Tosesihua.
17. 13 October Terrazas’ scouts find signs out on the plain that a large body of Apaches 
has passed, apparently going towards Tres Castillos, a few days previ-
ously. Terrazas sends a courier to Mata Ortiz ordering him to rejoin the 
command. That night, a scouting party is despatched to Tres Castillos, 
but returns to report plenty of tracks but no Apaches.
18. 14 October Terrazas leads a small scouting party to Tres Castillos. From this point, 
he sees dust clouds to the south, and he returns to pick up his command, 
finding that by this time Mata Ortiz has rejoined his command. At 
dusk, the Chihuahua state troops attack Victorio at Tres Castillos….
Part 2: Buell’s Campaign (Green Arrows)
K. 5–9 October Buell’s command marches to San Ignacio (5 October), then along the 
Rio Grande to 18 miles south east of Fort Quitman (6–9 October). 
L. 9–10 October Buell receives Terrazas’ request that he return to the USA.
M 8–10 October Lieutenants Maney and Schaeffer, with a mixed detachment of 
Apache scouts and Ninth Cavalrymen, meet Terrazas’ forces in the 
Sierra de Los Pinos.
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In the first volume to this trilogy concerning the Victorio Campaign, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair 
of the Horse’s Tail ’, I wrote quite a long Preface/Acknowledgements and the comments made there 
are as germane to this volume and need not be repeated.
However, research is an on-going process and I would like to thank the following people for their 
assistance in gaining access to several sites in New Mexico and Texas in June. C.R. “Kit” Bramblett 
and his wife Jerry for helping to gain access to the battle site at Tinaja de Las Palmas (see Chapter 
10). I would also like to thank Gary and Gracie Zent for granting permission to visit and Prudella 
McMillan for contacting them on our behalf. Finally, Karl and Toni Laumbach for arranging the 
trip out to Texas and for their support in general. 
Karl, Toni and Deni Seymour deserve my deep appreciation for their general support and advice 
this year. In addition, we also had great fun presenting a panel on how archaeology can inform 
history and vice versa at the 2018 Society for Military History conference in Louisville, Kentucky. 
Thanks also go to Willy Dobak and Lance Blythe for making the panel work so well.
I would also like to thank Forestry Service District Archaeologist, Chris Adams and District 
Ranger, Michael N. Hutchins for their advice and acknowledgement concerning the Palomas 
River battle of May 1880 (See Chapter 8).
The usual suspects also deserve a mention: Dan Aranda, Eric, Kathy and Ruby Fuller, Emilio 
Tapia and Juan Rojelio were, as ever, generous hosts. Bill and Jill Cavaliere were, again, as usual, 
excellent hosts. Thanks to Bill, I finally got some good photos of a Northern Cardinal, a Mexican 
Cardinal, Acorn Woodpecker and got within touching distance of a Javelina, all in the space of 
fifteen minutes at Portal, Arizona. Also got very close to a pair of Barn Owls, a pair of Screech 
Owls and their three chicks and a plethora of other wild life at his ranch. I think the incident 
involving me, an eight-foot wood baton, a large tree and a Bull Snake is probably best forgotten. 
The people of Portal braved some of the heaviest rain I’ve seen in the southwest to hear me talk 
about the Victorio Campaign in an event organised by the Cochise County Historical Society. I 
have to commend Bill Cavaliere for organising this event and keeping his eyeballs on both the 
audience and the speaker in particular. I also had the great pleasure and honour of finally meeting 
Henrietta Stockel, another icon in the pantheon of great Apache historians. 
As ever, thanks goes to my wife Catherine for her constant encouragement and support. Our cat, 
Kira, also, very occasionally, shows her support. She also occasionally reminds me that cats are just 
as careful and cautious as the Chiricahua Apaches, and just as lethal.
However, I have to end with the very sad news that Ed Sweeney passed away on 6 September, 
2018. Ed played a key early role in facilitating my contact with people in the Southwest, particu-
larly Dan Aranda. This initiated the field-study side of my research which proved to be an essential 
component of this work. He was always very supportive, even to the extent of telling me what he’d 
said as a referee to some of my articles, even though they were supposed to be anonymous. This 
would never fail to encourage me to endeavour to persevere with this project. 
My abiding memory of Ed would be during September 2009, when he, Dan Aranda, Emilio 
Tapia and I ended up camping on the continental divide at the northern end of the Black Range. 
We talked Apaches and all sorts of things into the early hours of the morning around a campfire. 
I then spent most of the rest of the night in a camp-bed looking at the stars, planes, satellites, 
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shooting stars and seeing the flashes on the eastern horizon from a distant, inaudible electric storm. 
A city-dweller such as myself rarely gets the opportunity to talk with the experts and experience 
the Southwest at the same time. 
Ed leaves an outstanding legacy as an authority on Chiricahua Apache history. He will also be 
greatly missed as a good friend.
Author’s Notes
 
A couple of issues came up as a result of some feedback on the first volume of this trilogy.
The Apache warrior on the front cover of Volume One is not Victorio. He is an Apache warrior 
named Frijole. There were a couple of comments which reached my ears that I was either being 
disingenuous or ignorant by passing this photograph off as Victorio. This surprised me as I had 
quite deliberately chosen this image for the front cover.  I wanted to have a front cover image which 
did two things: first, give a flavour of the terrain and two, show an image of one of the lesser-
known participants. Frijole was in Nana’s following so almost certainly fought throughout the 
Victorio Campaign. The more obvious approach was to have used the alleged Victorio photograph 
for Volume One, Edward Hatch for Volume Two and Nana for the final book of this trilogy. I have 
used a quote attributed to Victorio and Nana for the titles of Volumes One and Three. I have used 
a phrase used in a letter sent by Colonel Hatch for Volume in his correspondence for the title of 
Volume Two. The correspondence would have worked well.
However, separate research by Radbourne, and more recently Aranda, in my opinion, conclu-
sively established that the two photographs said to be Victorio are not of the Apache leader.1 I 
thought, if anything, it would have been dishonest to use a photograph which I was convinced was 
not Victorio. As an alternative I decided to eschew the use of leading actor images and opt to utilise 
photographs of lesser-known participants. 
The young officer on the front cover of this volume is Walter Finley, Ninth Cavalry. It is one 
of the few contemporary photographs of one of the junior participants in the Victorio Campaign. 
Most US army officer photographs either pre-date the conflict significantly often being images 
taken during the American Civil War or post-date the campaign by some years. When looking 
for images of even US army participants in the Victorio War is that veteran First Lieutenants and 
Captains images often date back to the Civil War. The images of junior officers in that same period 
are often post-1900. Nevertheless, there are some photographs of officers such as Lieutenants 
Gatewood and Mills dressed for rough service in Apacheria. However, it was the discovery of a 
contemporary photograph of Finley which reached the front cover. First, his beard cannot disguise 
the fact that he still looks young enough to be in High School and not facing Victorio’s warriors 
in a night battle in October 1879. Second, his private correspondence proved to be the key which 
allowed Karl Laumbach to challenge the accepted version of what happened at Hembrillo Canyon 
in April 1880. It was this information which prompted me to look very carefully at US army 
accounts of this operation in order to further challenge accounts of this battle. Finally, despite his 
youth, Finley’s private correspondence shows a very mature analysis of the reasons for Victorio’s 
resistance.
I intend to use an image of Sergeant Brett Woods as part of the cover image for Volume Three. 
The use of footnotes also generated quite a discussion, particularly on Facebook, in response to a 
number of people objecting to the use of footnotes.
My position on this is unequivocal: I loathe endnotes. I am an academic. If another author piques 
my interest by unearthing new information or advancing an alternative explanation of events, I do 
1 See short discussion of this issue in Chapter 16.
xxvi Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
not want to be constantly moving back and forth between endnotes and the narrative. This impedes 
the flow of the narrative. If I can quickly glance down I can see the source and carry on with the 
reading virtually uninterrupted. 
For those who don’t like footnotes, I fail to see how the presence of footnotes causes any problem: 
simply ignore them and carry on reading.
27
1
Victorio’s Decoy Strategy, January 1880
 
Victorio and his following, broadly prompted by the same reasons as Juh, moved back towards 
south-western New Mexico in late December 1879-early January 1880. Governor Terrazas 
contacted General Pope, informing him that General Trevino was to move against Victorio on 28 
December. A few days later, Terrazas asked US forces to help prevent the Apaches reaching the 
United States, predicting the critical area would be the Florida Mountains.1 The Apaches were 
believed to be based around the Lagunas de Guzman and Santa Maria suggesting that any north-
ward movement to avoid Trevino would be centred on the Florida Mountains. Major Morrow, at 
Fort Bayard, was instructed to take to the field to cooperate with Trevino’s forces.2 By 6 January, 
the Mexican authorities thought the Apaches were definitely making for the Florida Mountains.3 
In response to Terrazas’ information that Victorio was moving towards the Florida Mountains, 
General Pope immediately ordered Major Morrow into the field and, if necessary, to use the 
Ninth Cavalry Companies based at Forts Bliss and Stanton to help hunt down any Apaches who 
crossed into the United States. When Morrow did not immediately leave Fort Bayard, General 
Pope repeated his instruction to move immediately into the field. Pope added that Morrow could 
call upon all the troops in southern New Mexico and should act decisively to ‘end this trouble as 
soon as possible’.4 General Pope reminded Major Morrow that the latter was in command of field 
operations, and that his authority was not to be hindered by post commanders.5 At the same time, 
Morrow was told that the Department of Arizona had been informed of Trevino’s operation, and 
1 Luis Terrazas to Acting Assistant Adjutant General (Hereafter referred to as ‘AAAG’) 2 Jan., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.472-473; See also Pope to Whipple. AAG Headquarters (Hereafter 
referred to as ‘HQ’), Military Division of the Missouri, 9 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Campaign, Feb. 1879-
Nov. 1880’ in “Special Files” Created by the Military Division of the Missouri. Records of U.S. Army 
Continental Commands, 1821-1920, (Hereafter referred to as the ‘Victorio Files’) NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; As above in Papers relating to military operations against Chief Victorio’s band of Mescalero 
Apache in southern New Mexico, 1879-81 in Letters Rec’d by the Adjutant General’s Office, 1871-80, 
(Hereafter referred to as the ‘Victorio Papers’), NA, M666, Roll 526.
2 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 2 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoNM’), 
Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.5-6.
3 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 2 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.5-6; Pope to Carr, 7 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 236; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.260.
4 Loud to Morrow, 4 Jan., 1880 reporting instructions from Gen. Pope rec’d at Santa Fé (Hereafter 
referred to as ‘SF’), 3 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.10.
5 Loud to Morrow 4 Jan., 1880, repeating instructions from Platt Assistant Adjutant General (Hereafter 
referred to as ‘AAG’), Department of the Missouri (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoM’)and General Pope 
rec’d at SF, 3 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.9-10.
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had been asked to cooperate with the major in his operations against the Apaches.6 In a further 
missive, General Pope also ordered Morrow to use some of his force from Bayard and Stanton to 
‘suppress promptly’ the raiding activities of the Mescalero Apaches. Pope also ordered that every 
available infantryman and cavalryman should take the field.7 Pope seems to have been unaware of 
the exact geography of the region, and he does seem, despite his own protestations to the contrary,8 
to have been prone to demanding immediate responses from his field commanders when they 
should probably have been left to organise their own operations.9 Pope even went so far as to 
demand that couriers be sent after Morrow to deliver further instructions (a repeat of instructions 
already issued) and obtain a written acknowledgement of these from the Major.10
In the meantime, and interfering superiors notwithstanding, Major Morrow alerted three guard 
posts at McEvers’, Mason’s and Knight’s Ranches, occupied by small sections of Ninth Cavalrymen 
detached from Fort Bayard.11 If the Apaches were making for the Floridas, and beyond, these 
pickets would be the most likely to detect any such movement. Morrow also:
sent Maney with his Indians to the [F]lorida Mts to hunt up Indian trails Beyer to [C]ow [S]
prings with his own & M company. Purington [D]awson and Humphreys to Cummings. I 
leave here at daylight tomorrow. Am provided with Thirty days rations and will cooperate with 
Mexican Troops. Will not want the Stanton or Bliss Companies.12
Despite, the Major’s statement that he would not need them, District Headquarters ordered that 
the troops at Fort Bliss be placed on standby to be ready to join Morrow’s command if called 
upon.13 It was more realistic to use the Fort Bayard and Fort Bliss troops to counter the threat from 
below the border, while the Fort Stanton garrison would counter the Mescalero Raiders, the latter 
being judged by Morrow as not presenting a serious threat.14 
The first indication that the Apaches had crossed the border came from the Florida Mountains, as 
predicted by the Mexican authorities. On 2 January 1880, a group of prospectors was attacked in the 
Florida Mountains. (see document file no .25.) One of these prospectors, John Adair, later reported 
that he had been part of a 10-man party drawn from Pinos Altos, Georgetown and the Lower 
Mimbres. They had worked their way down the western side of the Florida Mountains and had been 
6 Loud AAAG to Major Morrow, 4 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.12 see also p.18; Pope to Whipple. AAG HQ Military Division of the 
Missouri, (Hereafter referred to as the ‘MDoM’), 9 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14.
7 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 4 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.10-11.
8 ‘He [Morrow] can judge better than I what force it is necessary to use on or near the Pecos and what force 
to help General Trevino with.’ (Loud (repeating Gen. Pope’s instructions rec’d at SF) to Morrow, 5 Jan., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.19).
9 See for example Loud to Major Morrow, 4 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.12-13.
10 Hatch to Co Fort Bayard, 5 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.20.
11 Billington, 1991, p.93.
12 Morrow Bayard to Loud AAAG SF, 4 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.474; Loud to AAG 
Fort Leavenworth, 14 Jan.1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.14.
13 Loud AAAG to CO Fort Bliss, 4 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.13.
14 Morrow, 5 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.20-21; see also Hatch to CO Fort Stanton, 5 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.22.
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Plates 1.1 and 1.2 Two shots of the remains 
of Slocum’s or Mason’s Ranch, one of the 
sites where Major Morrow chose to station 
guard detachments to detect the return of 
Victorio to New Mexico. The ranch seems 
to be a mix of stone and adobe build, and 
is being steadily eroded as the years pass. 
The upper photo also shows the obvious 
threat of erosion of the walls through flood 
damage. (Photos: Author)
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camped at some natural water tanks at the south-eastern end of the Floridas. On the morning of 2 
January, they had cleaned their guns and had fired off some shots ‘in order to more thoroughly clean 
them’.15 Up till that point, they had seen no sign of the presence of Apaches and obviously felt that 
such a noisy process would not be dangerous. Four of the men remained in camp while six men left 
the camp to prospect, two including Adair, on their own, and four others in a small group. At about 
9:00 a.m. Adair heard heavy firing from the direction of their camp. He and the other men hastily 
returned to the camp and found it under attack by Apache warriors. The prospectors took cover 
behind some rocks but could catch glimpses of Apaches working their way around their flanks. They 
pulled back for some distance to avoid being trapped, but doing this left their horses and mules out 
of range of their guns, and the Apaches promptly ran their stock off and disappeared.16
Of the four men left in the camp, three had been hit, probably in the first volley: Edward Fulton 
was killed and F.C. Bell and J.J. Baxter wounded. The prospectors lost all of their stock, apart from 
some burros that had remained in the range of their rifles. The survivors made their way to Fort 
Cummings.17 Adair thought that they had killed two of the 28 to 30 Apaches who had attacked 
them.18 However, Adair himself noted the heavy firing, and that the Apaches, rather than holding 
their positions, had made it obvious to their opponents that they were shifting positions. This 
suggests that the Apaches were employing the tactic of combining heavy gunfire with rapid move-
ment through rough terrain, to give the impression of greater numbers than were actually present. 
If there had been approximately 30 Apaches, there would have been more than enough warriors 
present to pick off the whole party while it was scattered around the camp. It is also clear that the 
obvious effort by the Apaches to outflank the miners had been carried out with the intention of 
forcing the prospectors to retreat beyond rifle range of their stock.
Morrow received news of this attack on 4 January,19 and the following day set out in pursuit of 
Victorio for the second time in less than five months. The Department of Arizona also received 
the news of Victorio’s return to New Mexico via the Commanding Officer for the Department of 
the Missouri on or around 6 January 1880.20 Lieutenant Blocksom’s company of Apache scouts 
was sent to join Morrow, and that of Lieutenant Gatewood was ordered out to patrol the country 
between the Gila and San Francisco Rivers.21 Lieutenant Howard’s Apache scout company was 
also ordered to prepare itself for field service.22 In fact, as noted in the last chapter of the previous 
book, Gatewood’s A Company, Indian scouts, was already in the field scouting that very country.23
15 John Adair’s Account of an Attack upon Prospectors in the Florida Mountains on the 2 Jan., 1880 in the 
‘Correspondence’ Section of the Grant County Herald 17 Jan., 1880.
16 John Adair’s Account of an Attack upon Prospectors in the Florida Mountains on the 2 Jan., 1880 in the 
‘Correspondence’ Section of the Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
17 Lt Allen to Loud SF, 3 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.470-471; Gibson Operator Grant 
to Carr Fort Thomas, 3 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 236; John Adair’s Account of an Attack 
upon Prospectors in the Florida Mountains on 2 Jan., 1880 in the ‘Correspondence’ Section of the Grant 
County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, p.260.
18 John Adair’s Account of an Attack upon Prospectors in the Florida Mountains on 2 Jan., 1880 in the 
‘Correspondence’ Section of the Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
19 Loud AAAG to Commanding Officer (Hereafter referred to as ‘CO’), Fort Bayard 4 Jan., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.11.
20 Willcox to AAG, Presidio, San Francisco, 6 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.6-7
21 Martin to AAG, DoNM, 6 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.5; Loud to CO Fort 
Bayard, 8 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
p.25 & 27.
22 Kerr AAAG, Howard, (Through CO Camp Huachuca), 6 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, Dept. of 
Arizona, (Hereafter referred to as DoAz), NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 
1880, Letter No.11, pp.24-25.
23 HQ , Troops in the field in South Eastern Arizona, Fort Apache, Special Orders No.12, 31 Dec., 1879, 
Special Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 1, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, pp.9-10.
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James P. Martin, Assistant Adjutant General to General Willcox, also informed Colonel Carr, 
Sixth Cavalry, that a major campaign could not be mounted in New Mexico by troops from the 
Department of Arizona due to the poor condition of troops and transportation. However, Martin 
thought that a smaller scale scouting and support operation could be mounted to aid the joint oper-
ation of General Trevino and Major Morrow. Thus, it was judged that the international line from 
the juncture of Arizona and New Mexico territories to the Florida Mountains could be patrolled,24 
and on 6 January, Blocksom’s Apache scouts were sent to cover the 100 or so miles between the 
Arizona line and the Florida Mountains.25 Three days later, Major D. Perry, Sixth Cavalry, was 
sent out to follow Blocksom to the Floridas. Perry was instructed to cooperate with Major Morrow 
but not to go beyond the Mimbres River unless sure that such a move would achieve positive 
results against the Apaches.26 This detachment of four officers and 73 cavalrymen, with 24 Apache 
scouts, patrolled the country between Fort Bowie and Fort Bayard, arriving at the latter post on 
13 January, and departed for Fort Bowie on 18 January.27 These orders were issued too late to block 
Victorio’s move into New Mexico but they did allow Morrow to concentrate more immediately 
available troops from New Mexico on the pursuit of the Apaches. 
Major Perry’s instructions also reflected the uncertainty of the moment:
I do not think you can do better than to wait near Fort Bayard till Morrow is heard from or 
there is some different news of where the Indians are – Department Commander expects you 
to return as soon as the emergency is over.28
In approving Carr’s decision to send Perry into New Mexico, General Willcox did so with the 
proviso that Perry must cooperate with Morrow and return to Arizona as soon as the campaign 
was over.29 Willcox was clearly worried that Juh and his following might leave to join Victorio. 
Lieutenant Haskell was informed of Trevino’s operation and instructed to be very vigilant towards 
Juh and his warriors.30 There was also the problem of different military commands trying to retain 
control of their own forces. For instance, in contrast to Willcox’s instructions to Perry, Carr made 
it clear that Blocksom’s Apache scouts were not intended to join with Morrow. He ordered that the 
Apache scouts should operate independently to prevent the Apaches moving west of the Florida 
24 Martin to Carr, 6 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.3-4; Kerr to Carr, 6 Jan., 1880, 
Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter 
No.8,pp.21-22.
25 Carr to Blocksom (through CO Fort Bowie), 6 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.6, p.20; Carr to Blocksom (through CO 
Fort Bowie), 6 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 
1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.10, pp.23-24.
26 Carr to Perry, 8 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 
Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.33, pp.45-46; Carr to AAAG SF, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.488-490; See also Report of Col. EA Carr 29 Aug., 1880; Kerr AAAG to Morrow, Fort 
Bayard, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 
1880, Letter No.12, pp.25-26.
27 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257, Vol. 896, p.21; See also Comdg 
Bowie to Adjutant General (Hereafter referred to as ‘AG’), 8 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
236; Carr, 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.33; See also ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880; Bi-Monthly Company 
Muster Rolls for Company C, 6th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94.
28 Comdg Fort Bowie to Major Perry, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 236.
29 Martin to Carr, 19 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.15.
30 Martin to Haskell, 6 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.5.
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Mountains.31 These specific instructions were probably provoked by instructions from Colonel 
Hatch that troops from Arizona should report to Morrow.32
US Army Blues: Déjà Vu in the Black Range and San Mateo Mountains, January 188033
The post surgeon at Fort Bayard noted that, ‘8 Officers and 174 men of the Ninth Cavalry and 
24 Indian Scouts left the post for the field to operate against Victorio’s hostile band of Apache 
Indians January 5th.’34 The attack on the prospectors in the Florida Mountains clearly confirmed 
that Apaches were now inside the USA. The first indication that Victorio had also evaded the 
Morrow’s border blockade came on 6 or 7 January, with the cutting of the telegraph line east from 
Fort Cummings. The repairman found the break near the Goodsight Mountains. He also found an 
‘Indian trail crossing road at that point. 150 feet wire taken.’35 The Arizona Citizen of 17 January 
1880 reported that several hundred yards of wire were taken then ‘dropped a hundred yards or so 
to the north of the road.’36 Fort Cummings was also alerted to the sighting of 55 Apaches preparing 
to attack McEvers’ Ranch early on 8 January.37 The ranches to the north, including McEvers, 
Fountains and Mossner Ranches, were subsequently reported to have been attacked, with 30 cattle 
slaughtered and another 60 driven off.38 A courier was despatched to find Major Morrow and the 
news was passed on to Fort Bayard. Lieutenant Martin B.Hughes was ordered to proceed from Fort 
Bayard to McEvers’ Ranch poste haste with a detachment of 38 cavalrymen. Each man was issued 
100 rounds and rationed till 31 January.39 Lieutenant Taylor, commanding the small detachment 
of Ninth Cavalrymen at McEvers’ Ranch, was ordered to remain there and scout the surrounding 
county thoroughly to ascertain the truth of this report.40
The departure of Lieutenant Hughes left no mounted troops stationed at Fort Bayard.41 For 
once, the courier reached Morrow in record time. The Major immediately countermanded the 
order to send Lieutenant Hughes to McEvers’ Ranch. Instead, Hughes was to march to Fort 
Cummings, where further orders from Morrow awaited him.42 Morrow had stationed himself at 
31 Carr 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.33.
32 Loud to Col. Carr, 5 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.24.
33 See Map 2.1 for a summary of Morrow’s campaign against Victorio during January-February 1880.
34 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21.
35 Lt Allen Silver City to Loud SF, 8 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.481; Carr to AG DoAz, 
8 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 
1880, Letter No.20. pp.29-30.
36 Arizona Citizen, 17 January, 1880 in Library of Congress ‘Chronicling America’ website <http://chroni-
clingamerica.loc.gov/> (accessed 10/09/2018).
37 Loud to Carr, 8 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.24.
38 Thirty Four, 15 Jan., 1880; Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 8 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.25; Carr to AG DoAz, 8 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, 
DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.20. pp.29-30.
39 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG DoNM, 8 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.476-480; 
Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21; Hatch to Carr, 8 
Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 236.
40 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 8 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.25 & p.26.
41 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG DoNM, 8 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.484-485.
42 Humphrey Bayard to AAAG SF, 8 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.482-485; Loud to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 9 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.27-28.
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Fort Cummings, after leaving Fort Bayard, and had sent out a couple of detachments to scout the 
surrounding country. The Major had also scouted the Florida Mountains. On receipt of the news 
that the telegraph line to the north had been cut, he moved very swiftly. By 8 January, he had sent 
out orders to his scattered detachments ordering them to move to Fort Cummings to either join 
him or follow up his trail:43 
I expect Dawson to overtake me tomorrow night. Beyer with his command has gone astray his 
orders were to report to me in the Florida Mts which he failed to do & I fear he is on a wild 
goose chase. I think however I have force enough to get away with Victorio.44
Morrow left Fort Cummings with Captain Purington, Lieutenants Humphrey and Maney, and 46 
men, moving to the north towards McEvers’ Ranch, on the morning of 9 January 1880.45 The major 
felt that he had sufficient force to deal with Victorio and that the Apaches would be caught within 
two days.46 It would appear that Lieutenant Hughes’s detachment joined Morrow on 9 January, at 
Macho Springs, that Lieutenants Dawson and Hugo left Fort Cummings with their detachment 
on the same morning, and that Beyer left Cummings to join Morrow early on 10 January.47 L 
Company, Ninth Cavalry, had also left Fort Bliss on 8 January to join Morrow’s battalion.48
Morrow, having reached his old supply camp at McEvers’ Ranch, picked up a large trail leading 
into the Black Range.49 Humphreys, at Fort Bayard, reported that the Apache trail led north into 
the Black Range, and private letters from Lieutenants Day and French informed him that they 
were expecting to engage the Apaches on 11 January.50 
Even as Morrow was trying to coordinate his forces, further information concerning the numbers 
and movement of Apaches arrived at Fort Bayard. On 12 January, a ‘commissary train arrived 
yesterday, man in charge reports having seen sixty-six Indians near Black ?Sakes? about 12 miles 
east of Macho going north about Wed Jan 7th.’51
War: Skirmish on the Rio Percha …
On 12 January 1880, Morrow caught up with Victorio on the Rio Percha, by which time it was 
clear that all his scattered detachments had re-joined his command (see Table 1.1).52
43 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth Ks., 9 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.27.
44 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.34-35; Morrow McEvers Ranch to Loud AAAG, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.494-495; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 11 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 17 Jan., 1880, p.465.
45 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.508.
46 Allen Bayard to Lt Stedman SF, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.499.
47 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.508-509.
48 Returns for Dec. 1879 & Jan., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Bliss, Texas, 
Jan. 1872-Dec. 1885, NA, M617, Roll 117.
49 Morrow McEvers Ranch to Loud AAAG SF, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.494; Morrow 
to Loud, 9 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 10 
Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.34-35; 
Thrapp, 1974, p.261.
50 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.510.
51 Humphreys, Bayard to AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.509.
52 Bayard to CO, DoNM, 15 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.514-515; Thirty Four Extra, 15 
Jan., 1880.
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Table 1.1 Roster of Major Morrow’s Battalion, 5 January 188053 (See Document File No. 26.)
Officer Company Number of Soldiers/Scouts
Major Morrow with Lieutenants Day 
and Finley
Captain Dawson and Lieutenant Hugo B Company, 9th Cavalry 20 soldiers
Captain Beyer and Lieutenant 
Humphreys
C Company, 9th Cavalry 36 soldiers
No officer F Company, 9th Cavalry 25 soldiers
Captain Purington H Company, 9th Cavalry 15 soldiers
Lieutenant French M Company, 9th Cavalry 30 soldiers
Lieutenant Maney, 15th Infantry A Company Indian scouts
D Company 9th Cavalry
24 Apache Scouts
13 soldiers
Lieutenant Hughes (with a detachment 
drawn from the Fort Bayard garrison 
including a Hotchkiss mountain 
howitzer)
B Company, 9th Cavalry
F Company, 9th Cavalry
H Company, 9th Cavalry
D Company, 9th Cavalry
10 soldiers
2 soldiers
2 soldiers
24 soldiers
Doctors
Guides
Teamsters
2
2
3
The Mimbres Apaches used the rough country to hold off their foes from early afternoon till the 
light failed. Morrow noted that Victorio ‘made a strong stand & evidently thought he could check 
us but he finally gave it up & went off on the jump.’54 Morrow claimed several Apache warriors 
killed and wounded, with a Sergeant Gross killed and one scout55 wounded in return.56 There are 
some discrepancies in the number of casualties sustained, but this can probably be put down to 
delays in filling out returns for the Ninth Cavalry rather than an attempt to play down the fatalities 
sustained.57
53 Humphreys to AAAG SF, 10 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.491-493; See also CO Fort 
Bayard, 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
p.34; Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.486-487; See 
also Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.32
54 Platt quoting both Morrow’s Report & Hatch’s endorsement to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Whipple to Sherman, 14 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, 
NA, M666, Roll 526.
55 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21 Notes that the scout 
sustained a flesh wound in the thigh. 
56 Morrow to Loud AAAG, 13 Jan., 1880 Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.47; Whipple to Sherman, 14 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press 
Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.41; Morrow to Loud AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.512-513; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company 
F, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb.1880 in NA, RG94; Report of The Surgeon General in Annual Reports of 
the War Department 1880, (Hereafter referred to as ‘AR-WD’), NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, 
p.520; Platt quoting both Morrow’s Report & Hatch’s endorsement to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, 
RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21; Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880; Thirty Four Extra, 15 Jan., 1880; ‘Town and 
County’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.261; Record of Engagements, 
p.93; web article The Ninth Regiment of Cavalry by Lt G. Hutcheson; Wellman, 1957, p.164; Webb, 
1976, p.87.
57 The Regimental Return for Jan. lists both Gross and Pvt. D.H. Jones as being killed in action. (Record 
of Events Jan., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 
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During the fight, Lieutenant Day:
commanded Troop “C” 9th Cavey in two charges, both successful. The first a charge by 
Company. Then crossing the valley, was fourth man up in the charge by battalion. After an 
hour’s fighting Lt (now Capt Hughes) Lieuts Day and Maney (15th Infty) collected about 40 
men, moved off by the flank and made a charge on the flank, which was repulsed. Lieut Day 
and about 8 men reaching within 50 feet of the breast high natural wall of rock which crowned 
the crest of the gulch. Lieut Day alone sustained the entire fire of the hostile line at this point 
while climbing to a position which commanded the hostiles on the flank, Capt Hughes with 
five men holding a similar position in front, to liberate Lt Maney and the soldiers in the 
bottom and sides of the gulch.58
It was even reported, in the Grant County Herald of 21 February 1880, that one of the two Apaches 
claimed to have been killed was shot by Major Morrow himself.59 The fighting ended at about 5:00 
p.m., when the troops were able to bring their mountain howitzer into action, at which point the 
Apaches withdrew, though it was noted that until that point the Apaches had shown no inclination 
to flee from Morrow’s command.60 The fighting could be heard in the Animas River area and sheep 
herders straggled into Hillsboro reporting hearing heavy firing, including cannon fire, all after-
noon.61 One sheepherder claimed to have been detained by the Apaches, who confiscated his gun, 
almost certainly a breech-loading rifle of some description, but compensated with some clothes. 
Among these items of clothing was a shawl which was recognized as belonging to a victim of the 
September 1879 Jaralosa massacre.62 The man also erroneously claimed that Victorio and Loco 
were dead, and that the Apaches were led by Nana.63
Morrow spoke ‘in highest terms of hotchkiss gun’64 during the engagement. The Apaches were 
no strangers to artillery. They certainly first came up against artillery at Apache Pass in 1862, 
when attempting to contest the passage of General Carleton’s California Volunteer column during 
the American Civil War.65 The Grant County Herald claimed that six Apaches had been killed by 
howitzer fire.66 Morrow also estimated that Victorio had between 50 and 60 warriors.67 (see docu-
ment file no. 27.)
Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88) Two enlisted men were recorded as having been 
killed and one wounded (Chronological List, p.48; see also O’Neal, p.177; Haley, 1981, p.324).
Private Issac Jones of F Company, Ninth Cavalry, died from wounds received after the Hembrillo 
Canyon battle of 6 and 7 Apr., 1880. and it seems too close a coincidence that F Company should lose 
two men with the same surname within three months of each other.
58 Personal File Matthias W. Day, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 1; See also Kenner, 1999, p.197.
59 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
60 Thirty Four Extra, 15 Jan., 1880.
61 Ibid.
62 This occurred on 10 or 11, Sept., 1879. See Watt ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The 
Victorio Campaign 1879, Chapter 6.
63 Thirty Four Extra, 15 Jan., 1880.
64 Bayard to CO DoNM, 15 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.514-515.
65 See Sweeney, 1998, pp.430-437 & 1991, pp.198-202 for a detailed account.
66 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
67 Bayard to CO DoNM 15 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.514-515.
36 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
… and Peace: Parley at Canada Alamosa
Morrow hoped to catch Victorio the next day near either the Animas River or the Cuchillo Negro 
River, but once again the Apaches out-paced him.68 There was a brief skirmish between one of 
Morrow’s companies (H Company, Ninth Cavalry) and the Apaches on 13 January, but, so far, no 
further details have emerged.69 Hatch certainly hoped for another confrontation as he was confi-
dent that the Apaches would not be able to cope with another severely punishing onslaught.70 Just 
what led both Morrow and Hatch to conclude that they had inflicted dire chastisement on their 
opponents can only be a matter of speculation. Hatch also contacted the Department of Arizona 
to alert those in command to the possibility that Victorio might try to evade Morrow by passing 
down the Gila Valley.71 Captain Hooker, at Ojo Caliente, was again warned that Morrow was in 
pursuit of Victorio, and that a sharp lookout for the Apaches should be maintained by patrols from 
that post.72
On 16 January, Victorio contacted Andrew Kelley,73 known and trusted by the Warm Springs 
Apaches. As noted earlier, Kelley had played a leading role in persuading Victorio to surrender 
at Ojo Caliente in February 1879.74 Kelley was certainly based at Canada Alamosa in April-May 
1880, as he corresponded with Thirty Four from that location with reference to illegal trade with 
the Apaches.75 This conference probably occurred in the vicinity of Canada Alamosa, as it was 
reported in Thirty Four that the citizens there had had a conference with Victorio and 60 warriors. 
As far as these people could tell, there were no warriors missing from Victorio’s following, and the 
Apaches showed little concern about being pursued by US troops. Victorio reiterated his desire for 
a reservation at Ojo Caliente. 
Two hours later, Morrow arrived with his troops, and the Apaches quietly dispersed into the 
surrounding hills.76 Kelley stated that Victorio had been accompanied by approximately 60 warriors 
with good mounts and well provided with modern arms and ammunition. He also added that 
Victorio did not want to negotiate with the US army over a possible return to Ojo Caliente.77 Such 
distrust of the army may have dated back to the attempt to arrest him at Ojo Caliente in April 1879. 
Captain Hooker’s post return (see document file no, 31) confirms that, on 15 January, he had taken 
68 Morrow to Loud AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.513; Whipple to Sherman, 
14 Jan., 1880, in Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2539, Vol. 13, p.41; Bayard to CO, DoNM, 15 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.515.
69 Record of Events Jan., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88 & Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company H, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94.
Both sources clearly state that Company H engaged hostile Apaches on 12, 13 and 17 Jan.  with no 
casualties sustained in these encounters. It was reported that one sheepherder had been killed on 13 Jan., 
while his two companions were able to make their escape. (Thirty Four Extra, 15 Jan., 1880).
70 Platt quoting both Morrow’s Report & Hatch’s endorsement to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
71 Platt quoting both Morrow’s Report & Hatch’s endorsement to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also Whipple to Sherman, 14 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
72 Hatch to Hooker, 13 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.44; Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.48.
73 Andrew Kelly is mentioned as a beef contractor supplying ‘fresh beef on the hoof.’ (2 Mar., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.175).
74 Thrapp, 1988, p.764.
75 Report from Andrew Kelley concerning illegal trade with Apaches at Canada Alamosa as reported in 
Thirty-Four, 5 May, 1880.
76 Thirty Four, 28 Jan., 1880.
77 Thrapp, 1974, p261-262; Laumbach p.121.
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Plate 1.3 Canada Alamosa, today known as Monticello, where Victorio and his 60 warriors held a brief parlay 
with Andrew Kelley. The San Mateo Mountains can be seen looming on the horizon, (Photos: Author)
Plate 1.4 The San Mateo Mountains seen from the road from Canada Alamosa to Nogal Canyon. The 
modern road winds its way up into the mountains, up to a high saddle out of sight behind the closer of the 
two ridges on the left and middle of the photo. The road then drops rapidly down into Nogal Canyon. This 
is the sort of terrain Victorio would use to exhaust his pursuers. (Photo: Author)
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his company to Canada Alamosa as rumours had been received that Victorio wanted to parley. He 
makes no mention of any meeting with Victorio and notes that he met with a detachment from D 
Company, who were under orders from Morrow to join the Captain at Ojo Caliente. They returned 
to Ojo Caliente that same evening.78
This may have been the first of two conferences held by Victorio on 15-16 January, the second 
apparently being held about dusk with Major Morrow ‘ just below the highest peak of the San 
Mateos.’79 Lieutenant Day’s personal file states that ‘before this engagement [San Mateo Mountains 
17 January 1880] Lt. Day accompanied Col. Morrow to conference with hostiles.’80 This time 
Victorio took no chances and, while the Apaches displayed a flag of truce, Victorio remained on top 
of the cliff. He reiterated his desire to be settled at Ojo Caliente with his family and other previous 
requests. Morrow, unfortunately, could only inform him that if the Apaches surrendered and gave 
up their arms and horses they would be treated as prisoners of war. The Major, quite honestly, 
revealed that he could not guarantee any conditions.81 While Victorio would have appreciated 
Morrow’s integrity, his suspicions of potential foul play, should he elect to surrender, could only 
have been reinforced by such candour. With the onset of night, it was agreed that the parley would 
be resumed in the morning.82
Victorio’s Decoy Strategy
In the meantime, Mexican forces had also tracked Victorio to the border. General Trevino had 
contacted the United States authorities on 10 January 1880, to inform them that the Apaches 
had moved from the Florida Mountains towards La Mesilla.83 As this was clearly US territory, 
General Trevino also informed them that his punitive expedition was over. There appears to be no 
record of any clashes between the Apaches and this large force of mixed Mexican federal and state 
troops.84 Governor Wallace contacted Alexander Ramsey, the Secretary of War, on 10 January, 
reporting that Mexican troops had now reached the border and asking if they could be invited to 
continue their pursuit into the United States. Ramsey wholeheartedly approved, with the proviso 
that if the Mexican troops captured any Apaches, they should be turned over to US troops.85 This 
condition was received with great opprobrium by both the territorial press86 and the Governor 
of Chihuahua.87 (see document file no. 29.4.) As far as The Grant County Herald was concerned: 
‘If any of these red devils are captured they ought to be turned over to the tender mercies of the 
troops from over the line. The Mexican government understands how to deal with this question.’88 
Colonel Hatch wrote to the Governor of Chihuahua on 12 January, through the CO Fort Bliss, 
informing him of this development and inviting Mexican troops to cross the border and cooperate 
78 Record of Events Jan., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, N.M. May 
1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
79 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
80 Personal File Matthias W. Day, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 1.
81 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
82 Ibid.
83 Thrapp, 1974, p.260.
84 Stout, p.121; Thrapp, 1974, p.260.
85 Wallace to Ramsey, 10 Jan., 1880 & Ramsey to Wallace, 14 Jan., 1880, , ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; AGO (Hereafter referred to as ‘AGO’) to Commanding General DoM, 20 Jan., 1880 
in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 17 Jan., 1880, 
p.465.
86 Ashenfelter Editorial, The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
87 Terrazas to Gen Edward Hatch Comd DoNM, 17 Jan., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.429-430.
88 Ashenfelter Editorial, The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
Victorio’s Decoy Strategy, January 1880 39
with US troops.89 Forts Bliss and Bayard acknowledged receipt of this information from District 
Headquarters on the same day, and the latter sent couriers to inform Major Morrow and all other 
detachments in the field of this development.90 (see document file no. 29.) However, it would appear 
that no Mexican troops crossed the border. Mexican traders travelling with Colonel Cisneros until 
he reached the border later reported that the Mexican troops were not inclined to cross the line.91.
A column of both federal and state troops, led by Colonel Cisneros, followed the Apaches to 
the border before disbanding on 10 January 1880, with the local Mexican troops returning to their 
homes and the 187 Federales marching to El Paso.92 Colonel Cisneros sent word on 7 January, from 
‘Stoney Ford on the Guzman River’, that according to his scouts:
the Indians to the number of a hundred and more including their families have taken the road 
towards Mesilla in the direction ???? having with them a considerable amount of plunder & 
having committed great depredations.93
The message was delivered to the telegraph office at Mesilla by a Mexican courier travelling directly 
from Cisneros’s command. Thus, it did not reach Santa Fé until 9 January, by which time Morrow 
was already pursuing the Apaches north of McEvers’ Ranch. Cisneros’s dispatch is interesting in 
that plunder and families are mentioned, whereas, so far, events would indicate that Morrow was 
in pursuit of a group of between 50 and 60 warriors alone. What is far more interesting is that this 
intelligence, if combined with other reports, can be used to argue that Victorio was in the process 
of deploying a very clever decoy strategy. This was aimed at protecting his own logistics while 
targeting that of his enemies. (See Map 1.1.)
First, a party of 30 Mexican traders was attacked in or near the Florida Mountains. These men 
had all of their animals stolen, though they later recovered them.94 Thirty Four, from information 
received from the Mexican merchant in charge of the train, reported that two Apaches had stolen 
the Mexicans’ horses. The traders had managed to catch up with the pair and recover their stock 
before the latter managed to join a larger party of Apaches.95 This attack must have occurred between 
10 and 12 January, as the merchants had left Colonel Cisneros’s command on the 9 January, and 
arrived at Las Cruces, New Mexico, on 12 January.96 The Mexican merchant in charge of the train 
89 Hatch to Terrazas, 12 Jan., 1880 in Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.38-39.
90 Osborne, CO Fort Bliss to AAAG DoNM, 12 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.500; 
Humphreys, CO Fort Bayard to AAAG SF 12 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p502-505; 
Loud to Morrow, 12 Jan., 1880 in Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.41-42; Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 12 Jan., 1880 in Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. 
– Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.42.
91 Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880.
92 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.506-507; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.45; Platt to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880.
93 Cisneros to Col. In Chief SF rec’d, 9 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.496-498; see also 
Loud (citing Letter from Cisneros from Stony Ford on the Guzman River, 7 Jan., 1880) to CO Fort 
Bayard to forward to Major Morrow, 9 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.28-29.
94 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 13 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.506.
95 Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880.
96 ‘Dispatch just received from Bayard repeating dispatch received from S.H. Newman, and which has 
been sent to CO Bliss and Col. Carr states a party of 30 Mexican merchants arrived at Las Cruces 
last night [12 Jan., 1880] They were attacked in Florida Mountains and their animals stolen but recov-
ered. They were with Mexican Troops from eighth till tenth. The Mexican auxiliary troops forces were 
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stated that the trail of the Apaches was 300 yards wide, indicating that the party had about 500 
horses and mules. The trail was making for Magdalena Canyon (presumably Magdalena Gap).97 
The important point is that a very large group of horses and mules was reported to be on the move 
from the Florida Mountains towards the Sierra Uvas after Morrow’s detachments had left the area 
to pursue the Apaches who had cut the telegraph line between Fort Cummings and La Mesilla.
Secondly, The Grant County Herald of 17 January 1880 reported that a wagon train loaded with 
supplies for Fort Bayard had encountered a large group of Apaches on 6 January, at Mule Springs, 
between Cooke’s Range and the Black Range Mountains.98 This consisted of approximately 90 
warriors with women, children and 200 horses laden with ‘plunder’. The freighters prepared for 
a fight but three Apaches approached the train and asked to trade for flour and 150 pounds was 
handed over. The Apaches were noted as departing the springs in a northerly direction.99 (see docu-
ment file no. 28.) Apaches from this party could easily have cut the line between Fort Cummings 
and La Mesilla. These two points indicate that there were at least two groups of Apaches moving 
into New Mexico in early January.
Third, there may have been another group of Warm Springs Apaches moving from Mexico 
into the USA. On 7 January 1880, Apaches attacked a merchant convoy in Chihuahua, killing 
nine men, and taking 80 mules and $10,000 worth of goods.100 While there may have been two 
groups of Apaches already in the USA, there may also have been a relatively strong rear-guard 
party lingering in northern Mexico. These warriors would have been tasked with monitoring and 
even delaying the Mexican armed forces sent against the Apaches. However, if they were not being 
closely pursued, they might well have taken advantage of any target or opportunity which presented 
itself.
Finally, a report from Agent Russell, at the Mescalero reservation, stated that on 17 January, 
Lieutenant G.W. Smith, travelling between Tulerosa and Fort Stanton, had crossed an Indian 
trail of between 70 to 80 Apaches who were travelling towards the Agency from the south. It was 
assumed by Lieutenant Smith that these were Apaches belonging to Victorio’s band; and though 
Russell discounted this possibility, he also noted that two of Victorio’s men had recently been seen 
within approximately four miles of the Agency.101 Agent Russell was sufficiently alarmed by such 
reports to request that troops be sent to protect the Agency.102 Lieutenant-Colonel Swain, previ-
ously unimpressed with Russell as an ineffective agent, did comment that, ‘knowing he [Russell] is 
a man not easily frightened. I fear he has good cause for alarm and that the matter is more serious 
than I can well attend to under the circumstances.’103
When studying the actions of the Apaches, it is important to remember that they rarely under-
took any action without reason. The problem facing Victorio was how to get, if possible, all of the 
plunder taken in Mexico to places where he could sell it without being blocked by the US army. 
disbanded and the regulars under Colonel Cisneros started for El Paso, they numbered one hundred and 
eighty.’ (Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.45; Platt to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880).
97 Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880.
98 As the Grant County Herald is published every Saturday, this meeting occurred on 6 Jan., 1880 based 
on the point  that the paper being published on the Saturday most of it would have been written before 
Saturday. If this is so, the phrase ‘Tuesday of last week’, suggests this date rather than 13 Jan., 1880.
99 ‘Town and Country’ Section of the Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
100 Thirty Four, 14 Jan., 1880.
101 Russell to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, (Hereafter referred to as ‘CoIA’), 22 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
102 Russell to Col. Swain, CO Fort Stanton, 17 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
103 Swain to AAAG, DoNM, 18 Jan., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, 
Box 87.
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Victorio also had to consider the threat presented by General Trevino’s offensive. So, with an 
advance party of mainly warriors, he crossed the border into New Mexico. At least some of these 
warriors were involved in attracting the attention of the US army by attacking the prospectors in 
the Florida Mountains; but the main aim was to get through to Mule Springs. As noted by the 
freighters who encountered the Apaches at Mule Springs, there were also some women and a large 
number of pack horses. Therefore, the pack horses and the women, with some of the warriors, may 
have been held back, for example, in the Tres Hermanas Mountains, until the Apache scouts had 
moved from Fort Bayard to investigate the Florida Mountains. This group could then have crossed 
behind the scouts and the cavalry Morrow took from Bayard to Cummings and reconvened at Mule 
Springs. The pack horses spotted at Mule Springs may have been carrying such plunder as could be 
traded at Canada Alamosa and Las Palomas. The group could then have been split up, with some 
warriors and the women and pack horses moving north to trade their plunder, while Victorio, with 
60 warriors, diverted attention by cutting the telegraph line and leaving an obvious trail to the 
north. This occurred on 6 or 7 January; but Morrow did not catch up with the diversionary group 
until 12 January, which would have left plenty of time for the group with the pack horses to move 
far ahead of the pursuit.
Still to be accounted for is the large herd of horses and mules whose trail was spotted by the 
Mexican traders moving from the Florida Mountains towards the Sierra Uvas. This group’s 
ultimate destination may have been the Mescalero reservation, travelling via the Sierra Uvas, 
across the Rio Grande, and through the San Andres Mountains. The large number of horses, 
mules and possibly some cattle in the herd does not necessarily mean that it was accompanied 
by a large number of Apache warriors. This group was probably driven by a small number of 
warriors, travelling with the remainder of the Apaches – the old, the women and the children. 
If so, detection of this herd would entail its abandonment and the loss of fresh supplies of 
rifles and ammunition. It was imperative that the US army did not detect this group. Thus, the 
cutting of the telegraph wire makes very good sense: why else attract the attention of the US 
army when the Apaches had successfully passed through Morrow’s picket lines undetected? 
This action was meant to give the second group the best chance of getting through to the 
Mescalero reservation.
There were two other problems facing the Apaches. First, how could they coordinate the move-
ments of the two groups? How could the first group let the second group know when it was safe 
to move? They could have used mounted couriers, but they may well have used a simple set of 
signal fires. As the first group moved into the USA, single warriors, the older and the most reli-
able, could have been left in the Florida Mountains, Cooke’s Range and in the southern reaches 
of the Black Range above Mule Springs. Once Victorio knew that he had a large number of Ninth 
Cavalry and Apache scouts on his trail, all he needed to do was to signal the lookouts in the Black 
Range. So before starting this operation, Victorio could have simply arranged for a set of signals 
to be transmitted down to, for example, the Tres Hermanas. If two fires were lit on the Black 
Range and seen on Cooke’s Range, this signal would be passed on to the Florida Mountains and 
then on to the Tres Hermanas. The leader of the second group would then know that it was safe 
to make the attempt to get their plunder over to the Mescalero reservation. If the effort to decoy 
the US army away from the area failed, then only one fire would be lit, and this would let the 
second group know that they would have to improvise. The Apaches must have managed to get 
far enough ahead of the Mexican armed forces to allow them the time to linger for some days in 
the region of Palomas Lake and the Tres Hermanas. Colonel Cisneros reached the Guzman River 
(probably the Corralitos River) on 7 January, and did not arrive at the US border until two days 
later. The wiping out of a merchant convoy in Chihuahua suggests that a relatively strong rear-
guard was left in Chihuahua to give the group waiting in the Tres Hermanas sufficient warning 
of approaching Mexican troops. 
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Plate 1.5 Entrance to the Goodsight Mountains campsite. What looks to be an innocuous canyon from the 
plain winds its way back and forth up into the mountains and develops into a deep canyon with steep sides 
and natural rock breastworks. (Photo: Author)
Plate 1.6 Another view down the canyon from deeper within the ravine. Again, one can see the natural 
rock breastworks that the Apaches could use to hold off an assault while the rest of the group and their 
dependents could make good their escape. Both this and the photo above were taken from near Point F on 
Map 1.1. (Photo: Author)
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Plate 1.7 View looking down into the 
area (Point C on Map 1.1) where the 
canyon opens into a natural corral where 
stolen stock could be penned with a 
good supply of water at certain times of 
the year.  (Photo: Author) 
Plate 1.8 The Goodsight Mountain campsite seen from upper Point B on Map 1.1. The point where the 
photograph was taken is only about 200 yards from Point C on the map, yet the presence of this Apache 
cantonment could hardly be guessed, which helped to prevent accidental discovery while the Apaches were 
not using the site. (Photo: Author)
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The second problem was how to keep such the waiting group’s herd watered and fit for sale. Thus 
the apparent delay in an area where water was available (Palomas Lake and the Tres Hermanas) 
could only benefit their stock. However, they also had to get their stock from that point to the 
Mescalero reservation. The trail seen by the Mexican traders going towards Magdalena Pass may 
have turned northwards, going up the eastern side of the Goodsight Mountains to a good campsite 
which was not discovered by the Army until December 1881. (See Figure 1.1.) The herd could 
then have been driven through the Sierra Uvas, across the Rio Grande, and across the Jornada 
Del Muerto to the San Andres Mountains in successive stages with, they would have hoped, the 
minimum of loss.
Any horses or mules which did not keep up could be abandoned or eaten. The reports of 80 
Apaches making for the Mescalero reservation may have referred to part of this herd driven by a 
few Apaches. With the herd safely stationed in the San Andres Mountains, the Apaches could have 
afforded to break it into smaller groups and drive these across to the Mescalero reservation to trade 
them for fresh munitions.
In the meantime, Major Morrow was engaged in an exhausting pursuit of 60 well-armed and 
well-mounted Apaches far to the north, along the eastern side of the Black Range and into the San 
Mateo Mountains. Thus, while he preserved his own logistic support, Victorio targeted that of his 
enemies by leading them on a gruelling pursuit across southern New Mexico.
Victorio also benefitted from the activities of other Apaches not allied to him. He was blamed for 
the earlier attacks reported to the east of Fort Stanton in the vicinity of Roswell and the Black and 
Plate 1.9 Shot taken from the ‘crow’s nest’ at Point E.2 on Map 1.1. Again, though this was taken at a much 
higher elevation than the previous photograph, the presence of a quite deep canyon does not make itself 
obvious to the casual observer, who might thus be surprised to stumble upon the site. (Photo: Author) 
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Delaware Rivers.104 A further alarm was raised when it was reported that Mescaleros and Mexicans 
were fighting near the Mescalero reservation. This turned out to have been the result of a drunken 
binge which resulted in the death by drowning of one Mescalero Apache. The Mescaleros retaliated 
by burning a hay train of seven wagons.105 
Hatch also informed Colonel Grierson that reports had been received on 15 January that a 
wagon train had been attacked at Crow Springs, 75 miles from El Paso. The train was abandoned 
and the drivers and others accompanying the wagons arrived in El Paso and requested an escort 
to return with them to recover what property they could. Hatch stated that the culprits were from 
Indian Territory; but the location would suggest that the raiders were far more likely to have been 
Mescalero Apaches. As all his troops were in the field at that point, Hatch requested that Grierson 
supply this escort. He also stated that the site of the attack was in the District of the Pecos, in order 
to further shift the responsibility for providing this escort to Grierson.106 If Hatch could attribute 
blame, legitimately or not, to raiders from outside the District of New Mexico, he could divert 
demands for protection away from his already stretched military resources. 
Nevertheless some reports could not be ignored. A Tenth Cavalry detachment patrolling along 
the Delaware River reported that, a week earlier, two Mescaleros had passed through driving stolen 
stock in the direction of the Mescalero reservation.107 In response to the activities of these Mescalero 
raiders, Hatch ordered the transfer of an infantry company from Fort Bliss to the Mescalero Indian 
agency.108 Hatch also ordered D Company, Ninth Cavalry, to move from Fort Union to Santa Fé.109 
While these Apaches were almost certainly not allied with Victorio, the Chihenne leader still 
benefitted from such activities, as this forced Hatch to divert troops which otherwise could have 
been assigned to Major Morrow.
104 Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Vol. 13, p.14 
& p.17.
105 Lt. G.W. Smith, 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.33-34.
106 Hatch to CO District of the Pecos (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoP’), 17 Jan., 1880 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.69, 
Letter No.27.
107 Grierson Ft Concho to COSF, 18 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.522-523.
108 Hatch, 21 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
p.67
109 Ibid, p.69.
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A squadron of cavalry riding slow
Crosses the plains in search of the foe, 
Which rides ever ahead.
The red man’s trail may be plain to the eye,
And the hunters may chase as the crow doth fly-
They will ever be led, 
For the red man rides with lightning speed.
No rest for rider, no rest for steed-
‘Til the hidden lair is won.
The soldier in chase may tire or fall,
Worn by the race, or struck by the ball, 
Leaving his work undone
Anonymous.1
Renewed Hostilities: Skirmishing in the San Mateo Mountains
We left Major Morrow’s pursuit of Victorio after the Major’s conference with the Apache leader on 
the evening of 16 January 1880. The following day hostilities were renewed, once it was clear that 
the Apaches had no intention of renewing negotiations.2 Morrow had found time to send orders 
to Hooker, at Ojo Caliente, to cover the western and southern sides of the San Mateo Mountains 
while Morrow was covering the northern and eastern sides. Hooker made no contact with any 
Apaches and returned to Ojo Caliente on 20 January 1880.3 If we look at Map 2.1, we can see that 
Morrow would have had time to send a courier to Ojo Caliente asking Hooker to move his troops 
directly west, then south, along the San Mateo Mountains, while he himself moved north-west 
from Canada Alamosa, crossing a high ridge below Vicks Peak,4 before dropping down into Nogal 
Canyon. Morrow probably turned east and north before encountering and parlaying with Victorio 
on the evening of 16 January 1880
1 Powers, p.92.
2 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
3 Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916 Ojo Caliente, N.M. May 1879-Mar. 1882, M 617 Roll 
877.
4 The author has travelled this route twice and according to the USGS 1:250, 000 Map ‘Tularosa’ the road 
passes immediately below this peak. One suspects that ‘Vicks’ is a shortening of ‘Victorio’.
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On 17 January, Morrow’s battalion had a ‘brisk’5 skirmish, with the Apaches, who were in 
possession of a strong position and an abundance of ammunition.6 Second Lieutenant French was 
killed and two Apache scouts7 were wounded. Morrow had no idea how many casualties, if any, 
were inflicted on the Apaches.8 This skirmish occurred in the upper reaches of Nogal Canyon.9 
The canyon meanders out of the San Mateos to the east, and its upper reaches are dominated by 
pine-topped cliffs. It is not clear whether the skirmish took place at the site of the previous day’s 
conference, or if the Apaches had shifted to an even more defensible site nearby. 
Major Morrow had appointed Lieutenant Day as his adjutant in the field, and during this fight, 
this veteran of the Las Animas of September 1879 physically transmitted Morrow’s orders to each 
company as they attempted to close with the Apaches. This suggests that the terrain was too rough 
for Morrow to be able to keep all of his battalion under his direct command. It also suggests that 
the Apaches were able to use the terrain to move round the flanks of their enemies and disrupt 
Morrow’s efforts to coordinate his forces. Day was then attached to Captain Purington’s company 
and, with the aid of some troopers, who boosted him up the canyon face with their carbines, 
reached a point where he gained a good view of the Apache positions. At this point, the Apaches 
managed to attain a position where they could open fire on the horses of Purington’s company and 
Lieutenant Day scrambled back down the mountainside and led the horses to safety. 
Lieutenant Day then contacted the officer in charge of the mountain howitzer and gave him 
the information necessary to bring the Apache positions under fire.10 Once the Lieutenant had 
indicated a site for the howitzer, it must have been manhandled up to its firing position, though 
it is unlikely that the Apaches would have ignored this development. It was no accident that the 
one Ninth Cavalryman11 who was killed during the fight on the Rio Perchas on 12 January was 
directing the fire of the howitzer. As soon as the Apaches spotted the howitzer, the effort to move 
it into position must have come under constant fire. Once the howitzer was brought into action, the 
Apaches killed the few horses that were with them, scaled the precipices behind their own cliff-top 
positions, and disappeared. Their main supply of horses, it was supposed, were secreted elsewhere, 
deeper in the mountains. 12 However, Morrow could make no pursuit without abandoning his 
horses and mules, and he withdrew to Ojo Caliente to replenish his food and ammunition stocks.13
5 Thrapp, 1974, p.262.
6 Thirty Four, 28 Jan., 1880.
7 A wounded Indian scout was brought into Fort Bayard on 25 Jan., 1880. (‘By Telegraph’, The Grant 
County Herald, 31 Jan., 1880); See also Thirty Four, 28 Jan., 1880; Report of The Surgeon General in 
AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.520.
8 Morrow, Canada Alamosa, 18 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; Hatch (reporting 
telegram dated 18 Jan., 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 20 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.61-62; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press 
Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.45-46; Morrow HQ Troops in the Field 
Camp near Canada Alamosa to Loud AAAG, 18 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.525-
526; See also Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 20 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.527; 
Carr to AG DoAz, 19 Jan., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 
13 Dec., 1879 – 7 May, 1880, pp.52-53; Medical History, Fort Bayard NM, May 1879, NA, RG94, 
Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 24 Jan., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.262; Thrapp, 1967, p.192; Stout, p.121; Record of Engagements, p.93; Wellman, 1957, p.164; Haley, 
1981, p.324; Webb, 1976, pp.87-88.
9 Letter from Van Smith to Thirty-Four, 7 May, 1880.
10 Personal File Matthias W. Day, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 1.
11 See Appendix 2.1.
12 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
13 Morrow to Loud AAAG HQ Troops in the field Camp near Canada Alamosa, 18 Jan., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.526; Morrow Canada Alamosa, 18 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
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Lieutenant French, variously described as ‘promising’,14, a ‘valuable scout’,15 and ‘intrepid’,16 was 
officially reported to have been killed in action, shot through the head17 ‘while gallantly commanding 
Company “M,” Ninth Cavalry’.18 Nothing was further from the truth. Lieutenant Finlay thought 
that Lieutenant French, who had been in the army for some time but had no combat experience, had 
become disoriented and lost contact with the rest of the troops and had failed to return to camp that 
evening. Finley stated that, half an hour after the search party returned to camp, three gunshots 
were heard, but that it was too dark for the search party to discover anything, and French’s body was 
not discovered until the following morning.19 (see document file no. 27.2.) Surgeon MacPherson, 
though not present himself, also reported that Lieutenant French was missing for 12 hours before 
his body was found.20 This was a clear example of ‘wiping the slate clean’, as less than a month 
before his demise, French was cited in the Army and Navy Journal as facing court martial proceed-
ings.21 A general court martial verdict against Lieutenant French in 1879 was to ‘be dissolved and 
that officer will be released from arrest and returned to duty.’ This order was dated 19 January, 
1880, two days after Lieutenant French was killed.22 The fact that three shots were heard almost 
certainly rules out suicide, and the unfortunate man had probably been picked off by the Apaches. 
Immediately prior to his departure in pursuit of Victorio, on 3 January 1880, Major Morrow had 
put in a personal request to General Pope that French be released from arraignment of a charge of 
being drunk on duty. Morrow described French as ‘an efficient and valuable officer and I need his 
services in the field. I will hold myself responsible for his future sobriety.’23 However, Morrow also 
made it quite clear that he did not wish that this request be placed on the post records. This might 
simply mean that Morrow did not wish a charitable act of support to become a matter of public 
knowledge. Another implication is that Morrow may have needed every available officer, no matter 
how troubled, for his pursuit of the Apaches. Morrow’s unofficial support would not have interfered 
M666, Roll 526; S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880; 
See also Thrapp, 1974, p.262.
On 20 January, 1880, 10,000 rations were under escort of one NCO and Seven privates to be delivered 
to Ojo Caliente. (Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.64) 
This information was reiterated on 24 January, but Hatch added that replacement horses and mules were 
on their way to Morrow’s command. In addition, 30,000 rounds of ammunition had been ordered from 
the Fort Union arsenal. (Loud to Morrow, 24 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.72).
14 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 24 Jan., 1880, p.484.
15 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 31 Jan., 1880, p.509.
16 Ibid.
17 ‘The ball penetrated the mastoid portion of the temporal bone on the right side, passed through right 
temple and brain, and emerged one inch from the median line through the right supra orbital process 
of frontal bone, 6 inches from the wound of entrance. Wound of exit 1 ½ inches in diameter. Cranium 
fractured through the whole of right Parietal and temporal bones. Right ear cut through the middle of 
right cartilage. Fracture of nasal bones. Ecchymosis in left side of head. Face very much swollen. A deep 
incised wound was found on right buttock, extending from the anterior superior process of the flinm to 
1½ inches from the tuberosity of the lochium, 4 inches deep, 5 inches long, extending upwards 2 inches 
from spinal column.’ (Personal File James Hansell French, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 448; See also 
Nolan, 1994, p.38).
18 Personal File James Hansell French, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 44; Bi-Monthly Company Muster 
Rolls for Company M, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, 
Vol.17, 24 Jan., 1880, p.491 & Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 14 Feb., 1880, p.552.
19 Letter dated Ojo Caliente, 20 Jan., 1880 in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection.
20 Letter 15 Mar., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan. 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville.
21 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 20 Dec., 1879, p.380.
22 Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.58.
23 Morrow to Pope, 3 Jan., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 87.
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Plate 2.1. The San Mateo Mountains photographed from their southern end. This shows the rocky 
scrubland which is one of the features of the southern reaches of these mountains. (Photo: author)
Plate 2.2. Pinewoods in Rosedale Canyon, the San Mateo Mountains. It was through varied terrain such as 
that shown in these two photographs that Victorio led Morrow’s battalion in late January 1880. 
(Photo: author)
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with a future court-martial, should French have survived the expedition, but would have given the 
unfortunate Lieutenant the chance to redeem himself.
One major obstacle to progress in the campaign against Victorio was the time taken to transmit 
news of it, as it unfolded, to District Headquarters and beyond. Morrow’s command dropped 
in and out of communication twice with District Headquarters (7-8 January and 12-15 January) 
prompting periodic appeals for information as to his whereabouts.24 In response to these difficul-
ties in communication, Hatch ordered Hooker to ‘establish and maintain a suitable courier line 
between telegraph office at Ft. Craig and Ojo Caliente.’25 Of course, this was fine only for as long 
as the Apaches obligingly operated in the general vicinity of Ojo Caliente. This situation made it 
very difficult for District Headquarters to coordinate other troops, outside of Morrow’s immediate 
control, in sufficient time to lend meaningful support to the Major’s campaign against Victorio.
Morrow was also sent authorisation to ‘follow Victorio on to any reservation’, though the prob-
lems of actually delivering such a message become apparent: ‘This dispatch will be forwarded from 
here [Fort Bayard] to McEvers’ Ranch to be forwarded from there as chance opportunity may 
present.’26 General Pope made it quite clear that he wanted Victorio and his followers ‘crushed as 
early as possible. No exertion must be spared to do so.’27 Pope urged that any Apaches captured 
should not be turned over to the reservation authorities but held at an army post and put to work. 
Any prisoners against whom there was strong evidence should be placed in irons and put on trial. 
On 21 January, Lieutenant Emmett arrived at Fort Bayard not only accompanied by a detach-
ment of 12 Navajo scouts,28 but also carrying a message from Mariano, a Navajo chief. The latter 
offered to select 100 Navajo warriors and to lead them against the Apaches, provided that the US 
army armed and provisioned them. Mariano expected no pay but requested that they be allowed to 
‘retain such plunder as may be captured from Apaches.’ Mariano also offered to guarantee that the 
property of US citizens would be protected. This proposal was prompted by the killing of the two 
Navajo scouts in Las Animas Canyon during September 1879.29 Hatch certainly welcomed the offer 
to the extent that he instructed the CO Fort Wingate to send these volunteers, under command of 
Lieutenant W.W. Tyler, Ninth Cavalry, to join the troops in the field operating against Victorio. 
They would be armed on passing through Ojo Caliente, Fort Craig or at some other point along 
the Rio Grande.30 Pope recommended that Hatch be allowed to take up this offer of assistance,31 
but ultimately, the offer of approximately 100 Navajo warriors fell through, due to the poor winter 
condition of their mounts.32 The 100 Navajo warriors would also have violated the instructions, 
24 See Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.23, p.43 & p.51.
25 Hatch to Hooker, 20 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.63.
26 Humphreys Bayard to AAAG SF, 19 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.524; See also Hatch 
to Morrow, 19 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.p.60.
27 HQ DoNM to Morrow, 15 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.50.
28 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM, May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21.
29 Both scouts are named in the telegram but only one name ‘Baraja’ is legible. Humphreys Bayard to 
AAAG SF, 19 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.519-521; see also Hatch to DoM, 19 Jan., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.60.
30 Loud to Capt. Bennett, CO Fort Wingate, 27 Jan., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9th Military Department, 
the Department of New Mexico, and the DoNM 1849-1890, (Hereafter referred to as ‘9MD/DNM/
DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.43, pp.30-31.
31 Pope to AG Washington DC, 20 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also 
Pope to AG, Wash. D,C,, 20 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
32 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 9 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.113) some doubt as to the legality of such an endeavour (Ramsey, Secretary 
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laid down by Congress, which put a strict limit of 25,000 on the number of men to be employed 
by the US army.33 In the meantime, Emmett and his Navajo scouts were instructed to join Major 
Morrow’s command which was believed to be at Ojo Caliente.34 
Logistics Failure turns the Tide …
Major Morrow departed Ojo Caliente early on 22 January 1880, with the addition of E Company, 
Ninth Cavalry, under the command of Captain Hooker. Morrow had not found sufficient supplies 
at Ojo Caliente and had had had to requisition what stores were available from Fort Cummings, 
with the result that his men were on half rations.35 On 7 January 1880, a large and surprisingly 
variable list of supplies was earmarked for delivery to Ojo Caliente from Fort Craig’s stores, though 
there is no indication as to whether this was intended for Ojo Caliente’s garrison or was being sent 
in anticipation of a campaign against Victorio. (See Appendix 2.2) A large requisition of 10,000 
rations36 had been ordered for sending to Ojo Caliente by District Headquarters on 20 January, 37 
but the required rations clearly had not reached Ojo Caliente by the time Morrow departed. It also 
emerged that the telegraph line was not necessarily to be relied on, as some messages transmitted 
by army personnel had miscarried and not reached their intended recipients, further hampering 
military operations.38
A picket of 20 dismounted Ninth Cavalrymen was left to guard Ojo Caliente under the command 
of Lieutenant Hughes. He had ‘part rations for nine days’ and only broken-down horses, which crip-
pled his ability to maintain the courier service to Fort Craig demanded by General Pope. Hughes 
also noted that Captain Beyer had reported sick and was making his way back to Fort Bayard.39 
In the meantime, Hatch assured Lieutenant Hughes that supplies were being hurried on to Ojo 
Caliente and reiterated the importance of maintaining the courier line to Fort Craig.40 Victorio’s 
technique of exhausting his enemy was beginning to have an effect on both men and horses. It was 
also playing havoc with the US army’s logistics and hence its ability to keep troops in the field. 
Overall, Morrow’s command was in poor shape and the Major was clearly finding the strategy 
and tactics deployed by the Apaches as deeply frustrating. (see document file no. 30.) Despite his 
conviction that he had inflicted severe punishment on Victorio, and his claim to have recaptured 
over 100 horses, some laden with loot, he found that he could not bring Victorio to a decisive battle. 
He noted that Victorio, when they thought they had him at bay in the late afternoon, tended to 
turn and fight till nightfall before slipping away. These engagements were usually preceded by long 
pursuits over the most difficult terrain and as a result he predicted that his command would ‘soon 
of War, 26 Jan., 1880? in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
33 Charles Devens, Attorney General to Alexander Ramsey, Secretary of War, 29 Jan., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
34 Loud AAAG to CO Fort Bayard, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.73.
35 Hughes Ojo Caliente to AAAG SF, 22 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.528-529; Morrow 
to Hatch SF, 23 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.532-538.
36 My colleague, Willy Dobak informs me that a ‘ration’ was the amount considered necessary for sustaining 
a soldier in the field for one day. Email communication 17 Aug., 2013.
37 Loud to Chief Commissary of Subsistence, DoNM, SF, 20 Jan., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/
DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.24, p.17.
38 Loud to Joseph M. Gough, Manager Western Union Telegraph Company, SF, 12 Feb., 1880 in Letters 
Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.71, p.51.
39 Hughes Ojo Caliente to AAAG SF, 22 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.529-530.
40 Loud to Lt. Hughes, CO Ojo Caliente, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.75.
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be hors de combat.’41 As such, Morrow was not optimistic as to the chances of bringing the pursuit 
of Victorio to a speedy conclusion and recommended that 150 Apache scouts be employed to pros-
ecute the war.42 It is clear that Major Morrow appreciated the impact this campaign was having on 
his troops. Morrow did not comprehend that, when he engaged in such long pursuits, punctuated 
by ineffective skirmishes, he and his men were merely doing what Victorio wanted. Each gun battle 
tempted the US troops into believing that their pursuit was wearing down the Apaches when all 
that was accomplished was their own exhaustion.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise to find that Morrow tried to arrange another meeting 
to discuss terms with Victorio. On 21 January, he telegraphed Hatch with the following query: 
‘Should Victorio surrender what terms am I authorised to offer he insists upon keeping this reserva-
tion as a sine qua non can I promise it to him?’43 This elicited an unequivocal response from Hatch: 
‘Should Victorio surrender inform him he will remain on the Ojo Caliente Reservation, which 
has been so decided by the War Department.’44 Morrow appears to have used Andrew Kelley as a 
scout or emissary, though it is not clear from the archives exactly when Kelley was recruited. Kelley 
had returned from scouting in the San Mateo Mountains on 22 January, to inform Morrow that 
Victorio had moved to the north-western end of this range.45 Kelley was reported due to leave on 
23 January, in an attempt to make further contact with Victorio, with a view to negotiating a peace 
agreement.46 
Nevertheless, while exploring the peace option, Morrow maintained his pursuit of the Apaches 
after leaving Ojo Caliente on 22 January 1880. The Apaches led Morrow’s battalion through the 
San Mateo Mountains for several days.47 Hooker recorded this pursuit as marked by constant indi-
rect harassment, with the Apaches declining to engage in battle and instead leading the soldiers 
over the roughest terrain they could find. The Apaches finally evaded the pursuit by fleeing out of 
the southern end of the mountains.48 The apparently large numbers of Apaches present in these 
indecisive skirmishes led Hatch to believe that most of the independent Apaches living in Mexico 
had joined Victorio.49 The District Commander failed to realise that Victorio’s followers were past 
masters at using the terrain, and at producing a high rate fire from breech-loading and repeating 
rifles, so as to give the impressions of greater numbers than were actually present. Hatch concluded, 
probably correctly, that the employment of the maximum number of Apache and Navajo scouts was 
the only solution to their problem. The lack of grass and sheer inhospitable nature of the San Mateo 
Mountains was wreaking havoc on the Ninth Cavalry’s stocks of horses and mules.50 
However, peace negotiations were still being pursued. By 27 January, Lieutenant Hughes 
reported that Morrow’s command had left the San Mateos and returned to Ojo Caliente, leaving 
41 Morrow to Hatch SF, 23 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.532-538.
42 Ibid.
43 Morrow Ojo Caliente via Cummings to Loud AAAG, 24 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, 
p.531.
44 Loud to Major Morrow, 24 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.72.
45 Hughes Ojo Caliente to AAAG SF, 22 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.528-529
46 Ibid.
47 It would appear that Morrow may have returned, or at least sent a detachment from his command , to 
Ojo Caliente for further supplies on 25 January, 1880.. (Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Jan., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.77).
48 Record of Events Jan., 1880 in Returns From US Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, N.M. May 
1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617 Roll 877.
49 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.77.
50 Ibid.
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on the same day ‘for Canada for talk with Victorio.’51 Lieutenant Hughes also stated that Victorio 
‘told Kelley he would not make peace until his families were brought here.’52 One John Sullivan 
presented a bill for $45 ‘for nine days service with horse as bearer of messages between Major 
Morrow and Victorio @ $5.00 per day.’53 The involvement of Kelley and Sullivan54 would appear 
to lend strength to the argument that the citizens of Canada Alamosa acted as intermediaries 
between Victorio and Morrow for this second meeting;55 but, so far, there is no evidence that the 
two men actually met during this time.56 
This attempt to parley fell through, and by 30 January, the Apaches were last reported to have 
left Canada Alamosa ‘followed by Hooker’.57 It is not clear whether these negotiations took place 
with no result, or that fear of treachery, ever present in the minds of the Apaches, meant that no 
direct meeting took place. According to a letter sent to Jack Crawford ‘the Poet Scout’ by Andrew 
Kelley58 Victorio did, in fact, meet with Captain Hooker but only after Kelley agreed to remain as 
a voluntary hostage in the hills with his warriors:
Old Victorio came into the Cuchillo range and wanted a talk and as I was always trusted by the 
Indians he sent in for me and I went out in the afternoon and saw him and the commanding 
officer was anxious to see Vic and promised me a safe pass for him to come in and have a peace 
talk. Vic would not trust the C.O. until I passed my word that he would be all right. Then Vic 
said that if I stayed with his warriors as a hostage until his return he would go to the Fort, 
which he did and after a long talk there the Comd’g Officer wanted to arrest him and put him 
in irons and put him in the Guard House. Lieut Emmett reminded the C.O. that if he done so 
my life would be taken, he replied he did not give a d—m as Vic’s arrest was worth a number of 
lives like mine, even tho I had a family depending upon me Emmett replied you are my comd’g 
officer but I will not allow you to have dishonor cast on a U.S. office by doing this, and I with 
my scouts will see you do not do so, and if necessary I will assume command and put you in 
arrest, and the C.O. came to his senses and let Vic go back.59 
If Kelley’s story is true then it shows the lengths some US army officers were prepared to go to catch 
Victorio, and both Victorio, and particularly Kelley, were lucky that Lieutenant Emmett refused 
to accept such a dishonourable solution. Moreover, if Victorio, all too conscious of the fate of his 
predecessor, Mangas Coloradas, had been aware that Hooker had tried to arrest him, it would only 
have reinforced his view that a fight to the finish was his only option. The only problem with this 
account is that Emmett, having brought 12 Navajo scouts to Fort Bayard, on 21 January, could not 
51 Hughes to AAAG, 30 Jan., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.432; S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. 
Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
52 Hughes to AAAG, 30 Jan., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.434.
53 Loud (querying the legitimacy of such a claim) to Hatch, Fort Craig, 22 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.152.
54 We last met John Sullivan when he tried to warn Captain Hooker that a large group of Apaches were 
near Ojo Caliente just before Victorio attacked E Company’s horse-herd on 4 Sept., 1879.
55 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
56 There is a strong local tradition that Morrow and Victorio met in late January in the Caballo Mountains 
and that Mexicans from Canada Alamosa and Las Palomas were involved in its arrangement (conversa-
tion with Emilio Tapia, September 2006) but so far I have not found any record which confirms this 
information.
57 Hughes to AAAG, 30 Jan., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.432.
58 ‘Captain’ Jack Crawford was recruited as a scout during the summer of 1880 and was based at both Fort 
Craig and Ojo Caliente during the latter part of 1880 and into 1881 so would have had ample opportu-
nity to meet Kelley.
59 Kelley letter, 4 May, 1905 to Crawford, cited in Laumbach, p.122.
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have been anywhere near the area when Hooker investigated claims that Victorio was near Canada 
Alamosa seeking peace talks on 15 January. (See previous chapter.) If Emmett was present at the 
attempted talks between 27 and 30 January, as we shall see below, he only left Fort Bayard on the 
26 January and it is not clear whether he or his scouts had linked up with Captain Hooker by 30 
January.
The only reasonably detailed contemporary summary of the meeting between Morrow’s emis-
saries emerged in a private letter from Colonel Hatch to General Pope dated 24 February 1880. A 
clearly sceptical Hatch had written personally to Pope as the story was ‘not reliable enough to be 
forwarded officially’. Hatch also dismissed Kelley as a ‘primitive Squaw man’. The gist of the story 
is that on 23 January, Victorio and Nana (Hatch mentions both by name), showed a flag of truce on 
a mountain near to Ojo Caliente. Kelley and Sullivan answered the call, and Victorio suggested a 
parley in the San Mateo Mountains to: 
hear upon what terms they could come in. Major Morrow then sent Kelley out or said to him 
you can see him and inform him he can surrender at any time by coming in and giving up his 
arms and horses, the impression I think was Victorio did not meditate surrender but wished to 
gain time. Morrow thought by sending Kelley he could place the Indian camp so thoroughly 
he might be able to surround it.60 
The willingness of both sides to be quite duplicitous is very interesting and has a distinct parallel 
with Hooker’s alleged treacherous design. However, Hatch outlines the talk between Kelley and 
the Apaches: ‘Victorio was inclined to surrender Nana remarked the country was as large as it was 
and that he had spent the most of last summer in preparing for a struggle with the troops.’ The 
latter point fits well with what we know about Nana’s activities on the Mescalero reservation from 
late 1878 to August 1879. The most intriguing point to Hatch was that Kelley stated that three 
quarters of the Apache warriors were unknown to him: ‘he [Kelley] having issued rations for ten 
years or more to these Indians must have known all their faces.’61 Unfortunately Hatch did not 
elaborate on this point. Hatch also noted that Nana apparently claimed to have visited the Indian 
Territory to speak to both the Kiowas and the Comanches and had gained the support of their 
young warriors. Nana also claimed to have done the same with ‘all the Indians in Old Mexico.’62 
Hatch regarded this bit of information as thoroughly unreliable being a combination of ‘the usual 
Indian boasting and retailed second hand by a Frontiers man.’63 On one level Hatch is probably 
correct to dismiss this as a fiction but perhaps misses the point that the Apaches might have been 
trying to cause the army more disruption by attempting to make them stretch their already limited 
resources further in response to such a threat.
What is clear is that the parlous state of US army logistical support probably encouraged Morrow 
in his attempt to open a dialogue with Victorio, no matter the duplicitous intent. It also suggests 
that Victorio and Nana were aware of at least some of the problems facing the US army and were 
more than happy to see if they could cause further problems by giving the impression of a wider 
Indian insurrection.
Captain Carroll, based at Fort Bayard, attempted to relieve the logistical problems, notifying 
District Headquarters that he could provide 3,000 rations by ‘contract train’ which he would start 
towards Morrow on 25 January. Carroll also stated that he would also leave that post ‘with available 
60 Hatch to Pope, 24 Feb., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
Morrow’s Campaign, January–February 1880 55
men on Monday [26 January 1880].’64 In response, Hatch instructed Carroll to carry 5,000, or, if 
possible, as much as 10,000 rounds of carbine ammunition to Morrow.65 The troops leaving Fort 
Bayard consisted of four officers and 55 Ninth Cavalrymen. They were joined by the 12 recently 
arrived Navajo scouts, presumably under the command Lieutenant Emmett.66 At the same time, 
Lieutenant C.W. Taylor, then in Albuquerque, was also instructed by District Headquarters to 
find and bring forward a train of four wagons recently departed from Santa Fé. These wagons were 
carrying rations destined for Ojo Caliente and the troops at Ojo Caliente were reported to have 
run out of rations.67 A few days later, Hatch asked Lieutenant Taylor, now at Fort Craig to find out 
whether, and at what price, corn could be purchased in the vicinity of Fort Craig.68
The Apaches regain the Initiative
After the breakdown of these peace talks Morrow appears to have temporarily lost contact with 
Victorio; and District Headquarters once again lost contact with Morrow. On 30 January, Lieutenant 
Hughes had to report that the current location of Hooker and Morrow was not known.69 He also 
passed on a rumour of ‘one Indian wounded & held prisoner by Mexicans at Canada.’70 
Morrow may have assumed that Victorio was now heading back to Mexico, as he informed 
District Headquarters that his command would be going directly to Fort Bayard.71 By the end of 
January, the earlier optimism concerning the imminent defeat of Victorio seems to have dissipated. 
On receipt of the news that Morrow intended to return to Fort Bayard, Hatch immediately ordered 
him to maintain pressure on the Apaches, and to remain in the field for as long as it took to achieve 
a result. He also promised Morrow that essential supplies would soon arrive at Ojo Caliente.72 A 
note of desperation entered Hatch’s efforts to rouse support for defeating the Apaches: 
any person desiring to join Major Morrow in his operations against those Indians will be 
permitted to do so and rations furnished them, if necessary they will be armed also.73
64 Carroll Bayard to AAAG DoNM SF, 24 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.531. See perpetual 
Calendar RR1250-1251, Cambridge Encyclopaedia, 2nd Edition, Editor David Crystal.
65 Hatch to Carroll, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.79.
66 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.21; Loud to Capt. 
Carroll, CO Fort Bayard, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.74.
According to the Grant County Herald, Captains Carroll and Rucker, Lt’s Smith and Goodwin with 
70 men from B, C, D, H & M, Ninth Cavalry plus Navajo scouts with 11 wagons and one mountain 
howitzer, commanded by Lt. Goodwin, Left to join Morrow on Jan. 26, 1880. (‘By Telegraph’, The Grant 
County Herald, 31 Jan., 1880).
67 Loud to Lt Taylor, Albuquerque, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.73-74.
68 Hatch to Lt Taylor, Fort Craig, 28 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.87.
69 Hughes to AAAG, 30 Jan., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.432 & 433.
70 Ibid, p.433.
71 Hughes to AAAG, 30 Jan., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.432.
72 Loud to Morrow, 1 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.93-94.
73 Hatch to Operator at Mesilla N.M., 29 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.88.
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Major Morrow was also informed that he could recruit ‘any persons, white, black or Indian who 
may desire to join you,’ and that the ‘fight with Victorio’s Apaches must be continued as long as one 
is left with arms in his hands.’74 Yet, by 7 February 1880, Hatch reported that there had been no 
uptake of this offer by the citizens of New Mexico.75 
There were two or three report of clashes between the Apaches and various Ninth Cavalry 
detachments towards the end of January; but these, when we consider them, mainly indicate the 
difficulties of transmitting accurate reports from different detachments in the field through to 
District Headquarters. From Ojo Caliente Lieutenant Taylor reported that:
couriers just in from Lt Hughes report that last night they were joined at Canada Alamosa by 
three couriers from Maj Morrow, with dispatches for Capt Hooker asking for cooperation in 
surrounding the Indians near Palomas. Capt Carroll 
had a fight at this point on the 29th & reported two or three men wounded one Indian 
[hostile or scout not clear] killed can’t determine knowledge possessed by couriers how many 
men Carroll had but think a detachment of his company & one company under Hugo. Maj 
Morrow was at Palomas yesterday enroute for Bayard the Indians attacked a supply train for 
Ojo Caliente which Carroll was taking in which began the fight.76
It was reported that ‘Carroll and Rucker had fight and Indians well punished.’77 Hatch repeated 
this information not necessarily realising that Taylor’s version might have been garbled as a result 
of being second hand. Hatch thought that Carroll had taken the opportunity to block Victorio’s 
attempt to reach Mexico, allowing Hooker to attack from the west and Morrow to advance from 
the north, thus driving Victorio across the Rio Grande into the Caballo Mountains.78 There also 
exists an intriguing telegram from Lt. Hughes at Ojo Caliente, possibly dated 30 January 1880, 
which mentions an attack in which a wagon train, with an escort of 30 men, was driven back to 
Canada Alamosa on 25 January.79 This report prompted Hatch to warn Governor Terrazas that the 
Apaches might be going south towards the Florida Mountains and back to Mexico, and to suggest 
that Mexican military units should guard the passes in those mountains.80 Earlier, we saw that 
inaccurate reports from civilians could cause problems; but in this case, it would appear that the 
74 Loud to Major Morrow, 28 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.84.
75 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.109.
76 Taylor to AAAG SF, 31 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.435-437.
77 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 2 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.98.
78 Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth 2 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.383-385; Hatch to 
CO Fort Bliss, 2 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.98-99; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 2 Feb., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
526; Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.82, pp58-65.
79 Hughes to AAAG SF, 30 Jan., 1880? NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.433. According to Thrapp, 
Rucker and Carroll attacked Victorio on the Animas River west of Las Palomas, losing one man killed, 
two wounded plus several horses shot. They then pursued the Apaches to the Rio Grande. (Thrapp, 
1974, p.262; Worcester, p.225) On 30 January, Stout states that Captain Rucker with M Company 
and Captain Hooker with E Company attacked Victorio four miles north of Las Palomas as they were 
crossing the river, probably the Rio Grande. One Navajo Scout was slain and two troopers injured and 
a few horses killed. (Stout, pp.122-123) These two versions have enough similarities to be potentially 
garbled accounts of the same engagement.
80 Hatch to Governor Luis Terrazas, 1 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.95.
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Plate 2.4 Mescal Canyon at the northern end of the Caballo Mountains. About a mile up from the Rio 
Grande, the Canyon opens out into a natural amphitheatre. The photograph is taken from the centre of this 
location and shows the type of cover the Apache Warriors could easily have deployed for concealment, and 
then protection once they opened fire. However, it may also illustrate why Rucker sustained relatively few 
casualties during the ambush: the cover is too far away to allow the Apaches to pick off many horses, let 
alone men. (Photo: author)
Plate 2.3. Looking north along the main spine of the Caballo Mountains. The main part of the mountains 
would be impassable to large groups of cavalry or driven herds, which suggests that the Rucker fight took 
place in the passable sections at either the northern or the southern end of the range. Nevertheless, the tops 
of these mountains provide an excellent overview of the surrounding terrain, making them an ideal point 
for a possible peace talk between Victorio and Morrow, as it would be very difficult to trap the Apaches in 
such terrain. (Photo: author)
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reports relied on were garbled army versions of one fight between a Ninth Cavalry detachment and 
the Apaches in the Caballo Mountains.
The bi-monthly company return for M Company, Ninth Cavalry, makes no mention of an attack 
on a wagon train. Nor does Captain Hooker’s quite detailed report on his company’s activities 
during January 1880. (see document file no. 31.) The bi-monthly return for M Company does, 
however, make reference to a battle between Captain Rucker’s company and the Apaches in the 
Caballo Mountains on 30 January 1880.81 Lieutenant Finley also noted that the only skirmish he 
was aware of during this period was the defeat of a small detachment of 15 men in the Caballo 
Mountains on that day.82
What appears to have happened is that, while moving his wagon train up towards Palomas, 
Carroll came across signs of a party of Apaches and detailed Captain Rucker to pursue them across 
the Rio Grande. The fact that Rucker was attached to Carroll’s command may have given rise 
to a ‘Chinese whisper’ that Carroll’s train had been attacked. On entering the foothills towards 
the northern end of the Caballo Mountains, probably a mile or so up Mescal Canyon,83 Captain 
Rucker, commanding a detachment of men from B and M Companies, Ninth Cavalry, walked into 
a classic Apache ambush. Rucker had been joined by some Mexican volunteers; and at least some of 
Lieutenant Emmett’s Navajo scouts were also present. Proceeding up the canyon, they came upon 
a herd guarded by three or four older women who, apparently surprised by the soldiers’ appearance, 
appeared to panic and try to drive the stock away. Rucker’s detachment charged and when they 
were about to overrun their quarry, Apache marksmen opened fire from all directions.84 
The historian Joseph A. Stout Jr places this skirmish four miles to the north of Palomas,85 which 
puts it in or near Mescal Canyon. What is striking about this canyon is that it is quite wide, with 
relatively low walls, and at first glance it does not look particularly dangerous. About one and a half 
miles in, it widens out briefly into a natural bowl before it again narrows and enters the northern 
reaches of the Caballo Mountains. This natural bowl in Mescal Canyon was the perfect place for the 
decoy herd to be placed, the relatively low canyon walls providing excellent cover for the Apaches. 
Once Rucker’s command was well within this natural amphitheatre, the Apaches stationed above 
and around them would have opened fire, catching their enemies in a withering crossfire. One 
Navajo scout was killed,86 Sergeant Albert Stout was shot through the left shoulder, and Privates Bolt 
and Shaw were also wounded.87 Many of the detachment panicked and fled. Captain Rucker, with 
a second unidentified officer and approximately a dozen men, formed a rearguard and skirmished 
81 Record of Events Jan., 1880 in Returns From US Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, N.M. May 
1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
82 Letter dated Tulerosa, 11 Feb., 1880 in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection. The Chronological List 
relates a skirmish in the Caballo Mountains on 30 January. It names Captain L.H. Rucker as officer-
in-charge and states that three enlisted men were wounded. Chronological List, p.48 Lt G. Hutcheson 
reports that Capt. Rucker with Companies B and M clashed with the Apaches in the Caballo Mountains. 
Three troopers were wounded. See web article The Ninth Regiment of Cavalry by Lt G. Hutcheson.
83 I visited the area with Dan Aranda and Emilio Tapia in September 2006 (Apache Canyon) and June 
2007 (Mescal Canyon). Emilio was certain that the ambush could not have happened in the main part 
of the high Caballo Mountains and thought that it would either be in Apache Canyon at the southern 
end of the Caballo or in Mescal Canyon to the northern end of the Caballo Mountains. Having seen the 
western face of the main range of the Caballo Mountains I am inclined to agree with him. The western 
side of these mountains present a formidable series of high precipices and while not presenting a problem 
to unencumbered Apaches on foot; it would not have been possible to drive a herd of horses and cattle 
through such terrain. 
84 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
85 Stout, pp.122-123.
86 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
87 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company M, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94.
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their way back down the canyon.88 The 
Apaches, most likely on foot, kept pace with 
Rucker’s dismounted rearguard, constantly 
pushing its flanks from above, until the latter 
reached more open ground at the river. 
While Rucker’s encounter with the 
Apaches ended in defeat, it did suggest that 
the latter had moved east of the Rio Grande 
in the general direction of the San Andres 
Mountains and on in the direction of the 
Mescalero reservation. On or around 1 or 2 
February, 1880, Morrow’s command crossed 
the Rio Grande, passing through the Caballo 
Mountains, and followed a trail north-east89 
through Aleman Well,90 across the desolate 
Jornada del Muerto (Dead Man’s Journey) and 
into the San Andres Mountains.91 Morrow 
caught up with Victorio again on 3 February 
1880, on the eastern face of the San Andres 
Mountains.92 He had elements of five Ninth 
Cavalry companies and Indian scouts. In a 
canyon on the eastern side of the San Andres 
Mountains, they were opposed by Victorio’s 
warriors, who fell back from position to posi-
tion, as the Ninth Cavalrymen and Apache 
scouts advanced.93 The site of this skirmish 
may have been Hospital Canyon, to the south 
of the Hembrillo Basin in the San Andres Mountains.94
Years later, Major Morrow, in a letter to Captain Carrol,l stated that the latter had commanded 
the assault upon:
the right of Victorio’s line which at the time occupied two high ridges to our left front. You 
succeeded in capturing the ridges and turning the Indian’s right, in doing which, you had 
several men wounded.95
88 S.M. Ashenfelter, ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
89 This would suggest that Morrow passed through the southern pass in the Caballo Mountains. (See Note 
16 – Map One).
90 The name of this waterhole apparently commemorates a family of German immigrants wiped out by 
Apaches sometime before 1860. (Carmony, p.126) Local tradition tells a very different and far older 
origin to this tale dating back to the 1600s. 
91 Thirty Four, 4 Feb., 1880.
92 ‘Major Morrow’s Campaign’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 7 Feb., 1880, p.530.
93 Stout, p.124; Thrapp, 1967, p.192; Thrapp, 1974, pp.262-263; Haley, 1981, p.325.
94 Laumbach, p.55 & p.122; The Bi-monthly Return for B Company, Ninth Cavalry stated that they 
had ‘had an engagement with Indians in the Membres Canon San Andres Mountains’ (Bi-Monthly 
Company Muster Rolls for Company B, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94).
95 Letter from Morrow to Carroll, 14 Apr., 1890 in Personal File Henry Carroll, NA, RG94, Entry 297, 
Box 476.
Captain Louis Rucker.
On 30 January, 1880, he led a small detachment of 
Ninth Cavalrymen and civilian volunteers into an 
ambush in the Caballo Mountains and driven back 
across the Rio Grande. (National Archives)
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Lieutenant Finley also noted that:
The hostiles occupied the strongest position they have had yet while our force has been much 
weakened by sending in our dismounted men to Bayard. We fought from 9:39 A.M. until after 
dark and drove them from two positions but they held the third and strongest. We went into 
camp and in the morning found them waiting for us in the same place. This time we did not 
attempt to charge up the hill but went around some eight miles in sight of their position all the 
time and came up on more favorable ground in their rear. When they saw what we were after 
they decamped.96
The Army again claimed to have killed several warriors, yet found no bodies. They lost one Apache 
scout killed and four Ninth Cavalrymen wounded.97 The wounded men were Sergeant Brent Woods 
and Private Stephen H. Garnett, of B Company, and 
Privates James Johnson and Stanley Osborne, both of F Company.98 Osborne had been shot 
through the thigh and was still out of action in June 1880.99 (For accounts of the skirmishes between 
30 January and 3 February 1880, see document file no, 32.)
Morrow reported that the Apaches had been ‘routed’ and that he expected to catch up with them 
in the Organ or Sacramento Mountains. He also reported that if a detachment led by Captains 
Carroll and Hooker managed to get across the San Augustin Pass quickly enough, Victorio 
would not be able to seek refuge in Mexico.100 Hatch took the precaution of warning both the 
commanding officer, Fort Bliss, and the Mexican authorities that Victorio might be making for 
Chihuahua.101 Morrow estimated that Victorio would then try to return to either his San Mateo or 
his Black Range mountain strongholds.102 As usual, the Apaches did not act as predicted. Instead 
of riding for Mexico, they turned east, then north, and scattered into numerous small parties. 
Morrow reached Tulerosa on the edge of the Mescalero reservation on the day after the battle, 
and his battalion was described as short of rations, with their clothing in tatters.103 By 6 February, 
Morrow was at Malpais Springs, where the Apaches had rendezvoused after the battle in the San 
96 Lt Finley, Letter 11 Feb., 1880 cited in Laumbach, p.100.
97 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Feb., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; Pope to AAG, 
MDoM, 6 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.315; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 5 
Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.104; ‘By 
Telegram’, The Grant County Herald, 7 Feb., 1880; Report of The Surgeon General in AR-WD 1880, 
NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.520; See also Webb, 1976, p.88.
98 Special Order No 17, par 2, 5 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 
5 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.107; 
Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company’s B & F, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb. 1880 in NA, RG94.
These wounded men were sent to Aleman on 4 February, 1880 (Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 5 Feb., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.105) where 
they were fed by a Mrs Martin until they could be sent back to Fort Bayard by stagecoach. (Loud to Mrs 
Martin, Aleman, 5 Feb., 1880,Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.104-105; Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 21 Feb., 1880, p.576).
99 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company F, 9th Cavalry, May/Jun. 1880 in NA, RG94.
100 Pope to AAG, MDoM, 6 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.315; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 5 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.104.
101 Hatch to CO Fort Bliss, 3 or 4 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.101-102.
102 Pope to AAG, MDoM, 6 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.315; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 5 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.104.
103 ‘Correspondence Mesilla NM, 12 Feb., 1880’ Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
Morrow’s Campaign, January–February 1880 61
Plate 2.5 The Jornada Del Muerto (Dead Man’s Journey) from the top of the Caballo Mountains, looking 
towards the San Andres Mountains on the horizon. It was across this dry, arid terrain that Victorio led 
Morrow’s battalion at the beginning of February 1880. (Photo: author)
Plate 2.6 Hembrillo Canyon in the San Andres Mountains. On this lower terrain, the Apaches could make 
a stand on a ridge until, either flanked by Morrow’s troops or fired on by the mountain howitzer, they 
retreated to the next ridge and repeated the process. If pressed too closely, they could simply retreat deeper 
into the mountains and draw their enemies into a further, horse-killing, pursuit; or they could scatter and 
reconvene at a pre-arranged rendezvous. (Photo: author)
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Andres Mountains.104 Troops at Fort Stanton were sent to Dog Canon but did not intercept any 
Apaches, who may or may not have gone that way. Hatch suspected that the Apaches had fresh 
horses concealed on the Mescalero reservation and would scatter. His only consolation was that 
the Apaches had been so closely pursued as to prevent them from attacking the local populace.105 
This fails to account for two important points. First, the main purpose of Victorio’s confrontation 
with the US army, in January and early February 1880, was to run the Ninth Cavalry’s pursuit 
into the ground while keeping the whereabouts of his dependents and plunder (taken in Mexico) 
secret. Second, for the very same reason, it made no sense for the Apaches to raid any settlements 
in New Mexico at this time. Many of the Apache warriors were concentrating on keeping the US 
army’s attention securely focused upon their activities, while the remaining Apaches made sure 
that their plunder was transported to points where it could be traded for guns and ammunition. 
Raiding in New Mexico was simply not yet on Victorio’s agenda. That state of affairs would soon 
change. Hatch claimed that the Apaches were almost dismounted, with hardly enough animals 
to transport their wounded, due to Morrow’s persistent pursuit. Yet, the simple truth was that the 
Ninth Cavalry pursuit had finally exhausted itself, with little evidence that the Apaches had been 
in any way discomfited. 
Morrow’s forces had finally lost contact with the Apaches by 10 February,106 when both his 
detachments returned to Tulerosa having found only small trails107. As late as 18 February, District 
Headquarters in Santa Fé had to send a report to Hatch (then making his way to Fort Craig) 
stating that, up to that date, neither they, nor Fort Bayard, had received any information as to the 
104 Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.653; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.125-126.
105 Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.653-654; Hatch 
to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.125-126.
106 Thrapp and others argue that Morrow withdrew after the 3 February fight in the San Andres Mountains 
and. Captain Rucker’s unit was left to continue the pursuit of Victorio. (Stout, p.124; Thrapp, 1967, 
p.192; Thrapp, 1974, pp.262-263; Haley, 1981, p.325) Thrapp, in ‘Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches’, 
states that Rucker pursued for six days in the San Andres Mountains. In ‘Conquest of Apacheria’, he 
maintains that it was for two days, when they walked right into a prepared ambush in a ‘narrow and 
rough canyon’, ‘Several men and horses fell’ and the command seems to have panicked. (Thrapp, 1974, 
p.263, 1967, pp.192-193) The Apaches sensed a victory and charged. The company was routed and was 
pursued across ‘the river’. (Thrapp, 1974, p263; Thrapp, 1967 p.193) Rucker’s command is reported as 
losing its rations, bedding and other supplies in the rout. (Thrapp, 1974, p.263; Thrapp, 1967, p.193; 
Haley, 1981, p.325) In fact, the earlier comment by Lt. Finley suggests that this ambush is a more 
detailed account of the clash between Apaches and Cavalrymen under Rucker on 30 January, in the 
Caballo Mountains! Nevertheless, this skirmish was quite widely reported in newspapers across the US 
If one goes on to the Library of Congress ‘Chronicling America’ website <http://chroniclingamerica.
loc.gov/> (accessed 10/09/2018) and searches for ‘Fort’ and ‘Bayard’ between 1879-1881 there were no 
less than five newspaper reports of this battle all of which placed it in the San Andres Mts and/or on 
9 February, 1880 with interesting variations on the spelling of ‘Rucker’. See Daily Globe, 16 February; 
Salt Lake Herald, 17 February; Memphis Daily Appeal, 17 February; Shenandoah Herald, 18 February and 
Little Falls Transcript, 20 February, 1880.
There is another issue, which is a recurring theme of this campaign; the playing down or failure to 
report embarrassing defeats. Thrapp himself notes that this engagement is not acknowledged in official 
sources, being reported in a despatch to the Arizona Star. (Thrapp, 1967, pp.192-193; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.263 & note 47 p.368) Is this a case of media exaggeration or fantasy or another case of the suppression 
of an ‘unfortunate incident’ for the US army?
107 ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880; Thirty Four, 18 Feb., 1880.
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current whereabouts of Morrow’s command.108 Rumours of Apaches operating from the Caballo 
Mountains, and raiding in the vicinity of El Colorado, were waiting for Morrow when he arrived at 
Tulerosa. The following day, the battalion returned through the San Andres Mountains and across 
the Jornada del Muerto to scour the Caballo Mountains. Morrow’s command found traces of small 
groups of Apaches but nothing worth pursuing; so, he returned to Palomas to rest and refit after 
a hard campaign.109 And hard it had been: ‘His men were ragged, many of them barefooted and 
nearly one half without horses. All were hungry and jaded.’110 (see document file no. 33.) It was also 
reported that all of the officers in Morrow’s battalion had been affected by exposure.111 There was 
some indication that small bands of Apaches had returned to the Black Range and rumours were 
rife that Victorio was by then regrouping in strength in those mountains.112 Morrow’s command 
found Lieutenant Dimmick at Palomas with a large stock of much needed stores and the Major was 
informed that further ‘rations, forage, pack mules and ammunition’ were on their way to Fort Craig 
and could be sent where the Major required.113 Boots were still in short supply and Lieutenant 
Dimmick was instructed to give a clearer requisition so that these needs could be met as soon as 
practicable.114 By 20 February, Morrow was back at Ojo Caliente but was in no position to take any 
offensive action against any Apaches that might have been in the vicinity, as his horses were in very 
poor condition.115
The Ninth Cavalry’s regimental return shows an overall increase in unserviceable horses. It 
also records that the Ninth Cavalry lost 70 horses during January and February 1880. The effect 
of campaigning against the Apaches can also be clearly demonstrated by examining the Ninth 
Cavalry’s bi-monthly company returns for the period January to February 1880. If we compare the 
ratio of available men to serviceable horses with that for November to December 1879 (see Table 
2.1) we can see that the failure to provide sufficient mounts for the available troopers continued. 
If we also highlight the Ninth Cavalry companies serving with Morrow (bold type) in January-
February 1880, apart from C Company, whose results were not entered on the original form, those 
companies experienced significant (Blue Highlighting) and in some cases (Red Highlighting) quite 
drastic reductions in their pool of serviceable horses. Only L Company recorded a relatively small 
drop in the number of serviceable horses. Those companies not involved in this mini-campaign 
appear to have generally benefited from their non-participation (where recorded), either increasing 
the number of serviceable horses or at least being able to provide enough horses for the available 
men. The other critical point to note is that before these companies engaged in the January–February 
108 Loud to Hatch (to be picked up on latter’s arrival at Fort Craig), 18 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.132.
109 Morrow to AAG SF, 16 Feb., 1880 (relayed to SF from Aleman on the 17 Feb., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.133; Hatch, 18 Feb., 1880, 
DoNM General and Special Field Orders, Letters and Telegrams, (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.402; See also ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The 
Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
110 ‘Maj. Morrow’s Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880; Thirty Four, 18 Feb., 1880.
111 Thirty Four, 18 Feb., 1880.
112 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
113 Loud to Morrow, Palomas, 18 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.134-135; Loud to Hatch, enroute to Fort Craig, 18 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.133-134.
114 Loud to Dimmick, Palomas, 17 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.135.
115 Hatch, Ft. Craig, to AAAG SF, 20 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, p.408; Return for Feb. 1880 in Returns From US Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, New 
Mexico, May 1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
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campaign, apart from E Company, they were already short of sufficient serviceable horses to mount 
the available men. 
This did not stop Hatch from claiming all four engagements in the January–February campaign 
(12, 17, 30 January and 3 February) as great successes against the Apaches. He consistently stated 
that the latter had had great punishment inflicted upon them in each skirmish;116 but this is simply 
not true. Had Victorio sustained four clear defeats of the magnitude suggested by Morrow and 
Hatch, then his reputation would have suffered, and he would have lost many of his associates. 
Such failure would find little forgiveness in Apache society. It is quite clear that while both Hatch 
and Morrow understood facets of Apache warfare, they failed to see that they had been completely 
outmanoeuvred by Victorio. Thus, the latter’s standing as a successful leader was reinforced amongst 
the Warm Springs Apaches; among some members of other Apache groups it had probably gained 
new heights.
Table 2.1 Available Men to Serviceable Horses, Ninth Cavalry, November–December 1879 and 
January–February 1880117
Company Available Men 
Nov–Dec 1879
Serviceable Horses 
Nov–Dec  1879
Available Men 
Jan–Feb1880
Serviceable Horses 
Jan – Feb 1880
A 57 31 55 No entry
B 55 32 55 17
C 53 33 59 No entry
D 55 53 60 40
E 48 51 37 25
F 56 47 47 34
G 55 35 54 35
H 57 36 56 17
I 48 No entry 49 57
K 47 47 61 63
L 54 39 57 34
M 57 44 52 12
Unfortunately for Colonel Hatch, Thirty Four had a different view on the failure to defeat Victorio:
Major Morrow has for some months enjoyed an unusual opportunity of making a reputation 
and winning promotion. With 300 white soldiers, Victorio’s band could by this time have been 
annihilated. Morrow has done as well as possible under the circumstances and is unfortunate 
in not having at his command the material with which to win the fame of a Crook.118
This largely unwarranted poor opinion of the Ninth Cavalry (Crook did not win fame in Apacheria 
by employing white troops, but Apache scouts), combined with Hatch’s over-optimistic evaluation 
116 Hatch to General Willcox, 5 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.105-106; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 2 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.383-385; Hatch to CO Fort Bliss, 2 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.98-99; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 2 Feb., 1880 
in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
117 Derived Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Nov./Dec. 1879 & Jan./Feb. 1880, 9th Cavalry in NA, 
RG94
118 Thirty Four, 11 Feb., 1880.
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of the most recent campaign, would soon create a quite savage territorial press campaign against 
Hatch. 
In the meantime, the District Commander was faced with the difficult task of bringing the 
current Apache war to a successful conclusion. General Pope had a clear idea of what should be 
done, strongly recommending that preparations be made to occupy the Mescalero reservation for 
the purpose of disarming and dismounting the Apaches.119
Everybody knows, beyond the probability of dispute, that the Indians on this Reservation 
(like all the Apaches) are a miserable, brutal race, cruel, deceitful, and wholly irreclaimable. 
Although for years they have been fed by the Government and “civilized” by their Agent, they 
are in no respect different from what they were when the process began.
There is no game in that country upon which they can subsist and they therefore have no 
use for arms and horses except to depredate. They should, if kept there, be sufficiently fed 
to obviate the necessity of hunting game. The safety of the whole New Mexico and Texas 
Frontiers along the Pecos demands vigorous and conclusive action with the Indians. They can 
do nothing with Arms & horses except rob and murder; and surely it is the merest common 
sense to take away from them what they can use for no purpose except a harmful one.120
Surprisingly, given the apparent antipathy between the US army and the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, broadly concurred with Pope’s opinion that the Mescaleros 
should be disarmed and dismounted as soon as possible.121 In September 1879, the Acting 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the Mescaleros as ‘uncivilised and turbulent’ and that 
their Agent had clear orders to recover stolen stock and punish the perpetrators. He suggested that 
the army be called upon to station a detachment close enough to the reservation to easily render 
aid when called.122 In February 1880, the Secretary of Interior requested that ‘troops be stationed 
at Mescalero Agency to protect government property.’123 Pope noted that the Commanding Officer 
for the District of New Mexico had ordered troops from Fort Bliss for that very purpose on 21 
January 1880 and a telegram dated 14 February, confirmed their arrival.124
119 Pope to Whipple, AAG, HQ , MDoM, 9 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
120 Pope to Whipple, AAG, HQ , MDoM, 9 Jan., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; As 
above in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
121 Schurz, Secretary of the Interior to The Secretary of War, 11 Feb., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; Schurz to Secretary of the Interior to The Secretary of War, 11 Feb., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
122 Acting CoIA to the Secretary of the Interior, 23 Sept., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 39, Oct.-Dec. 1879.
123 Pope to AAG, 23 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.335.
124 Pope to AAG, 23 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.335.
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Colonel Hatch Reviews the Situation, February–March 1880
 
As it became clear that Victorio had returned to the United States, Colonel Hatch made the deci-
sion to take direct control of the campaign on or around 10 January, 1880.1 Hatch had been widely 
criticised in the territorial press for not taking an interest in events in New Mexico. However, one 
only has to see the volume of field orders, letters and telegrams generated by the Ute Crisis in the 
autumn of 1879 to realise that this criticism is unfair.2 Hatch had also been instructed to join a 
commission charged with determining the guilt, or otherwise, of the Utes in their recent conflict 
with the United States.3 He could not deal with two conflicts at once; and it was quite plain that 
higher command in the US army considered the Ute conflict as the first priority for action.
Despite these constraints Hatch did not lose sight of the conflict with the Apaches, and immedi-
ately tried to free up the maximum number of Ninth Cavalry companies to deal with the Chihenne 
Apaches. He also contacted his superiors to ask that those troops that had been detached from Fort 
Stanton to help keep the peace in Lincoln County be sent back to Fort Stanton and made available 
for field service against the Apaches. His reasoning was that, as the territorial governor had been 
authorised to raise, and arm, a militia of 1,000 men, there was no need for the Ninth Cavalry to 
assist the civil authorities.4 This request was duly granted on 28 February.5
Hatch arrived at Fort Craig by 19 February 1880,6 bringing with him two additional Ninth 
Cavalry companies from Fort Union and the Ute country (I and K Companies, Ninth Cavalry).7 
These two companies, with new recruits and horses, were sent to join Captain Hooker at Ojo 
Caliente; and the reinforcements were accompanied by a further 16 recruits and additional horses 
assigned to E Company. A new pack mule train assigned to Hooker’s expanded force was also en 
route to Ojo Caliente, and Hatch assured Hooker that much-needed supplies would be sent, and 
that he would be provided with a Hotchkiss Gun ‘if it can be obtained’.8 Replacement horses were 
also sent to A and H Companies, Ninth Cavalry9 However, this was just the beginning, as Colonel 
Hatch was preparing a comprehensive redeployment and reorganization of the Ninth Cavalry, in 
order to focus the entire Regiment on the pursuit and defeat of Victorio.10
8 Hatch to Hooker, Ojo Caliente, 9 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.112-113.
9 Loud to Stedman, RQM 9th Cavalry, SF, 8 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.63 p.45; See also Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 
21 Feb., 1880, p.576.
10 Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.654-655; Hatch 
to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.125-126; Special Field Orders No. 6, 1 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, pp.139-140; Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, 
RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.23.
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Hatch met, and saw for himself the state of, Morrow’s command after it arrived at Ojo Caliente 
on 22 February 1880.11 On the strength of this meeting, Hatch notified Headquarters of his first 
overall impression of the Victorio War. While Victorio was the leader credited with directing this 
war, in Hatch’s opinion, Nana was the most talented leader, and had a far larger following than 
Victorio. 
Finally, Hatch reported that the Apaches had chosen to make their stands in the most impossible 
terrain, with highly detrimental effects on both soldiers and mounts.12 He also acknowledged that 
the campaign would take some months, as the Apaches were ‘fighting very well and seem deter-
mined to hold out’.13 Therefore, Hatch, with Morrow’s support, repeated his request of 25 January 
1880 to employ as many Indian scouts as possible.14 In his opinion, at least 100 ‘Arizona foot 
Indians’ were necessary if the Apaches were to be defeated. If Apache scouts could not be officially 
employed, Hatch suggested that they should be hired as ‘guides trailers or packers, at fifteen dollars 
per month will not amount to the actual loss in horses, judging from the horses left by Morrow 
when he crossed the Rio Grande’.15
Hatch’s arrival at Ojo Caliente quickly revealed the difficulty of coordinating and supervising 
the campaign against Victorio. On 27 February 1880, Captain Loud, at Santa Fé, informed the 
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, that information from the latter destined 
for Hatch had been forwarded to Ojo Caliente by letter. Loud had arranged, by telegraph, for the 
letter to be deposited with the postmaster at Paraje, from where a courier detached from Fort Craig 
would carry it to Ojo Caliente.16 
There was a bloodless ‘confrontation’ between Mescalero Apaches under Nautzilla and A 
Company, Ninth Cavalry, under Lieutenant John Conline, in the Sacramento Mountains on 13 
February 1880.17 Conline was not willing to provoke a conflict, since he thought these Mescaleros 
might have been camped within the bounds of the reservation; although he later reported that he 
had seen what he suspected was the Terrazas brand on some of the horses at the camp. Two citizens 
named Eubank and Roberts were with Conline’s patrol, and Eubank identified a Mescalero whom 
he claimed to have wounded in the Ashby skirmish.18 He also spotted two colts belonging to Ashby 
amongst the horse herd. Roberts claimed to have seen a Mescalero riding one of his own horses. 
11 Return for Feb., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, May 
1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
12 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; See also similar comments made Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Jan., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.77; Hatch to 
AAG DoM, 16 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
13 Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
14 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; See also similar comments made Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Jan., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.77; Hatch to 
AAG DoM, 16 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
15 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 20 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.151; Hatch to AAG, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 23 Feb., 1880, 
‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 22 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.154; See also similar comments made Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Jan., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.77.
16 Loud to AAG, DoM, in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
17 See Lt. Conline’s Report cited in Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 15 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.138-139; Webb, 1976, p.88; Captain 
Steelhammer’s Report cited in Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 18 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.140-141.
18 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign’ Chapter 13, p.310.
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He also claimed to have scouted down a canyon nearby and found several small groups of horses 
hidden there.19 (see document file no. 34.)
Such reports only underlined the perceived need to clamp down on illicit trade networks on the 
Mescalero reservation. But as we have seen from General Pope’s earlier comments, the wheels of that 
particular project were already in motion. Ever since reports had started to surface of an illicit trade 
in goods looted by Victorio and other Apache raiders taking place on the Mescalero Reservation, 
the idea of disarming and dismounting the Mescalero Apaches had gathered momentum. As early 
as 22 October 1879, General Sheridan stated: 
It has been pretty well established that most of the raids made by our Indians have their origin 
on the Fort Stanton Indian Reservation. I have repeatedly called the attention of the authori-
ties to this fact and to the impossibility of stopping them unless the reservation is placed 
directly under the control of the military, when I am satisfied we would be able to put an end 
to them.20
As we saw earlier, General Pope, commander of the Department of the Missouri, had also recom-
mended disarming and dismounting the Mescaleros on 9 January 1880.21 In response to Pope’s 
recommendation, Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior contacted the Secretary of War:
I am in receipt of a letter of reply from the Indian Office concurring in the views of General 
Pope that, in the case of the capture of any of the hostile Indians they “not only be disarmed 
and dismounted but confined as prisoners in the guard house of some post where they will be 
made to work and those against whom sufficient testimony of hostile acts especially murders is 
found will be ironed and held for trial.”
So far as the recommendation concerning the Mescalero Indians is concerned, further concurrence 
is expressed as follows:
The Mescalero Indians as indicated by General Pope have no use for their arms and horses 
except to depredate as there is but little game in that vicinity and the best and most economical 
policy is to compel the Indians to remain upon their reservation and furnish them with suffi-
cient supplies to obviate the necessity of their hunting for game.
This Department concurs in the recommendation of the Indian Office based upon those 
of General Pope in regard to the disposal of Victoria’s and other bands and also in regard to 
disarming dismounting and guarding the Mescalero Indians and I have respectfully to request 
that the necessary orders may be issued at the proper time to carry the same into effect.
I have also to request that when those Indians have been disarmed and dismounted and the 
question of the disposal of their ponies is considered a sufficient number of the largest and best 
of the ponies be reserved to be used by them for agricultural purposes.22
19 Captain Steelhammer’s Report cited in Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 18 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.140-141; Lt. Conline’s Report cited 
in Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 15 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.138-139.
20 Sheridan to Townsend, AG Army 22 Oct., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.214.
21 Thrapp, 1974, pp.261-262 & Note 34 p.367.
22 Schurz to the Secretary of War, 11 Feb., 1880, in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 
2601, Box 88.
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Thus it would appear that both the Secretary of the Interior and his Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs clearly supported General Pope’s recommendation as to the treatment of Apache prisoners 
of war and, most importantly, that the Mescalero Apaches be disarmed, dismounted and confined. 
As we shall see, the devil would be in the army’s detailed implementation of these instructions, and 
in the fact that local employees of the OIA do not appear to have been informed of their superior’s 
support for General Pope’s recommendations. 
Captain Steelhammer, recently returned to Fort Stanton from his investigation of Captain Hooker, 
held a council with the Mescalero Apache leaders on 19 February. (see document file no. 35.) On 
being informed that it was believed that a large number of Mescalero Apaches were raiding, these 
leaders promised to bring in all of their followers to be inspected on 21 February. By 26 February, 
Steelhammer had seen only 53 warriors, and he stated that he believed there were 29 more men on 
the reservation who had not reported to him, but were not engaged in hostile activity. However, 
according to the reservation rolls, this left 75 warriors still at large. Steelhammer considered it likely 
that these men were hiding out on the reservation, raiding either independently of, or in direct alli-
ance with, Victorio.23 This information must have reinforced the belief that a significant number of 
Mescalero Apaches were hostile to the United States, even if not directly allied to Victorio. 
Hatch, fearing the Apaches would move west to contact their relatives still living in San Carlos, 
alerted troops in eastern Arizona, including Gatewood’s Apache scouts.24 In response to a request 
from Hatch, on 9 February, Colonel Carr furnished a detachment of Sixth Cavalrymen for service 
in New Mexico to reinforce the already stretched Ninth Cavalry. This unit consisted of 37 men 
from L Company under the command of Lieutenant T.A. Touey.25 They were first stationed at Fort 
Cummings, arriving there on 25 February,26 but by 10 March they had moved to Hillsboro. Here, 
they were joined by their company commander, Captain C.B. McLellan, who brought a further 
composite detachment of 29 men from F, G, L and M Companies, Sixth Cavalry, and a company 
of Apache scouts under Lieutenant Stephen Mills.27 Prior to his detachment to assist the troops in 
New Mexico, Touey described the scouts as being in perfect physical condition and well equipped 
with a mule train.28 Lieutenant Blocksom was also placed on notice that he might be required to 
23 Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 3 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.183-186.
24 Hatch to Gen. Willcox, 5 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.105; Thrapp, 1974, p.264.
25 Carr to Hatch, 9 Feb., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 
Dec., 1879 – 7 May, 1880, p.63; HQ , Troops in the field in SE Arizona, Fort Apache, Special Orders 
No.4, 9 Feb., 1880, Special Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 1, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, 
pp.14-15; Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880; see also Carr to Hatch, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
439, p.70; NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, p.23; Willcox 
to Hatch, 8 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.57; Record of Events Feb., 1880 in 
Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1875 to 
1880, NA, M744, Roll 63; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company L, 6th Cavalry, Jan./Feb., 
1880 in NA, RG94.
26 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company L, 6th Cavalry, Jan./Feb., 1880 in NA, RG94; See also 
Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.23; ‘By Telegraph’, The 
Grant County Herald, 28 Feb., 1880 which estimated that they had arrived on the 22 or 23 Feb., 1880.
27 Carr to CO Fort Bowie & AG DoAz, 25 Feb., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880,Letter No.’s 76 & 77, pp.74-75; Carr to CO Camp 
Huachuca, 25 Feb., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 
1879-7 May, 1880,Letter No.79, p.76; Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880; McLellan to Post 
Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; ‘Town and County’, The 
Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880.
28 Touey to Loud AAAG, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.71; Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 16 Feb., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.130.
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move into New Mexico.29 General Willcox even offered Hatch the use of a tripod-mounted Gatling 
gun, packed on mules, which had recently been ordered for use in the Department of Arizona.30 
Carr used this offer to highlight the shortage of mules and forage in the Department of Arizona: if 
the Gatling was required, it should be collected by troops from New Mexico, who had far greater 
stocks of both mules and forage.31 General Pope also requested ‘another Hotchkiss Mountain Gun, 
with three hundred rounds ammunition’.32
The First, Second and Third Battalions, New Mexico Troops
Setting up a field headquarters at Ojo Caliente,33 Hatch reorganised his troops into three battal-
ions – the First, Second and Third – of New Mexico Troops.34 While these orders were finalised 
in late February, it was clear Hatch had decided to reorganise his troops into three battalions by 
the end of January 1880.35 (see document file no. 36.) This was not as straightforward as it might 
appear, and on 9 March 1880, Hatch admitted to General Pope that in refitting his three battalions 
‘nearly every detail requires my personal attention … I am now busy on pack saddles and hope to 
improve them, so badly are they constructed.’36 While these battalions were in the process of being 
organised and refitted, Hatch concentrated ‘all of the dismounted men into the field in one column 
in the Black Range’.37 This detachment consisted of all those dismounted men based at Fort Bayard. 
It was to be based at McEvers’ Ranch and was expected to scout in the field with Captain Beyer’s 
company of cavalry, who were already stationed there.38 For this purpose, Hatch requested enough 
horses to furnish these dismounted troopers with fresh mounts.39
The First Battalion, commanded by Major Morrow, headquartered at Fort Bayard,40 was made 
up from five companies of the Ninth Cavalry. Lieutenant Humphries and 10 men of the Fifteenth 
Infantry provided the crews for a Hotchkiss Mountain Howitzer. McLellan’s composite company 
from the Sixth Cavalry, including two companies of Apache scouts under Lieutenants Gatewood 
and Mills, were ultimately assigned to this battalion.41 Hatch specifically requested the services 
of Lieutenant Gatewood to assist in the forthcoming campaign and, once clear information of 
29 Carr to CO Fort Bowie & AG DoAz, 25 Feb., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880,Letter No.’s 76 & 77, pp.74-75.
30 Willcox to Hatch, 6 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.102.
31 Carr to AG DoAz, 3 Mar., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 
13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.85, p.80.
32 Pope to AAG, MDoM, 12 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.316.
33 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.4-6.
34 General Field Orders No. 1, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.390; See also The Grant County Herald, 14 Feb., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, p.265; Thrapp, 1967, p.194; 
Stout, p.129; Leckie, 1967, p.215; Billington, 1991, pp.93-94; Laumbach, pp.135-137.
35 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 31 Jan., 1880, p.508.
36 Hatch to Pope, 9 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
37 Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 22 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.154; Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG SF, 22 Feb., 
1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.412-413.
38 Hatch to Morrow 23? Feb., 1880 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; see 
also a slightly garbled version of the above development in Thirty Four, 10 Mar., 1880.
39 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.156.
40 Station of Troops by Companies – Troops in the Field, Mar. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183
41 General Field Orders No.1, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.390.
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Victorio’s movements finally surfaced,42 Gatewood’s company was ordered to New Mexico on 5 
March 1880.43
Lieutenant Maney commanded a third Apache scout company, which had been raised specifi-
cally for operations against Victorio in New Mexico. However, their term of enlistment expired at 
the end of March. The problem was that the current members of Maney’s scout company seemed 
reluctant to sign on for another three months’ service. Hatch also noted that the 25 scouts currently 
with Morrow had also had enough after their gruelling pursuit of Victorio.44 Willcox approved the 
raising of an Apache scout company specifically for service in New Mexico, as ‘Morrow has taken 
42 Martin to Carr, 9 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.58.
43 Carr to Gatewood, 5 Mar., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 
13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, p.82; ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.40; 
Martin to Carr, 5 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.98; Hatch, Fort Bayard, to 
Willcox, 4 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.433; The order 
to move only arrived late on 4 March, 1880 and Surgeon MacPherson noted that the detachment would 
set out for Fort Bayard on the following day (See Letter 4 Mar., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 
1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at Charlottesville).
44 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to Willcox, Prescott Arizona, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.416.
Lt. Mills and Gatewood
This photo gives a clear image of the 
field dress of officers in charge of 
Apache scout companies. This is in 
clear contrast with many of the dress 
uniform photos of officers shown 
elsewhere in this volume. (Carlisle 
Barracks)
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all the fight out of those in New Mexico’.45. However, it should be remembered that this particular 
Apache scout company would have served six months by the end of March 1880, and had already 
participated in two hard campaigns against Victorio. To replace this company, Lieutenant Maney 
was sent to San Carlos to recruit Apache scouts. Once recruited, his company was to report to 
Major Morrow at Fort Bayard, where his scouts would be ‘armed and equipped for the field’.46 The 
bureaucracy inherent in this procedure is made all too clear by the fact that Hatch had to be very 
precise when discharging serving Apache scouts:
The term of enlistment of the twenty-four (24) Apache Scouts now at this Post expires on the 
31st of March. They will be discharged on the 20th of March to enable Lieutenant Maney to 
enlist Scouts at San Carlos on the same date.47
However, it would appear that Hatch recruited a second company of Apache scouts. Special Field 
Order No. 7 (2 March, 1880) clearly ordered ‘HK Parker Chief of Scouts’ to ‘proceed to San Carlos 
for the purpose of obtaining thirty seven (37) Apache Scouts to be enlisted pursuant to authority 
from the General of the Army’.48 One hundred Springfield rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion were ordered from the Fort Union Arsenal for the purpose of arming Indian scouts.49 At the 
same time, Hatch asked for authority to disband the Navajo scouts and recruit Apache scouts in 
their stead.50 Lieutenant Emmett disbanded his company of 12 Navajo scouts at Ojo Caliente on 
2 March 1880.51 Hatch stated that, some having been killed in action, the Navajo scouts ‘were of 
no value, were so completely cowed they wouldn’t leave the column to search for trails’.52 It was no 
coincidence that the Navajo scouts were disbanded on the same day that Parker was ordered to San 
Carlos. Whether Hatch had the authority to replace 12 Navajo scouts with 37 Apache scouts will 
be discussed later.
The Second Battalion, under the command of Captain Carroll, consisted of four companies (A, 
D, F and G) of the Ninth Cavalry. The battalion was headquartered at Fort Stanton, and the order 
for its formation was given on 22 February 1880.53 Acting Assistant Surgeon Handy was ordered 
to accompany it in the field.
45 Willcox to Chaffee, 25 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.79; See also Whipple to 
Commanding General, Dept of Texas (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoTx’), , NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.78; See also McDowell to 
Colonel Whipple, AAG Chicago, 27 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.341.
46 Special Field Order No. 9, 14 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 450; ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.64; Special Field Orders No. 9, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.307 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 20 Mar., 1880.
47 Special Field Orders No. 12, Paragraph 1, 18 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 450; See also 
‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.310.
48 Special Field Orders No. 7, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.305; See 
also ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 475, Vol.5, p.36.
49 Loud to Capt. Shoemaker, Fort Union Arsenal, N.M., 24 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/
DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.95, p.75.
50 Hatch, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.415; Special 
Field Orders No. 7, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.305; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.156.
51 NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 475 Vol. 5. p.34 & p.35.
52 Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
53 Special Field Order No. 5, Paragraphs 1-10, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 450; Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to 
AAAG SF, 22 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.412-413; 
General Field Orders No.1, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.390; Station of Troops by Companies – Troops in the Field, Mar. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
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The Third Battalion, led by Captain Hooker, was formed from E, I and K Companies, Ninth 
Cavalry, and H Company, Fifteenth Infantry. It was originally authorized to have a Navajo scout 
company, under Lieutenant Emmett, before this was disbanded in favour of hiring Apache scouts 
in their stead. The battalion was stationed at Ojo Caliente, and Hooker was also instructed to 
‘maintain a suitable “Courier-Line,” between the telegraph office at Fort Craig and Ojo Caliente’.54 
A Hotchkiss Gun had also been ordered for this battalion, but it had still not arrived by 10 March.55 
The Hotchkiss Gun, with a full supply of ammunition, finally arrived at Santa Fé on 23 March, 
and was estimated to arrive at Fort Craig by 1 April.56 A flurry of telegrams, dated 2 April 1880, 
from Headquarters, District of New Mexico, concerning the whereabouts of the Hotchkiss Gun 
strongly suggests that the mountain howitzer had failed to appear in time for the Third Battalion’s 
participation in the Hembrillo Canyon Operation.57 (See Chapter 5.)
The formation of the Third Battalion, in particular, illustrates one of the key problems concerning 
the US army’s competence in dealing with Apaches: they did not have adequate numbers of troops 
to cover the whole District of New Mexico. Therefore, troops had to be shifted from one ‘hotspot’ 
to another. Hooker’s battalion took almost a month to constitute, its component parts having to 
move from a number of points in northern New Mexico and southern Colorado to Ojo Caliente.58 
This task took time, and even when accomplished still left Colonel Hatch with insufficient troops to 
counter the Apaches effectively. This was not the only challenge facing Colonel Hatch in February 
and March 1880.
‘Friends’ as Enemies 1: The Territorial Press takes the Offensive
While the territorial press had been critical of the US army’s conduct of the campaign in 1879, they 
had also highlighted corruption in the reservation system, a lack of federal government interest, 
and illicit trade of arms and ammunition. During Morrow’s six-week campaign in January and 
February 1880, the press confined themselves to reporting the campaign as it progressed. As 
Morrow’s second campaign staggered to a close in mid-February, the papers took up the offen-
sive. First, they reiterated the accusation that Canada Alamosa, Palomas and Ojo Caliente and 
their environs were bases for an illegal trade in arms, ammunition and alcohol. This trade was 
organised by unscrupulous Mexicans and Anglo-Americans, in exchange for plunder taken by the 
Apaches.59 The people of Canada Alamosa and Ojo Caliente were also accused of harbouring some 
of Victorio’s wounded warriors.60 
183; Special Field Order No.5, 22 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, pp.300-302.
54 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, p. Special Order 9 par 8, 19 Jan., 1880; Station of Troops by Companies 
– Troops in the Field, Mar. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; General Field Orders No.1, 23 Feb., 
1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.390.
55 Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.215.
56 Loud to Hooker, Fort Craig, 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.240.
57 Loud to Hooker 2 Apr., 1880, Loud to Operator Fort Craig, 2 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.273; Loud to Hatch 3 Apr., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.276.
58 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, p. Special Order 9 par 2, 5, 6 & 8, Jan. 19 1880; Station of Troops by 
Companies – Troops in the Field, Mar. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; General Field Orders 
No.1, 23 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.390.
59 Thirty Four, 17 Mar., 1880; ‘Ashenfelter Editorial’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880.
60 ‘Ashenfelter Editorial’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880.
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Second, the press also reiterated another criticism by launching a stinging attack upon the 
African-American soldiers.
The people of this part of the country are thoroughly convinced that the troops now in the field 
are entirely unfit to follow or fight Indians. Maj. Morrow is no doubt an efficient and energetic 
officer, but he is doubtless like a good many others, lacks faith and confidence in his troops.61
The Grant County Herald did take one crumb of comfort from this state of affairs, declaring, ‘At 
least the attempt to use the African to chastise him [Victorio] has proved a decided failure.’62
This was but the opening salvo of a press attack on the US army that, while initially aimed at the 
rank and file of the Ninth Cavalry, would soon find its main target in the form of Colonel Edward 
Hatch. The attack was first provoked by Hatch’s attempts to explain his long-term strategy to 
reach a successful conclusion of the Victorio War. Hatch argued that the Apaches in small raiding 
parties were too difficult to destroy until these groups had re-united.63 In the meantime, Hatch 
explained, he was establishing a supply camp at Hillsboro, and had stationed small detachments 
at known waterholes, in preparation for the next offensive against Victorio.64 Second, Hatch also 
played down the number of casualties inflicted by the Apaches on the citizens of New Mexico 
during the previous six months, and strongly implied that reports of higher casualties were fabri-
cated.65 He requested that the press and citizens moderate their criticisms as it ‘disheartens’ the 
troops.66 Finally, he pointed out that citizens were not familiar with the difficulties of combating 
Apache guerrillas.67 While Hatch was broadly correct in much of what he said, the argument that 
the level of warfare had been very much exaggerated was politically inept. His stupidity unleashed 
a torrent of abuse which did not really abate until he and the Ninth Cavalry left New Mexico at 
the end of 1881:
Not by word of mouth, General. Not by dogmatic expression of the opinion that not thirty men 
had been killed during this entire campaign. Not by forcing yourself into a Ute Commission 
with a view to newspaper notoriety. Not by misrepresenting the strength of Maj. Morrow’s 
command. Not by the establishment of supply camps and other methods known to modern 
military science. Not by any of these is Victorio to be brought to terms. In fact, it were better 
for this frontier, to say nothing of your own reputation, if your time were devoted to sharp, 
energetic action against hostile Indians, rather than the ventilation of your own opinion at 
public places on every favourable opportunity.68
Thirty Four rejoiced in the conversion of the Grant County Herald to its way of thinking and 
renewed its accusations that ‘negro troops are worthless as Indian fighters and that Hatch should 
61 ‘Correspondence’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880; See ‘In the Name of the Prophet!’ and ‘The 
Situation’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
62 In the Name of the Prophet!’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
63 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880
64 Ibid.
65 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.82, pp58-65.
66 Thirty Four, 17 Mar., 1880; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880
67 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880.
68 ‘Hatch vs Breech Clouts [Veni Vidi Vici], The Grant County Herald, 20 Mar., 1880; See also ‘In the 
Name of the Prophet!’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
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be investigated’ and removed.69 Thirty Four would later take the dubious credit for being the first 
paper to start the anti-Hatch campaign, in late 1879.70
This situation cannot have been helped by the passing of joint resolutions by the New Mexico 
Council and the House of Representatives lauding Hatch’s conduct of the Apache war, on 13 
February 1880.71 (see document file no. 43.1.) In response to this resolution Thirty-Four published 
a resolution condemning the conduct of the war against the Apaches. (see document file no. 43.2.) 
What is particularly interesting is that both Hatch himself, and his planned ‘campaign’, were 
dismissed as ‘farcical’ before he launched his first attempt to crush the Apaches in early April 
1880.72 At this point, the Grant County Herald was already demanding Hatch’s court martial for 
gross misrepresentation of the facts and general incompetence in handling his command.73
The press attack on the US army from this point on in the campaign focused on the following 
themes. First, it dismissed Hatch’s policy of concentrating his forces in March 1880 (see next 
chapter) thus, in their view, allowing the Apaches to raid unhindered. Second, Hatch and other 
officers were accused of underplaying the seriousness of the Apache war in Washington DC. Third, 
the army, and in particular Hatch, was accused of exaggerating the success of his troops, to the 
extent of claiming victory when, in fact, his soldiers had been defeated by the Apaches. As we have 
seen, there was certainly truth in the accusation that Hatch, with no good reason, had trumpeted 
the success of the troops in January and February 1880. There may also be some basis for the charge 
that Hatch was not giving his superiors an accurate picture of events. For example, General Pope 
was to state, near the end of March 1880, that there had been no attacks on the citizens of New 
Mexico for a number of months.74 In fact, during March, the Apaches had launched a series of 
raids in the Rio Grande valley. (See Chapter 4.) Over and above the writers’ fury at Hatch’s public 
statements, the reason for the vociferousness of these attacks was clear: Apache guerrillas were 
paralysing the economic development of the region.75 It must be noted that the press did accurately 
reflect the anger of local citizens at the army’s lack of success against the Apaches.
The press were also, for the moment, somewhat ambivalent concerning the increased use of 
Apache scouts.
Well if this war cannot be ended without them, let it be so. Upon general principles we dislike 
this policy. It teaches the Indian the use of arms. It increases his vanity and sense of his own 
importance. It makes him impudent and proud. It belittles the white man in his estimation. 
But anything to end this trouble – even a bad treaty is better than getting whipped.76
The solution offered by the press was to use local volunteers. These were argued to have been histor-
ically successful against the Utes, Navajos and Mescaleros. However, this call was based on the 
assumption that the Federal Government would not only to authorise the militia, but also to feed 
69 Thirty Four, 24 Mar., 1880.
70 Ibid, 28 Apr., 1880.
71 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 27 Mar., 1880, p.684; See also copy in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, 
RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
72 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 20 Mar., 1880.
73 Ibid, 27 Mar., 1880.
74 Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 26 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.353-356.
75 ‘Resolution criticising the Conduct of the War’ passed in La Mesilla on 29 Mar., 1880 and published in 
Thirty Four on 31 Mar., 1880 (presented with general approval of the meeting by: A.J. Fountain, Jacinto 
Armijo, Rafael Ruelas, Euginio Moreno, Carlos Armijo and S.H. Newman).
76 ‘The Situation’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
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outfit and arm these volunteers.77 First, this call for federal support seems to be somewhat at odds 
with the ‘get up and go’ independent attitude one might associate with settlers on the American 
frontier. For example, the Grant County Herald decried the apathy of the people in the territory, 
not because they failed to take up arms, but because they failed to write to the Government about 
Apache depredations and the poor performance of US troops.78 Second, when New Mexican 
volunteer forces did attempt to tackle Apaches, they were notable in their lack of success. So far, 
two groups of armed citizens, (the Hillsboro men, on 11 September 1879 and Van Patten, on 13 
October 1879) sustained heavy casualties when they were ambushed by Apaches.
However, the press undermined its own position by indulging in gross misrepresentations of the 
situation in southern New Mexico. This was compared unfavourably to the Modoc and Seminole 
wars. In the former, it was argued, Captain Jack (the Modoc leader) had had far more men than 
Victorio. How was it that the former was defeated in a month, but the latter still at large after almost 
a year?79 We have already seen that a simple comparison of opposing numbers is not an accurate 
reflection on the reality of war with the Apaches. In comparison to the inaccessible Seminole 
Swamps, it was argued, ‘Victorio has the plains and hills, which are as well known to his enemies 
as to him. His country is comparatively open.’80 The truth of the matter was that the area of opera-
tions covered by the Victorio war was vast in comparison to that covered by the Modoc conflict. The 
statement that Apacheria was as well-known to their enemies as to the Apaches was contradicted 
by the very same press. The Grant County Herald warned that any citizen entering the Black Range 
and its environs pre-1880 was entering unknown territory and could expect to be attacked and 
killed by Apaches.81 It was simply not true that the US army and citizens in New Mexico knew the 
territory as well as the Apaches.
As for the charge of incompetence levelled at Hatch, while the Colonel may not have conducted 
a perfect campaign, he had a clear notion of how to attempt to fight the Apaches with the limited 
resources at his disposal. Even while Morrow was in the field pursuing Victorio in January 1880, 
Hatch was thinking ahead to future operations against the enemy. He had a clear idea of the 
direction of future operations, and took the opportunity to form the Third Battalion from troops 
not currently committed to the pursuit of Victorio. This was accomplished even as other troops, 
who would make up the First and Second Battalions, were still ‘in the field’ in hot pursuit of 
the Apaches. Hatch also made enquiries, in mid-January, as the possibility of raising additional 
Apache scout units. This does not suggest incompetence, but shows a commander who, even as 
some of his troops were still committed to field operations, was planning for future operations. 
It was also quite plain that the Colonel was well acquainted with the challenges which faced any 
officer charged with tackling Apache guerrillas. In a letter addressed to the Assistant Adjutant 
General, Department of the Missouri, Hatch comprehensively summarised these obstacles (see 
document file no, 37) and even went so far as to respond to the critical comparison with the Modoc 
War by concluding that:
It is impossible to describe the exceeding roughness of such mountains as the Black range and 
the San Mateo. The well known Modoc Lava Beds are a lawn – compared with them.82 
77 The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
78 Ibid, 3 Apr., 1880.
79 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
80 Ibid.
81 ‘The Black Range’, The Grant County Herald, 18 Dec., 1880.
82 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25 Feb., 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; same letter in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 
2601, Box 88; See also slightly edited version in Personal File Albert, P. Morrow, NA, RG94, Entry 
297, Boxes 71 & 72; Hatch to AAG DoM, 25 Feb., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; 
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Hatch exaggerated the situation when he asserted that US army detachments were consistently 
outnumbered by the Apaches. In fact, within a month of taking over command he made a number 
of quite inaccurate observations in a private letter to General Pope. While he admitted that 
campaigning against Victorio had been hard field service, he claimed that in each engagement the 
Apaches had sustained more casualties than the army; that the Apaches had twice escaped certain 
destruction through the advent of ‘dark nights’;83 and that the mountain howitzers had inflicted 
serious casualties on their foe. In the last case, Hatch stated that he had learned ‘from a wounded 
Indian found in the chaparral after a fight, that one shell killed and wounded six Indians’.84 He 
rightly pointed out that in January and February 1880 not a civilian had been killed; nor had 
travel or freight been disrupted.85 Yet, as we have seen, Victorio’s primary effort during this period 
was directed at disrupting the Ninth Cavalry’s ability to operate successfully. As we shall see, in 
March 1880, Victorio turned his attention to targeting the local populace and a large number of 
US civilians were killed or wounded and there was severe disruption to travel and trade. Finally, 
Hatch blamed the ‘Indian Bureau’ for provoking the war on two counts. First for its ‘floundering’86 
concerning where to settle the Warm Springs Apaches; and second, for ‘lull[ing]’ the army into a 
false sense of security by reporting that Victorio was content to stay on the Mescalero reservation.87 
While not completely untrue, his early communication with Pope shows either an inability to check 
the facts or a wilful distortion of the truth.
Yet, Hatch did give the reader a clear idea of the difficulties of trying to defeat Apache guerrillas, 
particularly the loss rate in army mounts in such an endeavour, and the economic chaos caused by 
the raiding Apaches. With these observations, Hatch very quickly gained the support of General 
Sherman, who clearly had his own ideas as to how to defeat the Apaches:
I am directed by the General of the Army to say that he is well satisfied with the operations of 
the troops in Southern New Mexico, knows the difficult nature of the country and does not 
expect impossibilities.
The General remarks that there is no necessity for great haste, only to prepare for the coming 
emigrant and subdue these Apaches in the course of time.88
One can only imagine how the New Mexico press would have reacted to such sentiments. If this 
was Sherman’s prescription for success against the Apaches, it was even less proactive than the 
policy adopted by Colonel Hatch.
Hatch to AAG Dept. Mo., 25 Feb., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; See also Army & 
Navy Journal, Vol.17, 20 Mar., 1880, p.664; Thrapp, 1974, pp.264-65.
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all the available troops and scouts, is now at McEvers’ ranch, near Hillsborough. His force is said to 
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However, the territorial press were not the only source of problems for the US army in New 
Mexico.
‘Friends’ as Enemies 2: False Reporting of Apache Raids
In an undated telegram from Fort Bayard to Santa Fé, Morrow made the following comment:
The report about Indians at point of rocks may be true but I do not believe it. Every day since 
my return I have received reports of Indians on the road about cummings89 and masons90 and 
in every instance the Indians have proven to be Mexicans or deer or troopers.91
The Ninth Cavalry had few enough resources to pursue actual Apache raiders, without having to 
expend these resources on investigating unsubstantiated rumours. Far to the east, along the Rio 
Grande between Texas and Coahuila, reports of raiding by Mescaleros allied to Victorio prompted 
the dispatch of four detachments of Eighth Cavalry troopers and one detachment of Twenty-
Fourth Infantrymen to scour the borderland for traces of these raiders.92 Each detachment reported 
no trace of Indians having gone into Mexico from the United States and concluded that reports 
of Indians on the United States side of the river were the product of vivid imagination.93 One 
Lieutenant Phelps, Eighth Cavalry, noted:
on three different occasions, I met a Mexican, who on catching sight of us, instantly fled, and 
when overhauled and questioned, they stated, that seeing a mounted party they at once took 
us for Indians, and if not undeceived would have spread the alarm of Indians far and wide. 
This fear of Indians may possibly account for the numerous abound stories I heard of Indians.94
The key point was that amongst the many false rumours, there would be accurate reports. Two 
detachments of Eighth Cavalrymen did pursue a trail of eight Indians believed to be from the 
Mescalero reservation. Captain Morris and then Captain Randlett pursued these Indians from 9 
to 15 March, until they lost the trail when it crossed into Mexico.95
Many officers felt that such rumours were often started quite deliberately in the hope that US 
army detachments would be stationed in the area. Not only would these detachments provide local 
protection, they would also prove to be lucrative additions to the local economy. The US army did 
not have the resources to protect every settlement from attack. Yet few people outside the army 
appreciated this fact. There were individuals within the local populace who, while clamouring for 
89 Fort Cummings.
90 Masons Ranch.
91 Morrow to Loud AAAG, either 10 Mar., 1880 or 10 Nov. or Dec., 1879 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
439, p.9 (This entry in the archives is not stored in any particular order and this telegram is dated the 10 
but no further indication of the date is given.) See also much later but similar comment from Hatch to 
Loud AAAG, 26 Aug., 1881 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.129.
92 Ord to the AG, MDoM, 30 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.359-380.
93 Ord to the AG, MDoM, 30 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.359-380; Tabular 
Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the DoTx, During the Year ending 
September 30, 1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.629-630.
94 Ord to the AG, MDoM, 30 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.365.
95 Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the DoTx, During the Year 
ending September 30, 1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.625-626.
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protection, were motivated either by fear or by hope of personal gain, which only compounded the 
difficulties faced by the US army in its attempts to combat the Apaches.
False reporting of Apache raiding was probably a further disincentive for the District of New 
Mexico, which already had poor relations with the papers, to share news with the local press. This 
in turn opened a new line of attack for the press. On 10 March 1880, Thirty Four complained that 
it could not give more information relating to Apaches to local citizens as the military were refusing 
to share information:
Have they [the citizens] no right to know when their lives are in danger? Have the troops been 
for the past six months so successful in protecting the people as to inspire perfect confidence 
in their all-protecting arms? No! But theoretically, the troops are for our protection; and resting 
secure in the theory, we must calmly fold our arms and be plundered. Such was the protection 
received by the party of a dozen who were massacred on the road near Mason’s last October96. 
Such was the protection received by the victims of the Jarralosa massacre97 about the same 
time. In the name of humanity we again call upon the military to “spread the news.”98
This was unfair to the military. Censorship of military telegrams was relaxed in late March to 
allow the communication of Apache depredations to citizens, on condition that the papers did 
not publish details of troop deployments.99 Moreover, District Headquarters was by now painfully 
aware that a significant proportion of intelligence received was either outdated or inaccurate, and to 
share such information would likely provide the territorial press with an additional rod with which 
to beat the military.
‘Friends’ as Enemies 3: Illicit Trade Networks
As noted earlier, the New Mexico press accused certain Mexican settlements of trading with, and 
sheltering, Apaches; but this was not the only source of illicit supplies of guns, ammunition, food 
and intelligence which were reaching the Apaches. Hatch complained that:
Every Mexican who has a sheep herd out of anxiety to procure his property is ready to afford 
them with ammunition and information. The country has cattle nearly every where if no game 
could be obtained there is abundance for them to subsist upon. 100
What the Army failed to understand was that these shepherds were caught between the US army 
and the Apaches. It would have been a brave Mexican shepherd who relied on theoretical US army 
protection in refusing to trade when confronted by Apache warriors. This relationship, in some 
cases, may have amounted to a ‘protection racket’ where landowners would supply their employees 
with ammunition on the understanding that this be given to the local Apaches in return for their 
not attacking the flocks and their shepherds. The economics of cattle ranching were such that the 
ranchers, in the face of the Apaches, had a choice of either employing large numbers of cowboys or 
96 This refers to the carreta convoy wiped out on the 13 Oct., 1879. (See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the 
Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879, p.247).
97 This attack occurred around about the 10/11 Sept. 1879. (See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a 
Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879, pp.187-188).
98 Thirty Four, 10 Mar., 1880
99 Ibid, 31 Mar., 1880
100 Hatch to Pope, 4 March, 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
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confining the cattle to specific areas. Either option would undermine their profit margins, whereas 
the loss of small numbers of steers to the Apaches may have 
been the least worse option for the ranching community. Again, one should not rule out the possi-
bility that individual ranchers may have come to more explicit arrangements with the Chihenne 
Apaches to protect their economic interests. As Benjamin E. Davis, Postmaster, San Augustin, 
New Mexico noted:
I have had to employ armed men to guard our sheep herds and employees at a monthly cost of 
$350. About six weeks ago one of my employees was killed  and last week we had ten horses 
stolen from the ranch, and a set of troughs 300 feet long that we use for watering sheep was 
so badly damaged as to render them useless, all of which Damage was caused by Indians.101
This clearly sums up the cumulative economic effect of Apache guerrilla warfare: costs in terms 
of lost lives lost, property destroyed, and the need for added protection of property. Against the 
local population population’s concern for their profit margin, the interests of the US army when 
campaigning against independent Apaches would have weighed little, at best rousing fleeting indi-
vidual regret.
Asymmetric Warfare?
Hatch was not an incompetent commander, but he did not fully comprehend his opponents. While 
he correctly identified the fact that Victorio had been operating free of dependants in January and 
February 1880, he incorrectly assumed that all of these dependants were sheltering on reservations 
in New Mexico and Arizona.102
The fundamental problem facing the US army was a combination of failing to fully comprehend 
the methods of warfare used by the Apaches and not having nearly enough resources to cover the 
amount of territory involved. Many officers, including Hatch, appreciated that to give their troops 
any chance against Victorio, they required enough Apache scouts, as the most ‘economical and 
expeditious manner’103 by which a quick end to this Apache war could be achieved:
Without these Indians as trailers the troops can do nothing and even with all the caution 
of the Indians, the first intimation of the hostiles position is usually a volley. I believe the 
hostiles must be hunted out of the mountain fastnesses, and the experience of General Crook 
in Arizona has shown this is the most effectual and economical to accomplish the end desired. 
This may look like delegating the work of the soldiers to the Indians, it is based upon experi-
ence and has sound reasons to recommend the course advised.104
Hatch was far more candid in a private letter to General Pope concerning the political economy of 
using Apache scouts:
101 Newspaper clipping of letter from Benjamin E. Davies in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 89.
102 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.82, pp58-65; Laumbach, 2001, p.122.
103 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; same letter in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, 
Box 88; See also ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.23.
104 Ibid.
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Plate 3.1. Cuchillo Negro, a village that, along with Canada Alamosa (Monticello) and Las Palomas, was 
widely believed to have amicable trading relations with the Chihenne Apaches up to 1880. (Photo: author)
Plate 3.2. Remains of the original Las Palomas village near the banks of the Rio Grande. Unlike the 
settlements of Canada Alamosa and Cuchillo Negro, the current settlement of Las Palomas has moved 
slightly from its original location. (Photo: author)
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I am in favour of employing Indians to operate against Indians. The animosity between the 
tribes as fostered here [means there] can be no concert of action against us by all the tribes, and 
whether they kill the hostiles or we lose the auxiliary, it [is] merely hastening the end inevitable 
at cost to the Indian. There is great economy in the use of the foot Indian.105
Despite Hatch’s requests, his superiors dilly-dallied over whether to allow him to recruit the addi-
tional Apache scouts he wanted, thus leaving him with too few scouts and troops to complete the 
very job his superiors wanted. 
My Kingdom for a Horse …
As February passed, the US army not only reorganised its structure but also had to refit its men. 
Special Order No. 18, of 8 February 1880, is mostly concerned with the effective delivery of recruits 
and replacement horses.106 Indeed Hatch’s somewhat ‘grand’ reorganisation of the Ninth Cavalry 
into three battalions looks to have been somewhat undermined if we compare the numbers of avail-
able men to serviceable horses. By the end of February 1880, the First, Second and Third Battalions 
would have been able to field 119, 157 and 145 mounts respectively to give a total of 421 Ninth 
Cavalrymen ready for mounted field service. By the end of March, these figures had increased to 
141, 147 and 149, to give Hatch a total of 437 mounted troops. (See Tables 3.1 to 3.3.) Therefore, 
Hatch made an urgent request to General Pope for 100 horses ‘to replace the horses in the Ninth 
Cavalry disabled by hard service during the past three months’.107 In a personal letter to General 
Pope, Hatch added that:
the horses brought out by Dodge at great expense last winter are melting away like snow, [due 
to] the fearful mountain trails, scant grass with no water or very little need of grain when in 
the mountains combined with forced marches to which they readily succumb.108
However, these numbers have to be balanced by the fact that the monthly regimental returns reveal 
that, at the end of February, the Ninth Cavalry had 671 troops available for active service, whereas 
by the end of the following month, this figure had fallen slightly to 664 men. In other words, 
Colonel Hatch could only mount 62.7 percent of his available men at the end of February; but by 
the end of March he could deploy 65.8 percent of the Ninth Regiment as cavalrymen. Furthermore, 
these tables also reveal that Hatch’s strategy of trying to ‘rest’ his forces met with mixed success. 
Both the First and Third Battalions managed slowly to reduce the number of unserviceable horses; 
but the Second Battalion actually had an increase in the number of its broken-down horses. What 
the tables suggest is that the rate of recovery for broken-down horses was very slow. Of the 114 
unserviceable horses with the First and Third Battalions in February 1880, 99 were still unservice-
able at the end of March.
On a more positive note all three battalions managed to reduce the number of horses lost during 
this period. However, for Hatch, expected to launch his operation against the Apaches by the 
beginning of April, it was obvious that he needed additional fresh horses, and more time to allow 
those horses broken down by field service to recover. He would be given neither. Plainly put, 
the Ninth Cavalry was expected to keep the federal peace in New Mexico on a shoestring. This 
105 Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
106 Special Order No. 18 Feb. 8 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
107 Pope to Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 25 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.342.
108 Hatch to Pope, 20 Feb., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
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may explain Hatch’s exaggeration of the number of Apache warriors before press criticism became 
sustained. Originally, this over-estimation may have been a symptom of the scarce resources at his 
disposal. In other words, Hatch was caught in a bureaucratic cleft stick when reporting to federal 
authorities in Washington. On the one hand, he had to point out the lack of human, equine and 
material resources. On the other hand, how far could the deteriorating situation at the hands of 
a numerically inferior opponent be outlined without adverse publicity threatening, for example, 
officer’s promotions or the reputation of their regiment?
Table 3.1 First Battalion, New Mexico Troops, Available Men to Serviceable Horses, February–March 
1880109
Company Available Men Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Lost Horses
First Battalion, New Mexico Troops, February 1880
B  55  17 21  3
C  60  39  0  2
H  54  17 15  0
L  57  34  5  1
M  54  12 30  7
Totals 280 119 71 13
First Battalion, NM Troops, March 1880
B  60  27 13 0
C  53  21 17 1
H  56  25 22 1
L  57  34  5 0
M  60  34  8 0
Totals 286 141 65 2
Table 3.2 Second Battalion New Mexico Troops, Available Men to Serviceable Horses, February–
March 1880110
Company Available Men Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Lost Horses
Second Battalion, New Mexico Troops, February 1880
A  57  31 10  2
D  55  53  1  0
F  55  38  0 13
G  54  35  6  1
Totals 221 157 17 16
Second Battalion, NM Troops, March 1880
A  49  42  9  0
D  45  25 23  6
F  45  33  5  0
109 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
110 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
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Company Available Men Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Lost Horses
G  58  47  4  0
Totals 197 147 41  6
Table 3.3 Third Battalion, New Mexico Troops, Available Men to Serviceable Horses, February–
March 1880111
Company Available Men Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Lost Horses
Third Battalion, New Mexico Troops, February 1880
E  52  25 33 4
I  56  57  3 0
K  62  63  5 0
Totals 170 145 41 4
Third Battalion, NM Troops, March 1880
Company
E  53  29 27 2
I  66  57  3 0
K  62  63  4 0
Totals 181 149 34 2
Other areas requiring attention included the need to transport a qualified signal corpsman and a 
civilian telegraph operator to key points on the telegraph network.112 A second Hotchkiss mountain 
gun was in the process of being sent to Hatch, though it seems to have become lost in transit as the 
Colonel telegraphed a request for its whereabouts to be confirmed or at least ascertained.113
Finally, several civilian guides were attached to Hatch’s force. Laumbach mentions one Hispanic 
guide serving with McLellan’s company, and attached Apache scouts.114 He also argues that Henry 
Parker (Chief of Scouts) and Van C. Smith may have been present. Both men were certainly with 
Apache scout companies during April and May 1880. Parker had been recruited as early as October 
1879 and was based at Fort Bayard.115 This would suggest that he was attached to Lieutenant 
Maney’s scout company. Parker was also noted as leading Apache scouts into the Florida Mountains 
in December 1879, but finding no trace of Apaches.116 Finally, Laumbach states that Carroll’s 
battalion was accompanied by Jose Carillo,117 interpreter at the Mescalero reservation, and a man 
111 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
112 Special Order No. 18, 8 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, par 3.
113 Platt AAG to AAAG DoNM SF, 11 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.81.
114 Laumbach notes that Morrow’s battalion met a party of militia, led by Gregorio Miranda, from the 
village of El Colorado in the Caballo Mountains. He suggests that the guide may have been recruited 
from Miranda’s party the rest returning home after confirming that the Apache were no longer an 
immediate threat to their livestock grazing in the Caballo mountains. (p.165).
115 Thirty Four, 15 Oct., 1879.
116 Ibid, 17 Dec., 1879.
117 This is the same man who eventually calmed Victorio down when he or Kaytennae attacked Agent 
Godfroy in Aug. 1879.
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variously named as Enbank, Eubank or Burbank.118 Recent research confirms that he was called 
William Eubank.119
This re-organisation was arranged in tandem with that of units in both western Texas and 
Arizona. By 12 March 1880, Hatch had submitted the basic outline of a plan to disarm and 
dismount the Mescalero Apaches. He would use New Mexico troops, including those sent by 
the Department of Arizona, to drive the Apaches eastwards across the Rio Grande and on to the 
Mescalero reservation. At the same time troops from Texas would advance north-west towards the 
same reservation and sweep up any raiding parties in the process. (see document file no. 38) The 
two forces were set to rendezvous at the Mescalero agency on 12 April 1880. Hatch thought that 
because Victorio ‘feels strong’, the Apache leader might stand and fight. If so, Hatch was confident 
that he could inflict a defeat of such magnitude upon the Apaches that the subsequent operation to 
disarm and dismount the Mescaleros would be a formality.120 
By this time Hatch believed that Victorio’s following, which he thought now included the Warm 
Springs, Mescalero and Mexican Apaches, were based in the San Andres Mountains.121 General 
Pope agreed the detail of the plan on or around 26 March122 and it was further approved by General 
Sheridan on 30 March 1880.123
Returning the Ojo Caliente Reservation to the Chihenne Apaches: The US Army Examines 
the Peace Option
It must be acknowledged that while Colonel Hatch and his superiors were planning for war, they 
also explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Warm Springs Apaches.124 Hatch 
may have misinterpreted some of the tactics being used by Victorio, but he fully understood the 
reasons for the Apache leader’s hostility. He argued that the decision to remove the Warm Springs 
Apaches to San Carlos was central to the continuing hostilities. ‘I am satisfied old Victorio and 
many of his Indians [would] rather die than go to San Carlos.’125 Hatch recommended that Victorio 
be granted his wish and be returned to Ojo Caliente. This reversal of policy seems to have been 
accepted by the Department of the Interior, as instructions were sent to Acting Agent Lieutenant 
118 Laumbach, pp.147-148. This must be the same man who accompanied Lt. Conline to Nautzilla’s camp 
in early Feb., 1880.
119 William Eubank is sometimes referred to as ‘Enbank’ or ‘Burbank’ but is clearly named as such in First 
Lieutenant Clark, Dillard Hazelrig, Fifteenth Infantry, AAQM, Fort Stanton to AAG, DoM, 31 May, 
1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 91.
120 Loud to General Pope, Fort Leavenworth, 12 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.219-220; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.265; Thrapp, 1967, pp.193-
194; Stout, p126; Leckie, 1967, pp.216-218; Worcester, p.226; Haley, 1981, p.325.
121 Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 22 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.154.
122 Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 26 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.353-356.
123 Whipple to Pope, 30 Mar., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.132.
124 Including General Sherman, who had a talent for camouflaging any sympathy for American Indians 
with the most genocidal of statements. 
125 Hatch, Fort Craig NM, to AAAG SF, 20-22 Feb., 1880, (The date on this letter is unclear but was 
placed between letters dated the 20 and 22 of Feb., 1880) ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.411; See also Laumbach, pp.123-124.
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Chaffee at San Carlos to send the Warm Springs Apaches living there to Ojo Caliente, in the 
charge of a reliable employee and escorted by the San Carlos Indian Police.126
There was a further, less humanitarian127 reason, for Hatch’s recommendation. He thought 
Victorio enjoyed an additional advantage in that many of his dependents were still living on the 
San Carlos Reservation being fed by the United States. ‘It is a great mistake for us not to have 
the women and children in our hands.’128Thus they were not a constraint on Victorio’s actions. 
Both Hatch and Pope were convinced that this measure would persuade most of the independent 
Apaches, including Victorio, to surrender. The newly resettled Apaches might then be prevailed 
upon to help finish off any remaining renegades.129 This was not the first time that this option had 
been considered. In March 1879, whilst Victorio had been staying at Ojo Caliente, Hatch had 
suggested recruiting some of the Warm Springs Apaches as scouts once the existing Navajo scouts 
had been discharged.130 Hatch also thought that if the San Carlos Indian Police were used to escort 
the Warm Springs Apaches back to Ojo Caliente, these policemen could then be used in the short 
term to hunt down any remaining Apache renegades.131 Hatch also tried to justify what was a fairly 
blatant attempt to inflate the number of Apache scouts at his disposal132 by arguing that as the 
San Carlos Police had already let the Warm Springs Apaches escape twice, ‘It seems proper they 
should assist in their recapture.’133 If this was actually true then this is surely a good argument for 
not employing them. To be fair, Hatch’s concern was even if the Apaches were either persuaded 
peacefully to surrender, or beaten into submission, there would be small bands of holdouts. Such 
independent Apaches would continue to depredate among the miners and prospectors scattered 
over the country. Hatch was convinced that moving the San Carlos Warm Springs Apaches to Ojo 
126 Brookes, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Chaffee 8 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.235-236; Schurz to the Secretary of 
War, 10 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Feb., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
127 During the Ute Conflict in 1879, Hatch had advocated that a substantial amount of Navajos should 
be armed and sent against the Utes retaining the women and stock captured during such an operation. 
(Hatch to Pope, 2 Oct., 1879, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.2, Jan.-Dec. 1879, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.266).
128 Hatch to Pope, 9 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
129 Hatch, Fort Craig NM, to AAAG SF, 20-22 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.411; see also Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth 20 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp151-152; Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to 
AAAG SF, 22 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.412-413; 
Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG 26 Feb., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, pp.420-421; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 21 Feb., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; Pope to Sherman, 24 Feb., 1880 & Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth 20 Feb., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
130 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25 Mar. 1879, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.2, Jan.-Dec. 1879, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.72.
131 Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 26 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.161; Hatch to AAG Dept. Mo., 25 Feb., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
132 As employees of the Department of the Interior, (Hereafter referred to as the ‘DoI’),the San Carlos 
police might not count as being members of the US army and thereby avoid political problems concerning 
Congress-approved manpower limits upon their standing army.
133 Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 26 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.161; Hatch to AAG Dept. Mo., 25 Feb., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
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Caliente would minimise the number of such renegades and at the same time maximise the number 
of potential scouts to combat these holdouts.134
It must also be noted that between March and October 1880, Colonel Hatch, depending upon 
how much pressure he was under, and perhaps depending on the audience addressed, veered back 
and forth from being clearly sympathetic to Victorio’s case to advocating his complete destruction 
by any means. At one point, he suggested that Apaches tasked with meeting Victorio could be paid 
to bring in his head.135 In the light of Hatch’s initiative to return Ojo Caliente to the Chihennes, 
one should be wary of statements made, in the heat of the moment, by a sometimes very harassed 
District Commander.
By 30 March, Hatch, still hearing nothing of the proposed movement of the Warm Springs 
Apaches to Ojo Caliente, enquired as to their whereabouts.136 His efforts were frustrated by 
what was, at first glance, a most surprising source. Lieutenant Chaffee had reported back to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Warm Springs Apaches residing at San Carlos, including 
Victorio’s wife, stated that they wished to remain at San Carlos.137 On being informed of the Warm 
Springs Apaches refusal to leave San Carlos on 1 April 1880,138 Hatch was at first dumbfounded, 
finding this reluctance to move ‘singular’.139 Initially, Hatch thought that this undermined Victorio’s 
claim that he had only declared war because he had not been allowed to remain at Ojo Caliente 
with his people.140 However, on reflecting more deeply on the matter Hatch concluded that:
Of course these families object to be put into my hands knowing they would be held as hostages 
for the good behaviour of the Indians now out on the warpath it would be infinitely better if 
they were loose today with the hostiles instead of being taken care of and fed while the men 
are on the warpath.141
General Pope, unaware that the Warm Springs Apaches at San Carlos had refused to move, 
blamed the Department of the Interior and contacted General Sherman to register his frustration, 
134 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 11 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.215-216; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 12 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
135 Hatch to Carr, Camp Thomas, 11 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.600.
136 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 30 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.263.
On 1 April, 1880, Hatch was informed that Sherman was vigorously pursuing this question. (Loud 
to Hatch, Aleman, 1 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.269-270).
137 Chaffee to CoIA, 12 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
138 Chaffee, San Carlos to Hatch, Aleman, 1 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.275; See also CoIA to Secretary of the Interior, 7 Apr., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
139 Hatch, Fort Bayard to Capt. Chaffee, San Carlos, 13 Mar.,1880 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.466; Hatch to AAG Dept. Mo. 16 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 526; Same letter in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
140 Hatch to AAG DoM, 16 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
141 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 Apr., 1880,Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.275-276; Hatch to AAAG, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.19-20, & 
Hatch to AAAG SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.37-38; See also Hatch, Aleman 2 Apr., 1880, 
‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.369; Hatch first made this recommen-
dation to the AAG Fort Leavenworth on the 20 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp151-152; Pope to Sheridan, 4 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to Sheridan, 4 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
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arguing that it was clear that Victorio and his men would never accept San Carlos as a reservation. 
He added that until this fact was appreciated, there would be many more ‘unnecessary’142 fatalities 
amongst both Apaches and citizens, and the sooner that all the Warm Springs Apaches at San 
Carlos were sent back to Ojo Caliente, the better for all concerned. He concluded that it simply 
made no sense to feed and clothe the families in Arizona while many of their men were wreaking 
havoc in New Mexico.143 The refusal of the Warm Springs Apaches to move from San Carlos prob-
ably gave the on-going feud being waged by the Indian Bureau and the Department of the Interior 
against the War Department enough oxygen to reignite the administrative conflict. The Office 
of Indian Affairs reverted to its short-sighted insistence on the continuation of the concentration 
policy and the harsh treatment for those who resisted. Such a policy was ultimately of dubious 
legality as the US Supreme Court, in 1901, backed the US Court of Claims in stating that damage 
caused by ‘non-treaty’ Indians should be regarded as ‘a distinct political entity in a state of war’.144 
This recognition of political legitimacy was also (rightly) extended to Victorio’s Warm Springs 
Apaches and their Mescalero allies.145 In the meantime, such a policy ensured that the Victorio and 
like-minded Apaches would continue to resist to the bitter end.
However, despite the auxiliary intention to use Victorio’s dependents to force a settlement, it is 
quite clear that a number of officers were well aware of the reasons for Victorio’s continued resist-
ance and were willing to promote an ultimately honourable settlement with the Warm Springs 
Apaches.146 (see document file no. 39.) While the continued feuding over the direction of Indian 
policy continued, General Pope could only ask Hatch to be patient and to treat any captured 
Apaches as prisoners-of-war,147 a policy upheld by General Sherman.148
In general, both sides, needing some rest, recuperation and re-supply, seem to have laid low for 
the rest of February 1880. Lieutenant Conline, with A Company, Ninth Cavalry, again clashed with 
Apaches in the Sacramento Mountains on 28 February 1880. In a strategy that contrasted with that 
of his earlier encounter with the Mescaleros, Conline’s command launched a two-pronged attack 
on a camp of Mescalero Apaches on a rocky hill in the ‘south east branch of Alamo Canon’.149 A 
party under Lieutenant Clark managed to surround the horse herd, while Lieutenant Conline 
and the rest of his force launched an attack on the camp, which consisted of seven lodges with an 
estimated 17 occupants. Conline claimed to have captured and burned the camp and ‘captured 
142 Pope to Sheridan, 4 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to Sheridan, 4 Apr., 
1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
143 Pope to Sherman, 25 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to Sherman, 25 
Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; See also General Sherman’s endorsement of Hatch 
and Pope’s views in Sherman to Secretary of the Interior, 30 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 526 & in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
144 Skogen, 1996, p.148.
145 Ibid, p.147.
146 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 14 Feb., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.82, pp58-65.
Hatch was accused of trying to manufacture a stunning victory by “unconditionally” surrendering to 
Victorio while presenting this to the public as having brought peace to the region. (‘Town and County’, 
The Grant County Herald 20 Mar., 1880) The paper believed that if such a peace deal was struck, Victorio 
would be back on the warpath in six months. “However, it would be a fitting termination to Hatch’s 
farcical campaign.” (‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald 20 Mar., 1880)
147 Platt AAG Fort Leavenworth to CO DoNM 24 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.79
148 Sherman to Pope 29 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.169.
149 Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 10 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.209-210 see also pp.210-211; ‘Striking Indians’, Army & Navy Journal, 
Vol.17, 13 Mar., 1880, p.643.
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sixteen horses and five mules’.150 No casualties were recorded for either side.151 It was believed that 
the Mescaleros were led by ‘Capitan Blanco’.152
By early March 1880, hints that a decision has been reached by the US army concerning the 
‘dismounting and disarming’153 of the Mescaleros are contained in several telegrams ‘the contents 
of which I cannot telegraph’154 to Hatch from Department Headquarters. Hatch planned to ‘kill 
two birds with one stone’. If given enough time to rest and refit his forces, he calculated that he 
might be able to disguise his operation to disarm and dismount the Mescaleros.155 He would mount 
an operation that would appear to be aimed at Victorio, and which would be timed to ‘conveniently’ 
arrive at the Mescalero reservation by ‘operational chance’. It was hoped that this ‘happenstance’ 
would not alert the Mescalero Apaches until it was too late.156
On 2 March 1880, reports were received that Apaches had been seen on the Mescalero reser-
vation and that both Victorio and Nana were camped in the White Mountains.157 Yet Hatch 
remained convinced that the Apaches were based in the San Andres Mountains. Accordingly, he 
ordered Captain Hooker’s Third Battalion into the field, accompanied by Lieutenant Gatewood’s 
detachment of Apache scouts.158 These troops were to thoroughly scout the San Andres to confirm 
the Colonel’s ‘impression’ that the Apaches were concentrated there. Hooker was to move from Ojo 
Caliente to Aleman (Martin’s Wells), and from there he would follow Morrow’s earlier trail into 
the San Andres. Hooker was to keep Hatch fully informed via the telegraph station at Aleman of 
his progress.159 
Hatch gave very clear instructions that should Hooker encounter Apaches, and should the 
latter flee to the Mescalero reservation, he was not to pursue them, but rather he was to fall back 
on Aleman and await further instructions. ‘It is not considered advisable to follow them on the 
Reservation until we are thoroughly prepared to strike a decisive blow.’160 If the trails led away from 
150 Personal File John Conline, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 279; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company A, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb., 1880 in NA, RG94; Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 10 Mar., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.209-210 see also 
pp.210-211; See also Record of Events Feb., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 
1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88; Return for Mar. 1880 in 
Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Stanton, New Mexico, Jan. 1878-Dec. 1887, NA, 
M617, Roll 1218 ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880; ‘Striking Indians’, Army & 
Navy Journal, Vol.17, 13 Mar., 1880, p.643.
151 Chronological List, p.49 See also Record of Events Feb., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry 
Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88.
152 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 9th Cavalry, Jan./Feb., 1880 in NA, RG94.
153 Loud to Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 27 Feb., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.162-163.
154 Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 1 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent, DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.170.
155 Hatch To AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.189-190; Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG SF, 5 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.439.
156 Hatch To AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.189-190.
157 Hatch, Fort Bayard, 2 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.428; 
Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.182.
158 One suspects that, as Gatewood’s scout company was not ordered to move to New Mexico until 5 Mar., 
1880, it is unlikely that they were present. Hatch had personally requested Gatewood on 9 Feb., 1880, 
and perhaps had assumed that by this date Gatewood’s company was serving in New Mexico.
159 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to CO, 3 Battalion NM Troops, Ojo Caliente, 5 Mar., 1880 in ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5.
160 Ibid.
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the reservation, Hooker was to pursue them vigorously. He was also reminded to keep a close eye 
on the country on his flanks just in case Victorio attempted to move westwards towards the Black 
Range, or south into Mexico, rather than retreat to the Mescalero reservation.161 
On 4 March 1880, Hatch also instructed the ‘officer in charge’, probably Captain Steelhammer, 
at the Mescalero agency, that should Victorio make contact, he was to be informed of the large 
force of US troops gearing up for an offensive against him:
the object of this telegram is if possible to hold Victorio quiet and learn his position defi-
nitely until we are thoroughly prepared to crush these Indians out, and also not to alarm the 
Mescalleros by the movement of so large a number of troops.162
Hatch had already concluded that most of the Mescalero warriors had now sided with Victorio. He 
dismissed Agent Russell’s estimate that only 35 Mescalero warriors were absent from the reserva-
tion.163 As far as Hatch was concerned, he had what he regarded as reliable information that at least 
100 Mescalero warriors were operating with Victorio.164 His belief appears to have been confirmed 
by Captain Steelhammer a few days later when he noted that all but one small band of Mescalero 
Apaches had deserted the agency.165 Hatch left it till 23 March before he wrote to Agent Russell 
at the Mescalero reservation and requested that the Mescaleros be gathered in with their stock 
no later than 12 April 1880. At that point he did not inform the Agent of his intention to disarm 
and dismount the Mescaleros. The preceding day, he had written to Fort Stanton instructing them 
to send 20 days’ rations and forage for the Tenth Cavalry, who were expected to arrive by that 
date.166 Russell was not fooled and contacted the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He stated that 
he thought that it was right that Hatch should ask the Mescaleros to come into the agency; but he 
warned that, if Hatch’s intention was to disarm and dismount them, the Mescaleros would resist 
and probably retaliate by raiding neighbouring settlements. Russell added that, in his opinion, that 
while some Mescaleros were in sympathy with Victorio, they did not represent a majority of the 
tribe. He also concluded that, of this minority, only a few had actually joined Victorio.167
161 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to CO, 3 Battalion NM Troops, Ojo Caliente, 5 Mar., 1880 in ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5.
162 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to Officer-in-Charge, Mescalero Agency, 4 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.436.
163 Hatch to Loud, 18 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.230; See also Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88.
164 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.189-190; Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG SF, 5 Mar., 1880. ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.439.
165 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG SF, 11 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.456; See also Hatch, Bayard to Gen. O.B. Willcox, Prescott, 18 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 235, p.38; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 12 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.217.
166 Hatch to Russell, 23 Apr., 1880 & Hatch to CO Fort Stanton, 22 Mar., 1880 in Letters Sent Vol. 7, 25 
Oct., 1880 – 24 Jun., 1881 in HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, 
NA, RG393, M1081, Roll 1. Note. I found these two telegrams at the beginning of vol. 7. See also 
Hatch to Russell, 23 Mar., 1880 NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 475 p.91 & 94.
167 Russell to CoIA, 27 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Russell to CoIA, 27 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
526; R.E. Trowbridge to Secretary of the Interior, 6 Apr., 1880, in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, 
RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 89; See also R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the 
Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached correspondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527.
Colonel Hatch Reviews the Situation, February–March 1880 91
This appears to be a case of the right hand (the Department of the Interior) not letting the left 
hand (Russell, through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs) know about their support for the 
dismounting and disarming of the Mescalero Apaches mentioned earlier in this chapter.
In the meantime, the effort to refit the US forces ranged against the Apaches continued, with 
100 horses being sent from Kansas City to Santa Fé on or around 7 March 1880. Additional rifles 
and ammunition were sent from the Fort Union Arsenal to Fort Bayard, though there were not 
enough wagons available at Santa Fé to supply this material as quickly as it was required.168
An important ruling on the ‘hot pursuit’ of Apaches into Mexico also arrived at Fort Bayard, and 
this removed an important operational option for Hatch. The directive from the Secretary of War 
stated that, as of 24 February 1880, the US army should ‘consider the instructions of June 1st 1877, 
to General Ord which contemplates and provides that under certain circumstances he may pursue 
raiders across the border, as no longer in force’.169 (see document file no. 40.)
This could not have come at a more inopportune moment. Within a fortnight of this directive, 
the Apaches renewed hostilities and plunged the troops in New Mexico into a prolonged campaign 
which would not end until the beginning of June.
168 Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 5 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.192.
169 Alex Ramsey, Secretary of War to the General of the Army, 24 Feb., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88; See also Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 9 Mar., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.205.
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Victorio Strikes the Rio Grande Valley, March 1880
 
If Hatch’s message outlining the forces arrayed against the Apaches was ever delivered to Victorio 
via Captain Steelhammer, it did not have the desired effect. In March 1880, Victorio’s warriors 
commenced raiding in the Rio Grande Valley (see Map 4.1), killing a number of people and stealing 
horses between Socorro and McEvers’ Ranch. News of this arrived with a garbled report of the 
capture of 30 cases of Winchester Rifles by the Apaches in Mexico.1 If this rumour were true, for 
Hatch at least, it went some way to explaining the large amounts of modern weapons currently 
in the hands of the Apaches.2 Hatch also noted that the Apaches were very well armed and had 
abundant supplies of ammunition. Here, he reiterated his long-held view that this equipment was 
gained from trade with a wide network of Mexicans, and he implied that this trade took place on 
both sides of the border. Trade in Mexico was not the only source of rifles and ammunition for the 
Apaches. Hatch ruefully commented that:
It is unfortunate he should have captured 30 cases of Winchester rifles in Mexico. With abun-
dance of ammunition I fear he will or has armed every Indian who will join him, he has 
shrewdly used the Mescalero Reservation for an asylum for his wounded, and it is to my 
impression he has cached large quantities of stolen property upon the reservation.3
One of the first parties of raiders attacked and killed a Mexican herder called Refugio Delgado, and 
ran off 15 head of cattle near Alamo Spring. A citizen called Wood and five other men followed 
the raiders’ trail for 30 miles along the western side of the San Andres Mountains, until they were 
approximately opposite Aleman, where the trail joined a larger trail and turned into these moun-
tains. Wood’s party feared a trap and retired.4
Another party of raiders made their presence known near Hillsboro. A ‘reliable’ source informed 
Lieutenant Allen, signals officer in charge of telegraph lines in southern New Mexico, that a 
party of Apaches had crossed the Jornada del Muerto and the Rio Grande, ten miles south of Las 
Palomas, on the night of Monday 1 March, and that three men had been killed.5 Further reports 
indicated that this party had moved towards Hillsboro, and that the three men had been killed 
on the ‘main river road’.6 Near Hillsboro, early on 2 March, a Mexican family was rescued from 
1 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG, SF, 4 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, pp.435-436.
2 Hatch To AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.189-190.
3 Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88
4 Thirty Four, 3 & 10 Mar., 1880.
5 Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard 6 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.195-196.
6 Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 6 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.196.
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the Apaches by three ‘Wallace Rangers’ (volunteer militia), though the Apaches made off with 10 
mules in the direction of the Black Range.7 By 6 March, Hatch was able to report that not only were 
the troops of the Sixth Cavalry on their tail, but that Captain Beyer, with 100 Ninth Cavalrymen8 
and Lieutenant Maney’s Indian scouts, was also in the area. A further Apache scout company from 
Arizona had been instructed to advance to Hillsboro. As noted in the previous chapter, Captain 
Hooker’s command was ordered to move into the San Andres Mountains. These particular Apache 
raiders inflicted no further casualties and faded away from view.9
Hatch’s reliable acting assistant adjutant-general, Captain Loud at Santa Fé, also informed 
Hatch that no report of this raid had been sent to Department Headquarters, as Loud felt that it 
was Hatch’s decision whether any such information was passed on.10 These two attacks were only 
the first of a series of raids on the inhabitants of the Rio Grande valley.
Guadalupe Ascarate of Las Cruces reported sending two men and six mules to rendezvous with 
his pack train travelling from Las Vegas NM to Silver City. Both men and two mules were killed 
by Apaches near Las Palomas on or around 5 March.11 The two men killed had been carrying two 
Winchester rifles, two Colt revolvers and 100 rounds of rifle and 60 rounds of pistol ammunition.12
Estanislao Montoya, ‘personally known to almost every one of Victorio’s band’,13 was raided by 
his former acquaintances. On 12 March 1880, at Nogal, approximately 40 miles north of San Jose, 
he lost 120 horses worth $3,000 to Apache raiders. The Apaches drove the horses off towards the 
Mescalero reservation, crossing the Rio Grande near San Jose.14 On the same day, at Toussaint’s15 
Ranch four mules and three horses were stolen.16
Two ‘civilians’ were slain near La Luz, approximately 10 miles to the south east of the Tulerosa 
agency on the Mescalero reservation, sometime during March.17 A citizen was reported killed at 
Blazer’s Ranch on 15 March 1880.18 Again during March, two wagons were ambushed between 
Hillsboro and Cummings, with three men killed. A woman and child survived and walked to Fort 
7 Thirty Four, 10 Mar., 1880.
8 What Hatch failed to point out to his AAAG, was that Captain Beyer was in charge of all the dismounted 
Ninth Cavalrymen from Fort Bayard backed up by 2 cavalry companies. (Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG 
SF, 5 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.439; See also Hatch 
to Morrow, 23? Feb., 1880 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5).
9 Hatch to AAAG SF NM 6 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.39-40.
10 Loud to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 9 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.208.
11 Thirty Four, 10 Mar., 1880; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Mar., 1880.
12 Thirty Four, 17 Mar., 1880.
13 Thrapp, 1988, p.1007.
14 E. Montoya to Wallace 23 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; See also E. Montoya 
to Governor Wallace, 23 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Luciano Chavez to Governor Lew Wallace, 27 Mar., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.257; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.267; Thrapp, 1988, pp.1006-1007. One Estanislado Montoya is reported as a San Antonio trader 
who was contracted to supply Fort McRae with corn in 1870. (Wilson, p.353).
15 See Lt Griffin’s survey report concerning the area between Fort Stanton and Fort Bliss. The Jornada Del 
Muerto covered in ‘fine gamma grass’ but worthless for grazing only four sources of water for 90 miles: 
Ojo del Muerto, Toussaint’s Ranch, Martin’s Well and the Stage station at Point of Rocks (p.2202) 
Notes little water in the Caballo Mts (p.2201) and that the San Andres even dryer than the Caballos 
(Report of Lt. E. Griffin, Corps of Engineers, submitted 26 Mar., 1879 in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 
33, 1879 Vol. I-II, p.2202).
16 Thirty Four, 17 Mar., 1880.
17 Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.88; ‘Hatch vs Breechclouts’ [Veni Vidi Vici]’, The Grant County 
Herald, 20 Mar., 1880; See also AAA Road Map, Arizona & New Mexico.
18 Webb, 1976, p.88.
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Bayard, arriving on 25 March, to report the attack.19 Captain Hooker reported parties of raiders 
leaving the San Mateo Mountains on 14 March, speculating that they were either going to the 
San Andres or the Mescalero reservation. The following day, in response to a report by Lieutenant 
Valois that Apaches were to the east of San Jose, Hooker, despite an outbreak of measles at Ojo 
Caliente,20 stated his intent to pursue them, whether they continued going east or attempted to 
circle back to the San Mateo Mountains.21
On 17 March, Lieutenant Schaeffer, with a detachment of unknown size, trailed and then 
sighted a party of four Apaches, only to lose track of his quarry as darkness fell. Captain Beyer 
sent out a detachment of 10 men under Sergeant Boyne to take up the trail. Beyer later reported 
that this small party was moving south and estimated that they would probably be found lurking 
near McEvers’ Ranch, or in the Goodsight Mountains.22 Captain Steelhammer sent word from a 
‘reasonably reliable’ source that Victorio, with a strong force of Apaches, was less than a day’s march 
away from, and was making for, the Mescalero agency. Steelhammer dug in, requested reinforce-
ments and awaited developments.23
On or around 20 March, a buckboard carrying mail was ambushed near Aleman, and the driver 
was reported slain and the mail scattered to the four winds.24 The Apaches also struck the telegraph 
line running out of Fort Cummings, and troops had to be sent from that post to repair the line.25 
Two couriers from Fort Craig were sent down the line to find the break, and Hooker, on learning 
of the break, moved the Third Battalion down to Aleman.26 Parties of Apaches were rumoured to 
be using the water near Aleman on a nightly basis, and mail drivers refused to operate their service 
unless escorted.27 During the last week in March, it was reported that the stagecoaches running 
out of Las Cruces were also refusing to travel unless escorted.28 By the beginning of April, mail 
runs were becoming more frequent across the Jornada, as enough troops were stationed at Round 
19 Thirty Four, 31 Mar., 1880.
20 Hooker 13 Mar., 1880, reports that he has taken all necessary steps to avoid an epidemic, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.221.
21 Hooker to Hatch/Loud, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.36.
22 Beyer, to Morrow Fort Bayard, 18 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-1889, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 453.
23 Loud to Gen. Hatch, Fort Bayard, 15 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.225-226.
24 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth & to Hatch, Fort Bayard, both 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.237-238; ‘Town and County’, The Grant 
County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880; See also Letter from Hatch dated 20 Mar., 1880 found between pages 29 
& 30 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy 
Journal, Vol.17, 27 Mar., 1880, p.693.
25 Letter from Hatch dated 20 Mar., 1880 found between pages 29 & 30 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; See also Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth & to Hatch, Fort Bayard, 
both 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.237-238.
In a somewhat ambiguous statement Hatch stated that ‘your last dispatch shows indications that 
Repairman is frightened he don’t know where line is down.’ If the lineman was afraid of encountering 
Apaches then one can hardly blame him. However, this could be read as indicating an earlier use of a 
trick noted from the later ‘Geronimo’ Campaigns where the line was cut and then spliced together with 
rawhide making it necessary for a minute examination of the line to spot the break. Being unaware of 
this tactic, the repairman may have checked the line and been unable to spot an obvious break.
26 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth & to Hatch, Fort Bayard, both 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.237-238.
27 Thirty Four 24 Feb., 1880.
28 Ibid, 31 Mar., 1880.
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Mountain, Point of Rocks and Aleman to provide small detachments of three soldiers for each 
run.29
Captain Beyer described how 10 Apaches raided Cienega Apache on 21 March, capturing 
12 horses and mules. Lieutenant Gatewood, with his command, was in the vicinity and made 
towards the site of the attack. (See Appendix 1.) Lieutenant Wright and another man, being well 
in advance of the detachment, were confronted by the Apaches and chased several hundred yards 
before rejoining the command. Gatewood’s detachment pursued the raiders for seven miles before 
they reached the Black Range. They were joined in the pursuit by Sergeant Boyne’s detachment, 
who were returning from their unsuccessful pursuit of the Apaches spotted by Lieutenant Schaeffer 
on 17 March, and Captain Beyer, with 12 men. The Apaches were well mounted and scattered as 
they entered the mountains. Gatewood’s detachment tried to continue the pursuit for another three 
miles, but gave up. Ten horses and mules were recovered30. (see document file no. 41.) That night, 
around midnight, a courier arrived at Gatewood’s bivouac and reported that three men had been 
killed at a nearby ranch, and that the Apaches were still at the ranch. Lieutenant Cruse, Surgeon 
MacPherson, 18 Apache scouts and 15 troopers were immediately sent in pursuit, but failed to 
catch the Apaches.31
While the above raids were confirmed as occurring, Captain Beyer was also plagued by the usual 
rumour mill which rumbled into action whenever warfare with the Apaches flared up:
Reported at Hillsboro that Indians ran off herd and Stage stock at Round Mountain on the 
Jornada on the eve of 14th inst – cannot trace the report to any reliable source – but I give it for 
what it is worth – Indians reported to have gone in direction of Mescalero Agency.32
Rynerson alerted the authorities that on 22 March, near Santa Barbara, the Apaches killed eight 
people, notably Don Santiago Gonzales, ‘the father of a territorial senator’, Green Worthly, ‘an old 
and well known resident and a member of the old California Column’, Juan Baca, ‘two boys’,33 and 
three unknown ‘Mexicans’.34 It was later reported that only Worthly, Gonzales, Baca and a man 
named Victoriano Fajardo had been killed in this raid.35 The same Apaches were believed to have 
slain eight sheepherders four miles north of McEvers’ Ranch on Tierra Blanca Creek on the same 
day. Among the slain were John Christy, Jose Fuente, Jesus J. Jola and Jose Candelaria. Rynerson 
stated that this attack was ‘only four miles from a camp of soldiers, and terribly heavy firing was 
heard from that direction.’36 This may have been at Wheeler’s Ranch,37 which was said to have been 
attacked by over 20 Apaches with the loss of Jose Purrieta, Jose Candelaria and John Christie, 
on 22 March. Wheeler had reportedly killed an Apache when his, Christie’s and Jojola’s anches 
29 Ibid, 7 Apr., 1880.
30 Beyer, Camp French to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 21 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-1889, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 453; See also Letter 22 Mar., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 
1880, University of Virginia at Charlottesville.
Thrapp also reports a skirmish between Lt Wright’s detachment and Apaches on 21 March, 1880 
near to Hillsboro. (1988, p.1608).
31 Letter 22 Mar., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville.
36 Rynerson to Governor Wallace, 25 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Ritch, (citing Rynerson’s letter of 25 Mar., 1880) 
Acting Governor, N.M. Territory to Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, 27 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, 
NA, M666, Roll 526.
37 This was near McEvers Ranch. It was R.D. McEvers who sent a courier to Beyer informing him of the 
attack. (Beyer, Camp French to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 22 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-
1889, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 453) Wheeler’s Ranch was said to be near the head of the Jarralosa. 
(Thirty Four, 31 Mar., 1880).
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Plate 4.2. A grave believed to be that of Green Worthly, one of many people killed by Apaches in the Rio 
Grande valley during March 1880. (Photo: author)
Plate 4.1. One of the old buildings still standing in Hillsboro, in 2006. Hillsboro was a focal point for 
Apache raiding in early March 1880. (Photo: author)
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were attacked.38 From Camp French,39 Captain Beyer dispatched Lieutenant Gatewood, newly 
arrived from his pursuit of the Apache raiding party, with his company of Apache scouts and Sixth 
Cavalrymen, to ascertain the truth of the report.40 
Both the Rynerson and Estanislao Montoya’s claims were later investigated by Captain Edwin 
Pollack, Inspector General, District of New Mexico and both reports were found to be accurate 
apart from the fact that the three unknown Mexicans had in fact escaped. Pollack also noted that it 
would have been impracticable for the army to defend individual ranches or herds, even if they had 
had three times the number of troops present.41
A Ninth Cavalry courier was ambushed and killed near San Jose on 23 March 1880. Captain 
Hooker reported that: 
San Jose attacked by Indians this morning Two couriers killed between San Jose and Ojo 
Caliente Victorio reported in force near Canada Alamosa will concentrate my command there 
at once.42
In fact, one courier, Robert Kane of K Company, Ninth Cavalry, had been killed and his weapons 
and horse taken.43 Two soldier and three Mexicans sallied forth from San Jose to attack the Apaches 
and in the exchange of fire one of the Mexicans was killed,44 but the Apaches were driven off.45
The following day, a representative of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad requested 
protection from marauding Apaches for their engineers working near Paraje.46 On 25 March, a 
telegram was sent from El Colorado asking for an escort for the mail service to Hillsboro as it had 
been ‘driven back’ close to where three men had been killed.47 
More attacks were recorded on 25 March, with Reade and Woode’s Ranch at San Nicholas 
(Spring?) raided, and 32 cattle killed and a further 100 driven off. At San Augustin, 10 horses 
were driven off towards Petia Blanca, presumably in or near the San Andres, as this is stated to be 
38 Thirty Four, 31 Mar., 1880.
39 The location of this camp is not clear. It was named after James Hansell French, after the officer killed by 
Apaches on 17 Jan., 1880. (See Chapter 2) It was initially called ‘Camp James Hansell French, but this 
was quickly shortened to Camp French. Captain Beyer, his company and a large group of dismounted 
Ninth Cavalrymen were stationed there in March, 1880. This force was initially deployed at McEvers 
Ranche but appear to have been quickly moved to Camp French. My best guess that it was somewhere 
in the region between Hillsboro and Cuchillo Negro and Las Palomas.
40 Beyer, Camp French to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 22 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-1889, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 472; See Thirty Four, 24 Feb., 1880.
41 Pollack to AAAG, DoNM, 18 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088,p 393) Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; see same letter in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, 
RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 89.
42 Hooker to Loud AAAG 22 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.26; See also Loud to Hatch, 
Fort Craig, 24 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.241.
43 Record of Events Mar. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88; Return for Mar. 1880 in Returns From 
U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, May 1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
44 According to the Army & Navy Journal, one soldier and one Mexican were killed in this skirmish. 
45 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 30 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.264.
46 WB Strong to Hatch 24 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.80; Strong to Hatch Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.244.
47 Thomas B Lynch to The Dept Comdr, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.26; Loud to Morrow, Fort 
Bayard, 25 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
p.248.
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approximately three miles from Morrow’s last contact with the Apaches in early February 1880. 
Finally, San Jose was attacked by 20 Apaches who killed three men.48 Smith also reported that the 
previous day a small party of Apaches had passed from McEvers’ Ranch to Hillsboro. This party 
attacked five herders but was driven off.49
On 26 March, two men were killed and a boy captured at Huning’s Ranch, 15 miles to the west 
of Polvedra.50 Three days later, Connelly’s Ranch was also reported to have been attacked, 80 miles 
west of Las Lunas, with Connelly losing all of his horses and mules. These attacks were allegedly 
perpetrated by 40 well-armed and mounted Apaches. The raiders then moved on to Rito Quemado 
and ransacked a freight train and attacked other settlers and travellers. However, it was widely 
assumed at District Headquarters that these attacks were exaggerated if not fictitious.51 Hatch was 
eventually directed to send an officer, Captain Pollack, to investigate the veracity of the claims.52 
When the Huning brothers were contacted by Pollack, it was found that, apart from the killing of 
two men, the rest of the information was hearsay. Connelly was also tracked down and stated that 
Victorio himself and five warriors had attacked his ranch and taken five horses and six mules, with 
a further six horses taken from the locality. The attack on Rito Quemado resulted in the taking 
of no more than four horses from the outskirts of the area. The locals opened fire and this was 
returned by approximately 25 Apaches. There was no indication of any casualties.53
Gatewood’s scout company had been stationed in the vicinity of Las Palomas since 25 March 
1880. Three days later, a small detachment of five scouts from the company, commanded by 
Lieutenant Cruse and accompanied by Surgeon MacPherson, buried two men who had been killed 
by Apaches several days earlier. These McPherson described as ‘strangers from Missouri on their 
way to Silver City’.54 It is more likely that they were two deserters from the Sixth Cavalry who 
were killed in very similar circumstances and at the same time. The two men were discovered by 
Lieutenant Cruse’s detachment, and Surgeon MacPherson stated that they had:
fought well considering they were armed only with pistols. We found their horses at least half 
a mile apart, but the men died together. One of them had eleven bullet holes in him and we 
trailed them half a mile by their blood.55
48 Thirty Four, 31 Mar., 1880.
49 Smith, Paymaster, Fort Cummings to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 25 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 
1868-1889, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 453.
50 Luciano Chavez, Socorro to Lew Wallace, 27 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; 
Luciano Chavez to Lew Wallace, 27 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 5 
May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.428-438.
51 Loud to Hatch, Aleman, 5 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.283; See also Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth 4 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.374; Huning to Ritch, Acting Governor, 3 
Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; See reports received of attacks on Huning and 
Connelly’s property 27 and 29 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
52 Loud to Hatch, Aleman, 27 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp339-340.
53 Pollack to AAAG, DoNM, 18 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
54 Letter 2 Apr., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville.
55 Ibid.
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Hatch stated that two deserters from the Sixth Cavalry were killed after they had sold their 
weapons, and speculated that they might have been killed by Mexicans.56 An anonymous letter 
dated Aleman, 5 April 1880, denouncing Thirty Four’s attacks on the troops also blamed Mexicans 
for killing the two deserters.57 However. MacPherson described how the same Apaches had 
attacked a group of Mexicans on the same day, killing five of them and carrying off two children.58
Lieutenant Cruse left a most vivid account of these two incidents59. In January 1880, he had 
been assigned to Lieutenant Gatewood’s Apache scout company.60 This detachment’s supplies were 
carried by an accompanying mule train, which had a complement of mule packers and was guarded 
by a detachment of Sixth Cavalrymen. The company operated as follows: the Apache scouts would 
fan out and scour the countryside for Apaches, while the mule train and its defenders followed in 
the rear. Cruse makes it quite clear that he felt that these scout units were the most effective means 
of combating Apache raiders.61 He also ascribes the Ninth Cavalry’s travails in pursuing Victorio’s 
warriors to their lack of such units.62 
After leaving Hillsboro, the Apache scouts, under Gatewood and Cruse, linked up with one 
Captain Moore at Chase’s Ranch, and the latter informed them of the destruction of a wagon 
56 Hatch, Aleman to AAAG, SF, 4 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, p.371.
57 Thirty Four, 7 Apr., 1880.
58 Letter 2 Apr., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville.
59 See Cruse, 1987, Chapter IV & V pp.46-73.
60 Cruse, 2001, p.262.
61 Cruse, 1987, p.54-55
62 Ibid, p.54
Lt Thomas Cruse.
Though a damaged photograph it gives a reasonably clear image of Lt. Thomas Cruse, the tall thin officer 
sitting at the lower left of the picture. (Carlisle Barracks)
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train and its 20 emigrants by Nana’s raiders.63 Arriving at Las Palomas, Gatewood made contact 
with Captain McLellan, whose Sixth Cavalry detachment was camped at the small settlement 
of Cuchillo Negro.64 McLellan asked Gatewood if he could verify a rumour that two Sixth 
Cavalrymen, George Allen and John Simmons,65 who had deserted his command four days earlier, 
had been killed to the south of Las Palomas by the Apaches. Gatewood despatched Lieutenant 
Cruse with some Apache scouts to investigate.66 Ten miles to the south of Las Palomas they 
encountered the remains of what Cruse referred to many years later as a large emigrant train.67 (see 
document file no. 42.1.) They had been ambushed, just after they had climbed out of a deep arroyo 
(see Map 4.2), and had probably dropped their guard when the Apaches suddenly opened fire at 
virtually point blank range.  
MacPherson also noted that efforts to combat Apaches raiding parties were hampered by false 
reports of their whereabouts. On 31 March, a Mexican sheepherder arrived at the camp and informed 
Lieutenant Cruse that he had seen four Apaches less than a mile away. Cruse, MacPherson and 
three Apaches scouts set out in pursuit, eventually cornering four Mexicans who had, in their turn, 
mistaken Cruse’s party for Apaches. On their return to camp, Cruse and MacPherson, expressed 
their annoyance towards their source by confiscating two of his sheep, which proved a welcome 
addition to the officers’ mess, on account of their having not had any meat rations for over a week.68 
On that basis, one wonders whether that particular shepherd would have considered his relations 
with the US army as much different from his relations with the Apaches.
Two Fifteenth Infantrymen on telegraph repair duty were posted missing, believed to have 
deserted. Private Norton was reported missing from La Mesilla, and Private Potter had been 
expected at El Paso. A description of the men and their equipment was circulated in the hope of 
their apprehension.69 A third man, named Brickley, was posted as a deserter, having been reported 
seen in the company of these two men in La Mesilla on 30 March.70 As we have seen, deserting 
was potentially a very dangerous activity; so it remains unclear whether these men had deserted, or 
been picked off by Apaches, or both. 
Without naming the date, Hatch reports that, Mescalero Apaches killed one man in an attack 
near El Colorado.71 Three men cutting hay near Ojo Caliente were also said to have been killed by 
Apaches.72 
Further to the east, W.T. Shedd, of Shedd’s Ranch, in the vicinity of San Augustine, reported a 
number of raids between the Organ Mountains and the Mescalero Reservation:
63 Ibid, 1987, p.67. No further details of Moore’s unit are given by Cruse. It may be that the title was honor-
ific dating back to service in the Civil War or earlier.
64 This appears to have been a small settlement founded in the 1850s near the mouth of the Cuchillo Negro 
River. (See Cuchillo Webpage Entry) However, Wilson states that the settlement was founded in 1871. 
(p.340) Gatewood seems to have contacted Capt. McLellan’s detachment as it moved from Camp Ojo 
Caliente to Las Palomas.
65 Record of Events Mar. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry 
Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 63; Laumbach, p.147.
66 Cruse, 1987, pp.67-68.
67 Ibid.
68 Letter 2 Apr., 1880 in MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville.
69 Loud to CO Fort Bliss, 1 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.271-272.
70 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 3 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.278.
71 Hatch to AAAG SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.18; Hatch, Aleman, to AAG, SF, 4 Apr., 1880, 
‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.371.
72 ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 27 Mar., 1880.
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Depredations committed in this vicinity, one man killed at the Cottonwoods Spring eight 
miles north from here at Mr Davis Sheep Camp, one horse taken and eight head of cattle at the 
same time. (David Woods with four men followed this trail north through San Andreas to the 
Embreo about sixty miles north from here) The miners at the Huera Mountains twenty [miles] 
east from here report Indians in that vicinity. Report of one man killed on the road between 
here and Tularosa [Tulerosa] three days since. The taking of five head of horse from here on 
the 23rd, also six head of horse from the adjoining Ranch on the same date. Trails of small 
bands passing to and from the Mescalero Reservation above and below this place are reported 
by nearly all parties coming in here. The herds of cattle owned by Woods and Read at San 
Nicholas are being rounded up and brought here for better protection. It is reported by parties 
that seem to be well informed that the Mescalero Indians are nearly all off the Reservation. 
Would it not be judicious to place a company of Cavalry here with a picket at San Nicholas to 
scout up and down the range and keep you informed of the movements any of the depredating 
bands in this vicinity. I feel more afraid of the Indians since they have broken up in small bands 
than when they were all together, when the military pursue them with some hope of success. 
I realize the difficulty of the military in subduing an enemy like the present one. I have been 
through the mile (as the saying is) in 69 and 70, when the San Augustine was the dread of the 
traveling public. If a company or picket is stationed here I will assist them every way I can in 
furnishing a guide whenever necessary to scout where they are unacquainted.73
Again while Shedd was clearly aware of the difficulties faced by the army, he was also a beneficiary 
of the army’s logistics network, being one of the independent agents providing forage for army 
horses and mules. He would benefit financially from having such a company of cavalry stationed 
on his ranch if he exaggerated the extent of the raiding. Whether Shedd did so, or not, is unclear, 
but less than two weeks after he sent this letter, he was sacked as a forage agent for malpractice.74 
(See Chapter 5)
Long-Term Strategy vs Short-Term Response
The US army’s response to this widespread raiding took the form of increased patrolling of the 
affected areas, and denial. Hatch believed that Victorio was still to the east and that having several 
detachments in the Rio Grande valley was more than enough to contain the Apaches.75 He argued 
that many of these reports were exaggerations and that the whole country was in a panic over a 
few scattered raiding parties, clamouring for levels of protection the US army simply could not 
provide.76
Hatch’s main concern was that his command should not be worn out in fruitless pursuit of real, 
but extremely mobile, Apache raiding parties; and he was adamant that his men and horses should 
73 Shedd to Hatch, 25 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
74 Hatch to AAAG, DoNM, 6 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
75 Hatch, San Jose, 26 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.396; 
Hatch to AAAG SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.27-29 This appears to be dated 26 March, 
1880; It was noted in the Report of the Chief Signal Officer that the telegraph station at San Jose was 
used as an HQ by the District Commander that year. It was strategically situated as it lay three miles to 
the south and seven miles to the north of the two most popular trails across the Jornada used by Apache 
raiders. (Report of Chief Signal Operator in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I-II, p.111).
76 Hatch to AAAG SF 26 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.28 & Hatch to AAAG SF 29 
Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.33-34.
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Plate 4.4. One of the graves of the two Sixth Cavalry deserters killed by the same Apaches who killed the 
Mexicans, and were believed to have been led by Nana. (Photo: author)
Plate 4.3. The burial site of the Mexicans killed by the Apaches to the south of Las Palomas. (Photo: 
author)
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not be wasted in pursuing figments of the local populace’s imagination.77 He was in the midst of 
planning a major operation, and he did not want his plans disrupted by the distractions posed by 
small bands of Apache raiders, no matter how distressing their activities might be for citizens. ‘I 
don’t wish anything to interfere with the general movement if it can be avoided.’78 
By mid-March, Hatch’s plans for an operation targeting the Mescalero reservation were advanced 
enough for him to inform Captain Steelhammer that troops under Grierson would be involved.79 
On 10 March, Hatch had requested the use of cavalry based in Texas.80 In agreeing to his request, 
General Ord specified that while Texas troops were operating in New Mexico, he should be kept 
fully informed of their progress, and that they should have returned to Texas by 20 April 1880.81
Hatch also requested that troops from Arizona cover the area west of the Rio Grande, as his 
intended operation would result in many New Mexican troops being deployed to the east of that 
river.82 In doing this, Carr was to ensure that such support did ‘not unlock San Carlos’ to Victorio.83 
Thus, Captain Daniel Madden with C Company, Sixth Cavalry, was sent into southern New 
Mexico to patrol the area between the Arizona line and the Rio Grande, while Hatch’s troops 
were concentrating their efforts to the east.84 Once arrived, they were tasked with patrolling the 
region encompassing Santa Barbara, Fort Cummings, McEvers’ Ranch and Las Palomas.85 (See 
Appendix 2.)
Colonel Carr was willing to support Hatch and shared Hatch’s view that Victorio should not 
be allowed to reach San Carlos. He was also worried that the recent arrival of Juh’s followers at 
San Carlos might cause some problems. Some concern was expressed concerning apparent ‘drunk-
enness and quarreling and dissatisfaction’ amongst the recently arrived Chiricahuas on the San 
Carlos reservation, which might be the precursor to a breakout. Lieutenant Haskell thought that 
there was no danger of such a development, but Carr thought it was best to keep a close eye on 
the situation.86 Lieutenant Blocksom was later ordered to move his detachment of Apache scouts 
and Sixth Cavalrymen to Camp Thomas. There he would be better placed to intercept any attempt 
by Victorio to reach San Carlos.87 This was in response to rumours that Victorio was making for 
77 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.60.
78 Hatch, Palomas NM, 24 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.400; See also Hatch, Fort Bayard to Willcox, Prescott, 18 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, 
pp.37-39.
79 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to Captain C. Steelhammer, 16 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.473-474.
80 Loud to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 10 Jan., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.208-209.
81 AAG Fort Leavenworth to AAAG, DoNM, 2 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Loud to Hatch, Aleman, 5 Apr., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.282.
82 Martin to Carr, 25 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.124-125.
83 Martin to Carr, 27 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.129.
84 Carr, Special Order No.6, 27 Mar., 1880, Special Orders Oct., 1879-Jan., 1881, DoAz, Vol. 1, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 239; Kerr AAAG Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, 
Vol.5, 13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.103, p.97; Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns From 
Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, 
M744, Roll 63.
85 Hatch, Aleman 5 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.373; 
Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880.
86 Carr to AG DoAz, 25 Mar., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 
13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.100, pp.90-91.
87 Carr, Special Order No.7, 8 Apr., 1880, Special Orders Oct., 1879-Jan., 1881, DoAz, Vol. 1, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 239.
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San Carlos;88 but it would also place Blocksom in a good position to counter any move by the 
Chiricahua Apaches to leave San Carlos.
The widespread raiding in the Rio Grande Valley caused Hatch great concern that this might be 
the precursor of a general move west by Victorio. In fact, having safely established himself back in 
the US, and having successfully transported plunder taken in Mexico, principally to the Mescalero 
reservation, Victorio was now looking for fresh sources of loot to fund his war against the US and 
Mexico. The widespread raiding in the Rio Grande valley reflected a continued effort to gather 
material which could be traded for rifles and ammunition. So while Hatch may have been wrong to 
predict an imminent move to the west, he was correct in holding his main force in check until the 
intention of the enemy could be divined. For the moment, only small detachments of troops and 
Apache scouts were sent in pursuit of the raiders.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, such carefully thought-out inaction was not well-received by 
the New Mexican citizens or press. Indeed, when Estanislao Montoya sent word to Hooker that 
Apaches had stolen his horses, had crossed the Rio Grande, and were going towards the Mescalero 
reservation, Hooker allegedly responded that he could ‘not arrange for their pursuit as he could 
neither divide his command nor move it.’89 In fact, Hooker did send out a company from his 
battalion after the raiders,90 but they were not quick enough to intercept them before they had 
moved into areas expressly forbidden to their pursuers. We know that Hooker was obeying orders to 
hold his command in readiness for future action; but this inaction led Montoya to assume that no 
protection was to be had from the US army. Montoya vented his frustration at Hooker’s apparent 
refusal to break up his command to follow Apache raiders by contacting the Governor of New 
Mexico, expressing no confidence in the army. Instead he asked the Governor to provide arms and 
ammunition for, between 50 and 100 volunteers, who would endeavour to protect the citizens.91
Hatch allowed Hooker, who had become convinced that Victorio was in the San Mateo Mountains, 
to lead his men into those mountains. He felt that the imminent arrival of McLellan’s company 
and Gatewood’s Apache scouts could support Hooker’s battalion if a large number of Apaches 
were discovered.92 For this reason, on 13 March, Captain McLellan’s reinforced company of Sixth 
Cavalry was tasked with scouting the San Mateo Mountains.93 McLellan established a base camp at 
Canada Alamosa and despatched his Apache scouts into the mountains. No recent signs of Apaches 
were found.94 Yet, when Hooker then proposed to follow trails which led towards the San Andres 
Mountains, Hatch immediately forbade this manoeuvre and, on 17 March 1880, quickly re-deployed 
McLellan’s detachment from Canada Alamosa to Ojo Caliente.95 Hatch informed Hooker that the 
latter’s intended move into the San Andres Mountains was premature and, ‘as soon as we are prepared 
to move from the river, Carroll will move on the Indians from Stanton and by that time troops coming 
88 Carr to AG DoAz, 8 Apr., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, 
13 Dec., 1879-7 May, 1880, Letter No.111, pp.101-102.
89 E. Montoya to Gov. Wallace, 23 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
90 Hooker to Montoya, 17 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
91 E Montoya to Wallace, 23 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526; E. Montoya to Gov. 
Wallace, 23 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
92 Hatch, Fort Bayard , to Hooker, 12 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, p.460; Hatch, Fort Bayard to Hooker, 16 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.475.
93 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.60; McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort 
Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
94 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
95 Ibid.
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up from Texas will be in position.’96 In forbidding this pursuit, Hatch implied that he wanted to wait 
for the arrival of Lieutenant Maney’s additional company of Apache scouts, who were expected to 
arrive in the area around 28 March. Hatch needed accurate identification of Victorio’s location, clearly 
arguing that US troops acting without Apache scouts would be unlikely to obtain this.97 Hatch’s senti-
ments about the nature of the terrain, and therefore the essential role of Apache scouts, was clearly 
underlined when he informed General Willcox that he was ‘indebted’ to him for the use of the Apache 
scouts.98 Yet in response to some attacks, Hatch did send out troops to watch certain parts of the 
country, although without committing too many of the troops earmarked for his planned operation. 
On 16 March, he dispatched Lieutenant Gatewood from Fort Bayard to scout the region between 
Hillsboro, Chase’s Ranch and Las Palomas.99 We have already seen the vigorous scouting and similar 
pursuits undertaken by this officer’s detachment. Around 20 March, Hatch also ordered Hooker to 
send one of his companies to Aleman, as the stage agent had reported that one of his drivers had been 
killed.100 A patrol of one officer and 23 men of H Company, Ninth Cavalry, left Fort Bayard for field 
service on 19 March, returning on 27 March.101 While no details of the route taken by this patrol 
have emerged, it would have had time to show itself to the settlements in the San Francisco valley 
and those along the Rio Mimbres, before returning to Bayard. On 23 March, Morrow was instructed 
to post a number of two-man dismounted escorts along the stage line between Fort Bayard and the 
Rio Grande.102 Hatch also noted that the telegraph repairman based at Fort Cummings, a Fifteenth 
Infantryman, was unarmed, a situation he gave orders to rectify immediately.103
By 24 March, Lieutenant Gatewood’s detachment of Apache scouts and Sixth Cavalrymen had 
been ordered to scout the Caballo Mountains.104 Hatch noted that the detachment had been camped 
‘below Palomas to watch the pass they [the Apaches] will naturally take to get out. Gatewood will 
keep the trail ambushed with Indians during the day and use soldiers at night.’105 This ambush was 
set up to catch the Apaches responsible for the killing of Captain Hooker’s courier. The fact that 
Gatewood was now east of the Rio Grande suggests that he had either failed to find any trace of an 
attack on Wheeler’s Ranch on 22 March, or had lost the trail of the raiders. 
One NCO and nine enlisted men were sent from Fort Bliss to provide a guard on the mail line 
through the Jornada del Muerto. Four men, including the NCO, were stationed at Aleman, with 
the remainder split evenly between Point of Rocks and Round Mountain.106 It had been decided 
that this detachment would be drawn from infantry or dismounted cavalrymen only.107 In early 
96 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.71-74.
97 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.71-74; Hatch, Fort Cummings, to 
Hooker, Fort Craig, 22 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.489.
98 Hatch, Bayard to Gen. O.B. Willcox, Prescott, 18 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, pp.38-39.
99 Special Field Order No.11, 16 Mar., 1880, Fort Bayard, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.309.
100 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.86; See also Letter from Hatch dated 
20 Mar., 1880 found between pages 29 & 30 in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5.
101 NA, RG 94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, p.24.
102 Hatch, Fort Cummings, to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 23 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-1889, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 453.
103 Ibid.
104 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.97 & 99.
105 Hatch, Palomas, NM, 24 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.400.
106 This we believe to be the mountain now known as San Diego Peak.
107 Hatch to CO Fort Bliss, 31 Mar., 1880,Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.277.
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April, Hatch instructed the Commanding Officer, Fort Bayard, to send some dismounted troopers 
to act as escorts for the stage line between Fort Cummings and Slocum’s Ranch.108 Captain Beyer 
was also instructed to maintain active patrols from his base at Hillsboro109 as a show of force to 
deter the small parties of Apache raiders who had been active in the area.110
Most of this patrolling activity seems to have found plenty of trails left by the Apaches but produced 
little direct conflict.111 Such tiny raiding parties proved almost impossible to counter, except by 
dealing with the wild reporting of attacks, many of which proved to be false. On 24 March, Hatch 
had to again firmly remind Hooker not to use up his horses in futile pursuits of small bands of raiders 
into the Jornada del Muerto. Hatch argued that McLellan’s company was of sufficient force to tackle 
these raiders.112 He dismissed Hooker’s report of Apaches in force as exaggerated, describing the 
Apaches responsible as a small scouting party of no more than a score of warriors.113 He therefore 
ordered Hooker’s battalion to protect the area around San Jose until 2 April, when the battalion was 
to move to Annaya Spring in preparation for ‘active service in the field’.114
Yet even the reduced response deployed according to Hatch’s orders had a negative effect on 
army logistics. By 26 March, Lieutenant Wright at Camp French was requesting the replacement 
of supplies recently issued to Gatewood’s command.115 The garrison of Fort Cummings ran danger-
ously low on ammunition, to the extent that they requested they be allowed to requisition muni-
tions from a supply train destined for Fort Bayard.116
Lieutenant Cruse’s narrative concerning the fate of the two Sixth Cavalry deserters raises two, 
related, issues of concern to the US army: first, low morale leading to increased desertion rates; 
and second, deserting soldiers as a potential source of weapons for the Apaches. As we have seen, 
the Apaches’ main source of munitions was through illicit trade with some Mexican settlements 
in southern New Mexico. It should be noted that some Anglo-Americans living in these settle-
ments were also more than happy to engage in such trade. This trade could be ascribed to the 
cordial relations Victorio’s Warm Springs Apaches maintained with specific Mexican communities 
in southern New Mexico, Canada Alamosa being a prime example of a Mexican community which 
maintained trading contacts with Victorio’s people. Las Palomas was another centre for the trading 
of illicit arms:
One merchant in particular, a certain Juan Felano, did a booming business in cartridges and 
rifles when the military wasn’t looking. Cartridges sold for a dollar a piece and a .45-55 carbine 
went for a hundred dollars. Mexican silver was the preferred item for exchange.117
The main source of guns and ammunition for Victorio was almost certainly through illicit trade 
networks on the Mescalero reservation. There appears to have been a brisk trade in stock stolen 
108 Hatch, Aleman, 1 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.366.
109 Thus further suggesting that the location of Camp French was close to Hillsboro.
110 Hatch, Aleman to Captain Beyer Hillsboro, 2 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.366-367.
111 Hatch, Fort Cummings, to AAAG SF, 22 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.484.
112 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.97.
113 Hatch, Palomas, NM, 24 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.400.
114 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.113-114.
115 Wright, Camp French to CO Fort Bayard, 26 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 1868-1889, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 453.
116 Smith, Paymaster, Fort Cummings to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 25 Mar., 1880, Miscellaneous Records 
1868-1889, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 453.
117 Laumbach, p.161.
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Plate 4.5. The Caballo Mountains photographed from the south west. In an effort to intercept the Apaches 
who had killed Robert Kane, Hooker’s courier, Apache scouts were sent to set up an ambush in these 
mountains. (Photo: author)
Plate 4.6. Apache Canyon, probably the main pass through the Caballo Mountains, which was picketed by 
Gatewood’s Apache scout company. (Photo: author)
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from both sides of the Mexican border on this reservation, and a lawlessness that revealed itself in 
the turmoil of the Lincoln County War and its aftermath during this same period. 
However, Cruse’s narrative shows that the two deserters, by selling their carbines and revolvers 
in Las Palomas had, in all probability, supplied these and at least 200 rounds of ammunition to 
the Apaches, the latter being the main customers for this trade. Thus the US army could find itself 
an unwitting commissariat for Victorio: witness the following telegram sent from Socorro NM by 
one Tilghman in 1880. ‘There is a Negro soldier here now with horse & full equipment which he 
is trying to sell shall I have him arrested?’118 A similar case occurred on 10 April 1880, in which 
Marshall Sherman from La Mesilla notified the army that another suspected deserter, a corporal 
from the Ninth Cavalry, had sold his carbine (number 40,952) at San Marical. The garrison of Fort 
Craig and the US Marshall were contacted and instructed to investigate this story and arrest the 
man and seize his horse and equipment if he turned out to be a deserter.119 Later that month, from 
Albuquerque, Sherman reported that:
Have in my possession govt carbine model eighteen seventy three no. eighteen thousand nine 
hundred twenty eight pawned here Apr fifteen by man in citizens clothing name P. Cady could 
this be one of the two deserters who sold govt horse mentioned in your dispatch I will hold 
gun till I hear from you.120
A sergeant and four men deserted from Captain Beyer’s command at Camp French with horses and 
a full complement of arms and equipment on or around 17 April 1880. Fort Apache was alerted 
with a view to intercepting these men.121 How many of these desertions resulted in arms sales to 
potentially hostile Apaches is difficult to determine. It was probably not a high figure in itself, but 
given the small number of Apaches involved in the Victorio war, the amount of government-issue 
weaponry that found its way into their hands may seem quite significant. It should be noted that 
the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, on the whole, sustained far lower desertion rates in comparison to 
other US army formations stationed in the territories of New Mexico and Arizona. However, if 
we examine the Ninth Cavalry’s desertion rates for 1879 to 1881, then the possibility that a dozen 
or so rifles, and ammunition for these, reached Victorio’s followers is not outside the bounds of 
possibility. (See Figure 4.1.) If we examine the desertion rates for the Ninth and Sixth Cavalry 
Regiments and the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment for the years 1879 to 1881 (see Table 4.1), we see 
that even if only a fraction of these deserters sold their arms, or were picked off as they attempted to 
leave Apacheria, they could have provided a significant, if irregular, source of arms to the Apaches.
Considered today, Hatch’s plan to conserve his forces for his main effort makes good sense. 
However, the increased activities of Apache raiders during March further undermined Hatch’s 
already low standing with many citizens in southern New Mexico. Despite their small numbers, 
small parties of Apache warriors were paralysing economic activity over a vast area.
118 Tilghman to Loud AAAG SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.50.
119 Loud to Sherman, U.S. Marshall, Mesilla, 10 Apr., 1880; Loud to the NCO in Charge, Fort Craig, 10 
Apr., 1880 and Loud to Mr Warden, Forage Agent, Fort Craig, 10 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.297-298.
120 Sherman to Loud AAAG SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.51-52; Loud to Lt Davenport AAAG 
in the field, Fort Craig & CO Fort Bayard, 29 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.346.
121 Loud to CO, Fort Apache, 17 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp310-311.) Towards the end of April, another supposed deserter was spotted passing 
Fort Craig. (Pease, Corpl, 15 Inf, to Operator Albuquerque, 30 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.–Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.350.
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Figure 4.1 Ninth Cavalry, Desertion Rates, 1879–81122
Table 4.1 Ninth and Sixth Cavalry and Fifteenth Infantry, Desertion Rates by Company, 1879–81123
1879 A B C D E F G H I K L M Totals
Ninth 1 1 3 3 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 15
Sixth 2 5 21 9 9 11 6 9 10 4 6 9 101
Fifteenth 2 4 10 7 8 9 3 2 5 3 N/A N/A 53
1880 A B C D E F G H I K L M 169
Ninth 7 7 9 3 1 6 7 2 0 1 1 0 44
Sixth 6 13 11 8 5 10 10 7 8 6 9 8 101
Fifteenth 3 13 9 13 3 4 6 7 9 15 N/A N/A 82
1881 A B C D E F G H I K L M 227
Ninth 5 2 10 5 14 12 10 3 6 4 3 7 81
Sixth 3 5 14 4 8 9 11 8 5 5 10 8 90
Fifteenth 13 3 4 4 7 12 17 8 8 5 N/A N/A 81
252
As time passed with no sign of the US army dealing with Victorio, the local media stirred up a 
storm of often unjustified and poisonous criticism:
We are dreaming of a golden age – a future empire –and fifty dirty lousy Indians have us in a 
state of siege.124
122 Derived 9th Cavalry Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls 1879-1881: NA, RG94.
123 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880 & 
9th Cavalry 1881-1887, NA, M744, Roll 88 & 89: 6th Cavalry 1875-1880 & 6th Cavalry 1881-1887, 
NA, M744, Roll 63 & 64 
124 The Grant County Herald, 3 Apr., 1880; Ellis, p.276; Worcester, p.225 & Note 34 p357.
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This was but a fraction of the vitriol produced in the press.125 (see document file no. 43.) For 
example, Hatch was accused of being paid to discourage immigration into the region.126 He was 
also accused of effectively abandoning the territory and building supply camps, ignoring one of the 
most effective and, according to the newspapers, savage Apache leaders to have been let loose in 
New Mexico. (see document file no. 44.) This campaign of vilification was capped by the produc-
tion of the ‘Apache Chronicle’ reproduced in the issue of Thirty Four for 7 April 1880. This spoof 
journal claimed to be the official journal of ‘General Victorio’ and was supposedly a reply by the 
Apaches to the lies spread about their defeat by Colonel Hatch.127 (see document file no. 45.) It 
was produced as a vehicle to accuse the US army in general, and Hatch in particular, of cowardice, 
incompetence, and lying to Washington concerning their inability to crush the Apaches. It also 
makes clear reference to Victorio’s trading relations with Mexican settlements and individuals.
Not all of the newspapers were so hostile in their attitudes. The Army and Navy Journal reproduced 
a letter from a correspondent from Silver City to the Philadelphia Times in which both Morrow and 
his troops received high commendation. Indeed, the correspondent refers to the Ninth Cavalrymen 
as ‘Buffalo Soldiers’: a very rare contemporary usage of this term.128 However, these positive reports 
were becoming the exception rather than the rule. More sober reflections tended to be drowned out 
by the clamour for more troops for a ‘final solution’.
The press reports might have been exaggerated and poisonous, yet they pointed to a situation 
during March 1880 that the US army could not allow to continue. Something had to be done to 
defeat Victorio and his warriors. While unable to prevent the raiding in the Rio Grande valley, 
Hatch’s command had been gearing up to strike at the Mescalero reservation, convinced that it 
provided Victorio’s main source of arms, ammunition, supplies and recruits. 
Moreover, as Hatch became increasingly convinced that Victorio was based in the San Andres 
Mountains, he began to formulate a plan for an offensive against the Apaches as a precursor to 
disarming the Mescalero Apaches. This involved a three-pronged attack that would culminate in a 
two-day engagement with Victorio in Hembrillo Canyon.
125 See Ellis, pp.276-277; See also Hart, p.44.
126 Ellis, p.277.
127 See also Ellis, pp.278-281 for a reproduction of the article.
128 ‘The Apache Campaign’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 3 Apr., 1880, p.705.
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The Battle of Hembrillo Canyon, April 1880
 
Toward the end of March, Colonel Hatch was ready to launch his offensive against the Warm 
Springs and Mescalero Apaches.
This operation was intended to unfold in two phases: an active operation in the field, centring 
on the San Andres Mountains; and once that manoeuvre was completed, a second phase disarming 
and dismounting the Mescalero Apaches by confronting them on their reservation. The first phase 
would involve the three battalions of New Mexico Troops, who would advance on the San Andres 
Mountains from different directions in an attempt to trap Victorio. The second phase would involve 
Hatch leading his three battalions across the White Sands and approaching the Mescalero reserva-
tion from the west. These troops would be joined in their endeavours by a Tenth Cavalry battalion, 
commanded by Colonel Grierson, which would approach the reservation from the south and east. 
All four battalions would converge on the reservation to dismount and disarm the Mescalero 
Apaches. As with many plans, even the best laid, this ambitious operation hit problems from the 
outset.
First, if we review the correspondence issued by the District of New Mexico prior to the first 
phase of the operation, this raises the suspicion that Hatch did not know the precise location of 
Victorio’s camp in the San Andres Mountains. Indeed, it is clear that, for some time in March 
1880, Hatch was unsure whether Victorio was based in the San Andres or the White Mountains. 
This suspicion is thoroughly reinforced by some of the orders issued, particularly those to Captain 
Hooker’s Third Battalion of New Mexico Troops.
Second, the coordination of Hatch’s three battalions broke down, a fact that is not highlighted 
in reports submitted after the event. This breakdown was inevitable, following a logistics failure 
which delayed the departure of the First Battalion. This battalion was directly under Hatch’s 
control; but the delay was not transmitted to Captain Carroll, commanding the Second Battalion, 
and the latter battalion commenced field operations unaware that they were working to a timetable 
that was no longer valid.
The Quest for Victorio’s Camp
On 23 February 1880, two of Victorio’s men contacted Agent Russell and Captain Steelhammer, 
through Mescalero intermediaries, to discuss peace. The two Apaches did not want to speak to the 
US army and stated that Victorio was camped 60 miles away in the San Andres Mountains. They 
offered to talk directly to Russell and Steelhammer, if both men agreed to come out alone; but this 
was refused. The Apache emissaries then attempted to negotiate with Russell alone; but the agent 
did not wish to enter into any negotiations without authority from his superiors. These envoys 
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remained in the vicinity for nearly two days then disappeared.1 It is not clear from Steelhammer’s 
report whether terms had been conveyed to the Warm Springs Apaches via the Mescalero Apaches; 
but he informed District Headquarters that he would have accepted Victorio’s surrender under the 
following terms: 
the men to become prisoners of war to be fed as such by Military and to be deprived of all war 
material, ponies included, no promise of immunity for past offences but a return of tribe to Ojo 
Caliente to be recommended.2
In response to this approach, Hatch contacted Steelhammer and repeated his instructions (see 
previous chapter) that Steelhammer engage in negotiations, in order to hold Victorio in limbo until 
Hatch was ready to strike. 
Should Victorio come in he can surrender immediately. You can say to him I shall have his 
women and children at Ojo Caliente about the 1st of the month, and that I shall have soldiers 
and Indians enough to take him by the end of the month, it is only a question of time, when our 
preparations are completed. If he allows his people to kill women & children I will not protect 
his women & children from the people when at Ojo Caliente. You of course understand the 
object of talking with him, it is if possible to hold him quiet until we are ready. I shall be able 
on the last of the month to put one hundred Indian Scouts in the field and double the number 
of troops we have had out. Keep me posted in all Indian Affairs.3
Two prominent Mescalero chiefs, Ca-bal-le-so and San Juan, secured five-day passes from Russell 
on 3 and 8 March, 1880, respectively. Ostensibly Ca-bal-le-so had gone to contact Victorio and 
initiate peace negotiations, and San Juan had then gone to investigate Ca-bal-le-so’s failure to 
re-appear after five days. On 16 March 1880, Russell acknowledged that 35 Apaches warriors 
had left to join Victorio.4 However, Russell was convinced that only a small minority of Mescalero 
Apaches were inclined to join Victorio. He also reported the return of Ca-bal-le-so on the same day 
with a tentative peace proposal from Nana.5 However, in his annual report for 1880, Russell states 
‘by the 1st of April, some two hundred to two hundred and fifty had left the reservation and gone 
to him [Victorio]; of this number fifty to sixty were men, and were of course of the worst Indians 
belonging to this agency.’6
Russell was not the only source that Hatch drew on to support his suspicions that Victorio was 
camped in the San Andres Mountains. We have already seen in the previous chapter that Hatch 
prevented Captain Hooker from leading his battalion, in pursuit of the Apaches, eastwards out 
of the San Mateo Mountains. By 18 March, Hatch was convinced that the Apaches were in the 
1 Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 3 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.183-186; See also ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 6 Mar., 1880; 
Thirty Four, 3 Mar., 1880; Hatch, Fort Bayard, to Hooker, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.460; Thrapp, 1974, p.266.
2 Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 3 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.183-186.
3 Hatch to Captain Steelhammer, Mescalero Agency, 11 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.458-459.
4 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 18 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.230; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.266; Laumbach, 2001, p.123.
5 Russell to CoIA, 27 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Thrapp, 1974, p.267.
6 Report of the CoIA. DoI, Office of Indian Affairs, (Hereafter referred to as the ‘OIA’), Washington, 1 
Nov., 1880, p.251.
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San Andres Mountains.7 However, by 21 March. 1880, he had drawn back from this conclusion, 
expressing only an ‘impression’8 that the Apaches were operating from the San Andres Mountains: 
‘I hope to get a fight out of him there.’9 General Pope stated that scouts had located the Apaches in 
the San Andres Mountains on 26 March.10 (see document file no. 46.) Whether the exact location 
of the camp was known, though, is unclear, for on 27 March, Hatch reported ‘the main camp of the 
hostiles are now in the San Andres and White Mountains if fortunate to strike a blow there about 
the fourth of April matters will look better.’11. By 31 March, Hatch stated that ‘It is the impres-
sion the principal camp of the hostile Indians are in the San Andreas.’12 Hatch clearly thought that 
it was important to defeat the Apaches in the field, as this would heavily incline them towards 
surrender.13
In fact, it turned out that Victorio was based in the Hembrillo Basin at the top of Hembrillo 
Canyon, on the eastern side of the San Andres, almost directly east from Aleman Well. Historian 
Karl Laumbach argues that Victorio’s people had been camped there since the end of January.14 A 
letter from Lieutenant Cruse stated that Apache scouts had only confirmed Victorio’s location as 
being in the general vicinity of the Hembrillo Basin on 2 April 1880.15 Yet Hatch’s orders would 
suggest otherwise.
To elaborate on the argument that Hatch did not know the exact location of Victorio’s base, we 
must first examine Hatch’s plan to attack Victorio, and the details that were worked out in advance 
of the operation. The earliest version of this plan seems to have been formulated on 12 March 1880. 
At that point, the plan was that Hatch’s forces should arrive at the Mescalero agency on 12 April 
1880. However, Hatch also stated his intention to attack the Apaches during his move east from 
the Rio Grande towards the reservation ‘for the moral effect it will have on the Mescaleros before 
going to Agency’.16 (see document file no. 38.) However, Hatch only finalised the exact details on 
5 April 1880, while at Aleman. (See Map 5.1.)
7 Hatch, Fort Bayard to AAAG SF, 18 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.477. A few days prior to this Surgeon MacPherson vaguely noted that ‘Victoria is on the 
other side of the journey of Death. (I have forgotten the Spanish name for it.)’ (Letter 15 Mar., 1880 in 
MacPherson Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at Charlottesville).
8 Both letters were quite difficult to decipher.
9 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG SF, 12 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, pp.461-462; ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’ NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 475, Vol.5, pp.87-90.
10 Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 26 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.353-356.
11 Hatch to AAAG SF 27 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.30-31; See also Hatch to 
AAG, 27 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.345; See also 
Loud to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 29 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.258; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 27 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
12 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.359.
13 Hatch, Fort Cummings, to AAAG SF, 22 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.484; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.286.
14 Laumbach, 2001, p.122.
15 Laumbach, 2001, p.164; See also Cruse, 2001, p.263.
16 Hatch to AAAG SF 12 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.41-44; See also Hatch, Fort 
Bayard, to AAAG SF, 12 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
pp.461-462.
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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
IN THE FIELD, ALEMAN, NEW MEXICO, April 5, 1880
SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS
NO. 18
1. The First Battalion New Mexico Troops will march in the following orders – Captain 
McLellan with his own Company (“L”), with detachments of 6th Cavalry and all Indian 
Scouts, will move to the San Andreas on the evening of the 6th instant as soon as it is 
dark enough to conceal the movement. He will report to the Battalion Commander for 
instructions.
2. All Companies of the 9th Cavalry present with the Battalion will move on the morning 
of the 7th instantly directly to the San Andreas, under direction of the Battalion 
Commander.
3. The Battalion will be rationed for ten days from the 5th instant. Owing to the condition 
of the pack animals, the command will move as light as possible, sending on train the 
supplies not required for the following ten days. The train will meet the command at 
Tulerosa on the 11th instant.
4. The Headquarters of the District Commander will be for the present with the First 
Battalion New Mexico Troops.
5. Under letter of instructions of April 4, 1880, from this office, the Third Battalion New 
Mexico Troops, under command of Captain A.E. Hooker, 9th Cavalry, will move on the 
6th instant from Annaya Springs to Malpais Spring and cover west side of San Andreas 
Mountains.
6. Under letter of instructions of March 31, 1880, from this office, the Second Battalion 
New Mexico Troops, under command of Captain Henry Carroll, 9th Cavalry, will move 
on the 4th instant, up the east side of the San Andreas Mountains.
By command of Colonel HATCH
THOMAS C. DAVENPORT
First Lieutenant 9th Cavalry,
A.A.A. General in the field.17
The impression that the detail of this plan was not finalised until 5 April 1880 is reinforced by the 
fact that, by 4 April, Hooker’s battalion was still not complete, Hatch having to order Captain 
Parker, with K Company, Ninth Cavalry, to move from Aleman, on 5 April, to join the Third 
Battalion.18 The fact that the orders to proceed from Annaya Springs to Malpais Springs, issued 
to the Third Battalion of New Mexico troops, were not changed, shows that Hatch did not know 
the approximate, let alone the exact, location of Victorio’s camp. Why else instruct this battalion 
to manoeuvre 25 miles from Hembrillo Canyon? Hatch’s specific orders to Hooker also betray the 
fact that the Colonel did not know the location of Victorio’s camp prior to launching his operation. 
It was only in hindsight that such knowledge was claimed. When Hatch wrote a summary of this 
operation on 5 August 1880, he claimed that:
17 Special Field Orders No.18, Aleman, New Mexico, 5 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, M666. Roll 526; 
see also RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
18 Special Field Order No.17 para.3, In the Field Aleman, N.M., 4 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 
450.
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Hooker, 9th Cavalry, with one hundred men was sent by Anaya Springs to go through the pass 
of the northern point of the San Andreas and come down on the East side of those mountains19
Yet prior to the commencing of this operation, On 4 April, from Aleman,20 Hatch issued orders to 
Hooker that he should march: 
from Annaya Springs to Malpais Spring on the road to Tularosa [Tulerosa]. At Malpais 
Springs (dispose?) of your force to cover the north side of the San Andreas Mountains. It is 
probable that you will find camp of hostile Indians in that vicinity.21
On the following day, in Special Field Orders, Number 18, Hatch instructed Hooker to ‘cover 
west side of San Andreas Mountains.’22 So, immediately prior to the operation, Hooker’s Third 
battalion was given two different parts of the San Andres Mountains to cover, yet both sets of 
orders instructed Hooker to march from Annaya Springs to Malpais Springs. If Map 5.1 is exam-
ined, it would appear rather difficult for Hooker to cover either the north or west side of the San 
Andres Mountains from Malpais Spring. This suggests that Hatch was not at all familiar with the 
local geography. It was not until months after this operation that Hatch dropped the instruction 
to march to Malpais Spring, and changed his instructions to cover the east side of the San Andres 
Mountains. By that time he knew how the operation had unfolded, and he changed his instructions 
to give the impression that the location of Victorio’s camp had been known before the operation.
It should also be noted that Hatch advised Hooker that he would ‘probably’ find an Indian camp 
on the north side of the San Andres Mountains. This shows that, up to the beginning of his offen-
sive, Hatch was not remotely aware of an exact location of Victorio’s camp. It also shows that Hatch 
was not averse to re-writing history. This was one of the key accusations already being levelled at 
him by some of the territorial press.
However, this was not the only problem with the coordination of the three battalions. It was also 
a fact that Hatch was unable to communicate delays in the proposed timetable for this operation to 
the Second Battalion of New Mexico troops, under the command of Captain Carroll. 
Too Early or Too Late? Communication Breakdown between Colonel Hatch and his Second 
Battalion
On 20 March 1880, Captain Carroll was ordered to take the Second Battalion, New Mexico 
Troops, to Tulerosa as soon as it was ready for field service. He was to take 30 days’ rations and use 
wagon transportation where possible, saving his pack mules for use in rough terrain.23 (see docu-
ment file no. 48.) These orders were relayed from Hatch to the telegraph operator at La Mesilla, and 
19 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 5 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.407, pp.260-268; See also Report of Capt. 
C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
20 Hatch seems to have arrived there on 31 Mar. in advance of the 1 Battalion. (NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 
475, Vol.5, pp.113-114).
21 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 475, Vol.5, pp.126-127.
22 Special Field Orders No.18, Aleman, New Mexico, 5 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
526; See also ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.320-321; NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 450.
23 Letter found between pages 29 & 30 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5.
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thence to Carroll via courier, a procedure that would take about three days24 These couriers had to 
cross territory known to present a high risk of encounters with Apaches. It should also be noted that 
the telegraph line was not necessarily in full working order, as the work required to bring the lines 
into full working order, as outlined by Lieutenant Allen on 2 December 1879, was not completed 
until 13 April 1880.25 The quality of individual repairmen could also leave much to be desired: on 
9 April 1880, one Private Michael McMahon was reported to have been drunk when on duty as a 
telegraph repairman.26
On 23 March 1880, Hatch informed District Headquarters that he hoped to commence his 
operation on 31 March.27 On 2 April, he stated his intention to set out on the following day for the 
San Andres Mountains, where most of the Apaches were thought to be hiding.28 Two days later (4 
April 1880), Hatch informed Hooker that:
Captain Carroll commanding 2nd Battalion is instructed to operate also [in the vicinity?] 1st 
Battalion with Indians ?????? move from this point on the 6th and will be on the San Andreas 
Mountains on the night of the 6th.29
However, an exhaustive search through the archives reveals no such instruction being sent to 
Captain Carroll, and once again Special Field Order Number 18 (written on 5 April 1880) strongly 
suggests that Carroll was not aware of these instructions. It states that Carroll was acting under 
‘letter of instruction’ issued on 31 March 1880.30 These instructions are worth quoting:
24 Loud, to Martin AAG Whipple Barracks, Arizona, 17 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.314. During mid-April, District HQ noted that 
telegraphic communications to Col. Hatch, who was then supervising the dismounting and disarming 
of the Mescalero Apaches (see next chapter), had to be sent to the operator at La Mesilla and then 
forwarded by courier to Tulerosa. (Loud to General Hatch, Tulerosa, 12 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.303-303) 
25 Lt. Allen to AAAG DoNM, 2 Dec., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 39, Oct.-Dec. 1879; Allen, Signals Officer, New Mexico Division to AAAG, 
DoNM, 13 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880. See also Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio 
Campaign 1879’, Chapter 13, p.303.
26 Allen, to AAAG, DoNM, 9 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
27 Loud to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.237-238.
28 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 2 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.272.
29 Hatch to Hooker, 4 Apr., 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part.3, Entry 475, Vol.5, 
pp.126-127.
30 Special Field Orders No.18, Aleman, New Mexico, 5 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, M666. Roll 526; 
see also RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
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Hatch to Capt. Carroll, Ninth Cavalry Tulerosa, March 31, 1880.
(Operator Mesilla will forward by first mail31)
It is the impression the principal camp of the hostile Indians are in the San Andreas, we shall 
move from here on the third, with Morrow’s command, Sixth Cavalry and Indians. Hooker’s 
Battalion in the mountains around Alamo Spring. You may be able to strike on the fourth. 
You should move upon the east side on the fourth to strike. Also if possible from San Andreas 
shall go to Reservation.
Hatch.32
Hatch to Captain H. Carroll, Ninth Cavalry, March 31, 1880.
 … hope to strike them about the fourth or fifth [April] I have telegraphed you to come up 
on the east side of the mountains about the place of your last fight. [Hospital Canyon?] On 
the 4th Hooker will move through the pass above probably known as the Aleman [Alamo?] I 
shall take Morrows command, the Indians and Arizona troops directly to the camp. After that 
proceed to the Agency. You will not want to leave Tulerosa with more than five days forage.33
The above orders would strongly indicate that, if he was acting under letters of instruction, Carroll 
would be under the impression that Hatch intended to strike the Apaches no later than 5 April 
1880. In Special Order 18, in which Hatch stated that some of his forces would move into the 
San Andres Mountains on the night of 6 April, with the rest moving in on the following day, he 
implied that Captain Carroll was aware of his latest orders. Yet it is clear that these do not match 
the instructions actually issued in letters to Carroll dated 31 March 1880. As we shall see later, the 
dramatic events involving Captain Carroll’s battalion did not happen, as Hatch tried to suggest, 
because Captain Carroll engaged the Apaches in Hembrillo Canyon too early. They happened 
because Carroll thought he was too late. Indeed, by 26 June 1880, at least two New Mexican news-
papers had published a garbled but recognisable version of events that echoes this interpretation.
Captain Carroll, the wounded officer who passed through Las Vegas last Saturday, owes 
his disablement and the killing of eight of his men to the carelessness and incompetency of 
General Hatch, who ordered him to be at a certain point on the 4th of May [April] when he 
would meet other troops. In order to reach the point in time, two night marches had to be 
made, and, upon reaching there, Captain Carroll and his soldiers met a hot reception from the 
Indians, who outnumbered them two to one. It was almost a miracle that the entire command 
were not murdered and scalped. It was afterwards learned that Gen. Hatch HAD MADE A 
MISTAKE, ordering Captain Carroll to be at the place designated two days before the rest of 
the troops. Daily Optic.34
31 Just how reliable this mail service was under the circumstances can be derived from the fact that Hatch 
had to detail small detachments of Infantry from Fort Bliss, with 30 days rations to protect the mail 
route across the Jornada on the very same date as these orders were issued. These were made up of one 
NCO and three privates based at Point of Rocks, Aleman and Round Mountain. (Hatch, Aleman, to 
CO, Fort Bliss TX, 31 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.357).
32 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.359.
33 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol.5, p.117.
34 Cited in ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 26 Jun., 1880.
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Problems with Logistics
While the Grant County Herald may  be accurate in its report of the events that took place, the 
reason it gives for the delay in the timetable – that it was a mistake, the implication being that 
Hatch was an incompetent commander – was not accurate. Rather, the delay was the result of a 
number of unforeseen logistical difficulties. District Headquarters reported that:
he [Hatch] is crippled in not having sufficient transportation now, that it is badly worn from its 
hard work during the winter, and the contractors have failed to deliver supplies in any reason-
able time. Grain is very scarce.35
Prior to the operation, Captain Carroll himself reported that he was still trying to gather some 25 
mounts for D and F Companies. He expected to lead 150 men out and would ‘move in three days’.36 
Carroll also anticipated that he could expect high horse casualties ‘if work proves severe’.37 
Hatch was also experiencing significant difficulties in coordinating grain supplies for his horses 
in the two weeks prior to the Hembrillo Canyon operation,38 writing that he was ‘crucified not 
having efficient transportation’ to move forage and other supplies, and that he had insufficient 
horses to mount all his troops.39 It was reported, on 31 March, that Hatch had instructed the forage 
agents at San Augustin and South Fork (Mescalero reservation) to have on hand enough forage 
for 200 horses at the former and 10 days’ worth of forage for 600 horses at the latter.40 On 6 April, 
Hatch, from Aleman, issued instructions that Shedd, whose ranch was located on the eastern side 
of the San Augustin Pass, should have his appointment as forage agent terminated for ‘improper 
practice’.41 What this impropriety may have been is not specified. It should be noted that Shedd’s 
Ranch was to the south and east of Aleman, on the eastern side of San Augustin Pass, so is almost 
certain that Shedd was the forage agent, referred to above, at San Augustin. Shedd may have been 
unable to supply forage as contracted; or he may have attempted to charge an exorbitant fee for his 
goods, knowing that he had a captive market; or he may have been guilty on both counts. Indeed, 
in the immediate aftermath of the Hembrillo Canyon operation, Hatch noted and condemned the 
extortionate price charged for grain in New Mexico since 1 January 1880. He even appears to have 
gone so far as to attempt to impose a set price for grain,42 in response to the price of fodder being 
deliberately inflated by local civilians indulging in what might be called war-profiteering.43
It is worth noting that an application to become a forage agent submitted in April 1880 by 
George Williams of Williams’ Ranch on the San Francisco River promised that, as agent, he would 
‘keep good Hay & Grain on hand at all times for any troops that may need it’.44 
35 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.239-240.
36 Carroll to Hatch 26 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Laumbach, 2001, p.164
37 Carroll to Hatch 26 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
38 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475 Vol. 5, pp.118-121 & p.136.
39 Hatch, Fort Cummings, 23 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.496
40 Thirty Four, 31 Mar., 1880.
41 Hatch to AAAG, DoNM, 6 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
42 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475 Vol. 5, pp.138-139.
43 Hatch, Aleman to AAG, SF, 4 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.372.
44 George Williams to Chief Quartermaster, DoNM, 17 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM 
Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
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Hatch also experienced some difficulties getting the US army to furnish him with sufficient 
military supplies to fully equip his men prior to the Hembrillo Canyon battle. A letter from 
Headquarters, Division of the Missouri, authorising the purchase of 150 mules for service in New 
Mexico was issued on 29 March, one day after Hatch had originally intended to start his operation 
against the Apaches.45 On 7 April 1880, the Chief Quartermaster, District of New Mexico, noting 
the authorisation to purchase these mules, contacted Hatch asking for instructions as to where the 
mules were to be sent once purchased.46 Hatch also ordered 200 canteens to be shipped to Fort 
Stanton for urgent use by the Ninth Cavalry. If these were not available, Hatch authorised local 
purchase if that proved possible.47 Two hundred canteens and straps were shipped from Fort Union 
to Santa Fé ‘for immediate use of Troops in the field’.48 These were to be shipped on the night of 6 
April 1880.49 On arrival at Santa Fé they were to be sent to Fort Stanton by wagon as soon as possi-
ble.50 The canteens still had not arrived at Santa Fé by 9 April, prompting Loud, Acting Assistant 
Adjutant General, District of New Mexico, to contact the Fort Union Depot and remind them that 
this equipment was urgently needed for field service and that such delays were a serious matter.51 
The canteens were a late requisition from Hatch (5 April 1880) and, as we shall see, this was 
probably prompted by problems with the water supply at Aleman. It is not certain when the addi-
tional mules were requested, but what is clear is that these mules were not delivered in time for 
Hatch’s intended operation.
Hatch’s proposed offensive was in trouble before it started, due to a combination of a lack of 
intelligence concerning the location of the Apaches, difficulties concerning the effective coordina-
tion of his three battalions, and logistic problems. These factors must be borne in mind when one 
studies the progress and outcome of the Hembrillo Canyon operation.
The Hembrillo Canyon Operation
The easiest starting point is to account for each battalion in reverse numerical order. Captain 
Hooker’s Third Battalion marched via Round Mountain, Malpais Springs, Tulerosa and on to the 
Mescalero reservation.52 Whatever instructions he had actually received, Hooker’s command did 
not encounter any Apaches, underlining the fact that Hatch did not know the exact location 
of Victorio’s camp. At first glance, Hooker’s lack of Indian scouts may have contributed to this 
failure. His Navajo scouts supposedly deserted on 12 March 1880, with all their government–issue 
45 Townsend, AG, to Commanding General, MDoM, Chicago, 29 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, p.358.
46 Chief QM DoNM to AAAG, DoNM, 7 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-
Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
47 Hatch, Aleman to AAG, DoNM, 5 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
48 Loud to Capt. Shoemaker, Fort Union Arsenal, 6 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.288. Half were to be delivered to Lt Maney, in charge of Indian 
scouts, and the rest to the CO, Fort Stanton.
49 Loud to Depot Quartermaster, Fort Union, 5 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.288.
50 Loud to Hatch, Aleman, 6 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.289 & 290.
51 Loud to Capt Hunt, Depot Q.M., Fort Union, 9 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.196.
52 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 9th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94.
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equipment, because they had become ‘frightened’.53 The reported desertion seems unlikely, however, 
given that there is evidence that the Navajo scouts were formally discharged at Fort Wingate on 
or around 22 March 1880.54 Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, instructions had been issued to 
discharge these scouts in order that additional Apache scouts could be recruited in their stead. 
Nevertheless Hatch and District Headquarters transmitted this story, though quite why they did so 
is not clear.55 It certainly failed to convince the Grant County Herald. Such a charge was interpreted 
as an unjustified attempt to scapegoat the scouts and distract attention for other serious failings in 
the US army’s conduct of the campaign.56
The experience of the Second Battalion of New Mexico Troops was very different to that of 
the Third. A number of sources state that Carroll’s battalion was made up of approximately 100 
troopers drawn from A, D, F and G Companies of the Ninth Cavalry.57 Laumbach states that 
Carroll actually had 155 men with him when he left Fort Stanton.58 If we examine the monthly 
regimental return for the end of March 1880, the Second Battalion of New Mexico Troops could 
provide mounts for 147 of its available men. 
Table 5.1 Second Battalion, New Mexico Troops, Available Men to Serviceable Horses, March 188059
Second Battalion, New Mexico Troops, March 1880
Company Available Men Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Lost Horses
A 49 42  9 0
D 45 25 23 6
F 45 33  5 0
G 58 47  4 0
Totals 197 147  41 6
This would certainly suggest that Laumbach’s figure is the more accurate of the two, especially 
since Carroll’s command was accompanied by water wagons, which could be escorted by a small 
number of dismounted men. These wagons were to keep pace with the Second Battalion by moving 
53 Hatch, Fort Bayard, to AAAG SF, 12 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.464; Loud to CO Fort Wingate, 13 Mar., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.146, p.108.
54 Bennett, CO Fort Wingate to AAAG, DoNM, 22 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
55 See Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 5 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.407, pp.260-268; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & 
Navy Journal, Vol.17, 27 Mar., 1880, p.693.
56 ‘Victorio!’, The Grant County Herald, 3 Apr., 1880.
57 Leckie, 1967, p.216; Thrapp, 1967, p.194; 1974, p.269; Billington, 1991, p.94; Utley, 1973, p.361; see 
also map in Thrapp, 1967, p.191. It should be noted that while this map shows Carroll moving down the 
west side of the San Andres Mountains, he actually marched down the eastern face of these mountains. 
Thrapp, in his later work on Victorio makes this clear. (Thrapp, 1974, p.268; see also note 4 p.369 of the 
same volume) Moreover, in the Public Affairs Office: White Sands Missile Range web page entitled 
‘Hembrillo Battlefield’ it states that Carroll arrived in Hembrillo Canyon via Sulphur Canyon which is 
clearly marked on Thrapp’s original map. Again this would indicate an approach from the eastern side of 
the San Andres Mountains.
58 Laumbach, 2001, p.170.
59 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
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down the eastern edge of the San Andres 
Mountains. This is made clear in a letter from 
Lieutenant Finley written on 14 April 1880:
The reason I was not in the last fight 
was that I had been appointed Asst. 
Quartermaster for the Battalion and had 
to stay with the train. I had two wagons 
loaded with water barrels and I camped out 
on the plain, three miles from the moun-
tains in which the fight took place.60 (see 
document file no.50.1)
The District of New Mexico included at least 
six61 water wagons in its November 1880 
listing of transportation allocated to specific 
posts.62 They were essential equipment for 
this area of New Mexico, as it had suffered a 
period of drought since at least March 1879.63 
Even if there had been water available, a 
Table of Distances produced for the troops in 
New Mexico in 1878 stated that the water-
holes were usually slightly alkaline, but could 
be much worse along the routes between Fort 
Stanton and Forts McRae and Craig (Route 
21) and Fort Stanton and Fort Selden (Route 
22). (see document file no. 50.2.) In other 
words, the water sources along these routes 
between the Sacramento Mountains and the 
San Andres Mountains were already known 
to contain water that was alkaline to varying 
degrees. Finally, Hatch notified Hooker, on 
4 April, ‘It is not probable there is any water 
between Annaya Springs & Malpais Spring 
60 Letter dated Tularosa [Tulerosa] N.M., 18 Apr., 1880 in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection; 
Laumbach, 2001, p.174.
61 Mea Culpa! Of course I managed to miss out Fort Stanton’s allocation by misaligning the photocopy. 
Something to avoid if one is based in Britain.
62 General Orders No.11. DoNM, 20 Nov., 1880 in General Orders, Circulars & Court Martial Orders 
1870-1881, DoAz & DoNM NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183.
63 General Pope informed his superiors, in September, 1880, that an eighteen month drought had forced 
sheep herders to scatter their flocks across a wider area thus making them a tempting target as a source of 
subsistence for the Apaches. This information had officially come from a report submitted by Col. Hatch 
in May 1880. (Report of General John Pope, 22 Sept., 1880 in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. 
I-II, p.86; Hatch to AAG Dept. HQ , 26 May, 1880 in DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5, p.273). In fact Hatch had informed Pope of the drought on 4 March 1880: ‘Never was there a 
season so bad as the present for operating last year was so dry the grass has nearly disappeared and it is 
almost impossible to subsist our animals.’ (Hatch to Pope, in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 88)
Lt. Walter Finley.
This is one of the few contemporary photographs of 
a participant in the Victorio campaign and, while 
smarter in appearance than Gatewood and Mills in 
Photograph 2 of this volume, this does give a good 
idea of the field service dress of a junior US Army 
officer. It was Finley’s letter to his mother just after 
the Hembrillo Canyon which suggested to Karl 
Laumbach that the ‘poisoned water’ version of this 
battle should be challenged. (Fray Angelico Library)
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at this ?????? if so it will be necessary to make a dry camp.’64 The implication is that Hatch had also 
warned Hooker that he should make sure that his battalion was carrying enough water to complete 
the operation. As each battalion was operating in the same area, it would seem safe to assume that 
Carroll had been given the same instructions. Lieutenant Finley’s letter confirms that Carroll’s 
battalion was operating with water wagons. 
However, before we cover the skirmishes and battles which took place between 5 and 7 April 1880, 
it is essential to note that modern battlefield archaeology has made a key contribution to our under-
standing of events in this chapter.65 Due to its remote nature and the fact that it was on Department 
of Defense Land, this battlefield has been left virtually undisturbed. Using Cruse’s memoirs, a team 
of archaeologists from Human Systems Research Inc. and New Mexico State University, led by 
Laumbach, were able to discover and survey the site of the Hembrillo Canyon battle of 6–7April 
1880. They unearthed a wealth of artefacts, including temporary breastworks, spent bullets and 
cartridge cases. Using the same search techniques as used in surveying the Little Bighorn battle site, 
they set about mapping the exact locations of all the artefacts they could locate.66 Once they had 
pinpointed the approximate location of the battle, they then thoroughly surveyed the site, producing 
a three-dimensional computer map of the area. Laumbach later carried out a comprehensive survey 
of Conline’s skirmish of 5 April 1880, which occurred some distance down Hembrillo Canyon. As 
we shall see, these surveys reveal some very interesting details about both battles.
It was a detachment from Captain Carroll’s battalion which made first contact with Victorio’s 
warriors. On 5 April 1880, from Malpais Springs, Carroll sent 31 men of A Company under 
Lieutenant John Conline ahead of his command.67 The reason Conline was sent ahead of Carroll’s 
battalion is that Carroll thought he was running behind schedule. As far as he was aware, Hatch 
was intending to attack the Apaches no later than 5 April 1880; and his battalion was not yet in a 
position to support the First Battalion of New Mexico Troops. 
The Battle of Hembrillo Canyon: Conline’s Skirmish, 5 April 1880
After a march of 37 miles, at around 4:40 p,m., Conline discovered a trail of approximately 50 
horses and 100 cattle entering Hembrillo Canyon on the eastern side of the San Andres Mountains. 
This trail was followed into the canyon until it narrowed; then Conline halted his company and 
sent a scouting party of six men further up the canyon. He also sent a courier back to Carroll. The 
advance party did not, at first, see any Apaches. Further back down the canyon, Conline, scanning 
the area with his binoculars, saw two Apaches moving down from the mountains into the canyon. 
Within seconds of this discovery, he spotted between 25 and 50 Apaches rapidly advancing down 
the canyon slightly to the right of these two warriors.68 
64 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475 Vol. 5, pp.126-127.
65 See Laumbach, ‘Hembrillo An Apache Battle field of the Victorio War: The Archaeology and History 
of the Hembrillo Battlefield’ and ‘Conline’s Skirmish: An Episode of the Victorio War. Archaeological 
and Historical Documentation of an 1880s Skirmish Site on the White Sands Missile Range’ Both are 
excellent additions to the Apache wars literature. See also Wakeman & Laumbach, Chapter 22, pp.130-
136; Wakeman & Laumbach webpage and the Bulletin of Las Cruces webpage.
66 Scott et al, 1989; Fox et al, 1993. Panzeri provides a very useful summary of their reconstruction of the 
Battle of the Little Big Horn in the Osprey Campaign Book of the same title.
67 Bi Monthly Return ‘A’ Company, 9th Cavalry Mar./Apr. 1880; Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns 
From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, 
M744, Roll 88.
68 Bi Monthly Return ‘A’ Company, 9th Cavalry Mar./Apr. 1880; Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns 
From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, 
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Conline spotted his opponents at about 
5:00 p.m., but the Apaches did not engage 
his detachment until about half an hour 
later, when they opened fire at 2–300 yards 
distance. Conline deployed his men in a skir-
mish line across the canyon and responded 
with several volleys, which forced the Apache 
to take cover. A short and ferocious fire-
fight was engaged in, which ended when the 
Apaches failed to turn both Conline’s right 
and left flanks. During the fight, one of his 
guides, Jose Carillo, identified Victorio as 
the person directing the Apaches during the 
battle. The Apaches then kept up a harassing 
fire until about 7:30 p.m. when they withdrew. 
Conline withdrew his company 15 minutes 
later. He claimed to have sent four couriers 
to Captain Carroll.69 (see document file no. 
51.1.) Conline sustained two casualties, with 
Corporal Hawkins and citizen guide William 
Eubank both slightly wounded,70 and two 
horses killed and one wounded.71
It is interesting to note that one of the 
officers with Carroll’s battalion later criti-
cised Conline for unsaddling his horses and 
turning them loose before he was attacked.72 
Over 100 years later, the archaeological study 
of the site would reveal that Conline had 
given a less than complete account of this 
skirmish.73 For example, the Lieutenant claimed that he secured his flanks on both sides of the 
Canyon; whereas it is clear that his skirmish line was deployed on the southern side of Hembrillo 
Canyon, and did not cover the entire canyon’s width. There were also facts which he either did not 
M744, Roll 88; See also Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo 
Canyon and the Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880; The Chronological 
List, p.49; Stout p130; web article The Ninth Regiment of Cavalry by Lt G. Hutcheson; Wakeman & 
Laumbach p.130; Wakeman & Laumbach’s web page.
69 Bi Monthly Return ‘A’ Company, 9th Cavalry Mar./Apr. 1880; Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns 
From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, 
M744, Roll 88; See also Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo 
Canyon and the Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
70 Eubank was certainly lightly wounded. On 31 May, 1880, William Eubank was paid $30.00 for the 
apprehension of Private Charles Wright who deserted from Company A, Ninth Cavalry while stationed 
at Fort Stanton. (1st Lieut Clark, Dillard Hazelrig, Fifteenth Infantry, AAQM Fort Stanton to AAG, 
DoM, 31 May, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 
91).
71 Bi Monthly Return ‘A’ Company, 9th Cavalry Mar./Apr. 1880; Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns 
From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, 
M744, Roll 88.
72 Personal File John Conline, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 279.
73 See Laumbach et al, 2005, pp.50-68 for an overview of what actually happened during this skirmish.
Lt. John Conline.
Though subject to periods of mental fatigue, Lt. 
John Conline wrote an unusually detailed account of 
the skirmish between his command and Victorio’s 
warriors on 5 April, 1880 in Hembrillo Canyon. 
Despite this detail modern archaeology has shown his 
account to be incomplete. (National Archives)
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appreciate or else chose not to reveal to his superiors. It is very clear that the good position from 
which he chose to fight was not ideal on three counts. First, the Apaches were able to seize the 
higher ground overlooking his left flank. Second, the Apaches were able to use the dead ground 
to come within 60 yards (in one or two cases within 30 yards) of his skirmish line. Finally, the 
Apaches were able to utilise the arroyo to his right to move around that flank and threaten his rear. 
(See Plates 5.1 and 5.2.)
The archaeology shows that Conline played down the extent to which he had to bend his line to 
protect his horses from approaching Apaches. His opponents managed to use the arroyo to open 
fire on his horses from behind his skirmish line. In this case, it appears that some Apaches were 
using arrows, possibly in an effort to wound some of the horses and provoke a stampede. One 
of these Apaches was firing Springfield rifle and carbine ammunition from the same gun. There 
were two metal arrowheads found in this area; one found within two metres of a spent Springfield 
Carbine cartridge case. This gives a clear impression of the close-range skirmishing during the 
fight. Walking over this site, one rapidly appreciates that Lieutenant Conline and his men had had 
a very narrow escape. They encountered the Apaches relatively late in the day; and these warriors 
were so convinced of the favourable odds, that they had launched an attack on the detachment. For 
Apaches to launch a direct attack on their opponents was very unusual. Yet they had judged the 
odds to perfection. By the time darkness fell, the beleaguered Ninth Cavalrymen were gradually 
being hemmed in by a successful turning of their right flank. To the front of A Company’s skirmish 
line, Apache warriors were using the natural cover to full effect to work their way very close to the 
Ninth Cavalrymen, pinning them down. Finally, some warriors on Conline’s left flank provided 
harassing fire from higher up the slopes of Hembrillo Canyon. It was a combination of the onset of 
darkness74 and their refusal to panic that saved A Company from disaster. The Apaches must have 
decided that the steadfastness of Conline’s men, and the onset of darkness, posed too much of a risk 
of casualties on their side, if they continued their attack as darkness fell. So, they withdrew; and 
Conline’s detachment was able to withdraw and rejoin the Second Battalion.
Having returned to join the rest of the battalion, Lieutenant Conline was able to give his 
commanding officer his first clear idea of the location of the Apaches. Moreover, they had seen 
that the Apaches were more than willing to stand their ground. This factor must have been music 
to Captain Carroll’s ears: that Victorio would stand and fight was exactly what Colonel Hatch 
had been hoping would happen. However, Carroll was also aware that Hatch had expressed his 
intention to arrive in the area no later than the morning of 5 April 1880. When Conline rejoined 
the battalion, it was approximately 11:00 p.m. on 5 April, and as far as Carroll was concerned, he 
was behind schedule – a schedule which, unknown to him, was now obsolete. Therefore, Carroll 
thought that he was in danger of ruining Hatch’s operational timing. As Conline had been driven 
out of the lower reaches of Hembrillo Canyon, it was a reasonable assumption on Carroll’s part 
that the Apaches’ main camp was somewhere in the upper reaches of this canyon. Carroll was 
accompanied by guides, who could give advice as to how to outflank the Apaches who had stopped 
Conline’s company. Intending to confront the Apaches in their camp, Carroll took command of D 
and F Companies and moved into Sulphur Canyon, roughly parallel to, and north of, Hembrillo 
Canyon, with the intention of entering Hembrillo Basin from the top of Sulphur Canyon. At the 
same time, Lieutenant Cusack was under instructions to move south, taking the remaining two 
companies from the battalion along the edge of the San Andres Mountains. It remains unclear 
whether this was to attract the attention of the Apaches, block the lower end of Hembrillo Canyon, 
or both.
74 Lt. C.W. Taylor stated that it was the onset of darkness which saved Company A from annihilation by 
the Apaches. (Personal File John Conline, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 279; See also Laumbach et al, 
2005, p.54).
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Plate 5.1. The extreme right of Conline’s skirmish line was positioned just to the left of the road in the 
foreground. The Apaches attacked down Hembrillo Canyon towards where the  camera is positioned. The 
broken line of brighter green foliage to the right of the road marks the dry arroyo down which some Apache 
warriors crept to get behind the Ninth Cavalrymen. (Photo: author)
Plate 5.2. View up the arroyo used by the Apaches to turn Conline’s right flank. (Photo: author)
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The Battle of Hembrillo Canyon.75 Carroll’s Siege, 6–7 April 1880 
Conline’s report of 30 to 50 warriors seriously underestimated the number of Apaches in the 
vicinity. With his Mescalero allies, Victorio may have commanded between 60 and 150 warriors 
when Carroll moved into Hembrillo Basin from the north. Laumbach argues that Victorio prob-
ably had reasonable warning of Carroll’s approach. A lookout positioned high up on the north 
and west side of the Hembrillo Basin would have been able to see the Ninth Cavalrymen two 
miles away.76 Nevertheless, Carroll, by not following Lieutenant Conline’s route into Hembrillo 
Canyon, probably took Victorio by surprise; though the Apache warriors quickly occupied both 
Carroll’s Ridge and Apache Ridge and set up a v-shaped trap.77 (See Figure 5.3.) Laumbach, 
following the advice of fellow historian Ron Burkett, draws a very interesting distinction 
between ‘trap’ and ‘ambush’. An ambush apparently has to have a ‘close-range “killing ground”’, 
whereas a trap ‘is meant to contain the enemy’.78 One must be very wary of applying US army 
concepts and terminology to the Apaches. However, on reflection this is a rather useful analogy, 
if used with a degree of qualification. Having been taken by surprise, the Apaches’ first priority 
was to  stop Carroll’s detachment from breaking through to their camp. Laumbach argues that 
the Apaches also stationed warriors around Rock House Spring and along Victorio Ridge, as 
a second line of defence. Some Apache warriors quickly created some new, small breastworks 
facing northwards.79 Hatch later observed that the Apache warriors ‘had thrown up with much 
labor stone rifle pits where there were not natural defences’.80 Again, the Apaches’ immediate 
imperative was to prevent the Ninth Cavalrymen from breaking through to their camp should 
the first trap fail.
Carroll was therefore moving south through Hembrillo Basin, between Apache Ridge and 
Carroll’s Ridge, when Victorio’s warriors opened fire from both ridges. The archaeology reveals a 
wide range of weapons and equipment deployed by the Apaches during the battle.81 
75 There seems to be some dispute in the various sources over the actual date of the battle. The earliest 
source seems to be provided by Capt. McLellan who clearly states that the battle was fought on the 6-7 
of Apr., 1880. Until clear evidence to the contrary is provided I shall use these dates. (See for instance, 
Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company L, 6th Cavalry, Mar./ Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94).
76 Laumbach, 2001, p.209. Having visited Hembrillo Canyon on the 22 September 2006 and seen the lie 
of the land I would agree with Karl on this matter. I did not reach the lookout position but Carroll’s entry 
point from Sulphur Spring is clearly visible from lower ground and it would have taken the Cavalrymen 
some time to march down into the Basin from this point. Incidentally, this entry point is quite high up 
on the northern side of Hembrillo Basin.
77 Laumbach, 2001, p.177 & p.209.
78 Laumbach email, 27/12/2002.
79 Laumbach, 2001, p.209.
80 Hatch to AAAG SF 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.67; See also Hatch, Tulerosa, to 
AAAG, SF, 10 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.387-388; 
Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 12 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.301; Pope to AAG, MDoM13 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 526.
81 Therefore, it should not be assumed that all of these weapons were deployed during the opening attack 
upon Carroll’s command.
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Table 5.2 Weapons and Equipment Deployed by the Apaches in the Battle of Hembrillo Canyon82 
80 .45-55 Springfield Carbines 
31 .50-70 1866 Springfield Rifles
15 .44-40 Winchester Repeating Rifles 
8 .50-70 1868 Springfield Rifles
3 .50-70 Remington Rifles
3 .50 Sharps Rifles
3 .44 Henry/Winchester 1866 Repeating Rifles. 
1 .44 extra-long Ballard Rifle
1 .44 extra-long Wesson Rifle
1 .45-70 Sharps Carbine
The large number of Springfield rifles somewhat undermines the stereotypical picture of the 
Apache warriors of the 1870s and 1880s being armed exclusively with Winchester and similar 
repeating rifles.83
Laumbach argues that Carroll had the 
choice of staying out in the open or retreating 
to a lower hill. Yet the Apaches on both 
ridges would have dominated both of these 
locations.84 He was saved by launching a 
counterattack on the Apache positions on 
what is now known as Carroll’s Ridge, which 
the archaeological survey suggests was held 
by far fewer Apache warriors than those 
stationed on Apache Ridge.85 He was, as 
Conline had been the previous day, probably 
also saved by moving into Hembrillo Basin 
relatively late in the day.86 
Nevertheless, Carroll and his men found 
themselves in deep trouble, even though 
they had managed to drive off the Apaches 
defending Carroll’s Ridge and set up as 
good a defensive position as they could. This 
seems to have involved two skirmish lines, 
one facing northeast the other facing west. 
82 Wakeman & Laumbach, p.133; Laumbach, 
2001, p.37 & p.209; 
83 Note the K-H Butte survey, which also 
suggests that the popular image of Apache 
warriors armed to the teeth with Winchester 
repeating rifles may not be strictly accurate. 
(See Ludwig, L.L. & Stute, J.L., 1993, The 
Battle at K-H Butte: Apache Outbreak – 1881: 
Arizona Territory (Westernlore Press: Tucson 
Arizona).
84 Laumbach, 2001, p.177.
85 Laumbach, 2001, p.209
86 Ibid, p.179
Capt. Henry Carroll.
Commander of the Second Battalion, New Mexico 
Troops. On 6-7 April, 1880, he was trapped in 
Hembrillo Basin with half of his battalion and 
severely wounded, before being rescued by the 
remainder of his battalion and Apache scouts and 
Sixth Cavalrymen from the First Battalion, New 
Mexico Troops. (National Archives)
128 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
Laumbach estimates that approximately 21 men would have been required to control the horses 
and mules, leaving 50 men to fight the Apaches.87 A rare account from the Mescalero Apache 
point of view is preserved in the Rare Manuscript Collections at Cornell University. A man named 
Old Paul was interviewed and remembered seeing Jose Carillo88 among the soldiers after they had 
become pinned down on the ridge. The Mescaleros:
called him [Carillo] by his Indian name there and said, “Today we’re going to butcher you.” 
He raised his rifle up and shot without sighting it he was so scared. They were all scared, those 
soldiers.89
The horses and mules were sheltered in a ravine at the southern end of Carroll’s Ridge; but as 
darkness fell, this left them vulnerable to infiltrating Apaches.90 Indeed, the cartridge analysis 
strongly suggests that the Apaches moved into this area as they closed in on Carroll’s defences 
during the night.91 (See Figure 5.4.) Though the Apaches were successful in killing or capturing 
approximately a quarter of the column’s horses and mules, this suggests that the surviving stock was 
moved up onto Carroll’s ridge under cover of darkness, for greater protection. With the troops prob-
ably last having filled their water bottles from the wagons that morning,92 water became the critical 
issue. The archaeology also reveals that the Apaches knew the varying capabilities of the different 
models of breech-loading rifles, and deployed these weapons in an attempt to frustrate attempts 
by Carroll’s men to reach water running down from Rock House Spring. Victorio concentrated 
most of those warriors armed with shorter-range but higher-rate-of-fire repeating rifles around the 
nearest source of water, while the ridgelines were occupied by warriors armed with longer-range 
single-shot breech-loading weapons.93 
This is a plausible supposition, and one which can be extended. If groups of warriors operated 
together in battle, they may also have done so when acquiring weapons. Even if they were able to 
find an illicit arms dealer, they would not necessarily have been able to pick out a particular make 
of rifle. However, within the limited range of weapons and ammunition they had access to through 
raiding or trading, the Apaches were quite capable of modifying their tactics to take advantage of 
the best features offered by the various models of breech-loading rifles. Betzinez also noted that 
the older Apache warriors, no longer quite so active, preferred longer-range weapons; whereas the 
younger warriors tended to favour repeating rifles.94 One can also see Apaches faced with Carroll’s 
beleaguered men swapping arms and bullets among themselves to suit the immediate tasks allotted 
to them by their leaders.95 These warriors managed to prevent the Ninth Cavalrymen from gaining 
all but a few canteens of water. Mescalero testimony suggests that while Carroll’s men may have 
87 Ibid, p.177 & pp.214 & 219
88 Called ‘Carrilla’ in this document.
89 ‘‘Power from Black One Offered a Mexican’ Box 39 #14/25/3238, Rare Manuscript Collections, Carl 
A. Kroch Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14853-4302. Thanks go to Karl Laumbach for 
passing this information on to me.
90 Laumbach, 2001, pp.177-178.
91 Ibid, p.26 & pp.215-216.
92 Ibid, p.177.
93 Ibid, pp.211-213, p.219 & p.224.
94 Betzinez, 1959, p.77.
95 The closest example of such cooperation can be seen in a skirmish between two frontiersman and two 
Apaches in 1871: ‘They fired three or four shots at me, one with a Henry rifle and the other with a six-
shooter. I was jumping side-wise and trying to reload my rifle when Townsend sent a shot and broke 
the arm of the Indian who had the rifle. Then they both started to run, keeping as much as possible the 
brush between them and us. They had run only a few steps when they ran together, and the one with the 
six-shooter got the Henry rifle and gave the pistol to the one with the broken arm. All of this time I was 
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been scared or confused at the beginning of the battle, they also remembered that as night closed 
in, Jose Carrillo made a successful attempt to reach water:
He started towards the water. He kept on, bullets kicking the dust on all sides of him. He got 
to the water. He drank, filled canteens, and ran back. He would not make a second trip though 
they wanted him to do it.96
It is not clear from this account as to who ‘they’ refers to; it could mean that the trapped Ninth 
Cavalrymen wanted Carillo to make another dash to collect water. However, it could easily be read 
as the Mescalero Apaches wishing for a second opportunity to try to kill Carillo.
However, the Apache warriors managed to seriously wound Carroll and several of his men 
during these attempts to replenish their water supplies.97 
This meant that the horses and mules were not watered that night and some of them were elim-
inated when they broke free to seek water. Two mules were discovered after the battle having 
drowned in a distant waterhole.98 As Carroll established his position and attempted to reach the 
nearest water, the Apaches used the cover of darkness to change positions and close in around 
that position. They occupied the higher ground to the west, south and east of Carroll’s Ridge.99 At 
some point during the night, or perhaps around dawn, the northern skirmish line had to use their 
revolvers to drive off an Apache attempt to infiltrate their line.100 According to Laumbach:
darkness was indeed a factor in the night battle. The sun set of the evening of April 6, 1880, at 
6:31 P.M. MST and twilight ended twenty-five minutes later. After that it was very dark. The 
moon did not rise until 4:25 A.M. on April 7. When it did rise, it was a waning crescent with 
only eight percent of the moon’s visible surface illuminated. Sunrise followed a little more than 
one hour later, at 5:46 A.M.101
However, Apache warriors, always very reluctant to fight at night, may have refused to attack the 
cavalry on such a moonless night. No doubt, with their intimate knowledge of the terrain, Victorio 
and Nana and other experienced warriors had concocted a careful plan of attack to coincide with 
the dawn. At first light, Apache warriors started to close in, slipping down towards and around 
their foes through a network of arroyos and thickets of vegetation. This manoeuvre would have 
been undertaken by the younger, more active, warriors while the more mature warriors harassed 
the trapped Ninth Cavalrymen with long-range sniping from the higher ridges. This attack was 
focused upon 20 troopers holding a position facing to the north east.102 
Early in the fight we have cartridges/weapons on Apache Ridge that are also found near to 
Carroll’s position, suggesting that they were involved first from long range and then moved 
closer. The 3 Henry’s are a case in point but several .45-55’s appear to have joined that 
trying to get a shot, but there was too much brush, and they were taking advantage of it.’ (Genung, 2001, 
p.78).
96 ‘Power from Black One Offered a Mexican’ Box 39 #14/25/3238, Rare Manuscript Collections, Carl A. 
Kroch Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14853-4302.
97 Laumbach, 2001, p.179.
98 Ibid, p.179.
99 Ibid, pp.215 & 219.
100 Ibid, p.219
101 Ibid, p.179. Lumpkin states that there was a thumbnail moon from about 4.30 am onwards. (JJ Lumpkin, 
Albuquerque Journal, 23 Apr., 1999)
102 See Wakeman & Laumbach webpage.
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manoeuvre. So it is logical to posit a movement from Apache Ridge down the Area H espe-
cially as Hatch talks about the Apache closing in.103
Laumbach and fellow-archaeologist Wakeman point out that the Apaches attempted to outflank 
this position, forcing the Ninth Cavalrymen to use their revolvers to blaze away and discourage 
their tormentors. If we examine Wakeman and Laumbach’s diagram104 of the excavated line of 
spent cartridge cases, most of the Ninth Cavalrymen seem to have been moving from position to 
position along their skirmish line. Very few men remained at a single position on the line. One 
revolver (9) left spent cartridges at locations all along the line. This may represent an officer, or 
NCO, moving up and down the line directing the defence. The more localised movement of some 
of the spent cases may indicate troopers moving to cover comrades specifically threatened by the 
probing attacks of the Apache warriors. Laumbach also points out that such movement could also 
be due to ‘rodents, visitors to the battlefield, wind, erosion and other natural processes’.105
Hatch stated that Carroll was wounded twice but that only one of these wounds was dangerous. 
He also noted seven enlisted men were seriously wounded.106 In Carroll’s case, the surgeon’s report 
on his injuries states that, ‘The course of the ball seriously endangered the axilliary artery, the 
brachial plexus, the head of the humerus and glenoid fossa, and, indeed it is difficult to understand 
how these parts escaped destruction.’107 Two troopers, Privates Johnson and Lyle, were still out 
of action by the end of June. Lyle needed to have his left leg amputated,108 and he was medically 
discharged from the army on 11 January 1881.109 Another soldier, Trumpeter Guddy, was shot in 
both legs.110 Three of Carroll’s men subsequently died of their wounds: Issac James and William 
Sanders/Saunders died in April and July respectively,111 and Private Morgan of D Company was 
also recorded as having died from wounds received at Hembrillo Canyon during April 1880.112 
Immediately after the battle, Surgeon MacPherson estimated that three of Carroll’s men were 
likely to die of their wounds.113
103 Laumbach Email, 27/12/2002.
104 Wakeman & Laumbach, p.134 see also Laumbach, 2001, p.221.
105 Laumbach email, 27/12/2002.
106 Hatch to AAAG SF 8 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.16-17; Hatch, Tulerosa, to AAAG, 
SF, 10 Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.387-388; Hatch 
to Sheridan 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements 
Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.155-156; Hatch to AAG, HQ , MDoM, Chicago, 13 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.394; Pope’s Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
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Letters 1 Jan., 1879 to 3 Sept., 1880, University of Virginia at Charlottesville; Chronological List, p.49; 
Record of Engagements, p.94; Wellman, 1957, p.165.
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Plate 5.4. Apache breastwork constructed on the ridge above Carroll’s position. Victorio Peak can be seen to 
the left of the centre of the photograph, while part of Victorio Ridge can be seen on the right. (Photo: author)
Plate 5.3. Photograph taken from the Apache position on Victorio Ridge. Carroll’s command was trapped 
within the area marked by two faint curved lines forming a mirror image of each other in the middle of 
the photograph. The Apaches also occupied the two ridges to the left of this position, and the hill to the 
right of, and above, Carroll’s position. Carroll’s two companies had entered Hembrillo Basin somewhere 
along the left side of the horizon, giving Victorio time to react to the appearance of US troops from an 
unexpected direction. (Photo: author)
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Plate 5.6. A spent 45:70 cartridge case found below Carroll’s position, so probably last handled by an 
Apache warrior working his way towards the Ninth Cavalrymen at dawn on  7 April 1880. (Photo: author)
Plate 5.5. Victorio Ridge. It was from this position that the Apaches held off the reinforcements from both 
the First and Second Battalions of New Mexico Troops on 7 April. (Photo: author)
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The Battle of Hembrillo Canyon: The Relief, 7 April 1880 
We now return to the First Battalion of New Mexico Ttroops, under the immediate direction of 
Edward Hatch. The Battalion had started to come together as a unit towards the end of March. 
Major Morrow left Fort Bayard on 29 March 1880 with six officers, 86 Ninth Cavalrymen, six 
Fifteenth Infantrymen and 63 Apache scouts.114 They rendezvoused with Captain McLellan, the 
composite Sixth Cavalry company and the Apache scouts under Lieutenant Gatewood, at Las 
Palomas. According to Captain McLellan, the rendezvous was scheduled for 1 April but Morrow 
did not arrive with the rest of his battalion until 3 April.115 Captain McLellan remained at Las 
Palomas until 5 April, before being ordered to move on to Aleman. Morrow was ordered to move 
his element of the command to Aleman on 4 April.116 
As the First Battalion congregated at Aleman, it was already clear that they would not be able 
to keep to the timetable that Captain Carroll was following. Unfortunately, the water pump at 
Aleman was broken, which further delayed their deployment into the San Andres Mountains. This 
meant that the horses and mules could only be watered at a fraction of the rate that might have 
been expected had the pump been working. The delay in Morrow’s arrival at the rendezvous with 
McLellan at Las Palomas would also be explained by a delayed supply train. Newman, the editor 
of Thirty Four, also noted that: ‘It is now admitted that the troops from the west were a day behind, 
on account of the breaking down of a supply train and the well at Aleman getting out of order.’117 
(see document file no. 49.) 
For these reasons, Hatch had to improvise the most efficient deployment of the troops at his 
disposal; and he had to deploy the Apache scouts first, and send them on to scout the San Andres 
Mountains. As the Apache scout companies were directly supported by detachments from the 
Sixth Cavalry, these had to be watered next. Late on 6 April, Hatch was able to send the Apache 
scouts and McLellan’s command east from Aleman.118 Morrow’s Ninth Cavalry element of the 
battalion watered its horses and followed up as quickly as possible during the early hours and 
morning of 7 April.119 
The Sixth Cavalry detachment, under Captain McLellan, with their accompanying Apache 
scouts, crested the San Andres Mountains above Hembrillo Canyon at daybreak. This was despite 
becoming lost after temporarily losing their guides during the night, and having to wait until 
the moon rose late in the night before they could reorient themselves.120 Hearing heavy gunfire, 
McLellan gave orders that the supply train should be secured, and the balance of the troops and 
scouts, under Lieutenants Gatewood, Cruse and Maney, moved towards the sound of the guns.121 
McLellan also sent two couriers to inform Hatch’s detachment.122 Once again, Lieutenant Cruse 
left a graphic account of events. They found Carroll’s beleaguered command and launched an 
attack, which drove the Apaches from their positions surrounding Carroll to a ridge to the south of 
Carroll’s position, later called Victorio Ridge. (See Figure 5.5.) Cruse estimated that they appeared 
114 NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1879, p.24; Hatch, San Jose, 
to Morrow, 29 Mar., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.354.
115 Laumbach, 2001, p.161.
116 Morrow cited in Laumbach, 2001, p.161.
117 Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming 
of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
118 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
119 Hatch in Report to The Secretary of War for 1880, p.95; Leckie, 1967, p.216; Utley, 1973, p.361;Haley, 
1981, p.326; Laumbach, 2001, p.167.
120 Laumbach, 2001, p.179 & p.181.
121 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
122 Cruse, 1987, pp.75-76.
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to be confronted by at least 200 Apaches, which caused him some concern as Victorio had previously 
been estimated to lead about 75 warriors. The Apache scout companies were detailed to work their 
way around to the right to flank Victorio Ridge, while the Sixth Cavalry detachment launched a 
frontal attack on the Apache positions. (See Figure 5.6.) Cruse describes a leapfrog advance, where 
half the soldiers (those not assigned to horse-holding duty) would fire at the Apache positions 
while the other half moved forward under this covering fire. The latter would then halt and open 
fire while the former moved up, passing through to positions in advance of the firing line. These 
men would then open fire on the Apache positions. The process was repeated several times as they 
closed on Victorio Ridge. Cruse estimated that he had had to cover 600 yards to reach the crest of 
Victorio Ridge, and recalled that the Apaches opened a heavy fire on the advancing soldiers. Once 
the line got to within 150 yards of the top, they took cover and rested for some minutes. Cruse 
passed word along the line that, when he gave the command, all of the men were to charge the crest 
firing on the run. When they rose up and charged, they found that they received little return fire: 
the Apaches had mostly withdrawn and were now engaged in a furious gun battle with the Apache 
scouts.123 (see document file no. 52.) On a more personal note, Cruse described his feelings during 
the Hembrillo Canyon battle:
I didn’t feel afraid when I first went in, but when several bullets had come uncomfortably close 
to me, I came to the conclusion that they were actually trying to shoot me, and that put a 
different light on the matter, and I didn’t feel half so comfortable or confident. I am sure that I 
did not kill any Indians, because I did not see a single thing to shoot at; in fact, I saw nothing 
except a long ridge from which came white smoke and bullets.124
Captain McLellan reported that his force first engaged the Apaches at 7:30 a.m., and that the fight 
lasted until 3:30 p.m.125 (see document file no. 53.)
What Cruse and McLellan failed to record was they were not the only US troops to arrive in 
the nick of time. Lieutenant Cusack, leading the rest of Carroll’s Second Battalion, arrived at 
around the same time as McLellan’s force and launched his own attack. Cusack’s own account is 
frustratingly brief, merely noting that his company was engaged between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. 
in driving the Apaches from ‘the hill held by him [the Apaches]’.126 Lt. Conline’s original account 
remains almost as vague:
On Apr 7, a little before 9 o’clock am [a.m.] joined Capt. Carroll near water in Membrillo 
Canon and about twenty minutes after, went into action, which closed at 5pm Apr 7, 80, after 
Victorio had been driven from the first water at 11 am, and the second at about 4pm, by the 
combined movements of Capt Carroll’s and McFellan’s commands.127
In the Ninth Cavalry regimental return, A Company was noted as being in skirmish lines from 8:00 
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on 7 April, and G Company was recorded as driving Apaches from positions in 
123 Cruse, 1987, pp.74-76; see also Wakeman & Laumbach, p.136; Carter, USACMH, Webpage; Report of 
Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
124 Cruse, 2001, p.263.
125 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880. See also McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 
May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Personal File Thomas Cruse, NA, RG94, 
Entry 297, Box 1428 where his file notes a ‘severe fight lasting from 6.30 A.M. until 3 P.M.’.
126 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company G, 9th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94.
127 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 9th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94.
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Hembrillo Canyon.128 D Company, led by Lieutenant Hughes, was noted as having fought contin-
uously for nine hours each day on 6 and 7 April.129 This additional information fits quite neatly 
with an account of the fight published in Thirty Four on 14 April 1880.130 (see document file no. 
55.) Lieutenant Conline later stated (see document file no. 54) that Lieutenant Cusack’s half of the 
battalion, recalled by courier, had marched at daylight on 7 April, and had joined Carroll under fire 
from the surrounding hills at around 8:30 a.m.131 Some of the fire came from McLellan’s Apache 
scouts who, unaware of the exact dispositions of Carroll’s command, mistook the approaching 
cavalrymen for more Apaches.132 Conline stated that the two companies of the Ninth Cavalry 
joined in the attack on Victorio Ridge. He also implied that some of the Second Battalion had 
provided covering fire for the Apache scouts as the latter had taken control of a second water hole 
(probably Upper Hembrillo Spring) at about 4:00 p.m.133 Indeed, from the Apache perspective, 
James Kaywaykla notes that the deadlock between the US army and the Apaches was broken by 
the arrival of cavalry from the Tulerosa Basin. This clearly points to the arrival of the other two 
companies from Carroll’s battalion.134
Skirmishing continued throughout the day as the Warm Springs and Mescalero Apaches faded 
back into the high ground to the south. Spent cartridges and bullets indicate that Victorio’s warriors 
conducted a fighting withdrawal to a ridge to the south before finally breaking off the engagement. 
McLellan reported that Morrow reached him at 5:00 p.m. with Hatch following an hour later, 
both missing any chance to participate in the action.135 When the action was broken off, the troops 
marching from Aleman had been without water, other than that which was in their canteens, for 
some hours. The troops under Carroll had been without water for almost two days.136 
There is some debate137 over the Apache casualties. McLellan and Cruse claimed three killed,138 
but the Apache scouts claimed to have killed approximately 20. Hatch stated that, while he knew 
of the claims of the Apache scouts, their reports had not been confirmed. As far as Hatch was 
concerned, he could only confirm that three Apache warriors had been killed.139. Hatch recognised 
128 See Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88.
129 Record of Events Apr. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 
Regimental Returns 1873-1880, NA, M744, Roll 88.
130 Thirty Four, 14 Apr., 1880.
131 Conline cited in Laumbach, 2001, p.182.
132 Laumbach, 2001, p.184 & p.224.
133 Conline cited in Laumbach, 2001, pp.189-190.
134 Ball, 1970, p.85.
135 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880; See also McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 
May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Morrow cited in Laumbach p.191.
136 Hatch to AAG, 16 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.412; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
18 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.318; 
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137 See comments by Laumbach, 2001, p.246 It is certainly true that Department HQ sent a request 
concerning the numbers of Apaches killed and the number of horses killed or captured five days after 
the battle. (See Loud to Hatch, Aleman (to be forwarded from Mesilla by first opportunity), 12 Apr., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.) It should be 
noted that if the New Mexican Troops in the Field had had any indication of heavy casualties, this would 
have been among the first statistics transmitted.
138 Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880. See also McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 
May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Leckie, 1967, p.216. We might wish to remind 
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when reading this report. 
139 Hatch to AAG, 16 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.412; See also Hatch to AAG, 16 
Apr., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.206; Thrapp, 1974, p.269.
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one of the dead Indians as a Mescalero Apache.140 The Colonel later stated that the slain Mescalero 
was almost certainly responsible for the killing of Robert Kane, the Ninth Cavalry courier killed 
near San Jose on 22 March 1880, as this Apache ‘was recognized as having in his possession the 
carbine of the soldier’.141 Hatch found the remains of 41 wickiups and suspected that there had been 
many more.142 He also later stated143 that his men had found ample evidence (flour sacks, blankets) 
that their opponents had included a strong force of Mescalero Apaches.144 This, and his estimation 
that there had been 200 Apaches involved in the battle, convinced Hatch that the Mescaleros had 
generally participated in the battle.145 He also thought that some Comanches had been present, as 
it was later reported that some of the ponies captured carried Comanche brands.146 
As a result of his intervention, McLellan, his Sixth Cavalrymen, and his Apache scouts were 
generally given the credit for saving Carroll’s command and driving off the Apaches.147 Immediately 
after the fight, Captain Loud, almost certainly passing on a comment made by Hatch, gave the 
distinct impression that McLellan’s command  the leading role in this engagement: ‘Carroll opened 
the fight and McLellan closed it last night. Carroll has been roughly handled.’148 Equally it should 
be noted that, while McLellan’s report gives credit for the victory to Lieutenants Touey, Gatewood 
and Cruse of the Sixth Cavalry, and Lieutenants Mills149 and Maney of the Twelfth and Fifteenth 
Infantry Regiments,150 Hatch was equally strong in his praise of Captain Carroll, Lieutenants 
Cusack, Hughes,151 Conline, and C.B. Taylor of the Ninth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Maney of the 
140 Hatch to AAAG SF 8 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.17; Hatch to Sheridan 10 Apr., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 
13, p.155; Platt AAG Fort Leavenworth to Pope, 9 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; Sheridan to AG approximately quoting above report, 10 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 526.
141 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.514-520; 
see also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in Loud to AAG, DoM, 
Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 
6, 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285; Stout, p.149.
142 Hatch to Sheridan 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.155; See Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 9 Apr., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.295; Platt AAG Fort 
Leavenworth to Pope, 9 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Sheridan to AG 
approximately quoting above report, 10 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
143 This information might be somewhat tainted as this is contained in a letter written in 1886 in response to 
a claim for compensation by the Mescalero Apaches for their treatment in which they blamed their trou-
bles upon Mescalero renegades and Victorio’s Warm Springs Apaches. They also claimed that twenty-
five women and children had been killed during Hatch’s operation to disarm and dismount them. (See 
Jose Carrillo to The CoIA, 7 Jul., 1885 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528).
144 Hatch to AG, U.S. Army, Washington D.C., 3 Apr. 1886 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
145 See Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 9 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.295; Hatch to Sheridan 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, 
Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.154-155; See also Hatch to AAG, 
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Fifteenth Infantry.152 McLellan’s report could be interpreted as trying to divert attention away 
from the active participation of African-American troops throughout the battle. This may be true; 
but if McLellan’s and Hatch’s reports are viewed as praising officers directly under their command, 
then it is Hatch who perhaps comes across as giving less credit than was due to the troops from 
Arizona. Nevertheless, when later summarizing the campaign from February to May 1880, Hatch 
was fulsome in his praise of Captain McLellan and Lieutenants Gatewood and Mills for their part 
in the Hembrillo Canyon battle.153 Hatch’s report for the Annual Report of the Secretary of War 
records the intervention of both McLellan and Cusack in the relief of Carroll’s detachment. 154 (see 
document file no. 56.)
A Close Run Affair: Luck Plays Into Victorio’s Hands
The most unfortunate incident concerning the Hembrillo Canyon fight, at least from the US 
army’s point of view, was about to occur. Until receipt of the news of the fighting in Hembrillo 
Canyon, the story was that Hatch had been ascending a path into the San Andres Mountains. 
According to Cruse’s memoirs, Hatch had taken the Ninth Cavalry element of the battalion across 
the San Andres Mountains on a route to the south of that taken by McLellan. If one believes that 
Hatch knew the location of the Victorio’s camp, this would make sense. If McLellan attacked first 
from the north east while Hatch moved up from the south, Victorio would be caught in between. 
Concerned that he had a disaster on his hands, Hatch elected to return to the level ground on the 
western side of the mountains and hurry his command to the scene of the action.155 Descending the 
very same trail were Victorio and Nana, with some warriors who were escorting their families out 
of the mountains while the rest of the warriors covered their retreat by prolonging the skirmishing 
in Hembrillo Canyon. The soldiers’ ‘about face’ proved to have been an extremely lucky escape for 
Victorio’s people. The Apaches had spotted them, and Nana later recounted that they had had ‘a 
bad fifteen minutes’156 until the command suddenly turned aside and hurried north.
Laumbach doubts the veracity of this version of events. He argues that, as Morrow did not finally 
leave Aleman till about 1:00 p.m., this makes it more likely that Hatch’s troops were following up 
McLellan’s route into the mountains. Laumbach notes that it is only Cruse who mentions Hatch 
going to the south east before entering the San Andres. He also, quite rightly, points that there 
is no indication in Kaywaykla’s account that the retreating Apaches were fleeing southwards. On 
retreating out of the southern end of Hembrillo Basin, they could have quickly swung round to 
the west and almost blundered into the battalion as it moved directly towards the San Andres 
Mountains:
Cruse is the only one to mention couriers. If McLellan sent couriers soon after the battle was 
joined or even as late as 11:00 am and if Morrow is correct that Hatch didn’t leave Aleman 
152 Hatch, General Order No. 5, 4 Aug., 1880, General Orders, Circulars and Court Martial Orders 1870-
1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; See also General Order No.5, 4 Aug., 1880, Printed Special 
Orders 1869-1888, DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 446.
153 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 5 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.407, pp.260-268.
154 Hatch in Report to The Secretary of War for 1880, cited in Sonnichsen, p.196; see also Hatch to AAAG 
SF 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.66; Hatch to AAG, HQ , MDoM, Chicago, 13 
Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.394; Personal File Patrick Cusack, NA, RG94, Entry 
297, Box 49.
155 Cruse, 1987, p.76.
156 Thrapp, 1967, p.196: 1974, p.270; Stout, p.132; Utley. 1973, p.361; Worcester, p.226; Haley, 1981, p.326.
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until 1pm, then Hatch would not have had time to do all this manoeuvring before the couriers 
reached him.157
Indeed, while couriers were sent by McLellan, it was from Aleman that Hatch sent a telegram158 
to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Santa Fé, giving the first news of the fight in Hembrillo 
Canyon:
Courier just in from front Indians are there in force we are bound to get a fight out of them 
already captured some of their animals leave with rest of command in a few minutes.159
It would be much more likely that Hatch would have set out from Aleman following his advance 
guard. Indeed, James Kaywaykla gives the Apache version of events, in which he states that Nana, 
unaccompanied by Victorio, was guiding the women and children away from Hembrillo Canyon 
towards the Jornada del Muerto when they encountered Hatch’s force. However, he makes it 
clear that, rather than turning aside, the Apache scouts with the troops failed to note their hastily 
concealed trail and passed their hiding place.160 It should be noted that, by this point, Hatch’s 
force would not have included Apache scouts, as these were already fighting in Hembrillo Basin. 
Kaywaykla assumed that Hatch was accompanied by such scouts; but their absence further explains 
the failure to spot the hidden Apaches.
As the fighting in Hembrillo Canyon died down, the Apaches split up. Many Mescalero 
Apaches took to their horses and departed eastwards towards their reservation. Sonnichsen implies 
that Victorio’s Mescalero allies slipped back to the reservation that night. George Sligh, a boy at 
the time, recalls accompanying his father as he drove a wagonload of liquor from El Paso to the 
troops at the Tulerosa Agency.161 They had to drive off the road and hide in the darkness when 
they suddenly found themselves caught between at least two parties of torch-bearing Apaches 
making for the Mescalero reservation. The torch bearing sounds a bit conspicuous for Apaches, but 
Sligh reported to Sonnichsen that they heard Apache voices as well.162 Laumbach thinks that the 
groups Sligh encountered were Mescalero women and children. He cites a report of a movement 
of 50–60 Apache warriors east out of the mountains on 8 April 1880.163 These are probably the 
50–60 Apaches spotted by Lieutenant Finley, guarding the water wagons. These Apaches left the 
San Andres Mountains approximately 10 miles to the south of Finley’s location and made for the 
Mescalero reservation. Finley could only record his frustration at having only five men with him on 
four broken-down horses. ‘If I had had fifty men on good horses I could have captured their stock 
and killed a good many of them.’164 
Victorio’s group, separate from Nana’s party, and made up principally of warriors, had proceeded 
south and, once they had lost their pursuers, doubled back to Aleman, watered their horses and 
157 Laumbach email, 27/12/2002.
158 It has to be noted that in the heat of the moment, many of the telegrams rec’d are not very clearly dated. 
But this telegram surely suggests that Hatch had not moved from Aleman by the time a courier reached 
him informing him of contact with the Apaches.
159 Hatch to AAAG SF Date unclear but looks to be 7 Apr.. NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.18; Loud to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth 7 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.291.
160 Ball, 1970, p.85.
161 Troops had been stationed at Tulerosa and at La Luz midway between Tulerosa and the Mescalero 
Reservation in 1878 in an effort to stop the selling of alcohol to the Apaches. (Reeve, 1938, p.275).
162 Sonnichsen, 1973, pp.197-198.
163 Laumbach email, 27/12/2002; Laumbach, 2001, p.241.
164 Letter dated Tularosa [Tulerosa] N.M., 18 Apr., 1880 in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection.
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departed for their old Black Range haunts.165 There is even reason to believe that some of the 
Apaches used the tracks left by Hatch’s battalion to hide their movement back towards Aleman 
Well. Nana’s near brush with Hatch may have occurred as this group of Apaches also attempted 
to use McLellan’s trail to hide their westward movement out of the San Andres Mountains, unex-
pectedly encountering the Ninth Cavalry in the process. Nana and Victorio, following standard 
practice, probably agreed to rendezvous at Aleman before they left Hembrillo Basin; the former 
leaving as soon as it became clear that a large reinforcement of troops and Apache scouts had 
arrived; the latter leaving after delaying these new opponents for most of the day.
Hembrillo Canyon Controversies
The key controversy concerning the Hembrillo Canyon operation relates to the way in which it 
was reported after the fighting was over. So far, no detailed account by any of the participants in 
the siege of Carroll’s command on 6 and 7 April has emerged. This is particularly surprising as 
such an event would surely have warranted a report from Captain Carroll. This is also in direct 
contrast with a detailed report made by Captain Carroll of a very inconclusive running battle with 
Juh’s Chiricahua Apaches on 4 October 1881, near the Dragoon Mountains in Arizona.166 The 
engagement in Hembrillo Canyon was a very close run affair, where the fate of Captain Carroll and 
two companies of Ninth Cavalrymen hung in the balance. Yet the Captain does not seem to have 
submitted a report. Hatch gave his superiors the distinct impression that he expected this report 
to be made:
I have had no report of the number of Indians killed at San Andreas; personally know of only 
three, the scouts report twenty, not verified by an officer. The fighting was over some three 
miles of ground. The troops were withdrawn for water this evening. Resuming the fight in 
the morning when the Indians broke for the Mescalero Agency Capt Carroll’s report is not 
in:– he had killed twenty five horses and mules from account received.167
The Army and Navy Journal of 24 April 1880 cited a 9 April report in the New Mexican which 
maintained that Colonel Hatch had received news from his scouts at Aleman, on 6 April, that 
the Apaches were concentrated in a specific location in the San Andres Mountains. The article 
gives the impression that Captain Carroll had led the advance from Aleman backed up by Captain 
McLellan’s command.168 The New Mexican would later be dismissed as a tame Santa Fé mouthpiece 
for Hatch by Thirty-Four and the Grant County Herald, so there are grounds to suspect that this 
report originated from Hatch.
It was clearly in Colonel Hatch’s interests to see that the problems experienced in attempting to 
coordinate the three battalions prior to the battle did not become general knowledge. As we have 
165 Ball, 1970, p.85; Thrapp, 1974, p.270; Thrapp, 1967, pp.196-197; Stout, 1974, p.132; Utley, 1973, p.362; 
Worcester, 1979, pp.226-227; Haley, 1981, p.326.
166 See Letters and Telegrams sent by the Battalion on the Southern Pacific Railroad at Separ NM Aug., 
1880/ Nov. 1881, NA, RG391, Entry 921; Letters and Telegrams Received by the Battalion on the 
Southern Pacific Railroad at Separ NM Aug., 1880/Nov. 1881, NA, RG391, Entry 922; Orders Issued 
by the Battalion on the Southern Pacific Railroad at Separ NM Aug., 1880/Nov. 1881, NA, RG391, 
Entry 923; Carroll to AAAG, DoNM, SF, N.M. 17 Oct., 1881, DoM, Letters Received, 7266 DoM 
1881.
167 Hatch to AAG, 16 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.412; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
18 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.318.
168 ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 24 Apr., 1880, p.773.
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already seen, a hint that Captain Carroll was not aware of the change in the overall schedule did 
appear in at least one newspaper story. Luckily for Hatch, this story was not further investigated by 
the territorial press. This is the most important point: Hatch was already under a media spotlight 
before the Hembrillo Canyon operation commenced. By the time it was over, he had failed to visit 
anything remotely resembling a defeat on Victorio. The reasons for the delay – logistic inefficiency 
leading to failure to keep to the timetable – were responsible for operational failure. What is more, 
Captain Carroll could probably have proved this to be the case. Therefore, Hatch kept a firm grip 
on how the battle was reported. Carroll’s severe wound played into his hands in the short-term; a 
severely wounded officer can hardly be expected to write a battle report. Yet there was no reason 
why his junior officers, particularly the officer who assumed command when Carroll was wounded, 
could not have been asked to submit their reports. In the longer term, there was nothing to prevent 
Carroll submitting a report. Yet, there appears to exist no primary record of events recorded by any 
member of D or F Companies, trapped overnight with Carroll. Apart from Lieutenant Conline, 
who concentrated on his own skirmish and was not trapped overnight with Carroll, none of the 
officers with Carroll’s battalion appears to have seen fit to leave an account of the siege. One 
suspects that it was quietly agreed that it was in nobody’s interests to embroil their regimental 
commander in further controversy.
‘Dihydrogen Monoxide’ Takes its Toll
This contemporary controversy has been further obscured by a subsequent myth, probably initi-
ated by Lieutenant Cruse in memoirs written long after the event. This has it that Carroll entered 
the fray too early, and for reasons completely outside his control. Prior to the battle, his battalion 
had drunk water tainted with gypsum and, suffering as a result from severe diarrhoea, they had no 
choice but to seek water in Hembrillo Canyon, thereby initiating the battle too early.
Hatch’s report, written in the immediate aftermath of the battle, states that, ‘Carroll’s command 
was badly used up being nearly three169 days without water.’170 This refers to the events of 6–9 April 
where, as we have seen, Carroll’s men were trapped overnight without water; but they, and the 
rest of Hatch’s two battalions, also ran short of water on the march over the White Sands to the 
Mescalero reservation.
One of the critical contributions of Laumbach’s study has been to directly challenge this story 
by making the discovery that Carroll’s battalion had water wagons. This completely undermines 
the drinking of gypsum water as an explanation for the failure of the Hembrillo Canyon opera-
tion. While this explanation makes it clear that Hatch was more than capable of taking control of 
how this battle was reported, it is doubtful that the poisoned water thesis has any substance. No 
primary source from April 1880 mentions it. More importantly, had the story been true, it would 
have provided the perfect means for Hatch to explain away the failure of this operation, and the 
District Commander made no mention of this story. 
The first mention of this story appears in Cruse’s memoirs, Apache Days and After, published in 
1940, and this has been accepted as the correct version of history ever since. 
Hatch may have successfully deflected attention away from the reasons why the operation failed; 
but claims that a major victory had been achieved over the Apaches garnered a mixed recep-
tion. Surgeon MacPherson was convinced that they had administered ‘a good thrashing’ to the 
169 Hatch, Tulerosa to AAAG SF, 10 Apr., 1880, mentions Carroll’s command having been without water 
for two days in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.387-388).
170 Hatch to AAAG SF 10 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.68; Hatch to AAG, HQ , MDoM, 
Chicago, 13 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.394.
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Apaches.171 Hatch also claimed a victory, using such terms as ‘thoroughly whipped’172 and ‘the 
pounding the Indians rec’d’.173 He was accorded a congratulatory telegram by General Sherman; 
but this praise immediately provoked controversy, even within army circles.174 Sherman’s accolade 
provoked Colonel Carr to claim that the key role in this ‘victory’ had been played by troops from 
his regiment.175
The Grant County Herald reported various rumoured versions of the Hembrillo Canyon battle 
on 17 April 1880.176 These version ranged from the fairly accurate (Carroll wounded twice, with 
another seven troopers wounded), to the wildly inaccurate, including 23 soldiers killed and 26 
Apache scouts deserting to Victorio.177 It was further reported that Carroll had been forced to 
retreat, abandoning his camp to the Apaches.178 Carroll was stated to have been decoyed into an 
ambush and pinned down overnight. Captain Cusack was also given qualified credit179 for joining 
the relief operation in conjunction with McLellan’s men.180 
However, the newspaper’s editorials were savage: it lost no time in dismissing Hatch’s claims as 
fiction. It incorrectly reported a mass desertion by Apache scouts, attributing this to their disgust 
at the inferiority of the ‘buffalo soldiers’ and a desire to join the winning side.181 The only reason 
that disaster had been avoided was stated to be the arrival of the Sixth Cavalry.182 The thrust of the 
paper’s analysis was to repeat and reinforce its claims that Hatch was continuing to misrepresent 
the truth to Washington DC, that ‘African’ troops were useless, and that the ‘right kind of troops’, 
in other words, white troops, should be deployed against the Apaches.183 The Herald also claimed 
that, after Hembrillo Canyon, Hatch’s downfall was imminent, for he would no longer be able to 
conceal the true state of affairs from his superiors in Washington.184 General Pope was said to have 
seen through Hatch and to be intending to remove ‘this mass of bombast and incompetency’.185 The 
press reporting of the events in Hembrillo Canyon also marked the beginning of press criticism 
of another newspaper, the New Mexican, when its version – Carroll leading a surprise attack and 
driving the Apaches into McLellan – was widely derided.186 Such mockery would soon change to 
171 MacPherson Letter 10 Apr., 1880.
172 Hatch to AAAG SF 8 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439 p.16; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
9 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.294; 
Platt AAG Fort Leavenworth to Pope, 9 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; 
Sheridan to AG approximately quoting above report, 10 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
526.
173 Hatch to AAAG, 10 Apr., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.69; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
12 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.301; 
Pope to AAG, MDoM13 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
174 Sherman to AAAG DoNM SF, 13 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.22; Laumbach 
pp.247-248.
175 Carr 21 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Report of Col. E.A. Carr, 11 Sept., 1880, 
in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.217; Hart, p.47.
176 See entries in ‘Town and County’, ‘By Telegraph’, ‘Correspondence’ and ‘Victory’, The Grant County 
Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
177 See entries in ‘Town and County’, ‘By Telegraph’, ‘Correspondence’ and ‘Victory’, The Grant County 
Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
178 The Grant County Herald, 24 Apr., 1880.
179 Cusack being said to have managed to get himself lost the previous day.
180 ‘Regarding that ‘Victory’’ and Leading Article, The Grant County Herald, 24 Apr., 1880.
181 ‘Correspondence’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
182 ‘Victory?’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Apr., 1880; ‘Regarding that ‘Victory’’, The Grant County Herald, 
24 Apr., 1880.
183 ‘Victory?’ and ‘The Outlook’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
184 ‘The Outlook’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
185 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 17 Apr., 1880.
186 The Grant County Herald, 24 Apr., 1880.
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accusations that the New Mexican was merely the Santa-Fé-based mouthpiece for ‘General’ Hatch’s 
propaganda. Again, no matter how wild the reportage, no mention of troops drinking poisoned 
water is made. Carroll is only said to have run short of water while pursuing the Apaches.187
Therefore, while Hatch managed to deflect attention from the true reasons for the failure of the 
Hembrillo Canyon operation, the territorial press were not going to let Hatch slip away unscathed. 
While the press were wrong about many things concerning the army in general, and Hatch in 
particular, they were not wrong in saying that Hatch was misrepresenting the prosecution of the 
war against Victorio. The problem was that, while coming close to pinpointing the very reasons 
for failure, they were all too prone to ‘bombast and incompetency’ in their own reporting of the 
campaign.
Nevertheless Victorio had nearly inflicted another humiliating defeat on the Ninth Cavalry, 
and Hatch could count himself lucky that his overall plan had at least driven Victorio off the field. 
The battle in Hembrillo Canyon did provide clear evidence that Mescalero Apache warriors were 
leaving their reservation and allying themselves with Victorio. Laumbach argues that Hembrillo 
Canyon, while not decisive, proved a turning point in the Victorio Campaign.188 As we shall see, the 
operation to close down the Mescalero reservation did have a decisive long-term effect on Victorio’s 
operations. However, beyond dispersing what had been a concentration of Apache warriors, it is 
difficult to see just what impact the battle had on the Apaches. To describe Victorio as gathering a 
small army of Apaches is perhaps to misinterpret the management of events by the Apaches them-
selves. The offensive direction of Apache warriors would have been geared towards raiding, and it 
is quite clear that the Apaches had hit the Rio Grande valley with a number of raiding parties prior 
to Hembrillo Canyon. But this is no different from their activities throughout the campaign so far. 
All Hatch managed to do in his Hembrillo Canyon operation was to shift the Apaches’ raiding 
activities westwards. Hembrillo Canyon may be one of the most interesting episodes of the Victorio 
campaign; but this is primarily due to its being, probably, the biggest battle of the campaign in 
terms of numbers involved, and because it was such a close-run affair. This battle rested on a knife-
edge, and Victorio came close to winning it; yet it was not a turning point in the campaign.
On the morning of 8 April 1880, Colonel Hatch organized the available Apache scouts and 
troops and scoured the San Andres Mountains to the south of Hembrillo Canyon, but encoun-
tered no Apaches.189 For the moment, Victorio had disappeared yet again. But the Army was now 
preparing to execute phase two of the operation: a move in force onto the Mescalero reservation.
187 Leading Article, The Grant County Herald, 24 Apr., 1880.
188 Laumbach, 2001, p.248.
189 McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Convey to Gen. Hatch my congratulations on his successful blow to the hostile Apaches and 
that I want him to go on patiently and persistently to make if possible an end to these annual 
outbreaks. In pursuing hostiles he need pay no regards to boundaries of Departments & must 
not allow his enemy to claim a safe refuge in an Indian reservation. He may treat them as 
hostiles wherever found and when made captive they should be deprived of arms and horses 
and held as prisoners of war. Such as can be identified with murders and robberies will be 
surrendered to the civil authorities for trial and punishment. The rest after a fair investigation 
will probably be sent to work in the stone quarries at Ft Leavenworth.
 General Sherman’s congratulatory telegram to Colonel Hatch 
 received Santa Fé, 13 April 18801 
Hatch and his troops arrived at the Mescalero reservation on 11 April 1880. McLellan reported 
that they left Hembrillo Canyon for Tulerosa at 4:00 p.m. on 8 April, but managed to get lost in 
the White Sands due to the absence of a qualified guide. By the time they found water, on the 
morning of 9 April, their mounts, having been without water for 72 hours, were in poor condition. 
They finally reached Tulerosa on 11 April 1880.2 One of Hatch’s first acts was to issue orders that 
forage agents from La Mesilla and Las Cruces should have their contracts revoked.3 Though only 
circumstantial, this evidence further suggests that unanticipated delays in the provision of forage 
had delayed Hatch’s proposed timetable for attacking the Apaches in the San Andres Mountains. 
Hatch also issued instructions to the commander of Fort Bliss to direct supplies to Ojo Caliente 
for anticipated future operations against the Warm Springs Apaches.4 These instructions suggests 
that, while Hatch publicly claimed a major victory over the Apaches, he at least was not a victim 
of his own propaganda, and was already preparing for further operations against Victorio. Having 
arrived at the Mescalero reservation a day earlier than originally planned (which in itself suggests 
1 Sherman to Pope 12 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.159-161; See also Sherman to AAAG DoNM SF, 13 Apr., 
1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.22; Hatch (acknowledging receipt of Sherman’s Telegram) to 
AAG, 18 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.178-180; Loud 
to General Hatch, Aleman (operator to forward by first opportunity) 13 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.304-305; Sherman to Sheridan, 
12 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Sherman to Sheridan, 12 Apr., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
2 McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; 
Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880; Hatch, Tulerosa, to AAAG, SF, 10 Apr., 1880, DoNM/
GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.387-388; See also MacPherson Letter, 10 Apr., 
1880; See also Special Field Order No. 19, 11 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Pope’s Annual 
Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.612.
3 Hatch to Loud, 11 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.145.
4 DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.144.
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that Hatch had planned for the ‘known unknowns’ which can frustrate any military endeavour, 
even though he could not predict what actually went wrong), all that was needed before he tried 
to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches was the arrival of Colonel Grierson’s battalion of 
Tenth Cavalrymen.
Grierson had set off from Fort Concho on 23 March 1880, having received instructions to move 
towards Fort Stanton and the Mescalero reservation on 18 March.5 Having left Fort Concho, he 
proceeded to Fort Stockton, where he received instructions from General Pope that he was not to 
arrive at the Mescalero reservation in advance of 12 April 1880. This would, it was hoped, avoid 
giving premature warning of the intended concentration of New Mexico and Texas troops at the 
Mescalero reservation.6 Grierson was accompanied by five companies of the Tenth Cavalry and a 
small detachment of Twenty-Fifth Infantrymen.7 The orders to march upon the Mescalero reser-
vation must have been received with some anticipation. As we have seen, small Tenth Cavalry 
detachments had been sparring occasionally with small Mescalero raiding parties for two years. 
It would have appeared to the troops that they were finally moving in strength to deal decisively 
with their Mescalero opponents. Even as Grierson’s battalion set out, Mescaleros attacked and 
killed a 19-year-old Mexican and captured a Mexican boy near Russell’s Ranch in Texas. Despite a 
pursuit mounted by a party of Mexicans led by the boy’s father, and detachments led by Lieutenant 
John L. Bullis and Lieutenant W.H. Beck, the Apaches, by splitting into two groups, evaded their 
pursuers.8
Most of Grierson’s battalion was instructed to rendezvous at Pecos Falls on 31 March,9 though 
L Company, under Captain Thomas Lebo, did not join until 5 April, at Black River Falls in the 
Guadalupe Mountains.10 In fact, Lebo’s company had been sent towards the Guadalupe Mountains 
earlier that month. Once Lebo had established a camp, he was to thoroughly scout the New Mexico-
Texas boundary between Waco Tanks, to the west of the Guadalupes, and Dug Springs, east of the 
Pecos River. Lebo was given explicit instructions to attack and destroy any Apaches he encoun-
tered. He was also authorized to pursue such raiders onto their reservation. This reflected the belief 
that most of the Mescalero Apaches were absent from their reservation, and that numerous small 
raiding parties were at large.11 
5 Ord to Grierson, 18 Mar., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.104-105, Letter No.111; Grierson to AAG, San 
Antonio, Texas, 18 & 19 Mar., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.218-221, Letter No.’s 101 & 102.
6 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 29 Mar., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.235, Letter No.125; See also Pope to Ord, 
25 Mar., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
7 Matthews, 1993, p.35.
8 Capt. Carpenter, 10th Cavalry to Post Adjutant, Fort Davis Texas 22 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.447-448; Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in 
the Department of Texas, During the Year ending Sept. 30, 1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
p.628; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the Department of Texas, 
since Sept. 30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633.
9 Smither to Keyes, CO Company, K, 25th Infantry, CO, Co. E, 10th Cavalry, all based at Grierson’s 
Springs, 26 Mar., 1880 & Smither to Kennedy, Fort Stockton, 28 Mar., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 
1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1 Letter No.’s 42; 43, 44; 
&47; Record of Events Mar. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company’s D, E, F, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr., 1880 in NA, RG94; ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, 
Vol.17, 27 Mar., 1880, p.693.
10 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr., 1880 in NA, RG94.
11 Smither to CO, Co. L, 10th Cavalry, 14 Mar., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No. 37; See also Smither to Lebo, 25 
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Indeed, Apache raiders had struck the 
area around Pecos Falls on 30 March. On his 
arrival, the following day, Grierson charged 
Lieutenant C. Esterly and a detachment 
from F and L Companies with their pursuit. 
According to the regimental return for the 
Tenth Cavalry, after three days they surprised 
a Mescalero raiding party under cover of a 
sandstorm and killed one Mescalero Apache 
on 3 April 1880.12 The bi-monthly return tells 
a slightly different story. The pursuit managed 
to get within firing distance of the Mescaleros, 
but the latter, having remounts, were able 
to outrun their pursuers. No Mescalero 
casualties were mentioned in F Company’s 
bi-monthly return, and I Company claimed 
that only one Mescalero was wounded in the 
affray.13 
Grierson expected to concentrate his 
battalion of approximately 250 men at Pope’s 
Crossing on the Rio Pecos on 5 April 1880.14 
He also established a supply camp on the 
Black River three to four miles above where it 
joined the Pecos. This was 17–18 miles north 
of the Delaware River and approximately 25 
miles from Pope’s Crossing. This camp was to 
supply Grierson’s command when it returned 
from the Mescalero reservation. Grierson left 
his detachment of Twenty-Fifth Infantrymen 
to guard this camp, warning them to be 
vigilant and not to herd the stock at night. 
Mar., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, pp,232-233 Letter No.120.
12 Record of Events Apr., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; See also Grierson’s Report of his 
Expedition to the Mescalero Agency Mar. – May 1880: submitted 21 May, 1880 (Hereafter referred to 
as ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.634; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 
21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79; Record of Engagements, p.94; Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 1976, 
p.88; Matthews, 1993, p. 35; Rister, 1928, pp.193-194.
The bi-monthly return for Company L stated that the skirmish took place on the 2 of Apr. ‘on staked 
plains, half way between White Sand Hills & Pecos River. (Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company L, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94).
13 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company F & L, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94.
14 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 30 Mar., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.237, Letter No.128; Ord to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 1 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.271; See also Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79; See also Tenth Cavalry 
Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls, NA, RG94.
Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson.
Commander of the Tenth Cavalry and the District of 
the Pecos. Accompanied by a battalion of troops from 
his regiment, he helped Colonel Hatch in the latter’s 
less than successful attempt to disarm and dismount 
the Mescalero Apaches. He and his men would later 
engage Victorio’s warriors at Tinaja de Las Palmas 
and Rattlesnakes Springs, July/August 1880, in a 
difficult mini-campaign of manouevre. (see Chapters 
9-11 this volume) (National Archives)
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Grierson estimated that he would return with his battalion on 25 April, but anticipated that he 
might be delayed. If so, the detachment would be contacted by courier. In anticipation of this delay, 
the garrison was to reduce the forage issued to their animals from approximately nine to seven 
pounds a day.15 
Grierson spread his command to patrol an area 50 miles wide as they moved towards the 
Mescalero reservation, in an attempt to sweep up any raiding parties currently active in the area.16 
Having joining Grierson on 5 April, Lebo’s company was ordered to scout through the Guadalupe 
Mountains via Guadalupe Creek, and then by either Blue Water or Crow Creek to reach the settle-
ment of Penasco on 10 April and rejoin Grierson at that point.17 The rest of Grierson’s command 
followed the Pecos River to the Seven Rivers, before turning west and making for Penasco.18 On 9 
April, Captain Lebo’s company surprised a raiding party encamped at Shakehand Spring (40 miles 
south of the Penasco River19), killing (and burying) a Mescalero warrior, capturing four women, 
recovering a kidnapped Mexican boy and capturing 21 horses and mules. The Apaches had been 
preparing about 3,000 pounds of meat and 500 pounds of dried mescal before Lebo’s command 
found and destroyed the camp where they were doing this.20 The Mexican boy turned out to be 
the same boy taken near Russell’s Ranch, and he was ultimately reunited with his father when 
Grierson’s battalion returned to Texas.21
The Tenth Cavalry battalion, having rendezvoused with Lebo again at Penasco, marched via 
Silver and Elk Springs, and on past the headwaters of the Penasco River,22 to reach the Mescalero 
reservation on or around 12 April, as instructed.23 In fact, Colonel Grierson had followed numerous 
trails through the Sacramento Mountains and was preparing to surround and attack a large camp 
15 Smither to Lane, 6 Apr., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No. 52.
16 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635.
17 Smither to Lebo 5 Apr., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.50.
18 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
19 Lebo described Shakehand Spring (without naming it as such) as lying between the Guadalupe and 
Sacramento Mountains. (Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 
1880 in NA, RG94) It is named as Shake Hand Spring in the Guadalupe Mountains (Grierson, 20 May 
1880 in Endorsements Sent 24 Feb., 1878-21 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, p.238).
20 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635; Bi-Monthly Company 
Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Mar./Apr. 1880 in NA, RG94; Personal File Samuel L. 
Woodward, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 426; Leckie, 1967, p.217; Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 
1976, p.88; Record of Engagements, p.94; O’Neal, 1991, p.156; Matthews, 1993, pp.35-36; Rister, 
1928, pp.194-195.
21 Grierson to AG, MDoM, 20 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.448-449; ‘Grierson’s 
Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or 
Captured, by Indians, &c., in the Department of Texas, since Sept. 30, 1879, officially reported by post 
commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633; Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty 
Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 
Apr., 1880.
22 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
23 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635; Hatch to AAG, 12 Apr., 1880, 
DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.201; Leckie, 1967, p.217; Chronological 
List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.88; Record of Engagements, p.94; O’Neal. p.156; Matthews, 1993, pp.35-36; 
Rister, pp.194-195; Personal File Samuel L. Woodward, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 426.
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of Mescalero Apaches camped near the ‘head of the Tulerosa’ when he was contacted by Agent 
Russell and informed that these Apaches had camped there at the agent’s request.24
In relative terms, the US force which attempted to disarm the Mescaleros was huge. Five 
companies of the Tenth Cavalry (D, E, F, K, and L) were combined with the three Ninth Cavalry 
field battalions, bringing the total to 400 cavalry, 75 Indian scouts and 60 infantry.25 The Second 
Battalion, New Mexico Troops left at Tulerosa with orders to send their wounded up to Fort 
Stanton, and for the remainder to refit for imminent field service.26 The rest of the troops in Hatch’s 
force were to set out for the Mescalero agency between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on 12 April.27 
Hatch also specifically ordered that the Apache scouts were to ‘be kept well in hand and will not 
be permitted to advance in front of the Companies of the Ninth Cavalry belonging to the First 
Battalion.’28
Hatch, having contacted Russell on 23 March, requested that all Mescaleros be gathered 
together at the agency with all their animals by 12 April. On Hatch’s arrival on the reservation 
Agent Russell was emphatic that the Mescalero Apaches encamped on the reservation were 
peaceful. Russell admitted that ‘a few’ Mescaleros were acting with Victorio, and that many 
more passively supported the Chihenne Apache leader; but this did not amount to a majority 
of the Mescalero Apaches. Hatch would have none of this, concluding that the Mescalero 
Apaches were largely colluding with Victorio at Hembrillo Canyon. He also pointed out that 
the Mescalero reservation had, for at least a year, been used as a safe haven for renegade Apaches 
and the illegal trading of stolen goods for guns and ammunition.29 In view of this conduct, the 
Mescalero Apaches were to report with arms and stock to the immediate vicinity of the agency 
or be considered hostile. Hatch also informed Russell that there were more than enough Apache 
scouts to hunt down those Mescaleros who chose to remain at large on the reservation.30 In 
response, Agent Russell stated that all the Mescalero Apaches were camped above the Agency. 
‘Any Mescalero’s that your force may come in contact with in passing through the reservation 
from Tulerosa in any direction to this place will merit any punishment you may inflict as they all 
had timely warning of your coming.’31
24 Russell to CO in charge of troops that may be coming to this Agency by the way up the Rio Tulerosa 
[Tulerosa] Canon,12 Apr., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, p.635
25 Hatch to AAAG SF, 12 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, pt 3, Entry 439, p.41; Thrapp, 1974, p.271; Leckie, 
1967, p.217; Matthews, 1993, p.35.
26 Special Field Order No.19 para.3, 11 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; See also DoNM/
GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.322.
27 Special Field Order No.19 paras.1&2, 11 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; See also DoNM/
GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 59, p.322.
28 Special Field Order No.19 para.2, 11 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
29 Hatch to Russell, 11 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.140; 
Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.514-520; 
see also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in Loud to AAG, DoM, 
Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285.
30 Hatch to Russell, 11 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.140; 
See also Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kas, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.514-520; See also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in 
Loud to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285.
31 Russell to Hatch, 11 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Plate 6.1. The Sacramento Mountains seen from the vicinity of Fort Stanton. (Photo: author
Plate 6.2. Another view of the Sacramento Mountains. These mountains rise almost vertically out of the 
plain and are riven by a number of steep canyons which lead into the thickly forested inner heights. It was 
this terrain which provided the Mescalero Apaches with their home. The rugged terrain also provided 
the opportunity for Victorio and Nana to trade for munitions with little danger of intervention by US 
authorities, whether civil or military. (Photo: author)
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By 13 April, Hatch informed his superiors that over 400 Mescaleros had reported to the agency.32 
Only 65 warriors had been counted at the agency, with Hatch believing that most of the warriors 
were with Victorio, led by Caballero ‘head chief of Mescaleros’.33 However, bad weather intervened 
and frustrated Hatch’s intention of disarming the Mescalero Apaches on the morning of 15 April 
1880. The inclemency of the weather forced the Mescaleros to delay their congregation at the 
agency. Accordingly, Hatch delayed his attempt to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches 
until the afternoon of 16 April. The Mescaleros were thoroughly alarmed by the huge US army 
profile. While some came in reluctantly, others, whether allied with Victorio or not, remained 
in far-flung corners of the reservation. It was also reported that Victorio had sent emissaries to 
the Mescaleros, warning them that they were to be removed to San Carlos.34 Hatch had almost 
certainly misjudged the political situation on the reservation, believing his immediate assessment 
of the outcome of the Hembrillo Canyon battle: ‘I move from here to the Mescalero Agency. Think 
the punishment the Indians have received here will have effect to bring the Indians to terms.’35 
Subsequent events would disprove this suggested inclination towards defeat among the Mescalero 
Apaches. Agent Russell argued that the large numbers of soldiers suddenly appearing on the reser-
vation had made the Mescaleros very nervous, and that, fearing an en masse removal to San Carlos, 
they had scattered into the more remote parts of their reservation. Russell had only managed to 
make contact with Nautzilla, and it had taken much persuasion his part to persuade Nautzilla to 
meet with Hatch, who gave him assurances that the Mescaleros were not being threatened. It was 
only after this meeting that Hatch told Agent Russell that a full disarming and dismounting of the 
Mescalero Apaches was intended.36 Russell already suspected that the disarming and dismounting 
of the Mescaleros was intended, and refused to sanction such deception. He then agreed with 
Hatch that the Mescalero Apaches would surrender their arms and horses to their agent.37 It should 
be noted that Grierson thought that Hatch had been too focused on preventing trouble with the 
Office of Indian Affairs and the Interior Department. Moreover, Grierson judged that Hatch had 
perhaps relied too much upon Russell’s ability to bring in the Mescalero Apaches. Grierson also 
noted that, no matter what course Hatch adopted, it would expose him to criticism from some 
quarter.38 
However, Hatch was not complacent. On 15 April, he ordered that the men of his command 
be issued with 200 rounds of ammunition, and that ten days’ rations be carried by pack mules. 
Any extraneous equipment or supplies were to be left in the care of Lieutenant Gustavus Valois, 
the expedition’s quartermaster.39 He ordered Morrow’s battalion to the south in search of a camp 
rumoured to be in Dog Canyon or Alamo Canyon. He also sent Carroll’s battalion to block this 
32 Hatch to AAG, HQ , MDoM,, Chicago, 13 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.400; Loud 
to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 16 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.308-309.
33 Hatch to Platt AAG, 15 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.403-404.
34 Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming 
of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
35 Hatch to AAAG SF, 8 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, pp.16-17; Se also Hatch to AAG, HQ , 
MDoM,, Chicago, 13 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.394.
36 Report of the CoIA, DoI, OIA, Washington, 1 Nov., 1880, pp.251-252; See also sworn statement by 
George N. Maxwell, Sept. 30 1880 in Report of Inspector Mahan in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
528.
37 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Russell to Mahan, U.S. Indian 
Inspector, 27 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
38 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
39 Special Field Order No. 22, 15 Apr., 1880, para’s.2 ,3 & 5, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
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camp’s exit to the south.40 The latter was ordered to remain outside the canyon entrances and block 
any attempted escape out onto the plains.41 
In the meantime, Victorio also had to be tracked down. On 14 April, Hatch detached from 
Morrow’s battalion Companies B, H and M, Ninth Cavalry, under Captain Purington, to pursue 
Victorio42 Purington was ordered to commence his scouting between Las Palomas and San Jose.43 
On paper, this detachment looked impressive; yet it only mustered 62 men.44 A trail that suggested 
almost 250 Apaches was reported to Purington, and he followed this trail to the Rio Grande. Here, 
however, he had to break off his pursuit to collect additional supplies which had been delivered to 
Fort McRae. His horses were also reported to be exhausted.45 The Captain subsequently followed 
a trail that led westwards across the Rio Grande and into the San Mateo Mountains. His detach-
ment stopped at Ojo Caliente between 26 and 28 April 1880,46 no doubt to replenish their supplies 
before setting out after the Apaches once more. By the end of the month, Purington was able to 
report to Hatch that a number of trails had been discovered moving into the San Mateos.47
Heavy-Handed Operation to Disarm the Mescalero Apaches (see document file no. 57.)
As noted earlier, Major Morrow’s now reduced battalion had been ordered to scout Dog Canyon 
and Alamo Canyon. Early on 16 April 1880, McLellan’s company, with Gatewood’s scouts, moved 
off in advance of the rest of the battalion. Within two hours of setting out, heavy gunfire was 
heard at the agency.48 McLellan’s advance party had encountered a group of Mescaleros apparently 
running off some horses, and two of them were shot dead by Gatewood’s Apache scouts. Hatch 
claimed that Gatewood was attacked by the Mescaleros, arguing that the reports of Winchester 
rifles could be clearly distinguished from the Apache scouts’ Springfield rifles.49 The Mescaleros 
40 Hatch Mescalero Agency 13 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
pp.149-150; Hatch to Platt AAG, 15 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.403; Loud to AAG 
Fort Leavenworth, 17 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.311-312; Hatch to Pratt 15 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
41 Hatch Mescalero Agency 13 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
pp.149-150.
42 Purington was accompanied by Captains Dawson and Rucker and Lt. Hugo. (Correspondence from 
Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming of the Mescaleros 
published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880).
43 Hatch, Mescalero Agency, 13 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.147; Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the 
Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
44 Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming 
of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880; Report from Andrew Kelley concerning illegal 
trade with Apaches at Canada Alamosa as reported in Thirty-Four, 5 May, 1880.
45 Report from Andrew Kelley concerning illegal trade with Apaches at Canada Alamosa as reported in 
Thirty-Four, 5 May, 1880.
46 Return for Apr., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916 Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, May 
1879-Mar. 1882, NA, M617, Roll 877.
47 Hatch to Loud AAA Genl, SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, pp.449-450. In his telegram 
of the 1 of May, 1880, Hatch does not make it clear when he dispatched Purington. The implication 
given in the telegram is that Purington’s detachment was sent out from the Mescalero Reservation as a 
separate detachment from Morrow, Hatch and McLellan.
48 Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming 
of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
49 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kas, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.514-
520; see also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in Loud to AAG, 
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later claimed that they had been gathering in their own stock.50 Russell stated that this incident 
caused additional consternation, as one of the Mescaleros killed was Nautzilla’s father. Russell 
added that, even as he tried to calm the situation down, some Mescalero’s disappeared.51 The flight 
of some of the Mescalero Apaches was later used by Hatch to claim that the Mescaleros had acted 
in bad faith, and that this invalidated the agreement to hand over surrendered arms and mounts to 
Russell.52 One suspects that Hatch had no intention of keeping to this agreement, and the skirmish 
gave him all the pretext he needed to disown the ‘compact’ with Russell.
The physical disarming and dismounting of the Mescaleros was to be carried out by Captain 
Steelhammer’s company of Fifteenth Infantrymen. They were to march to the agency at 1:00 p.m., 
and at 2:00 p.m. were to commence the disarming of the Mescaleros. However, Grierson thought 
that this would not be so easily accomplished:
The Agency Buildings, are situated on the north side of the Tulerosa and the Indians as they 
arrived, instead of being brought directly there were placed in camp by the agent on a timbered 
ridge at the base of the mountains, on the opposite side of the stream and valley, fully half a 
mile distant with a boggy bottom between them and the Troops. I think that this arrangement 
was a mistake, as it left the Indians on the outside and too far away to be sufficiently under 
control of the military.53
Grierson suggested that Steelhammer be directly supported by the Tenth Cavalry; but both 
Steelhammer and Russell argued that this move would be counter-productive, and Hatch agreed.54 
However, if assistance was required, three shots would be fired to summon the Tenth Cavalry.55 
According to Grierson, watching from a distance with Hatch, Steelhammer’s company reached 
the Mescalero camp without causing a stampede and commenced disarming the Mescaleros.56 
This situation soon changed. Grierson spotted a number of Mescaleros, mounted and dismounted, 
including Nautzilla, moving away from their camp up the opposite slope, and he urged Hatch 
to intervene.57 Hatch demurred, thinking that Nautzilla was trying to prevent this exodus. At 
the same time, signs of a commotion were observed within the Mescalero camp itself and, at 
approximately 2:30 p.m., the three signal shots were fired and the Tenth Cavalry battalion sprang 
DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285.
50 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) 
concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 
1880.
51 Report of the CoIA, DoI, OIA, Washington, 1 Nov., 1880, p.252.
52 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
53 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
54 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 
19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
55 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
56 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 
19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
57 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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into action.58 They attempted to surround the camps on the other side of the Tulerosa River, but 
failed to prevent between 30 and 50 Mescalero Apaches from escaping into the mountains. A 
number of running fights developed and Grierson reported that the gunfire, at times, became very 
heavy.59 According to Hatch, as the Mescalero Apaches fled towards the hills, they opened fire 
on Steelhammer’s infantrymen, who apparently held their fire until the warriors were clear of the 
women and children before returning that fire. Hatch also claimed that none of the warriors would 
have escaped if their women and children had not been in the way.60 Even so, the only casualty 
inflicted was a Mescalero woman who subsequently died of her wounds.61 
Over the next few days, as the troops and Apache scouts pursued those who had escaped into the 
mountains, some 10 to 1462 Mescaleros were killed.63 Grierson claimed that about 250 Mescalero 
Apaches, men women and children, had been detained, and that approximately 400 horses had 
been rounded up. The number of weapons taken was rather disappointing, with only 20 to 30 rifles 
and revolvers, ‘good, bad and indifferent’, being recovered.64
This version of events was contested by Russell. He argued that Hatch had ‘let loose’ his Apache 
scouts on the Mescalero Apaches early on 16 January, and that they had killed two Mescaleros 
just after daylight. These scouts went on to kill a further seven Mescaleros that day.65 Russell is 
not specific, but one presumes that this was in the aftermath of the failed attempt to disarm the 
Mescalero Apaches that afternoon. Of the events leading up to the effort to disarm and dismount 
the Mescalero Apaches, Russell stated that:
I called the Indians around me, and after a brief talk told them that the commandant had 
orders to disarm them, but that he had consented that they might give their arms and horses to 
me; that I would give each a receipt for their guns and return them after the trouble was over. 
On this announcement some of those on the outskirts commenced gradually to withdraw, 
58 Ibid.
59 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 
19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
60 Pope to AAG, HQ MDoM,, Chicago 22 Apr., 1880, citing telegram from Hatch dated 18 Apr., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.413 & p.414; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 21 Apr., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.324.
61 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
62 Hatch’s first report states ten killed, a few days later, after a skirmish with fleeing Mescaleros he places 
the number now killed at fourteen. (Pope to AAG, HQ , MDoM,, 22 Apr., 1880, citing telegram from 
Hatch dated 19 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.415 & 416; Pope’s Annual Report Year 
ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.613; See also Sheridan to Townsend, 23 Apr., 
1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527).
63 Hatch to AAAG SF, 16 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.58; Whipple to Ord, 20 Apr., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 
13, p.178; Telegram from Hatch to AAAG SF, DoNM, 19 Apr., 1880, found between pages 199 & 200 
in DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5.
Surgeon MacPherson describes a fight near the Mescalero Reservation in which he estimated that 
between 10 and 15 Apaches were killed. While he dates this to the 13 March, 1880 it is probable that 
he is referring to events on the 17 April, 1880. It is clear from the letter, dated the 26 April, 1880 that 
MacPherson had just arrived at Aleman Well and had written in haste. A slip of the pen is more than likely.
64 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 
19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
65 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Russell to Mahan, U.S. Indian 
Inspector, 27 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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others handed me their guns. Captain Steelhammer and I both appealed to them not to leave; 
Nautzilla, the principal chief, went out among them and endeavoured to get them to come 
back again. Very soon it became evident that those who had left would not return, and the 
troops opened fire on them. The Indians did not return the fire, and none were hurt by the 
military.66
Russell argued that the subsequent treatment of those Mescaleros who did not attempt to leave, 
being confined to the agency under guard, was an unwarranted punishment of the innocent.67 He 
suspected some of the troops of plundering the Mescalero camp while ostensibly seeking concealed 
weapons;68 and he also protested the removal of the confiscated horses to Fort Stanton.69 As noted 
earlier, Hatch regarded the attempt to flee as an act of bad faith by the Mescalero Apaches, since 
they had promised to surrender their arms and horses peacefully. As far as he was concerned, 
those held were ‘not entitled to any consideration except that of being held prisoners.’70 Indeed, 
Hatch made it quite clear that the ponies taken from the Mescaleros and held at Fort Stanton 
were, under no circumstances, to be returned to the Apaches.71 On 17 April, an irate Russell wrote 
to Hatch to complain about the sudden removal of these horses from the agency to Fort Stanton. 
Hatch responded that this move had been prompted by the suspected attempts made by Mescalero 
Apaches to recover their horses from the agency corral.72 Russell’s protests were in vain, as the 
Secretary of War argued that the army had, for some time, had evidence that the Mescalero reser-
vation was a base for raiding and illegal trading in plundered goods.73 
Finally, Russell also objected to the conditions imposed on the captive Mescaleros, as outlined 
by N.J. Carter, the agency physician:
I have the honor to submit the following Special Sanitary Report of the Mescalero Apache 
Indians, now held as prisoners of war at this place. Some five days ago these captives to the 
number of over two hundred and forty (240) men women and children were huddled together 
into a cowpen or corral containing about one fourth of an acre of ground covered to a depth 
66 Report of the CoIA, DoI, OIA, Washington, 1 Nov., 1880, p.252; See also R.E. Trowbridge, 
Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached correspondence from Agent 
Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Russell to Mahan, U.S. Indian Inspector, 27 
Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
67 See for instance comments made by Russell about ‘peaceable Indians’ being held as prisoners in CoIA 
to the secretary of the Interior, 19 Apr., 1880 in Special Orders No. 109, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527; R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached 
correspondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
68 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Russell to Mahan, U.S. Indian 
Inspector, 27 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
69 Report of the CoIA, DoI, OIA, Washington, 1 Nov., 1880, p.252; R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to 
The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached correspondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
70 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kas, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.514-
520; see also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in Loud to AAG, 
DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285.
71 Hatch to Steelhammer and Russell, 17 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.165 & 166.
72 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
73 See Chief Clerk for the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Interior, 27 Apr., 1880 in Special Orders 
No. 109, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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of from two (2) to five (5) inches of half rotted manure and other debris, the decomposition of 
which under the warm sun of the past days is producing an atmosphere, in connection with the 
body excrements inseparably connected with crowding together so many little children, very 
injurious to health, as is shown by an unusual number on sick list during the past few days – 
one case proving rapidly fatal.
On view of the foregoing facts, as well as a fear of an increase in sickness and mortality-, I, 
respectfully submit the propriety of removing at once the captives to a more healthful location, 
giving them more space, and where better sanitary measures can be enforced.74
In fact, both parties were correct in their statements. Yet neither was willing to acknowledge 
the element of truth in the other’s position. Russell was quite right to point out that some of 
the Mescalero Apaches had not been involved in any hostile activity. However, Russell was very 
unwilling to accept that any Mescaleros had been involved in these activities, and usually agreed 
only when confronted by the most unequivocal evidence. Equally, the US army, from the top down, 
was absolutely convinced that the Mescalero reservation was a hotbed of disloyalty and sedition,75 
and that, despite the presence of some possibly innocent parties, the only solution was to declare 
martial law. Grierson thought that Russell was an honest man trying to achieve the impossible. The 
Agent, he observed, did not have the means to supervise the Mescalero Apaches, let alone keep a 
vaguely accurate account of their numbers or movements on or off the reservation. This, Grierson 
strongly argued, could be put down to the rugged nature of the terrain selected for the reservation. 
This allowed the Apaches to carry on with their existing way of life and allowed unscrupulous US 
citizens to carry on a lucrative trade in liquor, weapons and ammunition in exchange for stolen 
stock.  the Tenth Cavalry’s commander recommended that the Mescaleros be removed to a more 
suitable location.76
About 50 warriors, including Cab-al-es-so, fled the reservation,77 some of them later joining 
Victorio. Hatch reported that most of the Mescaleros held in captivity were women and children. 
He also stated that as most of them had been allied with Victorio and were ‘probably under the 
impression when made prisoner they were going to be tried & hung’.78 These prisoners were placed 
under a ‘strong guard’ commanded by Captain Steelhammer.79 Hatch instructed the commander 
of Fort Bliss to send all the dismounted men of L Company, Ninth Cavalry, and G Company, 
74 R.E. Trowbridge, Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior, 5 May, 1880 with attached corre-
spondence from Agent Russell in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
75 See ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical 
document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
76 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.635-637; see also identical docu-
ment in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 
19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79.
77 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, pp.450-451; Hatch to AAG, 
15 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.204 & p.205; Loud to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 May (citing Report by Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 1 May, 1880, rec’d Fort Craig 
3 May, 1880), Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.364-
365; Correspondence from Newman (Editor of Thirty Four) concerning Hembrillo Canyon and the 
Disarming of the Mescaleros published in Thirty Four 21 Apr., 1880.
78 Hatch to Platt AAG, 16 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.406; Hatch to AAAG SF, 16 
Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.59; Whipple to Ord, 20 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.178; Loud to AAG 
Fort Leavenworth, 15 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.318-319; Sheridan to Townsend, 20 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526.
79 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.448; Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 3 May (citing Report by Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 1 May, 1880, rec’d Fort Craig 3 May, 
1880), Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.364-365.
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Fifteenth Infantry, to the agency to provide this guard detail.80 Twenty dismounted troopers from 
Carroll’s battalion were also sent to join this detail on 23 April.81
In what was a small illustration of the on-going mutual mistrust between the War Department 
and the Office of Indian Affairs, when Colonel Hatch telegraphed his intention to hand over 
confiscated weapons to the Mescalero Indian Agent on 19 April,82 he received instructions from 
the War Department on 23 April not to leave confiscated weapons with the Indian Agent, but to 
place them in secure storage at Fort Stanton.83 Concerning the confiscated horses and other items 
recognised as having been stolen from Texas, Hatch also authorised Colonel Grierson to take such 
animals with him when the Tenth Cavalry battalion returned to Texas.84 The unclaimed mules 
were, if suitable, recruited into the US army, and unclaimed horses were distributed to the Apache 
scouts.85
A more significant issue were the accusations levelled by the Office of Indian Affairs, through 
the Department of the Interior, that Hatch had acted with ‘unnecessary cruelty’. (see document 
file no’s 57.2 and 57.3.) Sherman ordered Sheridan to investigate the matter.86 ‘Acts of unnecessary 
cruelty’ is the phrase used by the Adjutant General’s Office on 7 December 1880, when passing 
on instructions from the Secretary of War to the General of the Army to investigate Russell’s and 
Mahan’s reports. In response, the General of the Army referred to General Hatch’s report of 23 
August 1880,87 which stated that all but one of the Mescaleros killed had been outside the bounda-
ries agreed before the operation and had been considered hostile. Further action was not necessary 
‘unless specific charges and specifications are preferred by some responsible party and a general 
court martial ordered by the President.’88 Grierson’s evaluation of Russell as an honest man seems 
to be broadly correct. What is also apparent is that Russell’s immediate superior, J.R. Mahan, 
Indian Inspector, New Mexico, would spare no effort to attribute to Hatch’s actions the darkest of 
motives. (see document file no. 57.2.) 
80 Hatch, Mescalero Agency, 14 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.152.
81 Hatch to Steelhammer from San Nicholas Springs, 23 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.181.
82 Hatch to AAAG SF, 17 Mar., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.60; Hatch to Platt AAG, 17 
Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.407; (Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 19 Apr., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.321.
83 Platt AAG Ft Leavenworth to AAAG DoNM 23 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.23; Loud 
to Hatch (Operator at Mesilla will send by mail to Paraje and hold duplicate to be sent to General Hatch 
when his address is known), 24 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.330-331.
84 Hatch to Platt AAG, 17 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.408; Platt to AAG HQ MDoM, 
20 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
85 Hatch to Platt AAG, 17 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.410; Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 19 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.320-321; Whipple to AAG H.Q. MDoM, 20 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
526.
86 Sherman to Sheridan, 11 Jun. 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
87 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, Kas, 23 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.514-
520; see also same document in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Same letter in Loud to AAG, 
DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 23 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 6, Jan., 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.433, pp282-285.
88 Secretary of War to the General of the Army, 7 Dec., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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The Ninth and Tenth Cavalry Pursue the Fugitive Mescalero Apaches
In the short term, the operation to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches was botched. It 
did not succeed in dismounting or disarming those Mescaleros inclined to resist the US army; and 
it provided Victorio with some new recruits. Whatever feelings he voiced on the matter publicly, 
Hatch was well aware of the implications of the attempt to disarm the Mescaleros. On 18 April 
1880, he reported that Agent Russell estimated that 35 Mescalero warriors had joined Victorio (an 
underestimation in Hatch’s opinion). However, in the longer strategic term, the reservation’s role 
as a source of reinforcements and trade (particularly in guns and ammunition) for Victorio, was 
seriously undermined.89
The fleeing Mescaleros scattered southwards with detachments of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry 
in hot pursuit. Hatch issued clear instructions to his officers that all Apaches not surrendered and 
held at the agency were to be considered hostile.90 Hatch first sent Morrow on a sweep south-
wards through the Sacramento Mountains, while McLellan and the Apache scouts scoured the 
White Mountains to the north.91 The Apache scouts commanded by Lieutenant Mills, attached 
to Morrow’s battalion, caught up with some of the Mescalero warriors, in Dog Canon in the 
southern reaches of the Sacramento Mountains on 17 April. Lieutenant Mills’s detachment of 
Apache scouts exterminated ‘a small party of Indians. Killed three got their arms and twenty head 
of stock.’92 Van C. Smith, serving with Mills’s detachment, was apparently credited with taking 
one of the Mescalero’s scalps. Smith stated that the three Mescaleros had been fleeing towards the 
San Andres.93 
Hatch’s longer-term plan was to send the Ninth Cavalry after Victorio, while the Tenth Cavalry 
helped to mop up the fugitive Mescaleros.94 As other Mescaleros were thought to be fleeing south-
wards, towards the Guadalupe Mountains, Hatch ordered Grierson to pursue them,95 tasking the 
89 See Thrapp, 1974, p271-273; Worcester, 1979, pp.227-228; Leckie, 1967, pp. 217-219; Haley, 1981, 
p.327.
90 Hatch, Mescalero Agency, to Grierson, 17 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.161; Hatch to Grierson, 17 Apr., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 
1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
91 Hatch to AAAG SF, 18 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.61-62; Hatch to Loud AAAG 
SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, pp.448-449; Hatch, Mescalero Agency, to Morrow 17 
Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, pp.160; Hatch to AAG, 18 
Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.210; Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 21 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.325.
92 McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See 
also Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880. Telegram from Hatch to AAAG SF, DONM, 19 
Apr., 1880, found between pages 199 & 200 in DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, 
Vol. 5; Pope to AAG, HQ. MDoM,, 22 Apr., 1880, citing telegram from Hatch dated 19 Apr., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.415 & 416; Hatch to AAAG SF, 19 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 439, p.63; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 21 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.325-326; Sheridan to Townsend 23 Apr., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.190-
191; Sheridan to Townsend, 23 Apr., 1880, in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Leckie, 1967, 
p.220; Thrapp, 1974, p273; Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.89; Record of Engagements, p.95; 
O’Neal, 1991, p.177; Beyer & Keydal (vi), p.376; Sonnichsen, 1973, p.202 Sonnichsen quotes but does 
not cite his source.
93 Thirty Four, 28 Apr., 1880.
94 Pope to Sheridan, 27 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
95 Pope to AAG, HQ , MDoM,, 22 Apr., 1880, citing telegram from Hatch dated 19 Apr., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.415 & 416; Hatch to AAAG SF, 19 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.63-64; Telegram from Hatch to AAAG SF, DoNM, 19 Apr., 1880, found between 
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Tenth Cavalry battalion with scouring the Guadalupe Mountains until 1 May, at which point the 
battalion would return to Texas.96 On 20 April, a detachment of L Company, Tenth Cavalry, under 
the command of Lieutenant Maxon, scattered five Mescaleros, killing one and capturing five horses, 
between the Rio Fresnal and the Rio Alamo.97 Grierson’s command spent some days scouting the 
Sacramento and Guadalupe mountains, rendezvousing on the Penasco River. Here they found the 
local settlers in a state of panic over widespread rumours of vengeful Mescalero raiders, most of 
which proved to be false.98 The next eight days were spent scouting from the Penasco country to the 
Black River, but the Tenth Cavalry battalion encountered no further Apaches. Grierson arrived 
at Fort Davis on 8 May 1880,99 and by 16 May was back at Fort Concho, having covered approxi-
mately 1,500 miles with his cavalrymen.100
Most importantly, Grierson, while in the process of returning to Texas, redeployed part of his 
battalion in anticipation of further encounters with Apaches. L Company, Tenth Cavalry, was 
tasked with picketing the Guadalupe Mountains around Mansanita Springs, while F Company 
was left to guard the Black River Falls. These detachments were left with supplies to last until 30 
June, and orders to patrol the country between the Pecos and El Paso, and, if necessary, north to 
Fort Stanton.101 D Company was ordered to Grierson’s Springs to continue scouting duties from 
that point.102 On his return to Fort Concho, Grierson also ordered H Company, under Captain 
Carpenter, to occupy Eagle Springs. M Company, already stationed at the headwaters of the North 
Concho River, was to maintain vigorous patrols in all directions.103 While these deployments were 
pages 199 & 200 in DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5; Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 21 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.325-326; Sheridan to Townsend 23 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies 
of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.190-191; Telegram from Hatch to AAAG SF, 
DoNM, 19 Apr., 1880, found between pages 199 & 200 in DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5.
96 Hatch to Loud AAA Genl SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.448.
97 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.637; Bi-Monthly Company Muster 
Rolls for Company L, 10th Cavalry Mar./Apr., 1880 in NA, RG94; Record of Engagements, p.95; 
Record of Events Apr., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; Sonnichsen, pp.210-202; Chronological 
List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.89; Matthews, 1993, p.36.
98 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.637.
99 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 9 May, 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.242, Letter No.137.
100 ‘Grierson’s Report – May 1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.637-638; Matthews, 1993, p.37.
101 Smither to CO, Co. L & F, 10th Cavalry & Smither to CO, Fort Stockton, 3 May, 1880 in Letters 
Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, NA, RG393, M1381, 
Roll 1, Letter No.58, 61 & 62; Vincent (in the absence of General Ord) to the AG, Chicago Illinois, 
11 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Loud to Hatch, (Care of CO Bayard who 
will forward to General as soon as his whereabouts are known), 14 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.400-401; Grierson to AAG DoTx, 9 May, 
1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Telegram rec’d 10 May, 1880 (unclear from whom 
to whom) in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, 
Jan.-Jun. 1880; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79; Record of Events May 1880 
in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 
to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; Matthews, 1993, p.36.
102 Smither to CO, Co. D, 10th Cavalry, 3 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.57; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 
1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, 
Roll 1, Letter No.79.
103 Smither to CO, Co. M, 10th Cavalry, 25 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.72; See also Matthews, 1993, p.37.
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a tacit admission of the failure of the US army to disarm the Mescalero Apaches,104 some of them 
would become key components of Grierson’s defence of Western Texas in July and August 1880. 
(See Chapters 9-11.)
Within days of the US Army’s attempt to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches, the latter 
retaliated. Bill Smith a freighter, was killed at Penasco on 18 April, and a second freighter, Sam 
Smith, was killed near Las Vegas on 21 April. Both their wagons were ransacked. Sheepherders 
Juan Chavez, Trujillo and one other were also reported to have been killed by Mescaleros. In 
the same area, 16 mules were reported stolen by members of Victorio’s band.105 By 20 May, 14 
Mescalero Apaches, who were suspected of being those who had killed Sam Smith, had killed five 
cattle and stole 13 horses from Catron Ranch, only 30 miles from Fort Stanton.106 
By the middle of May, Captain Steelhammer reported that, while he had under guard 42 
Mescalero men, 124 women, 70 children and 20 infants:107
quite a number of small bands of Mescaleros, who evidently have no intention of joining 
Victorio are scattered over the country and issuing from their various hiding places continually 
committing serious depredations.108
Steelhammer argued that these Mescaleros had had ample time to surrender, and when enough 
troops could be spared, these bands should be hunted down, punished and forced onto the reserva-
tion.109 Reports of continuing depredations led to demands that a detachment of troops be stationed 
at Three Rivers.110 By 27 May, a leading Mescalero, four warriors, four women and one child 
had also surrendered. Steelhammer now estimated that there were not more than 400 Mescalero 
Apache in total, and he thought that most of the remainder were now with Victorio. He guessed 
that the rest would steadily trickle into the agency and surrender.111
104 See for instance comment that large numbers of Apaches were thought to be at large from the Mescalero 
Reservation in Smither to CO, Co. F, 10th Cavalry, 3 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No. 62.
105 Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880; ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; See also John B. Wilson 
to CO Fort Stanton, 22 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
106 ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 22 May, 1880.
107 Steelhammer to AAAG, DoNM, 14 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Loud to Hatch, Tularosa (Old Fort Tularosa) 
(Operator at Craig will forward by first opportunity), 19 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.409.
108 Loud to Hatch, Tularosa (Old Fort Tularosa) (Operator at Craig will forward by first opportunity), 
19 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.409; 
Steelhammer to AAAG, DoNM, 14 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
109 Loud to Hatch, Tularosa (Old Fort Tularosa) (Operator at Craig will forward by first opportunity), 
19 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.409; 
Steelhammer to AAAG, DoNM, 14 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Loud to Hatch (Lt. Plummer at Craig will forward 
as soon as possible) 23 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.424-425.
110 F.C. Godfrey, Tulerosa to Steelhammer, Fort Stanton, 17 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, 
Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
111 Steelhammer to AAAG, DoNM, 27 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
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The Ninth Cavalry Renews its Pursuit of Victorio
In the meantime, the New Mexico Troops returned to the search for Victorio. Hatch ordered Morrow 
to take the Second and Third Battalions towards the Black Range and San Mateo Mountains, 
while he himself took the Indian scouts and McLellan’s Sixth Cavalrymen back through the San 
Andres and Soledad Mountains in search of Victorio’s trail.112 Up to that point, Hatch admitted, 
his troops had been unable to find Victorio; but he claimed that US troops had ‘killed about forty 
bucks and captured about two hundred & fifty head of stock.’113 He also issued a general instruction 
to the ‘quartermaster and commissary of the dist. to keep the supplies of this department at each 
post up … arrangements should be made in time to supply the stores thus exhausted.’114 Going by 
previous experience, Hatch was obviously anticipating a long pursuit that must not be hampered by 
any inability of army posts or forage agents to quickly resupply his columns.
Morrow crossed the White Sands and the San Andres Mountains by way of the San Augustin 
Pass, and then went on to Santa Barbara, before turning north.115 On 25 April, with McLellan’s 
detachment, he proceeded to St Nicholas Spring, and crossed the San Andres Mountains, arriving 
at Aleman on 26 April.116 He reported that, by this time, the Apache scouts had shot about 200 
of the captured horses, as they were totally broken down.117 This strongly suggests that at least 
half of the confiscated horses had been handed over to the Apache scouts. This would explain the 
apparent discrepancy between the number of horses taken and the number handed over at Fort 
Stanton.118 Hatch’s command then crossed the Rio Grande at San Jose.119 Crossing the Rio Grande 
112 Hatch to AAAG SF, 20 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.54-56; See also Special Field 
Order No. 25 para.2, 23 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Hatch, San Nicholas Springs, to 
AAG, SF, 24 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.217; Loud to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 26 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.333-334; Pope to AAG MDoM, 27 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527.
113 Pope to AAG, HQ MDoM,, Chicago, 27 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.386 & pp.387-
388; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 26 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.333-334.
114 Hatch to AAAG SF, 21 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.65.
115 Hatch to Loud AAA Genl SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.449.
116 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF, 26 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.56; Hatch to Loud AAA 
Genl SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.449; McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 
May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880.
117 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 27 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.337-338.
118 The four hundred horses confiscated during the operation were supposedly sent to Fort Stanton escorted 
by Co. E, Tenth Cavalry though Captain Kelley was given a receipt for one hundred and forty one 
ponies, ten colts and twenty-one mules by Lt. Clark at Fort Stanton. (Smither to Kelley, 17 Apr., 1880 
in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
1, Letter No.53; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 21 May, 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.79; Lt. Clark, Fort Stanton, 18 
Apr., 1880 in Register of Letters Rec’d 23 Mar., 1878-30 Jan., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.29, Letter No.35; Kelley to AG, DoP, 22 Apr., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2) An additional 
fifteen ponies were handed over to officers in command of the Apache scouts as ordered by Hatch and 
eleven animals being so broken down as to be deemed worthless were shot enroute to Fort Stanton. 
(Kelley to AG, DoP, 22 Apr., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2).
119 Hatch to Loud AAA Genl SF, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.450.
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at Fort Selden,120 Morrow’s command rejoined McLellan’s detachment, the latter still, presumably, 
accompanying Hatch, via San Jose to Las Palomas, on 29 April, and the whole command returned 
to Canada Alamosa on the following day. In response to Captain Purington’s discovery of a number 
of trails leading into the San Mateo Mountains, Van C. Smith, with Apache scouts, was ordered 
to scout the San Mateo Mountains and rejoin the command at Canada Alamosa.121 Morrow’s and 
Hooker’s battalions were then ordered to scout that range and the Black Range for signs of the 
Apaches.122 Captain Purington’s detachment also joined the command at this point. It was noted 
that the supply of forage was still very low as ‘men cannot be hired to cut hay’,123 which did not bode 
well for Hatch’s need for fresh forage for future operations.
During this movement of troops, there was a minor panic in the region of San Augustin when 
Morrow’s Apache scouts were mistaken for Apaches and, despite there being no gunfire, reports 
came in concerning a major battle between the army and Apaches. The editor of Thirty-Four 
admonished citizens not to spread false rumours, and to report only accurate intelligence.124 
Of more immediate import, McLellan’s detachment, including Lieutenant Mills’s and 
Lieutenant Gatewood’s companies of Apache scouts and Sixth Cavalrymen, received orders to 
return to Arizona on 1 May, and had returned by 13 May. The Apache scouts returned to Fort 
Thomas via the Gila; and McLellan was ordered to march straight for Fort Bowie.125 
The return of the Apache scouts to Arizona, at first glance, seems ill-advised, as Victorio had not 
yet been caught. However, by 27 April,126 Hatch had received orders from General Willcox that 
all Arizona troops were to return to their stations.127 By this time, Hatch had also received reports 
that Victorio was moving towards San Carlos, and concluded that the Arizona troops should be 
sent back to counter this threat.128 Indeed, Hatch appears to have anticipated a pursuit of Victorio 
120 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF, 26 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.56; Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 27 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.337.
121 Van C. Smith Letter dated 28 Apr., 1880, San Jose in Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880.
122 Hatch, San Nicholas Springs, to AAG, SF, 24? Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p. 217.
123 Van C. Smith Letter dated 28 Apr., 1880, San Jose in Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880.
124 Thirty Four, 28 Mar., 1880.
125 Carr to CO Fort Bayard, 7 May, 1880, Troops in Southeastern Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 232, Vol.6, 7 May -18 May,1880, p.7; Hatch, General Field Orders No. 4, 1 May, 1880. NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; General Field Orders No.4, 1 May, 1880, Printed Special Orders 1869-1888, 
DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 446; Hatch to McLellan 1 May, 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.189; Special Field Order No.27, para.6, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 450; McLellan to Post Adjutant, Fort Bowie, 16 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Report of Capt. C.B. McLellan, 16 May, 1880
126 In acknowledging these orders, Hatch’s AAAG, Captain Loud at SF, informed his counterpart in 
Arizona that Hatch’s exact location was not currently known ‘as he is changing positions every day. 
Operators at Mesilla instructed to forward dispatch wherever he can reach him. It is thought your 
dispatch will reach him today. (Loud to Martin, AAG, Whipple Barracks, Arizona, 22 Apr., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.327).
127 Loud to Hatch, (Operator Mesilla will forward to General Hatch wherever he can reach him), 22 Apr., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.325-326; 
Hatch, Aleman, to AAG SF, 27 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.225.
128 Hatch to McLellan 1 May, 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.189.
It should also be noted that General McDowell commanding the Division of the Pacific had requested 
the return of the Arizona Apache scouts to help deal with Indian ‘difficulties’ on the Colorado River. 
(McDowell to Commanding General, MDoM, Chicago, 28 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, p.417).
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into Arizona Territory. On 26 April, his request for six copies of a map of this area to be furnished 
him from District Headquarters produced only two copies.129 
Colonel Hatch also used the recall of the Apache scouts to underline yet again to his own 
superiors the critical necessity and ‘economy’ of immediately recruiting equivalent Apache scouts 
specifically for service in New Mexico. He proposed two companies of 50 Apache scouts, each 
supported by a company of cavalry and a mule train of 25 mules:130 ‘for this mountain warfare [I] 
should prefer one hundred Indians with fifty soldiers to five hundred soldiers alone.’131 He also 
repeated his advice that if these could not be entered as scouts, they should be designated as guides 
or packers.132 This was wholeheartedly supported by General Pope.133 (see document file no. 58.)
This conclusion to the Hembrillo Canyon and Mescalero reservation operations heralded the 
start of another period of gruelling and largely fruitless pursuit of the elusive Victorio. Publicly, 
Hatch claimed that 41 Apaches had been killed during the army’s operations in April.134 This claim 
was dismissed by the editor of Thirty-Four, who claimed that the Colonel was misrepresenting the 
true situation in trying to portray the fighting in Hembrillo Canyon as a victory.135
At the end of April, General Pope complained to Hatch that information concerning his 
campaigning was not reaching Department Headquarters, and implied that Hatch was not using 
all of the infantry units at his disposal to help protect the area being attacked by the Apaches.136 An 
exasperated Hatch pointed out that he had deployed every available man, but that these deploy-
ments could not protect railroad construction and the burgeoning ranching and mining enterprises 
in southern New Mexico.137 Ultimately, Hatch’s request for two Apache scout companies became 
entangled with army bureaucracy. The entire Department of the Missouri was allowed 200 scouts, 
and the District of New Mexico had a quarter of that complement.138 Both Sheridan and Sherman 
rejected the request for additional scouts on these grounds, overruling the recommendation of 
General Pope.139
Victorio had stolen a decisive march on his enemies. He had gained almost three weeks (nineteen 
days) respite, allowing his people to rest and recuperate, whilst Hatch concentrated his efforts on 
the Mescalero reservation. Hatch had to contend with difficulties concerning the maintenance of 
129 Loud to Hatch, Aleman (Maps mailed to Paraje), 26 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.335.
130 Hatch to AA General, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, 18 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527 
& Hatch to AAG, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, 18 Apr., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/DoNM, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.207, p.142.
131 Hatch to AAAG SF, 18 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, pp.24-25.
132 Hatch 27 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
p.342.
133 Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 28 Apr., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See Pope to 
AAG HQ MDoM, 28 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See Hatch’s original letter 
in Hatch to AA General, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, 18 Apr., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
527 & Hatch to AAG, DoM, Ft. Leavenworth, 18 Apr., 1880 in Letters Sent by the 9MD/DNM/
DoNM, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.207, p.142.
134 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF, 26 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.56-57.
135 Thirty Four, 28 Apr., 1880.
136 Pope to Hatch, via Loud, AAAG, DoNM, 30 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.351-352 & pp.355-356.
137 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 May (citing Report by Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 1 May, 1880, rec’d Fort 
Craig 3 May, 1880), Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.364-365.
138 Thrapp, 1974, P.273-274.
139 AG, Washington DC to The Commanding General, MDoM, 5 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; Drum to Comdg. General, MDoM,, 5 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM, 
Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Thrapp, 1974, pp.273-274.
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efficient communication between his headquarters and that of his commander, General Pope. More 
importantly, even with no direct contact with Victorio, Hatch found that his military resources 
remained strained. The New Mexico Troops, having been on field service since the beginning of 
April, needed to rest both men and horses, and to be resupplied. The need for resupply was so great 
that some posts were authorised to purchase supplies on the open market.140 At San Jose, on 30 
April, B, H, L and M Companies, Ninth Cavalry, all received varying numbers of replacement 
horses and horse furniture.141 The following day, A, C, D, F and G Companies, based at Canada 
Alamosa, received the same.142 
Hatch concentrated his three battalions at Las Palomas, Canada Alamosa and Ojo Caliente,143 
and recruits for E, I and K Companies were ordered to their respective companies at Ojo Caliente.144 
Further remounts and recruits were delivered to the Second Battalion at Las Palomas.145 Once it 
had taken delivery, this battalion was ordered to return to Fort Stanton ‘for scouting purposes’.146 
This was in response to the news that there were virtually no troops left at Fort Stanton to guard 
200 captured ponies. The continued activities of independent Mescalero Apaches might include a 
raid on the Fort to recover their mounts.147 Hatch went so far as to instruct his own headquarters 
in Santa Fé that if any troops were needed to provide the paymaster with an escort, these should be 
taken from Fort Union’s garrison.148 Hatch’s forces were fully stretched; and Victorio was about to 
launch a new offensive which would test the Ninth Cavalry to the limits.
140 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 20 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.321-322.
141 Special Field Order No.26, para.1, 30 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
142 Special Field Order No.27, para.1, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
143 Hatch, San Nicholas Spring to Morrow, 23 Apr., 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.215.
144 Special Field Order No.27, para.2, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450. These replacements 
were under the command of Sergeant Jordan Co. K, Ninth Cavalry.
145 Special Field Order No.27, para.7, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
146 Special Field Order No.27, para.8, 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Hatch, Canada 
Alamosa, to Cusack, 1 May, 1880, DoNM/GSFO/L&T, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.186.
147 Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 29 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.348.
148 Hatch Ojo Caliente to AAA Genl SF, 2 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Pt 3, Entry 439, p.457.
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There and Back Again: The Ninth Cavalry Dismounted in the Mogollon Mountains 
and San Francisco Valley, April–May 1880
 
I have not seen a hostile Indian in this camp in three years. Victorio’s men know some of the 
men in this camp as well as those men know Victorio. 
 James Cooney1
The Apaches Raids Intensify, April–May 1880
While Victorio and his followers had successfully evaded the US army in the aftermath of Hembrillo 
Canyon, not everything was playing out to their advantage. In the short term, Victorio had most of 
February and March to replenish his arms and ammunition through trading and raiding. Much of 
the trading was probably done through contacts in or around the Mescalero reservation. Now that 
the army had taken over the reservation, it would be more difficult to arrange clandestine meetings 
with illicit traders.
This was not the only source of munitions which was now being put under pressure. Victorio 
seems to have had a falling out with at least some of the people from the town of Canada Alamosa. 
By the end of March 1880, Hatch informed the Governor of New Mexico that a detachment of 
volunteers from the hamlet of San Jose and the surrounding area had formed a militia for their own 
protection. Hatch recommended that they be given arms and ammunition. All of the volunteers 
were clearly of Mexican descent.2 There is a story that one, Maximiliano Madrid, had watched as 
Victorio delivered an ultimatum to the people of Canada Alamosa, threatening that if they helped 
the troops, he would destroy the town.3 A raid near Canada Alamosa, reported in Thirty-Four on 
5 May 1880, took 40 head of horses and thus dismounted half of its citizens.4 The Apaches, said to 
have been Mescaleros, were led by Sanchez and Vicente, who were Warm Springs Apaches.5 One 
Clem Hightower stated that:
1 Grant County Herald, 14 Feb. 1880.
2 Jose Roman Romero (Captain) 1. Anicita Archuleta, 2. Jose Ma Lucero, 3. Bernardo Parras, 4. 
Heginio Achuleta, 5. Jose Romero, 6. Malio Baca, 7. Julian, Archuleta, 8. Peliz Lucero, 9. Jesus Baca, 
10. Siboricie Duran, 11. Mateo Miranda, 12. Fransten Gallego, 13. Feliz Bernal, 14. Josi Francisco 
Romero, 15. Juan Andreas Sadillo, 16. Anservio Ruvio, 17. Basitio Chavez, 18. Padros, Bayegos, 19. 
Juan Lopez, 20. Juan Torre, 21. Juan Velirde, 22. Juan Perria, 23. Bernardino Bayegos, 24. Bartolo 
Perria, 25. Savi Sanchea, 26. Juan Sanchez, 27. Juan Armjo Ysti, 28. Aristu Crispin, 29. Juan Jaramillo, 
30. Jose Jaramillo, 31.Vicente Rives. (Hatch to Lew Wallace, 27 Mar., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/
DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.171 pp.123-124).
3 Bryan, 1998, pp.124-125 .
4 Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880.
5 Report from Andrew Kelley in Thirty-Four, 5 May, 1880.
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P.H. Kelley is the only man in the valley who saved his stock. Fred Sanders lost four; Pat 
Higgins, one; Jose Lopez, two; Luz Chavez, four; Jose Lieba, one; Luis Encinias, two; and 
your humble servant, three. They started to drive off two of Kelley’s colts and one of his renters, 
a Mexican from Canada Alamosa told them they belonged to him and they let them go.6
On 22 April, Apaches killed Basilio Lobato, Ricardo Jaramillo and Jesus Maris Gonzalez, who were 
herding sheep and cattle in the vicinity of Canada Alamosa. Juan Jose Moreno was also missing, 
presumed tortured to death. A letter to Thirty-Four, dated 24 April, from Canada Alamosa, openly 
admitted a past bad association with the Apaches, but claimed to have turned over a new leaf by 
raising a company of volunteers. It also stated that:
We have made up our minds that the cottonwoods in this vicinity shall bear fruit if there are 
any midnight meetings between Victorio’s men and some of the persons of this town.7
A second letter to Thirty-Four from Andrew Kelley informed the paper that some of the illegal 
traders had joined this company of volunteers, but were being closely watched.8 (see document file 
no. 60.) It may be that there was a newer influx of Anglo-American immigrants to the area who, 
culturally, would have felt no need to reach any accommodation with those they regarded as mere 
savages. This sort of immigrant would have been very hostile towards anybody, Mexican or other-
wise, who traded with Apaches.
Victorio’s Raid on the Mogollon and San Francisco Mountains
Even as Hatch was reporting, on 1 May 1880, that he was about to follow trails into the San Mateo 
Mountains,9 Victorio and his warriors had already launched a series of raids from the Rio Grande 
westwards through the Black Range and along the southern reaches of the Mogollon Mountains. 
This part of the country had not seen Apaches for almost a year and was caught unawares by 
Victorio’s sudden descent. As recently as February 1880, James Cooney, a miner and prospector, 
had extolled the virtues of this particular section of the Mogollons for mining and settlement. He 
dismissed the dangers of Apaches: ‘I have not seen a hostile Indian in this camp in three years. 
Victorio’s men know some of the men in this camp as well as those men know Victorio.’10 
Thirteen Mexican sheepherders were reported as slain near San Jose on the Rio Grande, and 
5,000 sheep were scattered far and wide.11 Three ‘civilians’ were slaughtered near Ojo Caliente on 
27 April. A further six were killed near the headwaters of the Rio Gilitfe [Gilita Creek] the next 
day.12 
With these actions, Victorio launched a sustained attack on the mining and ranching settlements 
in the Mogollon13 and San Francisco Mountains in late April and early May 1880. (See Map 7.1.) 
According to local tradition, his raid was originally provoked by the ambushing and slaying of four 
6 Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880.
7 Thirty Four, 28 Apr., 1880.
8 Report from Andrew Kelley in Thirty-Four, 5 May, 1880.
9 Hatch to Loud AAAG SF 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.450.
10 ‘A Communication from the Mogollons’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Feb., 1880.
11 ‘Hatch and his Indians’, The Grant County Herald, 1 May, 1880.
12 See entries in the Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.89.
13 Cooney himself reported that by December 1879, there were fifteen mine workings started in his district 
of the Mogollon Mountains. (‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 13 Dec., 1879).
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Apache warriors by local settlers and miners.14 As noted in Volume One of this trilogy, this is prob-
ably the incident where four Apaches were killed just prior to Captain Beyer’s fight with Victorio 
in late May 1879.15 Writing to the Grant County Herald, a correspondent who visited the San 
Francisco Valley in February 1880, approximately ten months after the four warriors were killed, 
noted that the settlers were still living in fear of retaliation by Victorio. This prompted an appeal 
for US troops to be stationed locally to protect the scattered farms from attack.16 Two months later 
the Chihenne Apaches returned to exact vengeance for their losses.
Eyewitness testimony, some of which was recorded in the 1930s, stated that the Apaches struck 
Cooney’s mining camp, killing two to three men and wounding a fourth man named Taylor.17 
The latter managed to escape from the Apaches despite a severe leg wound by hiding in a ‘pros-
pect hole’. He was attacked between Copper and Mineral Creeks, and ran some distance on his 
wounded leg before reaching his hiding place. Just before he took cover, he ran past the opening of 
the Williams mine working and his hat blew off and landed in the tunnel entrance. The pursuing 
Apaches assumed that he had taken refuge in the mine and rolled some rocks into the passage but 
did not venture into the mine. Taylor watched the Apaches for some time before being able to slip 
away to safety.18 In fact Cooney’s mining camp may be better described as a mining campus. The 
Apaches struck this collection of diggings, catching and killing some of the miners, but the shots 
fired alerted other prospectors and miners to their danger. Parson Williams and some others were 
ambushed in a ravine above the mining district, but escaped without loss, having been alerted by 
hearing three earlier shots. Some of these men raised the alarm in the mining camps and beyond.19
Cooney’s camp was apparently forewarned of danger by the ambush of four prospectors on 
Mineral Creek on 28 April. Two escaped to warn Cooney’s camp.20 Leaving two miners named 
John Lambert and George Doyle21 concealed, watching over the camp, the rest of the camp scat-
tered to warn the other mining communities and camps in the area. Lambert reported that during 
the night the two men heard Apaches on the prowl but they were not discovered.22 The two miners 
saw several groups of heavily armed Apaches arrive and depart during 29 April, including a sighting 
of Victorio ‘a medium-sized, spare looking Indian, mounted on a fine-looking bay horse.’23 He was 
accompanied by a small group of warriors with some women and children driving a pack horse and 
mule train.24 The camp was thoroughly pillaged, the loot being carried off on pack animals; and 
the camp was then burned.25 James Cooney was not killed in this attack but managed to escape 
with one Jack Chick. The pair moved westwards to warn the settlements near Alma.26 Cooney and 
14 Jones, 1970, pp.32-33; See also Misc.3 Document.
15 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879’, Chapter 6, 
p.141 & document file no. 4.
16 ‘From the Fresco 6 Feb., 1880’, The Grant County Herald, 21 Feb., 1880.
17 American Life Histories webpage – Mogollons of the Early days & The Alms/Alma Massacre testimony.
18 ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 4th 1880’ The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880.
19 Ibid
20 Humphries, 1988, pp.158-159; See also Rakocy & Jones p.69.
21 Humphries, 1988, pp.158-159. Humphries reconstructed his account from an interview with John 
Lambert.
22 Ibid. p.159.
23 Ibid. p.159.
24 Ibid. pp.159-160.
25 See ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, 
Keller, Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; American Life Histories webpage 
– Mogollons of the Early days & The Alms/Alma Massacre testimony; Humphries, 1988, p.160; Jones, 
1970, p.33; Rakocy & Jones, pp.69-71.
26 Small settlement was named Alma in 1878 though the site had been settled for a number of years prior 
to this date. (See Alma Website).
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Chick apparently homed in on the settlement of Alma by howling to provoke a response from the 
settler’s dogs. They had already discovered another two prospectors ambushed and slain as they 
attempted to reach the settlement.27 Having successfully warned the settlers of the presence of 
Apaches, Cooney and Chick attempted to return to their mining camp. Both were ambushed and 
killed by Victorio’s warriors. It was less than three months since Cooney had dismissed the dangers 
of Apaches in the pages of the Grant County Herald.
The return of Cooney and Chick’s rider-less horses with bloodstained saddles28 alerted the 
settlement to the immediate danger, and the settlers attempted to fort up at the Roberts family 
home.29 Bullets were moulded and attempts were made to gather up their loose stock. Two settlers, 
Mutsinger and Potter, set out to render assistance to Cooney and Chick but were ambushed in turn, 
though they managed to escape.30 One James Keller, ‘who participated in the fighting previous to 
gathering the families together’, and a man named Carpenter reached Silver City to raise the alarm, 
having escaped from the area at night.31 The Meader Family were pursued by the Apaches as they 
approached the Roberts house and had to run from their wagon to the house under fire.32 Five men, 
including a Mr Coates, were blasting away at the Apaches on the hill opposite, until shot at from 
behind. They were forced to take cover in the Roberts cabin, but Coates abandoned his revolver and 
cartridge belt in the confusion.33 The Apaches then surrounded the house and a day-long exchange 
of gunfire ensued. The Apaches tried to panic the settlers with their skirmishing tactics without 
committing themselves to a full assault as long as the settlers held their nerve:
The Indians were able to keep up a constant fire as fifteen warriors would drive up and fire 
then drop back to reload their guns and another fifteen would take their place thereby keep 
up a constant fire as they were always moving in a circle. There were two-hundred thirteen 
warriors counted.34
Even if they failed to panic the defenders, such tactics gave the impression of far greater numbers 
of Apache raiders than were actually present. 
Only one settler, Willcox, was killed, and another, Murray, was wounded, with one or two 
Apaches warrior being hit in return.35 Willcox had unwisely risen up to take a look outside and was 
27 Humphries, 1988, p.160; Jones 1970, p.34. Humphries reconstructed his account from a 1915 article in 
the Mogollon Mining Journal which had interviewed a number of participants.
28 ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, 
Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; Humphries, 1988, p.161.
29 Lt Buchanan Silver City to Officer in Charge SF 2 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.445; 
See also Jones, 1970, pp.34-35; Rakocy & Jones, p.71.
30 ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, 
Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 
4 1880’ The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; American Life Histories webpage-The Alma/Alms 
Massacre testimony; Humphries 1988, p.161; Jones, 1970, p.34; Rakocy & Jones, p.71.
31 Lt Buchanan to Officer in Charge SF, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.446; ‘Massacre in the Mogollon 
Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, Meadows & Foster’, The Grant 
County Herald, 8 May, 1880; ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 4th 1880’ The Grant County Herald, 
8 May, 1880.
32 ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, 
Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; American Life Histories webpage-The 
Alma/Alms Massacre testimony; Jones, 1970, p.35.
33 Humphries 1988, p.161.
34 American Life Histories webpage-The Alma/Alms Massacre testimony; See also Jones, 1970, pp.34-35.
35 ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, 
Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 4th 
1880’ The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880.
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shot dead.36 The one Apache who was killed during the fight had managed to work his way close to 
a horse near to the cabin and was shot by Jim Keller as he rose up in an attempt to steal the horse.37 
The settlers recovered Coates’ revolver and cartridge belt from the body of the Apache, but during 
the night the Apaches managed to recover the body.38 At nightfall, the Apaches withdrew some 
distance and held what was taken to be a celebration, but in the morning the settlers could see no 
sign of them. It was not until the following morning that Captain Madden, with a mixed group of 
Sixth Cavalrymen and volunteers39 from Silver City, arrived to relieve the settlers, having set out 
on the morning of 4 May.40 
While we have quite a lot of detail about these attacks, the exact dates are unclear. Cooney’s 
camp is widely dated as being destroyed on the 29 April 1880. Yet, if the above dates are correct, 
Cooney was actually killed on either 1 or 2 May 1880.
Madden had informed his superiors of the situation in the Mogollons and had been granted 
permission to make a detour to aid the settlers before he adhered to his original orders (See Chapter 
6.) to return to Fort Bowie.41 The arrival of Madden’s Sixth Cavalry detachment was very fortunate, 
as Fort Bayard only had 11 men present for duty.42 On being requested to intervene to relieve the 
besieged settlers,43 Captain A.A. Humphreys responded: ‘I do not consider I am in condition to 
render any assistance unless authority is granted me to abandon post and let it look out for itself.’44 
Captain Madden’s detachment of 27 men45 and the Silver City volunteers continued into the 
36 Humphries, 1988, p.161.
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.
39 Capt. Price and thirty-five ‘well armed’ men followed by fifteen more departed on the morning of the 8 
May in response to the arrival of Kellar and Carpenter in Silver City on the previous evening. (The Grant 
County Herald, 8 May, 1880) There does appear to be a discrepancy concerning the dates of the attack 
upon Cooney’s Camp and the settlers and the arrival of these men in Silver City 7 days later. Especially 
since the Madden relief force left on the morning of the 4. I suspect that the paper may have forgotten 
to indicate that Capt Price left on the 4 and thus gives the impression that they left on the day of the 
Paper’s weekly publication date. District HQ , had certainly been informed by telegraph of these attacks 
by telegram from Silver City and naming James Keller as the source on the 3 May, 1880. (Loud to CO 
Fort Bayard, 3 May, 1880, & Loud to Hatch (Operator Fort Craig will send by courier at once), 3 May, 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.361-363).
40 ‘Massacre in the Mogollon Mining District and Upper Fresco Valley – Letter from Meader, Keller, 
Meadows & Foster’, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 
4th 1880’ The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; American Life Histories webpage-The Alma/Alms 
Massacre testimony; Jones, 1970, p.55.
41 Madden to AAAG, Forces in the Field SE Arizona, 26 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
527; For a brief summary of Madden’s movements see Record of Events May, 1880 in Returns From 
Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, 
M744, Roll 63
42 Lt Humphrey Bayard to Hatch Ft Craig, Carr Ft Lowell & AAAG SF 3 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 439, p.460
43 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 3 May, 1880, & Loud to Hatch (Operator Fort Craig will send by courier at 
once), 3 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.361-363 see also p.70.
44 Lt Humphrey Bayard to AAAG, 4 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.461-462; Humphreys, 
Captain 15th Infantry to AAAG, DoNM, SF, NM, 3 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, 
pp.82-83; Loud to General Hatch (Operator at Craig will forward by first opportunity) 5 May, 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.377-378.
45 Madden, Camp at Roberts & Keller’s Ranch to Carr, Lowell, 5 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
235, pp.50-51.
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Mogollon Mountains, where they discovered 
and buried Cooney,46 ‘horribly mutilated’, 
Chick, and a third man named Buhlman.47 
Madden reported that Victorio was 
commanding 200 warriors and accompanied 
by 80 squaws.48 The bodies of some Mexican 
shepherds and their families  were discovered 
on 7 and 8 May, as Madden and his group 
tracked the Apaches.49 By 9 May, Captain 
Madden had reached Bush Valley at the head 
of the San Francisco Valley, after three days’ 
pursuit of the Apaches. He estimated that 
they were one day behind Victorio, whose 
warriors had stolen 20 horses from the area 
the previous night. Madden had left Silver 
City on 4 May, with four days’ rations. His 
command was relying upon whatever local 
citizens could supply, and his horses were 
worn out.50 George W. Helde, one of the 
Silver City volunteers with Captain Madden, 
kept a diary (see document file no. 62) of 
this expedition, and he lists the recovery 
of 16 bodies by this detachment. Captain 
Madden’s official report (see document file 
no. 63) also records the recovery of the bodies 
of four Anglo-Americans and 12 Hispanics, 
including two women and four children.
A detachment of 19 Fifteenth Infantrymen 
was finally cobbled together from the Fort 
Bayard garrison. Commanded by Captain Humphreys, it was ordered to scout the Mogollon 
Mountains, leaving Fort Bayard on 12 May 1880. Humphreys camped in the area between 15 and 
18 May, but estimated that the Apaches had already departed to the north. Overall, Humphreys 
46 James Cooney’s grave is sealed under a huge boulder marking the spot where he fell. The site of this skir-
mish is seven miles north and five miles west of Glenwood New Mexico. (See Cooney and Glenwood 
websites) His brother Michael, no relation to Captain Michael Cooney, then serving in the Ninth 
Cavalry, a former customs inspector, took over his brother’s prospecting business. Finding a huge boulder 
he carved out his brother’s tomb. (See Thrapp, 1988, p.318 & 319; Misc. 3 Document) He was also to 
report that in the aftermath of Victorio’s attack upon the mining district that there had been attempts to 
‘claim jump’ various deserted miles by unscrupulous parties. (Cooney to Hatch, 21 Jun., 1880 in Letters 
Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880).
47 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 6 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.387.
48 Madden, Camp at Roberts & Keller’s Ranch to Carr, Lowell, 5 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
235, p.50.
49 ‘Williams Ranche on the Fresco May 4th 1880’ The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880; Jones, 1970, 
p.55.
50 Madden to Col. E.A. Carr, Ft. Lowell, 9 May, 1880, (Rec’d Lowell 17 May, 1880) NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 235, pp.93-95.
Captain Daniel Madden, Sixth Cavalry.
Madden led his company on a long but ultimately 
fruitless pursuit of Victorio in the Mogollon 
Mountains in May 1880. He would later lose his son 
to those same Apache warriors when they ambushed 
a stagecoach in September 1880. (See Chapter 14 this 
volume) (Carlisle Barracks)
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Plate 7.1. View of one of the hills occupied by the Apaches during the attack on the Roberts Ranch. The 
hill in question is in the middle distance at the centre of the photograph, just above and to the left of the 
grove of lighter coloured trees. The Mogollon Mountains march along the horizon. (Photo: author)
Plate 7.2. A closer view of the Mogollon Mountains to the north of the Roberts Ranch. The photo gives 
an idea of the ease with which small groups of miners could be picked off by Apaches. Victorio’s warriors 
could conceal themselves in the minimum of cover, so the foothills in the foreground provided abundant 
concealment. The deeper they travelled into the mountains, the more vulnerable the prospectors would be 
to attack. (Photo: author)
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estimated that about 40 citizens, mainly Mexicans, had been killed, and that much private property 
had been badly damaged.51 
The raiding continued with seven ‘civilians’ being killed near the San Francisco River52 and a 
further six being slain near Las Lentas on 2 and 4 May 1880 respectively.53 Felipe Chavez noti-
fied District Headquarters that ‘Melquiade Chavez, Jose Maria Sanchez & about ten men thus 
far killed by Apaches in the vicinity of Old Fort Tulerosa [Tularosa].’54 Two of these men were 
said to have been burned, ‘whether before or after death, could not be discovered.’55 Chavez also 
reported that approximately 100,000 sheep had been driven off by the Apaches.56 In response to 
their appeals for Hatch to come to their assistance, District Headquarters had to inform Chavez 
that they did not know the Colonel’s current location but believed that he was in the San Mateo 
Mountains.57 However, they did assure Chavez that Hatch was personally in the field ‘doing every-
thing possible with the Troops he has to afford protection to the people.’58 The next day, Chavez 
was contacted again and was informed that US troops were now making their way towards the 
Mogollon Mountains.59
Other casualty reports filtered in. A citizen named Kinnear informed the military authorities 
that Victorio had slaughtered 19 people ‘between Las Valles and Bush Valley’, with a further 27 
sheep herders reported missing.60 A prospector by the name of Friend was supposed killed, having 
fitted himself out in Albuquerque for a prospecting trip to the Mogollons just before Victorio’s 
raid.61 Over two months later, the Grant County Herald reported the discovery of thousands of dead 
sheep and ‘many’ slain Mexicans recently discovered by a patrol led by Captain Kramer,62 Sixth 
Cavalry, in the Gilitfe valley.63
Did the targeting of isolated Mexicans reflect the loss of the Mescalero reservation and such 
hamlets as Canada Alamosa as supply depots? Had this forced the Apaches to rely increasingly on 
raiding former allies to replenish ammunition stocks? The Grant County Herald notes, with grim 
satisfaction, that the Mexican settlements at Piedras Negras and Canada Alamosa, which had 
previously had good relations with the Apaches, had to organise their own defences as it was now 
51 Humphreys to AAAG, DoNM, 23 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
52 The settlement centring upon Parson Williams Ranche in the San Francisco Valley was described in 
Feb. 1880 as consisting of twenty one well fenced farms. (‘From the Fresco’, The Grant County Herald, 21 
Feb., 1880.
53 Chronological List, p.49; Webb, 1976, p.89.
54 Felipe Chavez to CO DoNM date unclear 1 May, 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.447.
55 Pollack to AAAG, DoNM, 8 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
56 Chavez to AAAG SF 4 May, 1880? NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.647-648; Loud to Hatch Fort 
Craig (Operator will send to General by first opportunity), 1 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.358-359; Thrapp, 1967, p.198; Thrapp, 1974, p.276; 
Stout 1974, p.137 & p.139; Sonnichsen, 1973, p.207; Leckie, 1967, p.220; Haley, 1981, p.327.
57 Loud to Francisco Chavez, 2 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.360-361.
58 Loud to Chavez, Albuquerque, 4 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.371-372.
59 Loud to Felipe & Fransisco Chavez, Albuquerque, 5 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.378; See also Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 
May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.379.
60 Cochran, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.96.
61 The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
62 Spelled ‘Cramer’ in the original text.
63 The Grant County Herald, 31 Jul., 1880.
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unsafe to step beyond their limits.64 However, the account of Patrocinio Martinez suggests that 
Victorio himself did not, even in April–May 1880, indiscriminately target Mexicans. He recalls 
that his father and brother were out in the mountains looking for stray oxen ‘in the spring of 1880’:
Victorio, who was a good friend of my father, warned him and my brother that they had better 
return home because the Indians might kill them. For some unaccountable reason, Victorio 
gave my father thirty dollars.
Martinez said that his brother returned home, but that his father ignored Victorio’s warning and 
continued searching for his oxen. He was killed by Apaches shortly afterwards, he said, and the 30 
dollars Victorio had given him was found on his body.65
At least one Apache raiding party may have moved southwards at the same time as the mining 
communities were struck in the Mogollon Mountains to the west. On 4 May 1880,66 Francisco 
Montoya’s freight train was struck near Cook’s Spring, presumably near Fort Cummings and inside 
Cook’s Range. He submitted a claim for losses of ‘112 Oxen, 5 Mules, 2 American Mules and 1 
American Horse.’ He lost one freighter killed in the attack.67 A small wagon train was also reported 
destroyed between Pueblo Viejo and Las Cruces.68 
This period of intense raiding may also be the inspiration for the ‘Victorio indulging in an orgy 
of cruelty’ narrative. The indiscriminate killing of Mexican shepherds does mark a change in tactics 
for Victorio, as he normally maintained good relations with these people.69 Thrapp speculated that 
Victorio’s Mescalero allies might not have had such relations, and might have been the culprits 
of such attacks.70 The attacks on Canada Alamosa suggest a wider problem for Victorio, in that 
relations between the two communities had become strained to the point of open hostility. It 
was not safe for the inhabitants of Canada Alamosa or Las Palomas to continue their trade with 
the Apaches; but it was equally dangerous for them to cease trading with Victorio. Whilst the 
calculation of relative safety had passed a tipping point in favour of the USA, the Apaches were 
still powerful enough to retaliate with consequences so dreadful that they are still remembered in 
southern New Mexico even today.
By the end of May, the Grant County Herald (see document file no. 66) claimed that 78 people 
had been killed by Apaches in Valencia County;71 but the same edition stated that 63 people had 
been killed in Victorio’s foray into the Mogollon and San Francisco Mountains.72 As far as can 
be determined, Victorio had not operated in the Mogollons or San Francisco Mountains since 
April–May 1879. Single and small groups of miners and prospectors, shepherds and settlers would 
have been incredibly vulnerable to the sudden appearance of war parties of several Apaches. The 
Mescalero warriors with Victorio may have wished to avenge their recent losses, and there certainly 
appear to be grounds for suspecting that Victorio had a deeply personal reason for revenge attacks. 
Yet the reality is surely more complex.
First, as we shall shortly see, Victorio had embarked on his usual tactic of conducting a long-
range raid, to exhaust his US cavalry pursuers by engaging them in a drawn-out pursuit over rough 
terrain. Second, a surprise attack on an area which had not been visited for about a year would yield 
64 Ashenfelter Editorial, The Grant County Herald, 8 May, 1880.
65 Cited in Bryan, 1998, pp.156-157.
66 The supporting statement of Jose Abatos, claims that the attack occurred on the 8 of May, 1880.
67 Misc.5 Document; See also ‘Would not the Truth do?’, The Grant County Herald, 5 Jun., 1880.
68 ‘Would not the Truth do?’, The Grant County Herald, 5 Jun., 1880.
69 Thrapp, 1974, p.276.
70 Thrapp, 1967, p.199.
71 ‘Indian Depredations’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
72 The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
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rich hauls of loot from people who had dropped their guard. Cooney’s letter to the Grant County 
Herald advances this theory. It also suggests that Victorio may have deliberately targeted different 
regions at different times to take advantage of such complacency. The large numbers of miners and 
prospectors killed would have provided a number of modern weapons and good supplies of ammu-
nition, without which most of these men would not have ventured into the wilderness. Finally, 
the revenge motive is almost certainly a factor, but was probably more general and long-term than 
specific and immediate in its motivation. The Warm Springs Apaches had originally gone to war 
with the United States as a result of their contacts with Anglo-American miners in this very area, 
in the early 1860s. A number of long-term scores may have been addressed by the Apaches in their 
raid of April–May 1880, not to mention more recent losses sustained in May 1879. (see docu-
ment file no. 4.) Indeed, the most common invaders of their territory in general had been Anglo-
American miners and prospectors. 
From the 1860s on, it was widely acknowledged that certain areas north and west of Hillsboro, 
particularly the Black Range and the San Mateos, were held by the Apaches. As late as December 
1880, it was acknowledged that any prospectors venturing into these lands ‘took their life in their 
hands.’73 One Harry Pie74 survived one trip and told of discovering a rich deposit of precious metal. 
Returning in 1879, he and a Mexican companion were never seen again, and the skeleton of a white 
man was later found near the supposed site of Pie’s strike.75 Thus, it can be seen that individual 
and small parties of prospectors and miners were incredibly vulnerable to the Chihennes, who had 
viewed them as a threat from the beginning. We will probably never know just how many intrepid 
men seeking their fortune disappeared into these mountains never to return. There may yet be 
remains of such unfortunates awaiting discovery.
The fact remains that, in this area of New Mexico, there is the lingering memory of a devas-
tating raid commanded by Victorio. With memory comes exaggeration of numbers and atrocity, 
reinforced by the official recriminations of the US authorities. Victorio’s reputation for personal 
cruelty probably largely, but not wholly, derives from such a historical memory process. However, 
the gist of this story of a sudden series of raids with a high fatality rate is probably accurate. The 
actual numbers killed by the Apaches in late April and early May 1880 will never be quantified. 
Logistics, Communication and Miscommunication
Having encountered this tale of havoc and destruction, the reader may quite legitimately enquire as 
to the whereabouts of Colonel Hatch and his two battalions of Ninth Cavalrymen. In fact, Hatch’s 
forces, having been in the field since the beginning of the Hembrillo Canyon campaign, were not 
really in a position to mount an effective pursuit. 
Lieutenant S.C. Plummer, Fifteenth Infantry, left in charge of detachments of Infantry at San 
Jose and Canada Alamosa that were intended to act as pickets and escorts,76 found his men ‘need 
ammunition please have me sent two thousand rounds.’77 Once again certain local contractors 
were willing to take advantage of the situation and charge high rates for their goods. District 
Headquarters contacted Hatch over a grain contract with the Lynch Brothers of El Colorado to 
complain that the army had been charged seven cents a pound when the ‘authorized’ rate was four 
73 ‘The Black Range’, The Grant County Herald, 18 Dec., 1880.
74 Also spelt ‘Pye’.
75 ‘The Black Range’, The Grant County Herald, 18 Dec., 1880.
76 Lt Davenport AAAG in field Ojo Caliente to Loud AAAG SF 1 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
439, p.456.
77 Plummer to Capt Loud AAAG SF 4 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.464.
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cents a pound. It enjoined Hatch to remind officers to keep to the authorized rates and recom-
mended that the Lynch Brothers’ bill be ‘disallowed’.78
The monthly and bi-monthly returns for the Ninth Cavalry Regiment also show a continuing 
decline in the numbers of serviceable horses, a steady increase in the numbers of unserviceable 
horses, and a small increase in the numbers of horses lost during the month of April. (See Table 
7.1.) This is despite the arrival of Lieutenant Schaeffer with at least 96 replacement horses for the 
Ninth Cavalry.79 This shows that Hatch’s attempt to rest his regiment may have had some effect, 
in that there was a small rise in the number of serviceable horses during March. It also shows that 
this rise was probably more down to the arrival of replacement horses, as the number of unservice-
able horses continued to rise between January and April. The effect of returning the regiment to 
active service during April is clearly underlined by the large decrease in serviceable horses and the 
increase in both unserviceable and lost horses. 
Table 7.1 Ninth Cavalry, Roster of Horses, 188080
Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses Horses Lost in Action, Died, etc.
January 438 103 36
February 425 129 34
March 441 140 10
April 345 213 54
Table 7. 2 Available Men to Serviceable Horses, January–April 1880.81
Company Available Men, 
January–February 
1880
Serviceable 
Horses, January–
February 1880
Available Men, 
March–April 1880
Serviceable Horses, 
March–April 1880
A 55 No Entry 21 18
B 55 17 58 22
C 59 No Entry 47 16
D 60 40 26 15
E 37 25 46 29
F 46 34 27 7
G 54 35 66 40
H 54 17 57 No Entry
I 49 57 54 20
K 61 63 55 50
L 57 34 57 30
M 53 12 67 No Entry
Table 7.2 shows that there was often, but not always, a decrease in serviceable horses between the 
January–February and the March–April bi-monthly muster rolls. If we examine the experience of 
78 Loud to Hatch, Tularosa (Operator at Craig will forward at first opportunity) 20 May, 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.414.
79 Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 22 May, 1880, p.854.
80 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
81 Derived Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Jan./Feb. & Mar./Apr. 1880, 9th Cavalry in NA, RG94
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two companies which did not take part in Morrow’s January–February campaign, but did partici-
pate in the Hembrillo Canyon operation and beyond, the decrease is obvious. Both companies start 
with more serviceable horses than available men. Yet by the end of April, I Company has dropped 
from 57 serviceable horses to 20 and K Company has recorded a reduction from 63 to 50 serviceable 
horses. Despite covering much ground in April 1880, neither company had fought any Apaches.
Hatch had no choice but to attempt to engage the Apaches, due to the mounting pressure from 
the New Mexican citizenry and his own superiors. However, these figures show that the Ninth 
Cavalry had already sustained heavy horse casualties. If they remained in the field in pursuit 
of Victorio, the situation could only get worse. These difficulties were further compounded by 
communication problems. Once troops had left established courier or telegraph routes, they could 
become difficult if not impossible to contact. On 5 May 1880, District Headquarters, Santa Fé, 
informed Lieutenant Humphreys, at Fort Bayard, that the current location of Hatch’s forces was 
unknown, despite Humphreys’ possession of important information for whoever was in command 
of the Indian scouts.82 Two days later, District Headquarters still knew nothing as to Hatch’s loca-
tion.83 This lack of knowledge reflects the fact that Hatch had put his forces in motion but, in doing 
so, had moved out of easy courier and telegraph communication. 
It also did not help that, initially, the US army was sceptical as to the reliability of the first 
reports concerning Victorio’s onslaught in the Mogollon Mountains.84 While it was true that many 
exaggerated and false reports of Apache raiding had been, and would be, received throughout the 
campaign, in this case some of these reports were fairly accurate. (see document file no. 64.) Even 
so, District Headquarters was bombarded by reports of 500 Apaches on the loose.85 By 7 May 
1880, Santa Fé could only confirm the attack on Cooney’s Mining camp.86 Later that day, they 
were able to confirm some of the other details that, when first received, had been considered of 
doubtful reliability.87 On 7 May, Lieutenant Plummer, as CO Fort Craig, received information that 
Victorio was in the San Mateo Mountains and that Nana, described as Victorio’s second chief, and 
Tomas had recently been killed fighting US troops.88 Humphreys, at Fort Bayard, also noted that 
he had received reports that the Apaches numbered between 150 and 250 strong, with estimates 
even as high as 450 warriors being received. He also had heard nothing from Captain Madden’s 
command.89 Humphreys could only guess that Hatch and his forces would reach the scene of the 
fight on the evening of 7 May. He also remained unsure as to the location of Gatewood’s and Mills’s 
Apache scout detachments90 and McLellan’s company. If any of these detachments passed through 
Fort Bayard, he suggested, they would be ‘of great assistance’.91 By 12 May, District Headquarters 
had still received no news from Colonel Hatch, though they presumed he was in the Mogollon 
82 Humphrey Bayard to AAAG SF 5 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.465-466.
83 Loud AAAG to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
p.442.
84 Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 5 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.428-438.
85 Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 6 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.387.
86 Loud AAAG to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.439-440.
87 Loud AAAG to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.442-443.
88 Loud to Hatch (CO Fort Bayard will forward to General as soon as his whereabouts are known), 7 May, 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.388.
89 Humphreys, Commanding Fort Bayard to AAAG, SF N.M., 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.441-442; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.389-390 & pp.394-395.
90 Humphreys, Bayard to C[arr], Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.53.
91 Ibid.
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Mountains.92 Word of Hatch was finally received on 15 May, but was already four days out of date. 
Hatch estimated that he was 90 miles from Fort Bayard, following a trail of approximately 500 
Apaches.93 This trail was heading towards the White Mountains in Arizona.94 Despite the time 
lag, the troops in Arizona were sent the alarm.95 
Hatch Moves his Forces into the Mogollon Mountains
As noted in the previous chapter, almost 100 Apaches scouts, accompanied by Henry Parker, Sam 
Bowman and Van C. Smith, left San Jose on 29 April, to scout the San Mateo Mountains. They 
spent two days in these mountains but found no recent signs of Apaches. When they emerged, on 
the south-western side of the mountains, they discovered two large trails estimated to be a week 
old. The trails quickly joined, moving north along the western edge of the San Mateo Mountains, 
before turning west for the Mogollon Mountains. One trail, believed to be Victorio’s, had come up 
from the Black Range, while the second trail, believed to be Mescaleros travelling to join Victorio, 
had come from the east. The latter had crossed the Rio Grande, ten miles south of the San Jose 
party. These Apaches raided the ranch of Donaciano Montoya, killing some cattle and taking 17 
horses.96 (see document file no. 67.) Having established that the Apaches had left the San Mateo 
Mountains by 1 May, 97 Hatch’s two battalions, the First (Morrow) and Third (Hooker), then refit-
ting as best they could at Ojo Caliente, were sent in the direction of the Mogollon Mountains, on 
3 and 4 May respectively. In the meantime, Hatch made it clear that he was relying on the two 
companies of Sixth Cavalry under Madden and McLellan (the latter then nearing Fort Bayard, 
on its way back to Arizona) to move into the Mogollon Mountains from the south to protect the 
threatened citizens.98
Morrow’s battalion99 had been ordered into the field with 15 days’ rations, accompanied by 
Lieutenant Maney’s Apache scouts, who had been issued with 20 days’ rations. Their orders were 
to proceed to Shaw’s Ranch on the North Star Road and follow any trails left by Apaches from 
that point. The battalion was accompanied by pack mules only, all wagons being left behind at 
Ojo Caliente.100 Captain Hooker, with the Third Battalion, was given identical orders and told to 
92 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.396.
93 Perhaps the citizens of New Mexico were not the only individuals capable of exaggerating the numbers 
of Apaches.
94 Loud , citing Hatch telegram, San Francisco River, 11 May, 1880 to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 15 May, 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.401-402.
95 Loud to CO Fort Bowie and Col Carr, Fort Lowell, 15 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.402-403.
96 Letter from Van Smith to Thirty-Four, 7 May, 1880.
97 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 May (citing Report by Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 1 May, 1880, rec’d Fort 
Craig 3 May, 1880), Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.364-365.
98 Hatch Ojo Caliente to AAAG SF 4 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.467-468 & p.469; 
See also Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 5 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.428-438; Hatch, Ojo Caliente to AAAG, SF, 4 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.378-379; Loud to CO Fort Bayard, 5 May, 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.380.
99 Thirty Four, 12 May, 1880 stated that Morrow’s battalion was accompanied by Captains Purington, 
Moore, Dawson and Rucker while Hooker was accompanied by Parker Dimmick and Taylor.
100 Special Field Order No. 29 para.3, May 3 1880 (Ojo Caliente), NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 450.
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make for Shaw’s Ranch.101 It would appear that, despite retaining the battalion formation, indi-
vidual companies fanned out in an attempt to pick up any signs of the Apaches. An Indian trail 
was discovered on 7 May near Chase’s Ranch by K Company, Ninth Cavalry, and was followed 
westwards into the Mogollon Mountains.102
The apparent tardiness of the Ninth Cavalry’s response to Victorio’s attacks on the Mogollon 
Mountain communities did not reflect cowardly or incompetent behaviour. The reason for this 
inability to respond can be put down to a failure to understand the principles of Apache warfare by 
more senior US army commanders. Hatch was not getting enough resources, particularly horses 
and mules and fodder for these, to keep his troops in the field for long periods. Nor was he given 
the leeway to recruit enough Apache scouts to spearhead his columns. Recognizing the need for 
these, he had sent Lieutenant Emmett to San Carlos to recruit Apache scouts.103 Yet on 13 May, 
permission to recruit an additional two companies of Apache scouts was denied ‘as an increase in 
present aggregate number of Indian Scouts cannot be allowed without subtracting an equal number 
of soldiers from the Army itself.’104 
Apaches move into Arizona: Ash Creek, 7 May 1880
Ever since Victorio had left members of the Warm Springs Apaches residing on the San Carlos 
reservation, in 1877–78, the US military authorities had been worried that a rescue attempt would 
be mounted. With rumours of heavy Apache raiding in the Mogollon Mountains, Colonel Carr 
realised the danger that Victorio might attack the San Carlos reservation. Captain Chaffee, at 
San Carlos, was warned to put his scouts on full alert.105 On 3 May, Carr ordered Lieutenant 
Blocksom to move his detachment of Apache scouts and Sixth Cavalrymen to join Captain 
Kramer’s E Company, Sixth Cavalry, on Ash Creek.106 This detachment was to scout east towards 
the Mogollons in order to detect, and even prevent, any move towards San Carlos.107 During April, 
when Kramer was originally ordered to Ash Creek, his detachment was joined by Private John F. 
Falvey of the Fort Apache Telegraph Station who:
took with him a key and a relay, and each night, as the trail lay near the line, cut in and placed 
Captain Kramer in direct telegraphic communication with headquarters. On arrival at Ash 
101 Special Field Order No. 30 para.1, May 4 1880 (Ojo Caliente), NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 450; Hatch, 
Ojo Caliente, to AAG SF, 4 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.234; Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 29 May, 1880, front page.
102 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 9th Cavalry, May/Jun. 1880 in NA, RG94.
103 Hatch to AAAG SF 4 or 5 May, 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.469; See also Special Field 
Order No. 30 paras.8&10, May 4 1880 (Ojo Caliente), NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 450; Hatch, Ojo 
Caliente, to AAG SF, 4 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.237.
104 Loud to General Hatch, (CO Fort Bayard will forward as soon as General’s whereabouts are known) 13 
May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.398;R.C. 
Drum, to Comdg General, MDoM, 5 May, 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry 
A1-1 2601, Box 90.
105 Martin to Chaffee, San Carlos, 4 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.204.
106 Carr, Special Order No.10, 3 May, 1880, Special Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 1, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 239.
107 Carr to CO Fort Bayard, Madden at Silver City, Captain Kramer and Lt Blocksom, San Carlos, 3 May, 
1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.5, Dec. 13 1879 – May 7 1880, 
Letter No.’s 142-145, pp.121-124; See also Loud to AAG Ft. Leavenworth, 6 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Creek he opened a station in a tent, about a quarter of a mile from their camp, and for two 
weeks transmitted many important messages over the wires.108
In effect, Kramer, as long as he stayed close to the telegraph line, was equipped with a ‘field 
telegraph’.
Carr’s warning had come none too soon, as a group of warriors under Victorio’s son, curiously 
known as Washington,109 launched a raid towards San Carlos.110 The motives for this raid were 
threefold: first, they wished to rescue some of their family members from San Carlos; second, they 
wanted to attack those Apaches at San Carlos who were providing the US army with scouts; and 
finally, they may have been trying to stir Juh’s Chiricahuas back into hostilities with the Americans. 
The US army was clearly worried about the close proximity of Apaches to the Warm Springs and 
Chiricahua Apaches then resident on the reservation. Chaffee rounded up Loco’s Warm Springs 
Apaches and marched them in close to the agency.111 Chaffee remained concerned that if Victorio 
came too close to the agency, Whoo (Juh) and other Chiricahuas would probably join them.112 This 
worry can only have been increased when the Chiricahuas refused Chaffee’s orders to move into 
the agency, responding that as far as they were aware, Victorio was nowhere near the reservation.113
However, on Ash Creek, Washington’s raiding party were discovered by a group of hunters from 
San Carlos, and thus lost the element of surprise in the skirmish that followed.114 Cruse reports 
that Washington thought that he had bottled the hunters in a cave; however, he had failed to spot 
two of the hunters, one of whom shadowed the raiders while the other spread the alarm.115 Chaffee 
reported that, on 7 May,116 the Apache raiders had assailed other Apaches on Eagle Creek on the 
San Carlos reservation, and had killed approximately 12 people. Among the dead was a prominent 
Apache, ‘Captain Killdegoing, and his entire family’.117 
This attack had critical implications for any peace settlement between Victorio and the United 
States. It was a continuation of the feud between Victorio’s direct following among the Chihennes 
and the San Carlos Apaches which dated back to their original removal to San Carlos in 1877. It 
meant that Victorio could not return to the San Carlos reservation, as he could not have hoped to 
survive reprisals from Apaches who had lost relatives to his warriors and held him directly respon-
sible. By this stage in the campaign, Victorio’s only option, apart from fighting to the finish, was 
winning back the reservation at Ojo Caliente.
108 Report of the Chief Signal Officer in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I-II, p.118.
109 Bourke and Randall report another Apache known as Washington during the peace negotiations in the 
Sierra Madre in 1883. (Bourke, 2001ii, p.383; Randall, 2001, p.395).
110 It is not clear where this information came from though on 5 June, 1880, Hatch informed Carr that 
Victorio was not, as first thought, present on this raid but had sent Washington with between forty 
and fifty warriors. Victorio had, according to Hatch, remained with a larger force near a Cienega in 
the Sierra Negrito Mountains. (Carr to AG DoAz, 5 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.811, pp.64-67).
111 Stacey, Thomas, Citing message from Capt. Chaffee, to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 235, pp.61-62.
112 Ibid.
113 Stacey, Grant, citing message from Capt. Chaffee, to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 9 May, 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 235, p.73.
114 Cruse, 1987, pp.81-82; Worcester, 1979, p.228-229.
115 Cruse, 1987, p.82.
116 Chaffee says on the 11 May that this took place on the previous Friday which the perpetual calendar 
states to be the 7 May.
117 Chaffee to CoIA 11 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Washington did eventually clash with the scouts and cavalrymen of Kramer and Blocksom’s 
commands, in the vicinity of Rocky Canon, Arizona.118 Kramer and Blocksom had been ordered 
out in response to reports of an attack on Stevens’ Sheep Ranch, 11 miles from Fort Lowell, where 
several families of Indians were reported to have sustained a number of fatalities.119 Six Apache 
scouts from Blocksom’s company also spotted the raiders and sped back to Ash Creek to raise the 
alarm.120 Victorio’s presence was reported by one A.W. Dixon who, with two Apache employees at 
Stevens’ Ranch, discovered Apaches rounding up horses and mules around 11:00 a.m. on 6 May. 
These Apaches signalled to the Apaches employed by Dixon inside the Ranch. When one of these 
men went out to talk, he was told that that the warriors were going to ransack the buildings for 
guns, ammunition and food. Dixon decided to run for his life and was sped on his way by a couple 
of shots.121
On 7 May 1880, hearing the news that Stevenson’s122 sheep camp had been attacked, Kramer, 
leaving his dismounted Apache scouts to follow him, took his cavalrymen off to the relief of 
Stevenson’s Ranch. Kramer was anxious to render aid as quickly as possible, but forging ahead 
of his Apache scouts with his Sixth Cavalrymen was unwise. As he approached the location of 
Stevenson’s camp, he was ambushed at close range, losing a number of horses and one man mortally 
wounded. The Sixth Cavalrymen skirmished with the Apaches until Blocksom’s scouts arrived, 
and the raiders then withdrew, but not before they had seriously wounded an Apache scout. Kramer 
pursued them for about nine miles before the Apaches made a stand. Kramer ordered a flank attack 
by the Apache scouts, which once again precipitated a withdrawal. The Apaches were trailed east-
wards until dark; then Kramer withdrew to make camp and await the arrival of his mule train. 
This did not arrive until approximately 9:30 a.m. the following morning. Kramer also reported the 
discovery of two unknown prospectors and a wounded Mexican shepherd during the pursuit.123 
(see document file no. 68.)
Sergeant Daniel Griffin, a civil-war veteran, died that night.124 Washington’s men had targeted 
Kramer’s mounts in their opening volley and several horses had been killed. Kramer had entered 
118 The Chronological List, p.50.
119 Halloran, Rocky Canon Creek to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, 
pp.59-60.
120 Stacey to AG DoAz, 7 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.6, 
7 May-18 May, 1880, Letter No.159, p.3) Eleven Coyotero Apaches were said to have been killed by 
Victorio’s warriors on Eagle Creek. (Report of the CoIA. DoI, OIA, Washington, 1 Nov., 1880, p.90.
121 Maj. Cochran, 12th Infantry, to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, 
pp.69-70.
122 This probably refers to the Steven’s Ranch referred to above. It was not uncommon to have variations of 
the same location name; for example, McEvers’ Ranch is sometimes being referred to as McEverett’s 
Ranch and could sometimes be attributed to individuals mishearing the name.
123 Kramer to Kerr, 8 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Personal File Adam 
Kramer, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 33;See also Personal File Augustus P. Blocksom, NA, RG94, Entry 
297, Box 463; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company E, 6th Cavalry, May/Jun. 1880 in NA, 
RG94; Willcox to AG Presidio, San Francisco, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, 
pp.218-219; Stacey, Thomas to AAAG, Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.55; 
Tabular Statement of Scouts and Expeditions of Companies 6th Cavalry from 1 Jul., 1879 to 31 Jul., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 240; Halloran, Rocky Canon to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 8 May, 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.65 & p.66; Record of Events May, 1880 in Returns From Regular 
Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 
63; Report of Col. E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.217; 
MacPherson Letter 16 May, 1880; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 22 May, 1880, p.855; 
Cruse, 1987, p.82; Thrapp, 1964, p.216; Thrapp, 1974, p.276; Thrapp, 1967, p.199; Chronological List, 
p.50; Webb, 1976, p.89; O’Neal, 1991, p.201; Carter, USACMH webpage.
124 Report of The Surgeon General in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.520.
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the skirmish with 28 men, but had pursued 
the Apaches with only 14, which suggests 
that he had lost up to 12125 horses killed and 
wounded.126 There were no confirmed Apache 
casualties, despite Colonel Carr’s claim that 
Kramer’s force had slain 11 Apaches.127 
Kramer sent a courier to Camp Thomas 
stating that he was faced by Victorio and 90 
warriors.128 
Captain Tupper, on joining Kramer 
the following day, claimed that the latter 
had successfully repulsed the Apaches.129 
Colonel Carr claimed a victory, stating that 
Washington’s raiders had been ‘routed and 
demoralized’.130 A basic knowledge of Apache 
tactics would suggest otherwise. Once again, 
we see the standard tactic of shooting down 
their opponents’ horses in order to cripple 
any subsequent pursuit. We can also see an 
example of a frequent misconception by the 
army that the Apaches had been routed in 
a fight when this was not the case. Having 
crippled their enemies’ ability to pursue them, 
what was there to be gained by entering into 
a prolonged battle with the pinned-down 
cavalrymen and arriving Apache scouts? 
Finally, this spate of raiding underlines the point that Apache warriors could wreak economic 
chaos, both physically and psychologically, across a wide swathe of territory, in vast disproportion 
to their actual numbers. For example, Carr felt obliged to station a company of Sixth Cavalrymen 
in the Dragoon Mountains of south-eastern Arizona. This was to provide visible protection to 
Tombstone, the surrounding settlements and the Southern Pacific Railroad construction teams 
then forging eastwards from California. A single foray into Arizona by a small party of raiders had 
125 Capt. Stacey at Fort Lowell, reported the arrival of two couriers from Capt. Kramer ‘with verbal 
messages, the first asking assistance which was sent him as promptly as possible. The other messenger 
both soldiers – whose names I do not know came from Kramer to see whether the first got through. Both 
men were in the fight which took place about ten miles from Halloran’s camp, as near as I am able to 
ascertain.’ (Stacey, Thomas to A.A.A.G. Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.55).
126 Martin to Carr, 10 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.220.
127 NA, RG232, Entry 232, 12 May, 1880; See also Comdg Dept. to AAG, Presidio, San Francisco, 12 
May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.249; Carr to AG DoAz, 11 May, 1880, Troops in 
SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.6, 7 May-18 May, 1880, Letter No.191, pp.19-
21; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol.17, 15 May, 1880, p.833.
128 Stacey, Thomas to Carr, Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.57.
129 Tupper to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.71.
130 Gen. Willcox’s General Orders No. 10, 4 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; Martin to AG 
Military Division of the Pacific, (Hereafter referred to as ‘MDoP’), Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol.10, Letters Sent, DoAz 1880 p.419; Report of Col E.A. Carr, 
29 Aug., 1880; Report of Maj. James Biddle 10 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 
Vol. I, p.213.
Captain Adam Kramer.
Captain Adam Kramer, Sixth Cavalry was ambushed 
by Apache warriors in Ash Canyon, May 1880, 
when he rashly charged ahead of the Apache scouts 
accompanying his detachment. (National Archives)
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caused a great deal of consternation among US citizens who were relatively far removed from the 
actual fighting. 
Washington’s raid into Arizona also stimulated controversy among Kramer’s superiors concerning 
the failure of the troops on the ground to finish off the Apaches. Kramer’s skirmish was seen as a 
lost chance, and all available troops from Fort Lowell were ordered out to join the pursuit, with 
orders that Victorio should be ‘pursued to the bitter end’.131 In addition, the problems in communi-
cating information quickly up the chain of command caused some confusion and indeed anger at 
higher levels. The first reports of Kramer’s fight noted that he had 36 Cavalrymen and 30 Apache 
scouts. Willcox subsequently sent off an indignant communication to Carr demanding to know 
why, if Kramer had 36 men, he had attached with only 28 men, and why, after that first skirmish 
‘in which he lost only one man, he moved forward with only fourteen men.’132 Why Kramer did 
not first engage the Apaches with the full strength of his detachment is unknown, but could be any 
combination of factors such as leaving men to guard a mule train or wagons, broken down horses, 
stragglers, and so on. The reason he pursued with only 14 men is that the Apaches had killed a 
number of horses and wounded some of his men. He had also sent back two couriers to call for 
reinforcements, and such details had not yet reached Department Headquarters. The now-familiar 
claims that the US army had ‘whipped’ the Apaches were made without any concrete evidence.133 
Such claims may have been made to counter criticisms that the Arizona troops had not performed 
as expected. Carr angrily pointed out that a number of his command were on detached service in 
New Mexico and had not yet returned. Carr felt that, given the shortage of troops, his forces had 
performed well.134 A report was passed up to Fort Lowell stating that Blocksom’s scouts had not 
performed as well as could be expected. ‘They could not be put in because Kramer did not have 
enough men to support them.’135 This may reflect either a misunderstanding of the principles of war 
followed by Apaches, which did not involve engaging in frontal assaults, or an effort to explain the 
failure to defeat the Apaches.
It also became clear that Willcox was desperate that Victorio should not wreak the same havoc 
in Arizona as he had inflicted, and was still inflicting, in New Mexico; and he left his subordinates 
in no doubt about his desire for a swift victory.136 His anxiety was fuelled by his belief that certain 
elements of the US army, based in New Mexico, were not up to the job:
Entre nous, the fact that the old fellow [Victorio] has been able to do pretty much as he pleased 
in New Mexico has been pretty generally attributed to color of his opponents in that country. 
It won’t look very well if he should be so in accord with the fourteenth amendment as to make 
no distinction on account of color when he comes into Arizona.137
On receipt of the news of Kramer’s fight, reinforcements from Camp Thomas (two officers and 32 
men, commanded by Captain Tupper) were sent out to support Kramer.138 Captain Tupper trailed 
131 Martin to ?, Fort Lowell, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.213.
132 Martin to Carr, 10 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.220.
133 Kerr to CO Fort Apache, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.6, 7 
May-18 May, 1880, p.11.
134 Carr to AG DoAz, 16 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.6, 
7 May-18 May, 1880, Letter No.180. pp.12-14.
135 Stacey, Grant, to AAG, Lowell, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.63.
136 See Martin to Carr, 9 May & 11 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, P.218 & p.220.
137 Martin to Carr, 11 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10 pp.224-225.
138 Stacey, Thomas to AAG Lowell, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.55; Comdg Dept to 
AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 8 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.216.
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Washington’s raiders for approximately 150 miles.139 Tupper’s immediate concern was that the 
Apaches would strike the settlements around Clifton.140 He was relieved to note that the Apaches 
passed 18 miles to the north west of Clifton, making for the San Francisco Valley, before veering 
away north west, then north, then swerving around to the east and crossing the San Francisco 
River using the Camp Apache road. He estimated that 48 Apaches had fought Kramer, and after 
the fight they had ridden 60 miles before taking any rest, abandoning 10–12 horses during that 
time. On entering the San Francisco Valley, the raiders had scattered briefly, before reforming. 
They had then slightly altered their course to avoid a collision with Hatch’s command marching 
in from the east, before Tupper had to break off the pursuit.141 Tupper also thought that, at the 
first campsite he encountered on entering the San Francisco valley, the raiders had been joined by 
a larger number of Apaches. At this camp, they found the remains of 18–20 slaughtered cattle. 
Some of the hides had been removed but little meat had been taken and some of this was found 
to be fresh enough to be eaten by Tupper’s command.142 This suggests that the Apaches may have 
become aware of the close proximity of Tupper and Hatch’s commands and abandoned the carcases 
at short notice. Failing to catch the Apaches, Tupper did manage to contact Hatch on 14 May and 
pass on information about their quarry.143 This was not before Tupper had had a narrow escape from 
Lieutenant Maney’s Apache scouts. Tupper’s scouts had informed him that the Lieutenant was 
going into camp less than three miles from Hatch’s command:
I concluded to ride down at daylight. At daybreak next morning Lieut Maney 15th Inf. with 
65 Indians marched into my camp & informed me that they had been up all night so as to 
“ jump” the camp at daybreak, as they had seen my scouts the evening before.144
Once the two commands joined, Tupper reporting that Hatch was accompanied by eight compa-
nies of the Ninth Cavalry, Hatch put his command on the trail of the raiders and seemed confi-
dent of meeting the Apaches in battle, a confidence Tupper did not share: ‘I did not feel like 
disregarding representations coming from such high authority.’145 Tupper remained with Colonel 
Hatch’s command until they had followed the trail to where it crossed the San Francisco River by 
the road from Fort Wingate to Fort Apache.146 Tupper had to abandon his pursuit and slowly return 
to Camp Thomas, due to his horses breaking down and there not being adequate forage in the area 
to sustain his mounts.147 Hatch noted that it was on meeting Tupper that he had been informed 
that the raiding party that had attacked San Carlos and other targets in the area was commanded 
139 Report of Col. E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.217.
140 Tupper to Post Adjutant, 23 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
141 Tupper to Post Adjutant, 23 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
142 Tupper had to abandon his pursuit and slowly return to Camp Thomas due to his horses breaking down 
and there not being adequate forage in the area to sustain his mounts.
143 Synopsis of Report of Maj. Morrow June 27, 1880 Concerning March, April & May 80 in Letters 
Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 93; Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 
Aug., 1880; See also Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.449; Carr to Haskell, 20 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
144 Tupper to Post Adjutant, 23 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Tupper, Williams Ranche, San Francisco Valley, to AAAG, Fort Lowell, 17 May, 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 235, pp.90-92; Carr to Haskell, Aide-de-Camp, Palace Hotel, San Francisco, 20 May, 
1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, 
Letter No.243, pp.24-25; Carr to Haskell, 20 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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by Victorio’s son, Washington.148 This suggests that some of Blocksom’s scouts may have recognised 
Victorio’s son as the leader.
In the light of Victorio’s activities in the Mogollon and San Francisco Mountains, Hatch 
requested that Colonel Carr station troops in this area. Carr’s response was to order two compa-
nies of the Sixth Cavalry and an Apache scout company to patrol the area.149 Carr reported that 
his contribution to the campaign against Victorio had forced several redeployments of his own 
command. This included placing the Sixth Cavalry’s regimental band on standby for field opera-
tions.150 For the moment, Carr proposed to send two companies of Sixth Cavalry under Captain 
Hentig to scout up to the head of the San 
Francisco Valley, as far as the road to Albuquerque. This detachment would be accompanied by 
those members of Gatewood’s scout company still fit for field service.151 Surgeon MacPherson also 
reported that the Sixth Cavalry Regiment, including its musicians, were being mustered at Camp 
Thomas in preparation for field operations against Victorio. He reported the exhausted state of the 
soldiers and their horses and mules through incessant pursuit of the Apaches.152 This convinced 
Surgeon MacPherson that he should quit military service.153
As far as Carr was concerned, an expedition mounted by Arizona troops against Victorio, though 
he was willing in principle to lead such an expedition, faced several difficulties. First, Carr was still 
short of troops. Those troops he had deployed to watch the Arizona-New Mexico line he could 
not move. This left him four companies which could be used, but this would leave south-eastern 
Arizona unprotected. The increase in freighters and prospectors ranging over Arizona made the 
task of protecting these citizens even more difficult. Each company was also below strength in men 
and horses, Carr reporting that he faced a challenge to put in the field more than 40 mounted men 
per company. Replacement horses and 70 recruits had arrived, and could be used; but both were 
woefully inexperienced for active field service against Apache guerrillas.154 
Nor were the Apaches likely to stay in one place long enough for troops to be gathered and an 
operation planned:
There have never been any successful operations against these Indians except by surprise. 
Major Morrow and other troops in New Mexico, with Gen’l Hatch in person have done all 
that men could do by following and pressing, but the only results have been, either to find the 
Indians with insufficient force and get badly hurt, or to have rear guard fights among rocks, 
enabling Victorio to locate the troops and then go elsewhere to work his will.155
148 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.449.
149 Report of Col. E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.217; See 
also Carr to AG DoAz, 5 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, 
Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.811, pp.64-67.
150 See General Orders No. 1 HQ Troops in the Field in SE Arizona, Fort Lowell A.T., 9 May, 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 238; Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880 in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 
35.
151 Kerr to Hentig, 17 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.6, 
7 May-18 May, 1880, Letter No.223, pp.39-40; See also Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company D, 6th Cavalry May/Jun. & Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
152 MacPherson Letter 16 May, 1880.
153 Ibid, 23 May, 1880.
154 Carr to Willcox, 19 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.242, pp.18-24.
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Plates 7.3 and 7.4. Two photos of the Gila Wilderness through which the Ninth Cavalry pursued Victorio 
in May 1880. (Photos: author)
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Carr advocated that an offensive war should be carried out against the Apaches but pointed out 
that to do this effectively needed an injection of manpower and money.156 He was keen to make 
the attempt, but warned that even if additional resources were available, the outcome was not 
certain, as Victorio ‘might beat me. He is both a strategist and a tactician.’157 Unlike Colonel Hatch, 
however, the one tactic that Carr did not advocate was the increased use of Apache scouts: ‘I think 
Hatch uses his Indians too hard: making them do too much of the fighting. Their designation of 
“Indian Scouts” indicates what are their legitimate duties.’158 In June 1880, Willcox contacted Carr, 
stating: ‘The Dept. Comdr agrees with you that Indian Scouts, should be made to feel that their 
work is to discover the enemy and the troops to fight.’159 General Pope was of the same opinion: 
‘Scouts being responsible not for the fighting but for the trailing.’160 Later, in September 1880, 
Carr reiterated his opinion that Indian Scouts were not effective unless backed by the army to do 
the ‘heavy fighting’.161 These ideas were still held at the highest levels of the US army over a year 
later.162 This is an excellent example of the complete failure to understand the key lesson (it takes an 
Apache to fight an Apache) learned by Crook in his Apache Campaigns of 1871–74. Indian scouts 
had been a feature of both British and American efforts to fight American Indians. However, the 
tactic generally used was that the Indian scouts found the enemy, then the army spearheaded the 
assault. If the scouts wished to join the attack, they would be very welcome to do so. Carr’s own 
experience of using Pawnee scouts at Summit Springs in 1869 followed that general principle, 
though in practice such scouts often ended up spearheading the attacks. Where the Apache wars 
were concerned, the European element of the US army (Apache scouts were also part of the US 
army during their term of service) would have to accept a secondary role in bringing about the end 
of Apache independence.
Kramer’s skirmish at Ash Creek, and Tupper’s follow-through, gave Hatch the lead he required. 
On receipt of news of the fight, and information that the Apaches were heading in his direction, 
Hatch, on 12 May 1880, moved his command north from Mineral Creek, hoping to find the trail 
in the San Francisco Valley.163 Two days later, Hatch sent in word that he was following a day-old 
trail, but:
My stock is nearly worn out and am afraid I can’t overtake them. The Indians are leaving a 
good deal of broken down stock on trail. Also killing some. Will be in vicinity of Old Fort 
Tularosa in three or four days probably.164
Hatch also issued instructions to Morrow, dated 12 May 1880, that he should detach a company 
from the First Battalion to garrison Parson Williams’ Ranch and protect ‘this section of country as 
his force will permit.’165 Hatch ordered that the officer in command of this detachment should take 
156 Ibid, pp.18-24.
157 Carr to Willcox, 19 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.242, p.22.
158 Carr to AG DoAz, 5 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 
18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.811, p.65.
159 Martin to Carr, 5 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.265.
160 Pope to Buell, 30 Aug., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 93.
161 Carr to Hatch, 10 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 439 p.396.
162 Sherman to General Drum 10 Sept., 1881 NA, RG393 Part 1, Entry 181, p.198.
163 Loud (citing Telegram from Hatch dated 12 May, 1880 on Mineral Creek), to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
20 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.417.
164 Loud (citing Telegram from Hatch dated 14 May, 1880 no location given), to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
20 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.417.
165 Special Field Order No.31, (Mineral Creek) 12 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; See also 
Hatch, Mineral Creek, Special Field Order, 12 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
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charge of ‘all dismounted men belonging to the First and Third Battalions New Mexico Troops and 
broken down stock.’166 This implies that the two battalions were working in close conjunction in 
mid-May 1880. Hatch, Morrow, 360 troops and 65 Apache scouts were reported to have arrived at 
Keller’s Ranch on 10 May.167 The following day, Hatch sent word by courier, and then by telegraph, 
that he was following a large trail of 500 Apaches, who appeared to be making for the White 
Mountains of Arizona. This news did not reach Santa Fé until 14 May 1880.168 The fact that Hatch 
felt he had to make available a company of dismounted men to help guard the San Francisco Valley 
settlements illustrates that, once again, the Apaches’ speed and freedom to choose their terrain was 
inflicting heavy casualties. 
The ‘Juh’ Problem
Washington’s foray towards San Carlos also rang alarm bells in the Department of Arizona in 
relation to the presence of the recently arrived Juh and his warriors. On 12 May 1880, Willcox 
recommended that:
the best way to keep Hoo [Juh] is to employ him on our side, pay him well, watch him and 
act accordingly. McIntosh had better be with you, and one or two such Chiricahua as young 
Cachise [Naiche] and can be trusted. If possible open negotiations with Victorio: tell him 
he has been out long enough and must come in: and has got your troops to fight as well as 
Hatch’s.169
Carr requested permission to recruit Tom Jeffords, as he was held in high regard by the Chiricahuas. 
He also recommended that immediate steps be taken to ‘reassure Hoo and his people as they may 
think they are to be captured, dismounted or disarmed’.170 The recent dismounting, disarming and 
detention of the Mescaleros would not have gone unremarked by the occupants of other Apache 
reservations. Juh and his warriors were obviously viewed as unknown variables. He was a potential 
ally, in that he might provide warriors to act as scouts. Equally, he could act as a conduit through 
Victorio might be persuaded to surrender. However, he had also been reported as having been 
allied with Victorio in late 1879, so how far could he be trusted? A rumour emerged that Juh’s 
Chiricahuas had been plotting to attack Stevens’ Ranch around the same time that Victorio had 
attacked it. This rumour was from something of a third hand source: ‘Our hospital steward saw 
Mariehilda … [who] has a boy, a half breed, herding for him.’ This herder claimed to have been in 
Juh’s camp at the end of April, where he had been closely questioned about the number of people, 
guns and animals at the Ranch. Captain Stacey reported this ‘for what it is worth’, but also stated 
that it showed a possible element of collusion between Juh and Victorio.171 
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166 Ibid.
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Willcox certainly thought that it was worth holding a conference with ‘Cochise’s son and the 
Talking Chiefs of the Chiricahuas’.172 Willcox’s letter is vague as to whether he wanted to use the 
Chiricahuas to open negotiations with Victorio, or to use them as scouts, or both. Willcox was 
prepared to hire Tom Jeffords at $125 per month, the ‘highest price allowed interpreters with the 
scouting companies’.173 In addition to Jeffords, Carr was authorised to hire Juh, Naiche and no more 
than three or four other Chiricahuas to be employed as guides.174 Willcox also stated that ‘in such a 
negotiation you must seek the cooperation of Hatch, in whose District the Indians are operating.’175 
Willcox also instructed Carr to contact Captain Chaffee, acting Indian Agent at San Carlos, to 
make every effort to secure the cooperation of the Chiricahuas.176 This action was not uncontro-
versial. Captain Chaffee expressed great doubts as to the wisdom of employing both Jeffords and 
Archie McIntosh, describing their influence over the Chiricahuas as ‘baneful’.177 Unfortunately 
for us today, Chaffee did not go into any detail on this issue. Willcox noted that ‘Chaffee may 
be right in his views and will no doubt cooperate in his own way.’178 Chaffee took the position 
that, since their arrival, he had treated the Chiricahuas fairly but no better than other Apaches 
on the reservation. However, he clearly noted that he expected obedience to his instructions and 
was not impressed with their refusal to move closer to the reservation when so ordered. Jeffords 
and McIntosh also seem to have clashed with Chaffee over his approach to the newly arrived 
Chiricahuas.179 It appears to have been over Chaffee’s decision to keep an obvious and close watch 
on the Chiricahuas after Kramer’s skirmish.180 Nevertheless, it was ultimately concluded that the 
Chiricahuas had been under close enough supervision to convince the US military of their good 
faith, which had been ‘severely but successfully tested at the time Victorio, or his son, made a raid 
on San Carlos.’181
This potential problem facing Carr seemed to resolve itself when Jeffords reported that young 
Cachise (presumably Naiche) was disinclined to participate in any form of hostilities, and that 
Jeffords ‘could not tell about the others’.182 Chaffee had also earlier interviewed Juh and other 
Chiricahua ‘Captains’, and received assurances that they did not intend to join Victorio.183 
Victorio had certainly achieved his usual goal of running the US army into the ground. There 
were also indications that he was diverting some of the plunder taken in this raiding to be sold 
172 Willcox to Carr, 12 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp248-249.
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down in Mexico. A party of travellers from Janos, arriving at La Mesilla, on 14 May 1880, stated 
that they had discovered a large and recent trail of horses and mules near Lake Guzman, going 
towards the Candelaria Mountains.184 With the Mescalero reservation under US army control 
and the apparent loss of other trading points such as Las Palomas and Canada Alamosa, it would 
have made sense for the Apaches to move their plunder down into Mexico for sale in such towns 
as Galeana.
Morrow’s battalion had moved into the San Francisco Mountains and then turned north-east-
wards towards the Datil Mountains.185 It was reported that Apaches had struck Lunas Ranch on 
12 May, killing three men, three women and two children, and carrying off two girls. On the 
same day, Placido Romero lost three herders to the Apaches in the same area. Lunas Ranch was 
believed to be 60 miles north west of Old Fort Tularosa, almost on the Arizona border in the Sierra 
Escudillo.186 Hatch reported that he had reached the Lunas [Limas] Ranch on or around 15 May, 
and alleged that the Apaches had killed two women four children and taken two girls captive after 
finding that the men had abandoned the women and children in the Ranch; which caused Hatch 
to describe the men as ‘simply cowards’.187 The two girls were later reported to have escaped.188 
Of most interest is the belief that Major Morrow had had a fight with the Apaches on 11 May, 
‘result not known’.189 (see document file no. 69.) Lieutenant Hutcheson’s short history of the Ninth 
Cavalry states that in ‘May, in the San Francisco Mountains, Troop C and detachment scouts, 2 
men killed and one wounded.’190 There is no record of this skirmish in the Ninth Cavalry’s monthly 
return nor in C Company’s bi-monthly roster. However, ‘missing official data’ concerning unsuc-
cessful engagements with Apache raiders is not unknown. There is also no indication of whether 
the casualties were Apache scouts, or Ninth Cavalrymen, or both.
Morrow wrote a report of his battalion’s activities between March and May 1880, a synopsis of 
which can be found in the National Archives in Washington DC191 The key date, where the next 
chapter is concerned, is 16 May 1880. It was at this juncture that Morrow detached his Apache 
scout company of between 50 and 75 Apache scouts under Chief of Scouts H.K. Parker and sent 
them ahead toward Ojo Caliente.
184 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 15 May, 1880.
185 Thrapp, 1974, p.278.
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Enigmatic Skirmish at Old Fort Tularosa, 14 May 1880192
On the evening of 13 May 1880, Sergeant George Jordan of K Company, with 25 troopers of K 
Company,193 escorting a wagon train of rations, encountered a messenger from Old Fort Tularosa 
seeking aid.194 This post should not be confused with the Tulerosa agency on the Mescalero reser-
vation. This was an old army post, which had been abandoned, but had proved to be a focal point 
for subsequent civilian settlement. In fact, this was the military post, placed on the short-lived 
Tularosa reservation, which the Mimbres Apaches had been moved to in 1872 and had abandoned 
in 1874.195 According to Kayser, the Fort was never properly completed, being a mixture ranging 
from well-constructed quarters to rough shanty buildings. These varying remains formed a nucleus 
for civilian settlement after the post’s abandonment in late 1874.196 They lay between the Mogollon 
Mountains to the south and the Datil Mountains to the north, approximately 50 miles to the west 
of Ojo Caliente.197 Sergeant Jordan’s own testimony stated that he had already been ordered to 
march to Old Fort Tularosa with a supply train to replenish ‘the rest of the regiment, which was 
pursuing Victoria’s band of Apaches.’198 
Apparently Victorio and a large group of warriors had been spotted in the vicinity, and the 
settlers felt vulnerable to attack. Jordan immediately gathered up his wagons and escort and they 
made a night march to the settlement, reaching their destination at about 6:00 a.m. on 14 May.199 
There had been no attack,200 and after some rest the men proceeded to fortify a part of the hamlet. 
With the civilians placed inside the works, and the troops deployed around them, everyone waited 
for the Apaches to attack.201 As evening drew on, the settlement came under intense gunfire as 
the Apaches closed in on foot. Some of the wagon teamsters and troopers, guarding the animals 
in a corral, were cut off. The Apaches launched two attacks in the fading light, but were unable to 
break into the main defences.202 They then turned their attention to the corral, in an attempt to run 
off the horses and cattle. Sergeant Jordan sent out 10 troopers to rescue the men in the corral,203 
and following this move the Apaches broke off their attack.204 Jordan estimated that Victorio had 
been leading at least 100 warriors in the attack.205 The following morning, Hatch and the rest of 
his battalion arrived at old Fort Tularosa, much to the relief of all concerned.206 On 7 May 1890, 
Sergeant George Jordan was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions at old Fort 
Tularosa on 13-14 May 1880.207
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However, this skirmish was an anomaly where the Victorio campaign overall was concerned. 
The two main secondary sources for the campaign, Thrapp and Stout, make no mention of it at 
all, which implies that the skirmish is not particularly significant as far as the overall campaign is 
concerned. The Chronological List records an encounter with Apaches at Tularosa (Old Fort) on 
14 May. No casualties at all are recorded on either side.208 Indeed, only a few days after this battle, 
Hatch, then at Old Fort Tulerosa, stated that there had been ‘some light skirmishing with detach-
ment here.’209 The only other comment from Hatch was that the ranch at Old Fort Tularosa had 
been attacked and this had been repelled by a Ninth Cavalry detachment.210
From the Apache point of view, the first question we have to ask ourselves is: what did the 
Apaches have to gain from such an attack? The suspicion would be that the attacks by Victorio’s 
warriors were intended to panic the defence into fleeing. Therefore, as long as the defenders 
held their ground, they were, in fact, relatively safe. The Apaches would not have closed with an 
entrenched enemy, as this would almost certainly have resulted in unnecessary fatalities. What did 
they have to gain? It is easier, and more important, to see what they had to lose in mounting this 
attack. The relatively large number of Apache warriors said to have been involved in the skirmish 
is open to question. The attack was mounted in conditions of poor visibility, once again giving the 
Apaches, through a prodigious consumption of ammunition and constant movement, the chance 
to create the impression of far greater numbers than were actually present. From a tactical point 
of view, the timing of the attack appears strange as well. There was enough time, from when the 
citizens of Fort Tularosa first felt threatened to the point of attack, to summon relief and then 
fortify the place. The Apaches worked by stealth and speed. Why give such an early warning to the 
settlers? This seeming lack of logic does in fact hint at a possible reason why the Apaches attacked 
Old Fort Tularosa. By drawing attention to their presence, they pressured the Ninth Cavalry into 
maintaining a pursuit which would simply cripple and kill even more of their horses and mules. 
This attack has all the hallmarks of a small Apache raiding party tactically probing the settle-
ment’s defences. They failed to panic the defenders into flight and did not succeed in running off 
the livestock. The raiding party then cut their losses and withdrew. What they had succeeded in 
doing was keeping Hatch on their trail.
In the meantime, Victorio and his men turned towards the Black Range. On 17 May, from Old 
Fort Tulerosa, Hatch reported that his command’s stock was worn out, due to the singular lack of 
forage in that quarter.211 For this reason, he was going to leave his worn-out horses under guard at 
that point and continue the pursuit of Victorio on foot. Hatch acknowledged that Victorio might be 
able to evade him, even though he stated that the Apaches were also ‘nearly dismounted’.212 He also 
estimated that Victorio had approximately 200 warriors, and he thought it was ‘possible he is going 
east.’213 Hatch guessed that Victorio was making for the San Mateo Mountains, with the ultimate 
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AAAG, 17 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.264; (Loud to 
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destination being the Mescalero reservation.214 This information was gleaned from the number of 
dead horses left on Victorio’s trail and information supplied by some captives taken by the Apaches 
who had then escaped. The captives reported having overheard Victorio stating his intention to 
make for the Mescalero reservation. They also stated that Victorio had some Comanche allies with 
him,215 although these were more likely Mescalero Apaches. There is a photo of Mescalero Apache 
scouts taken in the 1880s where some Mescalero warriors are wearing their hair in braids. Hatch 
also sent instructions to Lieutenant Payne, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding at Ojo Caliente, to 
send out rations and fodder for his men and horses. Hatch also warned Payne to watch out for a 
repeat raid on Ojo Caliente’s horse herd.216 Hatch informed District Headquarters that he had 
sent his scouts in advance in the hope of intercepting the Apaches in the San Mateo Mountains.217 
This was the company mentioned earlier as having left Morrow’s battalion on the San Francisco 
River. The news that Victorio had probably managed to evade his pursuers once again, and was now 
moving eastwards, prompted General Pope to request that Grierson be sent back to Fort Stanton 
with his Tenth Cavalrymen. General Sheridan responded by issuing instructions that, as soon as 
three companies of the Tenth Cavalry had arrived in Texas from Fort Sill, Grierson should be 
ordered out with five companies of Tenth Cavalry to Fort Stanton to cooperate with Hatch.218 Pope 
felt that he could not spare any more troops from within the Department of the Missouri without 
leaving other parts of the frontier open to attack.219 
In the meantime, Hatch had arrived at Ojo Caliente on 21 May, having pushed ahead of his 
command with a small detachment of ten men.220 He noted that Parker’s Apache scouts had trailed 
Victorio to a few miles to the south, before making for Ojo Caliente. Hatch sent them back out in 
pursuit, but he was not optimistic that the rest of his command could catch up with their quarry.221 
He estimated that Major Morrow was still one day from Ojo Caliente, and Captain Hooker’s 
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217 Loud to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 19 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.650; Hatch to 
AAAG, 17 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.264.
218 Pope to AAG, MDoM, 20 May, 1880, & Sheridan to Pope, 22 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.651-652; See also Pope (citing Hatch Telegram of 17 May from Tularosa) to Whipple 20 May, 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Sheridan to Townsend 22 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
219 Pope to Loud 20 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.419; see also See also Pope to Whipple 21 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 
14.
220 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.448.
221 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.266; See also Loud (citing Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 21 May, 1880) to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 23 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.427; Pope to AAG MDoM, 25 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See 
also similar but more difficult to decipher letter NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.265; see also 
The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Hatch makes similar comments two days earlier from Old Fort 
Tularosa, 19 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.410-411.
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battalion was three days away..222 Hatch blamed the faltering pursuit on distance and the nature 
of the terrain over which they had followed Victorio. He pointed out that his pursuit had taken 
him over the Mogollon Mountains and on into Arizona before he had turned back, commenting 
that their horses were too ‘fine’ for such arduous service.223 He also noted that the Ninth Cavalry’s 
mounts had been further weakened by lack of water and a scarcity of grass, the latter resource 
having been eaten down by the large number of sheep being raised in that part of New Mexico. 
He estimated that his regiment would soon be dismounted, though he comforted himself that 
Victorio’s following were in the same condition, having abandoned many horses and mules.224 That 
222 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.448; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 19 Jun., 1880, p.940
223 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.265; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.451-452.
224 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.266; See also Loud (citing Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 21 May, 1880) to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 23 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.427; Pope to AAG MDoM, 25 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See 
also similar but more difficult to decipher letter NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.265; see also 
The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Hatch makes similar comments two days earlier from Old Fort 
Tularosa, 19 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, 
pp.410-411.
Mescalero Apache Scouts.
Throughout the campaign against Victorio there were reports of large numbers of ‘renegade’ Comanches 
and Kiowas joining Victorio. There may have been a very small number of such individuals but these were 
more likely to have been Mescalero Apaches. This photograph shows a group of Mescalero Apache scouts 
a few years after the campaign where the influence of the Plains Indians living to the east and north of the 
Mescalero Apaches can be clearly seen, particularly the practice of braiding their hair. It was this influence 
which led rise to the rumours that a large number of Comanches had joined Victorio. (National Archives)
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the Apaches did not utilise horses and mules in the same way as the US army did either appears to 
have escaped the Colonel, or he was attempting to glean anything positive he could to include in 
his reports.
The state of Hatch’s command can be gauged by his urgent requests for fresh mules to be sent 
to Ojo Caliente from Fort Craig, as well as new boots, shoes and clothing for the men (‘a pair of 
boots will not last in the mountains a month’), hay for ‘stuffing aparejos’, and additional rations as 
the post at Ojo Caliente was now denuded of food.225 To be fair to District Headquarters, while 
Hatch was away on campaign, they had made sterling efforts to ensure that the Ninth Cavalry 
could remain in the field:
Eight thousand rations are en-route and should now be at Ojo Caliente, they left on first 
instant. Chief Q.S. will ship fifteen thousand more rations to Craig this week. The mules you 
ordered to Craig to be distributed south arrived at Craig yesterday and are with Lt. Valois. The 
wagons with them are loaded with corn, as you ordered. Have instructed Chief Quartermaster 
relative to boots and shoes for Ojo Caliente and hay for Aparejos. Ten bales of Hay was sent 
with the mules to Craig and which Lt Valois now has. Have telegraphed Commanding Officer 
Bayard to at once repeat to Craig all telegrams sent you in his case to be forwarded to you at 
Ojo Caliente and your mail to Paraje … Every endeavor to get supplies promptly from here 
to you has been made with means of doing so available here. So far as I can learn we continue 
to find contract transportation is hardly to be relied upon for the prompt transportation of 
stores. Lieut Valois telegraphed me that he left Craig for Ojo Caliente this morning, he must 
with him mules, corn and hay. Clothing226 for Ojo Caliente was shipped some days ago and 
Quartermaster informs me is now at Albuquerque awaiting arrival of corn to be shipped to 
you. Contract team will start with the corn and clothing about Wednesday. Railroad has been 
washed out causing some delays. Think we need a Quartermaster Agent at Railroad terminus 
to ship stores and attend to them, someone has now to go from here each time to do it … Chief 
Q.S. states he thought the eight thousand rations were at Ojo Caliente and requested Q.M. 
two days ago upon finding they had not arrived to hurry them up, they should have arrived by 
this time.227
Hatch expressed disappointment that he had been unable to bring Victorio to a decisive battle,228 
and noted that he needed 10 more companies of infantry to help protect the increasing number 
of ranchers and prospectors entering southern New Mexico. He also strongly recommended the 
recruiting of 200 Apache scouts to hunt down Victorio. If he was given these additional men the 
Apaches would be hunted down and destroyed in a matter of months.229
225 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.267.
226 This included 500 blouses, 400 Campaign hats, 600 Trousers (Cavalry), 150 Trousers (Infantry), 600 
Flannel Shirts, 800 Drawers, 1200, Stockings, 800 Boots. (Loud to Hatch, 26 May, 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.435)
227 Loud to Hatch, (Lieut Plummer at Fort Craig will forward by return courier) Ojo Caliente, 23 May, 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.429.
228 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.265; Loud (citing communication from Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 21 May, 1880) to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.425-426.
229 Loud (citing communication from Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 21 May, 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 
May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.425-426; 
See also Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to AAAG, SF, 21 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.265.
The Ninth Cavalry Dismounted in the Mogollon Mountains 193
It will come as no surprise that Hatch’s failure to bring the war to an end once again raised much 
adverse comment on the part of the press. Hatch was accused of deliberately making his command 
conspicuous so as to avoid any confrontation with the Apaches. He was also strongly criticized 
for failing to support Captain Madden, and for insulting ordinary citizens who had volunteered 
to serve in the Mogollon Mountains.230 (see document file no. 70.) A petition from the citizens of 
Silver City to President Hayes stated that the army had proved it could neither defeat the enemy nor 
protect the citizens of New Mexico. It also stated, without actually naming Hatch, that the situa-
tion had been misrepresented ‘through military or official channels’. General Pope countered that 
there were more than enough troops to deal with the Apaches, though the latter’s mode of warfare 
made this a difficult task to complete in the short-term. He also angrily pointed out that many 
reported depredations were at best exaggerated and at worst fictitious.231 (see document file no. 71.)
Morrow’s command reached Ojo Caliente on 22 May, and Hatch duly reported that Morrow 
‘considers it important we secure more of the foot indians from San Carlos as actual economy,’232 
in a further attempt to solicit more Apache scouts from his superiors. He also reiterated his desire 
for those Warm Springs women and children based at San Carlos to be transferred to his control if 
the Apaches were going to be successfully fought;233 and he repeated his earlier argument that the 
dependents of the Warm Springs Apache should be escorted by ‘two Indian police companies,’ who 
could then be deployed to hunt down the Apaches.234
Hatch also stated that the Apache raiding parties had remained scattered, and that he thought 
that they might reunite in the San Andres Mountains.235 This prediction may have been prompted 
by the fact that ‘Montzilla [Nautzilla] principal Mescalero Chief with four warriors four squaws and 
one child’ surrendered at the Mescalero agency on 20 May 1880, having crossed the Rio Grande 
on 19 May,236 indicating that some Mescaleros had split away from Victorio as the latter returned 
to the Black Range. Hatch also reiterated his claim that American Indians from Indian Territory 
had also joined Victorio. ‘A large fat indian killed on the San Francisco River was a Commanche 
possibly a sub chief.’237 Unfortunately, Hatch adds no further detail to this bald statement. Finally, 
he also sent a message to Fort Bayard asking that the settlements in the Miembres Valley be alerted 
to the danger that Apache raiders from Victorio’s following might be about to descend on them.238
The pursuit of Victorio was so gruelling that Hatch decided to reorganise his battalions. A 
dismounted battalion was to be deployed into the Black Range, while two companies with horses 
were to be sent to Fort Stanton to create a mounted battalion of four companies ready for field 
230 ‘The Mogollon Campaign’, The Grant County Herald, 22 May, 1880.
231 Citizens Bailey etc. to President RB Hayes, Washington D.C., 10 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also correspondence in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
232 Hatch to Loud AAAG 22 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.72.
233 Hatch to Loud AAAG 22 May, 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.73 & Hatch to Loud AAAG 26 
May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.75.
234 Hatch to Loud AAAG 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.76.
235 Hatch to Loud AAAG 22 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.73.
236 Hatch, Fort Craig, to Morrow, Capt Beyer’s Camp near Hillsborough 27 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.496; Hatch to AAG Ft Leavenworth, 28 May, 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.421; Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 27 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.441-442; Steelhammer to A.A.A.G., 
DoNM, 27 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to AAG Mil. Div. Mo., 28 
May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
237 Hatch, Ojo Caliente, to CO Fort Bayard, 22 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.268.
238 Ibid.
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service.239 Despite his doubts about the condition of Morrow’s command, Hatch ordered it to 
proceed from Ojo Caliente to Beyer’s camp near Hillsboro.240
In reality, the Ninth Cavalry was at the end of its tether. Hatch had to admit that if the Tenth 
Cavalry and extra Apache scouts were not forthcoming, he could only guard fixed points and would 
not be able to mount the active field operations demanded by General Sherman.241 Earlier in this 
chapter it was argued that, at the beginning of May, the Ninth Cavalry Regiment was not in a fit 
state to operate against the Apaches. By the end of May, it was clear that the pursuit of Victorio 
from Ojo Caliente through the Mogollon and San Francisco Mountains and back to Ojo Caliente 
had effectively dismounted the Ninth Cavalry. Table 7.3 shows that by the end of May, the Ninth 
Cavalry’s horse casualty rates had increased from 54 horses lost in April to 62 horses lost in May. 
Table 7.3 also shows that the regiment was now carrying more unserviceable than serviceable 
horses. Effectively, the Ninth Cavalry had run three mini-campaigns against the Apaches between 
January and the end of May 1880. During March 1880, there had been insufficient time for Hatch 
to rest as many of his men and horses as possible, because of severe provocation from Apache 
raiding parties during that month. 
The regiment’s return to active operations against the Apaches in April and May had had a 
catastrophic effect on the Ninth Cavalry’s ability to operate as a mobile unit theoretically capable 
of confronting the Apaches. What we see here is the effect of Victorio’s strategy of killing and 
crippling horses and mules by enticing the Ninth Cavalry into long pursuits over difficult terrain 
and targeting horses in the opening volley of any engagement with the US army. If we examine 
the monthly regimental return for the Ninth Cavalry (Table 7.4), we can see that, by individual 
company, the regiment was in very poor shape for field operations by the end of May. By the end 
of April, most companies were finding it difficult to mount more than 50 percent of the available 
men. Those companies that were still able to do so (Companies E, G, I and L) were no longer able 
to do so by the end of May.
According to the monthly return, 339 men out of an available 668 could be mounted and put into 
the field at the beginning of May. By the end of that month 240 men still had a serviceable horse 
out of an overall strength of 668 men. In percentage terms, the cavalrymen available to Colonel 
Hatch at the beginning of May had dropped from 51 to 36 percent of the men available for duty.
However, this dire situation was about to be dramatically changed by the intervention of the 
Apache scout company lead by Henry K. Parker. Hatch ordered that a wagon carrying 8,000 
rounds of ammunition for Morrow’s command be sent from San Jose to Canada Alamosa on 26 
May, with a two-man escort. From Canada Alamosa a larger escort of dismounted men should 
escort the wagon on to Major Morrow by 27 May.242 Hatch stated that this ammunition was for 
Lieutenant Maney,243 and was to re-supply the Apache scouts commanded by Parker, who had 
fought a major battle with the Apaches near the head of the Rio Palomas on 24 May 1880.
239 Hatch to Loud AAAG 22 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.74.
240 Hatch to Morrow, 24 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
pp.253-254.
241 Loud (citing Hatch, Ojo Caliente, 22 May, 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 23 May, 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.428; Pope to AAG, MDoM, 25 
May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
242 Special Field Order No.33 25 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; See also ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.248.
243 Hatch, Fort Craig, to Morrow, Capt. Beyer’s Camp near Hillsborough, 27 May, 1880 ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.496.
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Table 7.3 The activities of Morrow and his battalion, April–May 1880
30 April Canada Alamosa.
2 May Ojo Caliente.
3–4 May March via Shaw’s Ranch and Sherman’s Cienega.
7 May Reach the Gileta [Gilita] River. Joined by Hatch with Hooker’s Third Battalion.
8 May Proceed into Mogollon Mountains.
9 May Reach Cooney’s Mining Camp.
11 May Arrive at Kellar’s Ranch. Detach Purington to command dismounted men at Parson 
Williams Ranch.
14 May Encounter Tupper’s Command on Pueblo Creek. Follow Apache trail to the north east.
15 May Continue on trail to the north east.
16 May Tupper leaves with his command. 
Bodies found at Las Lentes. Parker with K Company sent to follow trail from that point. 
Rest of Battalion follows on Parker’s left flank.
March down Apache Creek to Tulerosa [Tularosa] Road and on into the Tulerosa 
[Tularosa] Mountains. Hear of fight between Ninth Cavalry detachment and Apaches at 
Kelly’s Ranch. March to that place and follow trail to Patterson’s Cienega on road to Ojo 
Caliente. Trail leads either toward Ojo Caliente or the San Mateo Mountains. 
Horses broken down and out of rations.
Hatch orders march to Ojo Caliente.
22 May Arrive Ojo Caliente.
24 May Reach Canada Alamosa. Rceive news of Parker Fight (see next chapter).
30 May Arrive Camp French via Cuchillo Negro and Las Palomas.
31 May March to Fort Cummings.
Table 7.4 Ninth Cavalry, Roster of Horses January–May 1880.244
Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses Horses Lost in Action, Died, etc.
January 438 103 36
February 425 129 34
March 441 140 10
April 345 213 54
May 244 277 62
244 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88 
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Table 7.5: Serviceable, Unserviceable and Lost Horses to Available Men, Ninth Cavalry, April–May 
1880245
Company Month Serviceable 
Horses
Unserviceable 
Horses
Lost Horses Available Men
A April 18 20 13 40
May 18 19  3 44
B April 22 18  0 56
May 22 18  0 51
C April 16 17  5 48
May 21 17  0 51
D April 16 23  9 46
May 16 23  0 48
E April 29 20  7 58
May  1 36 12 54
F April 20  6 12 43
May 12 20  7 44
G April 40 10  1 67
May 30 20  0 68
H April 24 34  3 60
May 24 32  2 59
I April 40 17  3 59
May 30 14  7 58
K April 50 14  4 60
May 13 40  9 61
L April 34  5  0 64
May 23 16 15 64
M April 30 29  0 67
May 30 22  7 66
245 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88 
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As noted earlier, H.K. Parker was accompanied by between 50 and 751 Apaches scouts. This was 
the Apache scout company recruited for service in the District of New Mexico, as opposed to the 
Apache scouts on loan from the Department of Arizona. On recruiting this company in March 
1880, Lieutenant Maney had nominated one Apache known as ‘Jim’ as first sergeant and three 
others as sergeants, one of whom was known as ‘Jack Long’.2 Both Jim and Jack Long would play a 
leading role in the events which followed.
The number of Apache scouts recruited suggests that Colonel Hatch, having been, so far unsuc-
cessful in his requests for additional Apache scouts, had resorted to subterfuge. It would appear 
that 65 Apache scouts had been recruited by Lieutenant Maney in March 1880, when the District 
of New Mexico had only been allocated 37.3 What had happened was that Lieutenant Maney had 
recruited 37 Apache scouts, while an additional 28 Apaches had been hired as mule packers. This, 
according to Maney, had been in compliance with a direct order from Colonel Hatch:
I was authorized by instructions from Gen. Hatch to enlist thirty seven Indian scouts and 
directed by Genl. Hatch to employ additional Indians as Packers. The Post Quartermaster at 
Bayard being directed to tally up such packers as I designated.4
Certainly, the July 1880 Fort Bayard returns show that 63 Apache scouts arrived at Fort Bayard on 
27 March 1880.5 However, at the end of September, Hatch himself queried the authority granted 
to recruit 65 scouts when the district was only authorised to have a little over half that number. One 
detects a ‘political’ smoke screen being created by Hatch to muddy the waters in preparation for 
later queries from his superiors when the apparent discrepancy in scout numbers became apparent. 
This, at first glance, appears quite innocuous; until one realises that Hatch could easily have been 
accused of acting unconstitutionally by flouting Congress’s control over the numbers recruited into 
the US army. Ultimately, Hatch appears to have deflected the blame for unauthorized recruitment 
onto Colonel George P. Buell, Commander of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment. Buell was brought 
in to command field operations against the Apaches in New Mexico during the summer of 1880. 
As we shall see, he had a habit of acting unilaterally where field operations were concerned. Buell’s 
unauthorized recruitment of citizen guides allowed Hatch the opportunity to pass the blame onto 
Buell.6 (See Chapter 15) For the moment, the important point is that, by the time Hatch’s creative 
recruitment came to light, it had already paid a massive dividend.
6 If the reader thinks that this is a somewhat underhand tactic on the part of Colonel Hatch one can, up to 
a point, agree with this sentiment. However, one is also inclined to judge Buell in the light of his vindic-
tive nature when dealing with subordinate officers. One cannot help but think that Buell was given a 
taste of ‘ just desserts’ by Hatch’s political manoeuvrings.
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Disaster for the Apaches on the Palomas River, May 24–25 18807
Parker’s scouts were supplied with four days’ rations and eight pack mules when they left Morrow’s 
command on the San Francisco River, on 17 May 1880. On the following day the exhausted pack 
mules collapsed.8 The Chief of Scouts ordered the rations distributed among the Apache scouts and 
carried on regardless, arriving on 21 May at Ojo Caliente, where he met Hatch’s small detachment. 
With another three days’ rations issued, Hatch ordered Parker and his scouts back on the trail.9 
The scouts moved down the east side of the Black Range. On 23 May 1880, they located Victorio’s 
camp on the Palomas River, approximately two miles downstream from Hermosa.
Parker himself used some ambiguous and cryptic language; but having visited the area, we10 
are reasonably confident that the location we have identified is accurate. Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that, for the moment, the exact location that Parker was describing remains unconfirmed. 
The camp was situated on the north side of the river, where the river runs through a narrow gorge. 
Victorio may have assumed that he had outrun his pursuers, for this was not a good defensive posi-
tion. On the southern side of the gorge, opposite the camp, was a hill covered in bushes and rocks 
which dominated the campsite. To the west, as the trail towards Hermosa dropped down to the 
canyon floor, there was a spine of rock rising to a blunt point which dominated the camp from that 
direction. A mile or so behind this spine rose steep dark cliffs topped with pine trees. To the east of 
the camp, a rocky ridge rose up and joined the mountains at a point north-west of the camp. From 
this junction there rose a cliff face which extended for no more than 100 yards to the north-west, 
before resolving itself into a rocky ridgeline which extended out of sight to the west. At the base 
of this cliff was a steep slope running down to the camp. The bottom of this slope was strewn with 
large boulders.11 
Parker’s command managed to remain undetected by stealthily moving off the trail and into 
the mountains. Parker sent out small groups of scouts to check the lie of the land. These returned 
by nightfall and reported that a careful approach during the night would make a dawn assault 
feasible.12
Parker and the Apache Scouts quietly closed in on Victorio’s camp from three sides. It would 
appear that Parker’s command approached from the west, down the Palomas River, before splitting 
into three groups. (See Map 8.1.) These manoeuvres were completed without Parker’s men being 
detected by their quarry. (see document file no. 72.) Parker sent 30 Apache scouts under Sergeant 
Jim to his right, to occupy the hill to the south of the camp. They were to initiate the attack by 
firing down into the camp. Parker took 11 warriors to his left and occupied positions in a line to 
the north-west of the camp. Sergeant Jack Long (an Apache scout who had been in Gatewood’s 
7 Hatch does state that this battle took place on the 23 May, 1880 in a letter to the AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
29 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527 but this appears to have been a mistake.
8 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.279; Thrapp, 1967, p.200; Thrapp, 1988, p.1111; Stout p.139.
9 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.279; Thrapp, 1967, p.200; Thrapp, 1988, p.1111; Stout pp.139-140; Haley, 1981, p.328.
10 Dan Aranda, Emilio Tapia and myself visited this site on the 30 June, 2007 and were initially sceptical 
about the site as there was a rather large gorge which had not been mentioned in Parker’s report which 
effectively bisected the battlefield. Otherwise the area looked very good from the reports left by Parker. 
Emilio also discovered four cartridge cases from the period from an area less than a foot square.
11 Author’s survey of this site on 30 June, 2007. Berndt Kuhn of Sweden discovered a contemporary news-
paper article which pinpointed the location. Emilio Tapia and Dan Aranda suspected that they knew 
where this was and Emilio knew the landowner and got permission to visit the site. The Diagrams in this 
chapter were the author’s attempt to reconstruct the battle.
12 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.277 & 279;Stout, p.140; Billington, 1991, p.96; Sonnichsen, p.208.
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detachment and had been wounded in the battle of 27–28 October 1879 in Mexico) was sent to the 
other side of the camp and occupied the ridge to the east of it. This effectively cut off any escape 
down the canyon. To reach his position, Jack Long probably passed round the southern side of the 
hill occupied by Sergeant Jim, and crossed the Rio Palomas River some distance below their target, 
before moving back up the canyon to occupy his position. 
Parker left the trail west towards Hermosa free, as he was confident that no Apaches would 
attempt to escape along the very route they had taken to reach their encampment.13 He hoped that 
the Apaches would assume that this route would be blocked by their opponents. Parker calculated 
that the Apaches would think that their own trail into their camp was the very means by which 
their enemy had discovered them. 
At dawn, the Apache scouts launched a devastating attack on Victorio’s camp. (See Map 8.2.) 
Sergeant Jim’s detachment spotted an Apache sentry as they were taking up position. It is not 
exactly clear where this sentry was placed, beyond the fact that he was stationed ‘on the side next to 
Jim’s position’.14 If he was placed on the hill occupied by Sergeant Jim’s detachment, at first glance, 
it is truly amazing that he did not detect the scouts as they closed in. From Victorio’s camp, the 
hill occupied by Sergeant Jim and his men looks quite steep and rounded. However, there is a shelf 
which tapers out into the gorge as it passes opposite the camp. (See maps.) One suspects that the 
Apache scouts crept round the hill along this shelf below the sentry. It was still a prodigious feat of 
stealth, and it does raise the possibility that the Apache sentry had dozed off. At dawn, this man 
was killed either by a carefully aimed shot or effectively executed from point blank range. The rest 
of Sergeant Jim’s detachment fired into the camp, killing a number of men women and children. 
Parker’s deployment was, from an Apache point of view, perfect. He had managed to place half 
his force undetected upon a hill which dominated Victorio’s camp. This meant that, in the opening 
volley, the scouts would be able to take their time in setting up their first shots and make the most 
of the surprise before smoke and fleeing targets made their job more difficult. The fact that there 
was a deep ravine between the Apache scouts and the encampment meant that, even if Victorio’s 
men rallied, they would not be able to launch a counterattack: they would neither be able to move 
directly against the scouts, because of the ravine, nor would they be able to outflank them, because 
of the two blocking parties. Today, this ravine is very deep, but can be scrambled down from the 
site of the camp, though the southern side is much more precipitous, and parts of it overhang the 
river below. Thus Sergeant Jim’s detachment was ideally placed to inflict the maximum damage 
for the minimum loss, and their fire caused chaos in the camp. The Apaches fled towards Parker’s 
detachment, which covered the easiest escape route from the punishment handed out by Sergeant 
Jim, whilst the latter waited until the last minute before opening fire. This drove the Apaches back 
down the canyon until they reached a point where they could be driven back by Sergeant Jack 
Long’s detachment. Suffering casualties each time, they fled back to their original camp site and 
eventually entrenched themselves in some rocks and boulders.15
Once they had their quarry cornered, Parker’s Apache scouts probably drew their noose tighter. 
(See Map 8.3.) This could easily have been accomplished, as Parker’s detachment could have worked 
their way closer to the pile of boulders from the north-west, while some of Sergeant Jim’s detach-
ment could have left their positions and, leaving behind a number of sharpshooters to maintain 
constant pressure on the trapped Apaches, could have crossed the river a little to the west, and 
come up Victorio’s trail. There is a slight rise bisecting the camp from north to south, and once the 
Apache scouts were in these positions, they would have closed off any chance of escape. They may 
13 Parker’s Report as cited in the AR-WD, 1880, pp.99-100; Thrapp, 1974, p.277.
14 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
15 Parker’s Report as cited in the AR-WD, 1880, pp.99-100; ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, 
The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
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even have been able to occupy the northern edge of the gorge. Sergeant Jack Long’s detachment 
could also have worked their way down from their positions to increase the pressure on the trapped 
Apaches. 
Victorio was reported to have been shot in the leg at some point during the battle,16 though 
scouts calling on the women to surrender were met with a barrage of derision. This included their 
allegedly threatening to eat Victorio if he died, so that no enemy would touch him.17 Victorio 
himself is reported to have spent much of his time urging the Apache scouts to change sides.18 
Given the history of animosity between Victorio’s followers and the San Carlos Apache scouts, 
it is more likely that, punctuated by regular gunfire, both sides exchanged insults, with Parker’s 
men letting Victorio know exactly what would happen to him if they got him, and Victorio and his 
followers, men and women, hurling their defiance back at the scouts. 
The Apache scouts kept the Warm Springs Apaches pinned down for most of the day, but Parker 
realised that he might have to withdraw if he ran out of ammunition and sent a Mexican mule 
packer to Ojo Caliente to ask for both reinforcements and ammunition. By the late afternoon, 
Parker found that his men were down to their last rounds and, with no sign of ammunition or 
reinforcements, he withdrew them to the nearest water and waited for two nights and a day. Once 
again, the army failed to show up and he suspected that his messenger had been killed.19 The only 
defeat so far inflicted upon Victorio in the United States had been carried out by approximately 60 
Apache scouts and a single Anglo-American scout.20
Parker then moved back to Ojo Caliente, where he learned that his courier had arrived, and that 
nobody could explain the failure to send out more ammunition. His courier had been attached to 
Lieutenant Maney’s pack train and sent to Camp French. Proceeding to this latter point, Parker 
finally contacted his courier, who informed him that he had arrived at Ojo Caliente to be told that 
Hatch was at Canada Alamosa. The courier had made his way to that point, and had delivered his 
message in person to Hatch. At some point during 25 or 26 May, Parker himself made for Canada 
Alamosa and linked up with Morrow,21 who had at last arrived there with his command.22 
It was then alleged by the Grant County Herald that Hatch had immediately made for Fort Craig 
to announce that his command had scored a victory over the Apaches.23 Hatch had indeed sent word 
to District Headquarters, from Canada Alamosa, on 25 May, that ‘Our scouts and few men with 
them attacked camp of hostiles at daylight yesterday morning on head of the Palomas River. Chief 
of Scouts reports officially killing thirty our men and scouts in the fight claim to have killed fifty 
five.’24 (see document file no. 73.) Bar the erroneous use of ‘few men’ and ‘our men’, this is hardly 
16 Parker’s Report as cited in the AR-WD, 1880, pp.99-100; Thrapp, 1974, p.280.
17 This particular story is recounted by Thrapp but while he quotes a passage he does not source this 
passage. Thrapp, 1974, p.280.
18 Parker’s Report as cited in the AR-WD, 1880, pp.99-100; Thrapp, 1974, p.280.
19 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
20 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; See also Thrapp, 
1974, p.277-281 for a full account of Parker’s operation; Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880; Thrapp, 1967, pp.199-
202; Thrapp, 1988, p.1112; Stout, 1974, p.139-141; Worcester, 1979, p.229-230; Roberts, 1998, p.185; 
Leckie, 1967, pp.221-222; Billington, 1991, p.96; Haley, 1981, p.328.
21 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
22 Morrow’s command is described as ‘out of rations, tired, footsore, hungry and without clothing.’ (‘Gen. 
Hatch has a Fight with the Indians’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880).
23 ‘The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
24 Hatch to AAAG, SF, 25 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.270; See also Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.436; 
Hatch to AAG, HQ  MDoM, 27 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Indian 
Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 29 May, 1880, p.884.
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Plate 8.2. The deep gorge between Sergeant Jim’s position and Victorio’s camp. (Photo: author)
Plate 8.1. The view over Victorio’s camp from a position high on the hill occupied by Sergeant Jim’s 
detachment. These Apache scouts probably opened fire from lower down the hill, but the small outcrop of 
rock would have provided good cover for a marksman firing into the camp during the day. Immediately 
beyond this position one can see the upper edge of the gorge as the river carved its way round this hill. 
Beyond this are the scattered boulders and bushes where Victorio’s followers took refuge. Above that is a 
boulder- and rock-strewn slope leading up to the base of the impassable cliff face. (Photo: author)
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Plate 8.3. The view up the impassable cliffs from the perspective of the trapped Chihenne Apaches. These 
cliffs are clearly not impossible to climb, but this would not be an attractive option under fire. (Photo: author)
claiming credit for the Ninth Cavalry or himself.25 Rumours even reached the District of the Pecos 
that Hatch had been killed in the fight.26 Therefore, accusations that Hatch had tried to take undue 
credit may have come from the very rumour mill which fuelled the constant press attacks that had 
been made on him since he took over direction of the campaign in February 1880. However, Hatch 
did later state that he had had, ‘with great difficulty’, to order Parker to take his Apache scouts out 
after their arrival at Ojo Caliente, which could be construed as an attempt to at least garner indirect 
credit for the whole affair.27 Hatch stated that his rapid departure for Fort Craig was to coordinate 
the movements of troops on the east side of the Rio Grande in the on-going campaign against 
Victorio.28 He had also issued orders for Morrow’s command to follow up and support the Apache 
scouts,29 but Morrow’s command was in no fit state to rapidly exploit the success of the Apache 
25 The Record of Engagements merely records a ‘fight’ in which 55 Apaches were killed. (p.95) However, 
in seeking to pin the blame for failing to defeat Victorio, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880 where 
the Apache ‘scouts and advance of Gen. Hatch’s column’ are given the credit for the victory may have 
fostered the popular belief that Hatch had been in command during this engagement. This version is 
still in circulation today. The Konstantin webpage entry for 24 May, 1880 stated that: ‘Col. Edward 
Hatch, and a large contingent of cavalry, have been searching for Victorio, and his followers, for some 
time. Today, they fight a battle near the source of the Palomas River, in New Mexico. The army reports 
55 Indians are killed in this battle.’
26 Kennedy, camp on Black River to AAAG, DoP, 18 Jun., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File, 19 Mar., 1878-14 
Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
27 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 5 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6,  1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.407, pp.260-268.
28 Hatch to AAAG, SF, 25 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.270; See also Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.436; 
Hatch to AAG, HQ  MDoM, 27 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
29 Hatch to AAAG, SF, 25 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.270; See also Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.436; 
Hatch to AAG, HQ  MDoM, 27 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to 
AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 7 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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scouts straight away.30 Meanwhile, Hatch rapidly lost touch with Morrow and could only assume 
that the latter was on the trail of the Apaches.31
Everything indicates that there had been a major blunder in the failure of troops based at Ojo 
Caliente or Canada Alamosa to send out further support, though how quickly they could have 
arrived at the scene is open to question. Hatch, being in overall charge, was to be held responsible; 
and his many friends in the territorial press were quick to level more accusations of incompetence 
at him.32
Yet Parker may not have been as forthcoming as he might about this battle. He admitted in his 
report to Hatch that ‘[t]here is other things concerning fight which I fail to mention.’33 One obvious 
omission would appear to be the killing of quite a large number of women and children. Also 
interesting is the failure to mention that he had placed half of his command on the other side of an 
impassable ravine. As noted earlier, from an Apache point of view, this was an excellent deploy-
ment. However, it would have been judged a very poor deployment by US army officers, who did 
not understand Apache tactics. To them it would have seemed that the ravine prevented a charge 
that, in all probability, would have finished Victorio off. The absence of accompanying US cavalry 
and infantry thus becomes of critical importance to this battle. An immediate follow-up charge 
into a surprised camp was not necessarily unknown, but was not a favoured tactic for Apaches, 
who preferred to avoid unnecessary casualties.  However, it was an effective tactic deployed by the 
US army when attacking American Indian camps. The Apache scouts had pinned Victorio and 
a group of his followers into a difficult position by careful manoeuvring. Yet this position would 
only have become untenable if it had been directly assaulted. The Apache scouts had patently been 
unwilling to do this, as they would have known they would sustain unnecessary casualties. Had a 
detachment of US cavalry or infantry been present, there is a good chance they would have been 
willing to risk a number of fatalities to finish off Victorio. Parker, with knowledge of both Apache 
and US army principles of warfare, had good reason to deliberately omit any reference to the ravine, 
to avoid criticism of his deployment. This is before one takes into account the storm of criticism 
levelled at the US army in the immediate aftermath of Parker’s victory. Parker may have realised 
that, if he submitted a full report, it could give Hatch some ammunition, no matter how misguided, 
to deflect some of this censure onto him and his scouts. Even had Hatch been aware that Apache 
scouts would not have assaulted a defended emplacement, he probably would not have passed up the 
opportunity to censure the conduct of Parker’s attack.
As for Victorio, once the scouts had withdrawn, he and the survivors of the battle made a quick 
retreat. The Palomas site was later described as being covered in blood and human remains. There 
were some hurried attempts to bury the slain but the ‘wagonloads of utensils and dried meat’ aban-
doned suggest a precipitate retreat.34 Despite this defeat, Victorio did not consider surrender. He 
allegedly released a Mexican captive with the message that, ‘Victorio was not dead and would not 
surrender until the last man was killed.’35
30 Loud (citing Hatch, Fort Craig, 29 May, 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.448-449; Thrapp, 1974, note 
20 pp.370-371.
31 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.448-449.
32 Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880.
33 Parker’s Report as cited in the AR-WD, 1880, pp.99-100; Thrapp, 1974, p.278.
34 The Battle Ground’, The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880
35 Ibid.
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Nevertheless, Victorio had been clearly, and heavily, defeated for the first time in this campaign. 
Parker reported that his detachment36 had killed 31 Apache men and had killed 55 altogether.37 
Hatch reckoned that Parker’s initial report of 31 killed had not included ‘non-combatants’. This 
comment implies that Hatch understood that Parker had chosen not to go into too much detail 
concerning the killing of what many Europeans would have seen as non-combatants.38 Lieutenant 
Cruse commented on the 10–11 warriors killed, though he stated that this battle took place in 
July 1880.39 Later in the summer of 1880, in response to an inquiry concerning the particulars of 
this battle, it was argued40 that the casualty list might have been somewhat inflated, and it was 
concluded that only three or four Apache warriors had been killed.41 (see document file no. 74.) 
Even if the warrior fatalities were as low as the last figure, with rarely more than warriors in his 
following at any one time, this would have been a devastating setback for Victorio. Even when he 
was in alliance with Juh, earlier in the campaign, or with Mescalero allies, it would be surprising if 
that figure had ever exceeded 200 warriors.
We can speculate about casualties forever, but what is clear is that Victorio had been roundly 
defeated for the first time in the campaign, by Apache scouts with no support from US troops.42 
Thrapp43 describes the Palomas River battle as one of the most decisive engagements of the Apache 
Wars, with Victorio being deprived of several of his best warriors and his band being forced to 
scatter and flee as best they could to Mexico.
Flight into Mexico, May–June 1880
The Warm Springs Apaches and their allies scattered into the Black Range. Apart from those 
Apaches too wounded to travel, at least three groups went south down the Black Range, making 
for Mexico.44 One of the fleeing Apache bands killed one Lyons45 and four other men on 29 May, 
36 Parker later commissioned medals for his Apache Sergeants and himself received a watch from the 
grateful citizens of Grant County on the 16 Jul., 1880. (‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 3 
Jul., 1880; The Grant County Herald, 17 Jul., 1880) ‘The five silver medals which Capt. Parker ordered for 
Indian Sergeants Peltay, Jim, Loco Jim, Jonny and Jack Long will be presented at Ft Bayard to-morrow. 
They are about the size of a silver dollar, and are engraved. Presented to Sg’t (Name) by Capt. H.K. 
Parker, for bravery in fight on Palomas River, May 24, 1880’ (‘Town and County’ The Grant County 
Herald, 17 Jul., 1880).
37 Sheridan to Townsend, 27 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.281-283; The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
38 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
39 Cruse, 1987, p.84; Thrapp, 1974, p.280; Sonnichsen, 1973, p.208; Chronological List, p.50; Webb, 
1976, p.89.
40 Probably by Lt. Col. Dudley of the Ninth Cavalry.
41 Letter dated Fort Cummings, 1 Aug., 1880 and signed Lt. Col. 9th Cavalry Commanding in Letters, 
Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent; and General and Special Orders and Circulars Issued by a Battalion 
Jul./Sept. 1880, NA, RG391 Entry 920, p.3-4.
42 Thrapp, 1974, p.280.
43 Thrapp, 1974, pp.280-281; 1967, p.202.
44 Thrapp, 1974, p.281.
45 According to Lt. Col. Dudley, Ninth Cavalry, writing in 1881, Lyons had been an unofficial trader based 
at the deactivated Fort Cummings with his Mexican wife for a period of six to seven years before being 
killed by Apaches. (Dudley, 25 Mar., 1881 (0778-0779) in Endorsements Sent, Volume 5, 5 Jan., 1881-7 
Apr., 1881, HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, NA, RG393, 
M1081, Roll 2).
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at the western end of Cook’s Canon.46 It was noted that the bodies had been burned and the trail 
of their ambushers led towards the Florida Mountains.47 The western end of Cooke’s Canyon is 
wide and flat. However, there are a number of small watercourses which pass close to, or even 
cross, the track. When viewed today, these runnels are four to six feet deep and are often very 
difficult to spot until one is almost on top of them. It would have been very easy for the Apaches 
to remain concealed until the Lyons party was within point blank range. The Daily Southwest for 
31 May 1880 and 1 June 188048 reported the ambush of two mounted men and three wagons in 
Cooke’s Canyon. Two of the wagons were carrying goods to Las Cruces for a Mr Solomon of 
Solomonville, driven by two men, Hildebrand and Carson. They, along with the third driver, name 
unknown, were found burned with their wagons. Two other men, Lyons and Vijil or Vejil, appar-
ently mounted, managed to escape the opening volley but were hemmed in and took cover on a 
low hillock a short distance away. They had time to make breastworks and apparently, from the 
cartridge cases later discovered, made a spirited defence before being killed.49 The probable site (see 
Figure 8.1) suggests two possible variations on the Apache ‘roadside bomb’ technique. An arroyo 
runs parallel to, then crosses, the wagon road and the Apaches could have concealed themselves 
close to the road and shot the men from point-blank range. An alternative scenario would have the 
Apaches in the arroyo closing the trap behind the wagons after they had passed and the convoy 
being attacked from the excellent cover afforded by the rocks along a low but steep bluff which the 
wagon road passed around. Both scenarios also easily allow concealed mounted Apaches to emerge 
from good cover and cut off the escape of any survivors.
Lieutenant Smith, with a detachment of H Company, Ninth Cavalry, was the first on the scene 
after the attack and concluded that the Lyons party had simply been in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.50 Lieutenant Maney, with the Apache scouts, estimated that there were 100 warriors 
in the party, and that, in consideration of their wounded, they were making directly for Mexico. 
The size of the party led Maney to conclude that this was Victorio’s main party.51 Captain Loud, in 
46 Sherman to Townsend, 3 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.316; Loud to Hatch, 30 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.450; Sheridan to Townsend, 3 Jun., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; ‘Fighting at Fort Cummings – Cooks Canon Full of Indians – 
Raid on Hillsboro’, The Grant County Herald, 5 Jun., 1880; Pope to AAG HQ  MDoM, 2 Jun., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.282; Stout, p.145; Chronological 
List, p.50; Webb, 1976, p.89. 
As noted by Lt Cruse, in Chapter 1, Cook’s Canon was a popular ambush site. In 1880, Hastings 
recalls seeing 17 graves from those killed when a wagon train was ambushed. (p.295) In the same year 
Wasson records that Cook’s Canyon: ‘is lined with graves.’ (p.271) Myers notes that it was four miles 
long, running east to west and was such a favourite ambush spot that Fort Cummings was located at its 
eastern entrance at Cook’s Spring. (Myers, 1966i, p.303, note 7; 1966ii, p.56, note 19; 1968, pp.29-30) 
In 2005 there were a few graves still visible in the eastern section of the canyon.
47 Lt. Smith, Cummings to AAAG, SF, 31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.455; See also Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 2 Jun., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.464.
48 Thank you to Daniel D. Aranda, Las Cruces, New Mexico for this information.
49 Daily Southwest, 31 May & 1 June, 1880.
50 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 2 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.464; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 2 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14.
51 Maney, Fort Cummings to Hatch, Fort Craig, 31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.458-459; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM 1 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Map 8.4 Lyons Ambush, 29 May 1880
KEY: A. Apache ‘command’ position. B. Arroyo paralleling, then crossing, wagon road. Close range 
hidden Apache positions. C. Possible hiding place for mounted Apaches to ride out and cut off any retreat.
D. As C. E. Very rocky outcrops providing excellent cover for Apache warriors. F. Probable location of 
the attack on the three wagons from Apaches positioned in B and E. G. Possible position of the ambush 
where Apaches hidden in the arroyo deliver the main attack from point blank range. H. Hillock where 
the two mounted men fled and dug in when they were cut off. I. Arroyo giving further potential hiding 
for Apache warriors. These might have blocked the two mounted fugitives and turned them towards H. 
J. Probable route taken by the two mounted men to H, if the ambush was sprung at F. K. As above, but 
if the ambush was sprung at G. L. Large grave site not associated with this ambush. M. Probable graves 
of the three wagon drivers. Given the condition in which they were discovered, it is probable that they 
were buried very close to where they were found. This makes F. the more likely of the two possible ambush 
scenes. N. Probable graves of the two men killed on the hillock H.
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Santa Fé, thought these must be Mexican Indians but also concluded that the damage done by the 
scouts at the Palomas River was ‘more serious to the hostiles than first supposed’.52
Hatch reported that his troops and scouts had had another clash with the Apaches on 27 May, 
but no particulars of this clash have come to light.53 Shepherds were rumoured to have been shot 
at by Apaches on the Mimbres River.54 As they moved south, the Apaches raided ranches near 
Hillsboro, even reportedly stealing horses from Hillsboro itself.55 Rumours were also received 
that the San Carlos reservation had been attacked, though the latter story was quickly scotched.56 
Such rumours, combined with local press reaction, prompted Headquarters, Department of the 
Missouri, to request confirmation of ‘raids and fights near Cummings’, though by this stage in the 
campaign their primary concern was that accurate and regular situation reports be quickly trans-
mitted to them.57
In reality, the Apaches had once again managed to evade their enemies and most had fled 
towards Mexico. Those Apaches left behind scattered into the Black Range and hid out in its abun-
dant cover, to recover, or not, from their wounds.58 Such scattered survivors would have been very 
difficult to find and were more than capable of fending for themselves. 
Moreover, problems with logistics had once again intervened to hamper the efficient pursuit of 
the fleeing Apaches. For example, on 30 May, in reaction to reports that the Apaches had fled east 
towards the Rio Grande after a fight near Fort Cummings, Captain Charles Parker was ordered 
to move his command from Canada Alamosa to Las Palomas. If he discovered any traces of the 
fugitives to the south of Palomas, he was to give pursuit.59 Captain Parker was told to send a 
courier to Camp French to instruct a supply train bound for Fort Craig to drop enough rations off 
for his command at Palomas. He was also told to ‘take what grain you can with you from Canada 
[Alamosa]’.60 The wagon train, with 8,000 rations for the troops, was found stalled near Fort Craig 
with both ‘wagons and teams broken down’.61 Hatch had sent out wagons to take some 1,500 
rations to Morrow’s command, now based at Camp French, with the balance to be sent to Ojo 
Caliente to replenish its empty stores. He had also sent an urgent request to his chief quartermaster 
concerning the whereabouts of a batch of requisitioned footwear supposed to have been dispatched 
to his troops, because ‘our men are nearly barefoot.’62 Hatch also complained that 30 aparejos sent 
from Indian Territory, destined for his mule trains, were not fit for purpose.63
52 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.458; Pope to AAG HQ MDoM 1 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527.
53 Hatch to Head Quarters, MDoM, 29 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.473 & p.474; Pope 
to AAG, HQ MDoM, 29 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Loud to AAG 
Fort Leavenworth, 28 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.444-445.
54 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 29 May, 1880.
55 ‘Fighting at Fort Cummings – Cooks Canon Full of Indians – Raid on Hillsboro’, The Grant County 
Herald, 5 Jun., 1880.
56 Loud to Hatch, 29 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.446.
57 Pope to Captain Loud, SF, New Mexico, 1 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.30.
58 Thrapp, 1974, p.282.
59 Lt. Davenport AAAG In the Field, Fort Craig to Captains Charles Parker, Canada Alamosa, 30 May, 
1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.9.
60 Ibid.
61 Hatch to AAG SF, 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.272
62 Hatch to Chief Quartermaster, SF, 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.274.
63 Hatch to Loud, 27 May, 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 90.
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Plate 8.4. Accounts of the battle tell 
of some of the Chihenne Apaches 
taking shelter between two large 
sides of split rock. These two rocks 
are the only clear candidates on 
the site. While they offer cover 
from the three different positions 
occupied by the Apache scouts, these 
boulders would not have sheltered 
many Apaches. Nevertheless there 
are many ‘nooks and crannies’ in 
the scattered rocks below the cliff 
face which would have sheltered 
individual Apaches. (Photo: author)
Plate 8.5. View over the Lyons ambush site from the Apache ‘Command Post’ (Point A on the map). A man 
can stand fully upright behind these boulders and not be visible to anybody below. The arroyo can be seen 
running diagonally upwards from the middle right of the picture towards the Florida Mountains on the 
distant horizon. The small hill where the two survivors attempted to hold off the Apaches can be seen just 
below and to the left of the three distinctive peaks on the middle-right horizon. (Photo: author)
Victorio Defeated on the Palomas River, 24–25 May 1880 209
Hints as to the flexibility required of the officers in command of various cavalry and Indian scout 
detachments in the field can be seen in Special Field Orders, Number 36, issued on 30 May 1880. 
Such flexibility also had to be exhibited when dealing with the accounting and finance elements of 
US army bureaucracy.
1. 1st Lieut G. Valois R.Q.M. 9 Cavalry, A.A.Q.M. In the Field will transfer to 2nd Lieut. 
J.A. Maney. 15th Infantry on proper Invoices and Receipts two Government mules for 
which he is responsible and which are now in Lieut. Maney’s Pack train.
2. 1st Lieut. G.A. Stedman, Adjt. 9 Cavy. A.A.Q.M. Santa Fé, will transfer to 2nd Lieut 
G.A. Maney 15th Inf. on proper Invoices and Receipts three Government mules for 
which he is responsible taken from Nichols train and now in Lieut. Maney’s Pack train.
3. 1st Lieut. G.A. Stedman, Adjt. 9 Cavy. A.A.Q.M. Santa Fé, N.M., will transfer to Post 
Quartermaster Fort Bayard on proper Invoices and Receipts three Government mules 
for which he is accountable taken from Nichols train and now in Major Morrow’s Pack 
train.64
Shortages of supplies were no longer confined to the US army. The economic effect of the sustained 
guerrilla warfare in south-western New Mexico had started to affect the wider population. By the 
end of May, the citizens of Shakespeare informed the Governor that there was a severe shortage of 
supplies, due to the Apaches killing or driving off freighters, and they requested  him to call out the 
militia.65 Acting Governor Ritch, obviously unaware of the logistical problems facing the District 
of New Mexico, tactlessly contacted Captain Loud, stating that if US troops could not protect the 
region, they should send supplies to enable the militia ‘to take the field’.66
The Ninth Cavalry, or at least those elements of that regiment still capable of action, were forced 
to fan out in an attempt to track down the Apaches. Morrow’s command had worked its way 
south to Fort Cummings, arriving there on 2 June 1880. By 4 June, Morrow was able to inform 
Hatch that the Apache trail from Cooke’s Range made for the Mexican line in the direction of 
Lake Palomas, and that he had followed the trail to within seven miles of the international line.67 
Morrow also confirmed that a trail of 25 Apaches in the Goodsight Mountains, which was being 
followed by another detachment of troops, had also crossed into Mexico.68 Morrow was instructed 
to scour the area for any small parties of Apaches that might remain in the area.69 
Once again, Hatch underlined the need for the additional 50 Apache scouts he had requested 
to be authorised, as small parties of warriors would otherwise be impossible to hunt down.70 An 
64 Special Field Orders No. 36, HQ DoNM, In the Field, Fort Craig N.M. 30 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/
GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.10.
65 Citizens from Shakespeare to Lew Wallace, 31 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
66 Ritch to Loud, 1 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
67 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 4 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.475; Pope to AAG, HQ MDoM, 5 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527. 
Rasch states that Palomas Lake is 12 miles south of Columbus. (1960, p.9) On modern maps the Laguna 
would appear to be approximately ten to fifteen kilometres south of Columbus. See NH 13-1 – El Paso 
(USGS) & H13-1-Cuidad Juarez (INEGI).
68 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 5 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.478.
69 Hatch, Fort Craig to AAAG SF, 7 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.490.
70 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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additional problem was that communications between Morrow and Hatch had been undermined 
by the ‘impatience and bad sending’71 of the telegraph operator at Fort Cummings, and the man 
was replaced as quickly as possible.72 Lieutenant Allen, in charge of the telegraph lines, thought 
that this episode could in fact be blamed on the ‘impatience and bad sending’ of the operator at 
Craig.73 Apparently, there was some animosity between the operators at Fort Cummings and Fort 
Craig. As part of this infighting, the operator at Fort Craig had informed Hatch that the Fort 
Cummings operator, on being told that Hatch was awaiting a reply to a telegram, had told him to 
tell the Colonel to ‘go to hell’.74 Later that summer, further neglect of duty was reported by Captain 
Bean, Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, concerning the operators at Fort Craig and Socorro. 
Lieutenant Allen recorded that the operator at Socorro had been relieved, and that the operator 
at Fort Craig would be replaced. Allen also noted that Captain Bean’s specific charges were being 
investigated.75 This extraordinary behaviour was a completely unnecessary addition to the list of 
obstacles confronting the US army’s attempts to prosecute a successful war against Victorio.
On or around 5 June, Major Morrow was finally rewarded for his enduring pursuit of the 
Apaches, when some of his battalion caught up with one small group between Cooke’s Range and 
the Mexican border. However, the exact details of this skirmish or skirmishes are not clear. Two 
Apaches were killed and three wounded, and their livestock was captured.76 The first clash devel-
oped into a running battle as the Apaches made for the Mexican border south of Fort Cummings. 
The original US army reports mention catching a small party in Cooke’s Range, and that one of 
the two killed was Victorio’s son. Washington was recognised by Apache scouts from Parker’s 
command, and it was apparent that Parker’s scouts had done most, if not all, of the damage in 
this encounter.77 Hutcheson states that L Company, Ninth Cavalry, lost two troopers in a clash in 
‘Cook’s Canon’ on 5 June.78 Interestingly, the Army and Navy Journal reported that the pursuit of 
the Apaches from Cooke’s Canyon was undertaken by L Company and the Apache scouts.79 It is 
possible that the cavalry and scouts were ambushed by an Apache rear-guard in Cooke’s Canyon 
before the running fight in the direction of Palomas Lake developed. Overall, the Ninth Cavalry 
detachment claimed to have killed 10 Apaches.80 We are not informed whether the Apache casual-
71 Buchanan (temporarily in charge of Signals, DoNM to Loud, 5 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ 
DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
72 Buchanan to AAAG, DoNM, 6 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
73 Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 5 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.479.
74 Hatch to Buchanan, 12 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880. A livid Hatch promised to deal with the culprit but so far no 
indication of the outcome of the investigation into such a puerile situation has come to light.
75 Allen to Bean, 4 Aug., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
76 Hatch to Loud, 5 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.480; Sheridan to Townsend, 8 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Hatch 
to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Bi-Monthly Company 
Muster Rolls for Company B, 9th Cavalry May/Jun. in NA, RG94 stated that ‘had one Engagement 
with hostile Indians Jun. 5 1880,’.
77 The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880. 
78 See web article The Ninth Regiment of Cavalry by Lt G. Hutcheson. Hutcheson also reports a skirmish 
between Company B, Ninth Cavalry and presumably Apaches on the 11 and 12 of Jun. close to Fort 
Cummings but records no casualties.
79 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 12 Jun., 1880, p.920.
80 Hatch to Loud, 5 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.480; Sheridan to Townsend, 8 Jun., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of 
Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.328; Letter dated Aleman N.M. 6 Jun., 1880 in The 
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ties were men, women or children. Two scalps of Apaches killed near Cooke’s Canyon were put on 
display at the Centennial Hotel in Silver City.81
Once across the border, the Apaches were not pursued. Hatch, strongly backed by General 
Pope,82 appealed for permission to pursue the Apaches into Mexico, in order to maintain a relent-
less pressure on them.83 Hatch also confidently stated that he could ‘obtain the consent of the State 
of Chihuahua to pursue them’.84 (see document file no. 75.)
Mr Ayers informed me last night that while in Chihuahua some time ago Governor Terrasas 
said the state was too poor to support Troops to hunt Victorio’s Indians, but that he could and 
would willingly make a treaty or arrangements by which our Troops could come in to the State 
of Chihuahua to get the Indians. I repeat the information to you for what it is worth.85
Quite what resources Hatch would have used to maintain this relentless pressure, given the reported 
state of the Ninth Cavalry by the end of May 1880, is an interesting question.
The State Department acknowledged Hatch’s request and contacted the Federal Mexican 
Government.86 On 22 June 1880, the Federal Mexican Government informed the United States 
that it would not allow troops to enter its territory in pursuit of Apaches.87 For the moment, 
Lieutenant Maney, based at Fort Cummings, with his Apache scout company, was instructed: 
‘Hold your Indians well in hand and watch the trails.’88
Walter Lowry Finley Collection; Pope’s Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, p.613; Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, p.281 &p.282; Thrapp, 1967, pp.202-203; 
Stout, p.145; Billington, 1991, p.96; Chronological List, p.50; Record of Engagements, p.95; Webb, 
1976, p.89; O’Neal, p.177; Smith, 1994, p.164. The Army & Navy Journal also reported that Victorio’s 
son was killed but names him as ‘Mennolito’. (‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 12 Jun., 
1880, p.920).
81 Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880.
82 Pope to AAG HQ MDoM 14 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Pope to AAG, HQ 
MDoM, 14 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
83 Loud (citing Telegram from Hatch, Fort Craig, 31 May, 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 1 Jun., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.459; Hatch, Fort 
Craig to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 10? Jun., 1880; ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.34; Hatch to AAG, DoM, 10 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, 
RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 91; Hatch to AAAG, SF, 12 Jun., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.338.
84 Hatch to AAAG, SF, 12 Jun., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, 
p.338; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.515; Pope to AAG, HQ MDoM, 14 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
85 Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 13 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.517; See also Hatch to AAAG, SF, 12 Jun., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.338.
86 Drum, AG to Commanding General, MDoM, 19 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; AG to Gen. Pope 19 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.377; Pope’s Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.612.
87 Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, Jun. 22 1880, in Papers relating to the Frelinghuysen-Romero 
Agreement of Jul. 29, 1882, providing for reciprocal crossings of the international boundary by troops of 
the United States and Mexico in pursuit of hostile Indians, Feb., 1862, Jan.-Jun. 1867; Letters Rec’d by 
the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81; Drum, AG to Sheridan, 22 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Drum AG Wash. D.C. to Gen. P.H. Sheridan, 22 Jun., 1880 in 
Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
88 Instructions to Lt. Maney, Fort Cummings, 10 Jun., 1880’DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.365.
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Colonel Hatch claimed that, between the start of the Hembrillo Canyon operation and the end 
of May, approximately 100 Apaches had been killed.89 He, and to a lesser extent the Ninth Cavalry, 
received scant praise from the territorial press. General Sherman himself contacted Hatch through 
General Pope to assure him that he had his continued support, and that the actions of the territorial 
press carried no weight in Washington. 
However, in the same letter, Sherman revealed that there was no further money available to buy 
extra horses and mules until Congress approved the next appropriation of funds for the army. This 
money would not be available until 1 July 1880.90 (see document file no. 76.) Thus we have no less 
a person than Sherman himself stating that, in effect, Victorio’s tactic of constantly engaging his 
enemies in gruelling pursuits had emptied the US army’s coffers for the financial year 1879–80. 
Sherman had to resort to the emergency measure of ordering the movement of troops and animals 
that could be spared from other Departments and Divisions.91 One wonders what Sherman, an 
advocate of ‘economic’ warfare, in which the resources of the enemy (the Confederacy, and after-
wards the Plains Indians) were targeted as well as their armed forces, made of being forced to take 
his own medicine from the Apaches. The Apaches had effectively dismounted the Ninth Cavalry, 
and unless horses and mules could be transferred from other military sources, the regiment could 
not be remounted until Congress approved the army’s 1880–81 budget. Two days later, Sherman 
reminded General Sheridan that the US army’s authorized strength was fixed at 25,000 men. 
Therefore, if more scouts were to be recruited for service in the District of New Mexico, Sheridan 
would have to dispense with a similar number of scouts elsewhere within his division. As Sherman 
succinctly put it, ‘We must not exceed the law.’92 (see document file no. 77.) As we have seen, 
Hatch had already creatively interpreted the law where the recruitment of extra Apache scouts was 
concerned.
Sherman’s pronouncement on the law came on the same day that Hatch made the most intriguing 
statement that ‘casualties in my command should give me fifty Indian scouts more valuable now 
than four times the number of recruits.’93 This clearly implies that Hatch had lost 50 men, but this 
cannot be correct. If we assume Hatch was referring to the fiscal year July 1879 to the end of June 
1880, the District of New Mexico had lost one officer and 20 men (including Indian scouts) killed 
in action. It is also clear from the regimental and company returns that recruits were steadily trick-
ling in. This is a most ambiguous statement on the part of Hatch, and one wonders whether this 
was an attempt to bluff his superiors into allowing him to recruit additional scouts. It does also raise 
the suspicion that one or two skirmishes had either been missed from the official record or that a 
number of casualties had gone unrecorded.
The failure to defeat the Apaches brought out the worst in Hatch, who made a statement that was 
to prove prophetic in the parallel case of the Chiricahua Apaches, in 1886:
89 Pope’s Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.612.
90 Sherman to Pope, 29 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.290-291; Loud quoting Sherman’s letter to Hatch, Fort Craig, 
31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.452-
453; Sherman to Sheridan, 28 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
91 Sherman to Pope, 29 May, 1880 in Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, pp.290-291.
92 Sherman to Sheridan, 31 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.479 & p.480.
93 Hatch to AAG HQ MDoM, 31 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to 
AAG HQ MDoM 1 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Hatch to AAG, DoM, 3 Jun., 
1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 90.
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they must be destroyed or held as prisoners at some remote point from New Mexico. With the 
present uneasiness of Indian tribes I need not urge the importance of pitting one tribe against 
the other, and fostering the enmity already existing between them, it is sound policy to do so.94
Despite Sherman’s support for Colonel Hatch, the press continued to launch deeply personal 
attacks. One report recounted a fictional combat between Hatch and Victorio where the former 
was ‘unaffected by a shot through the head!’95 Hatch continued to be the main target, but the black 
troops were again dismissed as inferior to white troops,96 though the same paper would also state 
that a white regiment would be hard pushed to equal the Ninth Cavalry Regiment’s performance. 
This turned out to be a device to present Colonel Hatch as an untruthful blundering incompetent.97 
Sherman was also accused of being complicit with Hatch in misrepresenting the true situation, 
though the editor of Thirty Four, conveniently forgetting some of his papers own statements, also 
argued that exaggeration of Hatch’s faults would be counter-productive and would serve only to 
delay his removal.98 On 4 June 1880, the editor of the Grant County Herald, S.M. Ashenfelter, 
wrote to the Secretary of War repeating these charges and demanding that Hatch be removed from 
command.99 (see document file no. 78.1.) The following week, the same paper again attacked Hatch 
but also dismissed ‘negro’ soldiers as worthless.100 (see document file no. 78.2.) Thirty Four also slyly 
enquired as to the possibility that Hatch might be controlling the telegraph and suppressing bad 
news from New Mexico.101 Victorio’s prowess as a war leader was acknowledged, but even this was 
turned into an assault on Hatch, in which it was stated that more troops were needed but also that 
there needed to be a change in commander.102 Hatch’s request that he be allowed to pursue the 
Apaches into Mexico was dismissed as an attempt to be close enough to any Mexican victory to 
falsely claim that victory. As noted earlier, Hatch also stood accused of trying to steal the laurels of 
Parker’s victory on the Palomas River.103 The paper also noted an effort on the part of the military 
to discredit Parker, and suggested to its readers that he be referred to as ‘Citizen Parker’, just in case 
the army attempted to credit one of the two officers named Parker in the Ninth Cavalry.104 One 
Joseph Brown wrote to the Secretary of War accusing Hatch of masterly inaction at Fort Craig, 
94 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 3 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 
90
95 Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880; Hart. 1997, p.48.
96 Thirty Four, 5 May, 1880; On 2 June, 1880 the paper stated that: ‘While there are, undoubtedly, excep-
tions to this rule, yet as a whole, that race loves ease, show and tinsel, and prefers these things to all 
others. They cannot endure the hardships of mountain warfare, and they lack the ambition necessary 
to the making of a good soldier.’ An article titled ‘Fault Finding’ in The Grant County Herald, 12 June, 
1880 stated that ‘The negro, as we asserted in our last issue, is unfit for, and not adapted to be, a first 
class soldier. The campaign of the last ten months shows this clearly: this is not his fault, it is one of 
the characteristics of the race: the great mistake was in ever enlisting them into the regular army. The 
years which have elapsed since the war of the rebellion, have been passed by these soldiers in a round of 
garrison duty, of pleasure, and no fighting. This of itself is demoralizing to any soldier, much more so to 
the negro. In a fight they have no confidence in themselves, and their officers can have no confidence in 
them.’.
97 Thirty Four, 19 May, 1880.
98 Thirty Four, 12 May, 1880.
99 S.M. Ashenfelter to Alexander Ramsey, Secretary of War, 4 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527; Ashenfelter to Alexander Ramsey, Sec. of War, 4 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ 
DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
100 ‘Fault Finding’, The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880.
101 Thirty Four, 2 Jun., 1880.
102 Thirty Four, 19 May, 1880.
103 Thirty Four, 23 Jun., 1880.
104 Thirty Four, 23 Jun., 1880.
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miles away from the action, and Morrow of being incapacitated by drink at Fort Cummings. Brown 
clearly implied that Morrow’s drunkenness pinned down 200 troops and scouts at Fort Cummings, 
while only a few miles away the Lyons party was wiped out in Cooke’s Canyon.105
This anger occasionally manifested itself in verbal exchanges between soldiers and citizens:
Upon arrival of the Coach from the East, at the Post Office at the Post this morning, the driver 
addressed the escort, a soldier of Co. “M” 9th Cavalry as follows. “Get down you damned 
nigger and tell your Company Officer to send a White man as escort”
Inasmuch as the Stage Company has asked for soldiers as escorts, it should see that they are 
decently treated by its employees and until this assurance can be given, I respectfully request 
permission to call in all detachments stationed at the mailstations.106
Hatch obviously concurred and authorised the withdrawal until the guards were ‘treated properly’.107
In response to Ashenfelter’s charges, Hatch argued that Lieutenant Merritt had been respon-
sible for the breakout in April 1879,108 and had been court-martialled and cashiered. Hatch also 
admitted that the number of people killed by Apaches was large, but maintained it was nowhere 
near as large as stated by the press and denied any form of misrepresentation of the situation.109 
Hatch was quite correct to argue that the numbers killed by Apaches were exaggerated; but he was 
also too willing to underestimate these numbers. And the allusion to Lieutenant Merritt, who had 
committed suicide after the court-martial verdict, showed a less edifying side to Hatch, in that he 
was willing to place culpability on a dead officer. To state that Lieutenant Merritt was responsible 
for the Victorio War was quite wrong (since Merritt had certainly not been one of the authors of the 
concentration policy), and represented a thoroughly dishonourable position for Hatch to adopt.110 
Similarly unpleasant was his later accusation that utter cowardice had been demonstrated by the 
Mexican sheepherders who had survived Victorio’s raids in April and May 1880. His accusation 
that Mexican shepherds had engaged in supplying food and occasional ammunition to Victorio’s 
Apaches (see document file no. 79) had a strong element of truth in it; yet Hatch failed to acknowl-
edge the lack of US army protection for these men when they were confronted by Apache warriors. 
Hatch, also with some justification, argued that in pursuing the Apaches during April and May 
1880, he had had to contend with citizens more concerned with war-profiteering than facili-
tating the army’s pursuit of Victorio. (see document file no. 80.) Thus, while Hatch had a number 
of legitimate problems which undermined his efforts to defeat Victorio, his acumen in judging 
these was mixed with political naivety. Hence his relations with the press and most of the citizen 
they represented were appalling, and his difficulties in this aspect of his job largely self-inflicted. 
Nonetheless, he was aware of the key principles of Apache warfare and knew how to get around 
105 Brown to The Secretary of War, 28 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
106 Capt Purington, Fort Bayard to AAAG, DoNM, 6 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
107 Loud to Henderson, Agent N.M. Transportation Co. 13 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.514.
108 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879’ Chapter 5, 
pp.131-132
109 Hatch to Major J.J. Coppinger 10th Infantry, Acting Assistant Inspector General, DoM, 26 Jun., 1880 
in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter 
No.309, pp.199-201.
110 In response to Ashenfelter’s charges Hatch made the following statements. ‘The Officer responsible 
[Merritt] for the outbreak was brought to trial and dismissed the service and is now dead’ (Hatch to 
Major J.J. Coppinger 10th Infantry, Acting Assistant Inspector General, DoM, 26 Jun., 1880 in Letters 
Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.309, 
pp.199-201).
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army and congressional red-tape to get what was needed: a dangerous game to play, but one he 
played successfully.
A nine-point resolution was passed in Silver City on 10 June 1880 that is indicative of the 
general feeling against the troops in New Mexico. This blamed a drunken officer for provoking 
the war with Victorio, thus indicating that the citizens believed Colonel Hatch’s version of events 
when it suited them. It claimed that in the course of the war almost 300 New Mexicans had been 
butchered, with much loss in property and the economy. They then passed a number of resolutions 
roundly accusing the army in general, and the Ninth Cavalry and Colonel Hatch in particular, 
of incompetence and misrepresentation of the course of events. Only H.K Parker and Captain 
Madden of the Sixth Cavalry were given any credit for the prosecution of the war. The citizens also 
accused Colonel Hatch of trying to claim the credit for Parker’s victory, and demanded that he be 
removed from the command of the District of New Mexico.111 (see document file no. 81.1.)
Most of the above points can be countered, and Hatch presented a robust rebuttal of these accu-
sations (see document file no. 81.2); but this resolution offered a justifiable criticism in accusing 
Hatch of misrepresentation. Equally, we have to ask why Hatch felt he had to misrepresent the situ-
ation in New Mexico? Did the sheer volume of personal vilification aimed at him, and transmitted 
to Washington D.C. by the local press, lead Hatch into misrepresenting events in New Mexico? 
It should also be noted that, hidden away in the press coverage of the Victorio Campaign, there 
was the occasional piece of constructive advice concerning the prosecution of the war against the 
Apaches. A letter, printed in the Grant County Herald on 12 June, noted that the success garnered 
by Parker was due to his not following the formal procedure of an army expedition, which could 
easily be monitored and avoided by Apaches. What Parker’s command had done was to betray their 
presence as little as possible, with most of them hiding during the day while a few scouts were 
sent to spy out the land. The detachment generally only moved at night. The correspondent only 
regretted that Parker had not had a back-up force of 100 men which ‘would soon put an end to Old 
Vic, and his band of cut-throats’.112 (see document file no. 82)
Despite the tide of negative public opinion, Hatch was still faced with finishing off the war. He 
advised that an additional regiment and 100 Apache scouts would be required.113 He pointed out 
that:
Experience certainly advises obtaining them [Apache scouts] in some manner. Troops cannot 
find Apaches in the mountains without incurring great risks and expense. to be successful they 
must be hunted in the Indian way keeping the troops off the trail and Indians are best adapted 
for this service. Since the attack on the San Carlos Agency where a number were killed the best 
Indians on the Reservation are anxious to go out. I also consider it important to encourage the 
enmity between the tribes.114
111 The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880; See also Thirty-Four, 16 Jun., 1880; Copy of said resolution in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 526Hart, 1997, p.48.
112 ‘How to Fight Apaches’, The Grant County Herald, 12 Jun., 1880.
113 Hatch to Department HQ , 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.273.
114 Hatch, Fort Craig to AAAG, SF, 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
475, Vol. 5, p.271; Hatch to HQ , MDoM, 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.475, p.476 
& p.482; Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 27 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.439-440.
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This was once again endorsed by General Pope.115 Finally, on 7 June 1880, Hatch received permis-
sion to recruit 50 Apache scouts in addition to the 25 he was already authorised to recruit.116 
Sheridan had to make a direct request to General Sherman to allow this additional recruitment as 
‘I cannot change the allotment in this Division to accommodate him [Hatch].’117 Apparently, as the 
authorised strength of the US army was at full capacity, Sherman had to reiterate the point that 
such scouts would have to be found from within Sheridan’s Military Division.118 Hatch estimated 
that the Apaches could survive for at least two years off the horses and cows to be found scattered 
over the territory. He also thought that Victorio could be persuaded to surrender ‘if promised 
amnesty and if his families were at Ojo Caliente.’119
Nevertheless, Hatch received instructions that Victorio should be hunted down, and that, as 
part of this operation, a force of Apache scouts should be stationed in the Florida Mountains. It 
was also suggested that the Mescaleros with Victorio could be persuaded to surrender by the use of 
the prisoners on the Mescalero reservation.120 This plan was foiled when the Mescaleros refused to 
send a runner, reportedly saying that ‘they don’t care whether Mescaleros with Victorio are killed 
or not, that they deserve to for joining him.’121 This was a position they maintained throughout that 
summer.122 On 8 June 1880, Hatch also reported that some of the Mescaleros who wished to give 
up ‘were prevented by Victoria’,123 and Russell repeated Hatch’s statement to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs two days later.124 The source or sources of such information is not clear.
Hatch also attempted to estimate the numbers of Apaches still at large and concluded that 
Victorio had lost approximately 100 men and still had 336 warriors and 160 women and children in 
his following.125 (see document file no. 83.) This is a substantial over-estimation of both the casual-
ties sustained by, and the overall numbers of, the Apaches. However, it also clear that, going back 
to the events of 1876 and 1877, the US authorities had no clear idea of just how many Chiricahua 
Apaches had settled on the Fort Bowie reservation, nor of how many Warm Springs Apaches had 
been residing at Ojo Caliente before the closure of both reservations. Indian Agents were also not 
115 Pope to Lieutenant General P.H. Sheridan, HQ Mil. Division of the Mo., 30 May, 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.477 7 P.478.
116 Pope to Hatch, 7 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.488-489; Platt, AAG to Colonel Hatch, Fort Craig, New Mexico, 7 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 440, p.18; See also Platt AAG to AAAG, DoNM, 7 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 440, p.21.
117 Sheridan to Sherman, 31 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.300; Sheridan to Sherman 31 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.482-483.
118 Sherman to Sheridan, 31 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.479, p.480 & P.483.
119 Hatch, Fort Craig to Loud, 26 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.440-441; See also Hatch to Pope, 4 Mar., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 90.
120 Platt, AAG to Colonel Hatch, Fort Craig, New Mexico, 7 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, 
p.18; (Pope to Hatch, 7 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.488-489.
121 McGonnigle, 1 Lt 15th Inf. To Hatch 9 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.516; Russell to CoIA, 10 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527.
122 Morrow, CO Fort Stanton to AAG, DoM, 22 Jul., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 92; Hatch to Buell, 17 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.748.
123 Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 8 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
124 Russell to CoIA, 10 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
125 Loud to General Pope, Fort Leavenworth, 16 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.525; See also Loud to Pope, 16 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, 
NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Pope to Whipple, 21 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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necessarily willing or able to keep an accurate headcount of the Apaches on their reservations. 
There is the distinct possibility that a number of these Apaches had escaped the notice of the US 
authorities. Equally, to suggest that Victorio was directing almost 450 Apache warriors was a 
significant over-estimation of the numbers of independent Apaches.
Hatch concluded that the Apaches would attempt to cross the Rio Grande around Fort Quitman 
in an attempt to return to the Mescalero reservation.126 Morrow reported that if Victorio ‘does 
return he is liable to cross the Rio Grande below Old Fort Quitman he cannot reach Stanton by any 
other trail that I know of without coming within striking distance of this post and I would certainly 
hear of him.’127 Hatch believed that a large number of Mescaleros had attempted to make for their 
reservation after the Palomas River fight, but had been unable to get across the Rio Grande because 
of the presence of troops. They had had to abandon their possessions and flee south to Mexico 
‘with the intention of crossing above Old Fort Quitman and returning to Agency’.128 By 13 June, 
Hatch could confidently report that Victorio’s people were in the mountains of Mexico and would 
return as soon as their wounded recovered.129 This certainly suggests that Hatch had some source 
of information working south of the border. However, such sources could be extremely unreliable.
Two scouts with typically overstated frontier pseudonyms, ‘Hurricane’ Bill and ‘Cherokee’ Jim, 
returned from a scout into Mexico on 12 July, to pass on information that Victorio had allegedly 
moved back into New Mexico.130 Both men were described as ‘among the most trustworthy scouts 
on this frontier’ and as ‘employed by the military authorities to make the expedition in question’.131 
Both ‘Hurricane’ Bill and ‘Cherokee’ Jim were also wrong. For once, Hatch and Morrow were 
correct in predicting Victorio’s next move.
126 Hatch, Fort Craig to Grierson, Fort Concho, 9? Jun., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.384 & p.385; Thrapp, 1974, p.282; Thrapp, 1967, p.203.
127 Morrow to loud AAAG 20 Jun.? 1880, NA, RG393, pt 3, Entry 439 pp.12-13.
128 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 9 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.496; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 8 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Campaign, 
Feb., 1879-Nov. 1880’ in ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
129 Loud to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.515-516.
130 The Grant County Herald, 17 Jul., 1880.
131 The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880.
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When we last met Colonel Grierson, he had returned to the District of the Pecos after an attempt 
to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches. (See Chapter 6.) By mid-June, with Victorio in 
Mexico, and Hatch and Morrow predicting that the Apaches would attempt to return to New 
Mexico via the District of the Pecos, Grierson knew that he had to prepare an effective defence 
should the latter’s predictions come to pass.
There was some Apache activity in western Texas during May and June 1880, which was prob-
ably the result of Mescalero Apaches taking advantage of the turmoil caused by Victorio’s uprising, 
or raiding as a reaction to the US Army’s recent operation to disarm and dismount them.1 On 12 
May, eight heavily armed Mescaleros ambushed a party of civilians in Bass Canon, killing a man 
and a woman (James Grant and Margaret Graham) and wounding two other men. Eight horses 
were stolen, and it was assumed that the Apaches were intending to ally with Victorio, as they had 
departed the scene in a south-westerly direction.2 The survivors managed to reach Van Horn Wells, 
and from there Fort Davis was alerted late on 14 May.3 (see document file no. 84.) As the Apaches 
were reported to have fled towards the Rio Grande, only 25 miles distant,4 Major McLaughlin 
thought it futile to pursue the party. Instead, he sent immediate relief in the form of food and 
clothing, and instructions to help the destitute survivors reach either Ysleta or El Paso.5
Grierson had ordered Captain Carpenter’s company to Eagle Springs (see Chapter 6) to scout the 
Eagle and Carrizo Mountains. Carpenter was also instructed to coordinate his company’s activities 
1 Leckie, 1967, p.223.
2 Dan Murphy, Survivor of the attack, to Major McLaughlin, 10th Cavalry, from Van Horn Station, 13 
May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.463-464; Carpenter to AAAG, DoP, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, p.460; Pope to AG, Chicago, Illinois, 17 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.444-446; McLaughlen, Fort Davis to AAAG, DoP, 17 May, 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 
Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.118-119, Letter 
No.145; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 18 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.450; Carpenter 
to AAAG, DoP, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.459-460; Tabular Statement of Expeditions and 
Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the DoTx, during the Year ending Sept. 30, 1880., NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.628; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the DoTx, 
since Sept. 30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633; 
‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 22 May, 1880; ‘Town and County’ The Grant County Herald, 29 
May, 1880; Record of Engagements, p.95; Leckie, 1967, p.223; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.260; See also 
Baylor, 1996, p.321 note 18; Gillett, 1976, p.202; Thompson, p.165; Webb, 1976, p.89.
3 McLaughlin, Fort Davis, to AAG, DoTx, 17 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.462-463 
& pp.465-468
4 Dan Murphy, Survivor of the attack, to Major McLaughlin, 10th Cavalry, from Van Horn Station, 13 
May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.463-464.
5 McLaughlin, Fort Davis, to AAG, DoTx, 17 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.462-463 
& pp.465-468; Smither to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 18 May, 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 
Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.251-252, Letter No.150.
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with those of Captain Viele’s company.6 The latter had also been ordered into the area from its 
station in the Chenati Mountains, where it had been conducting regular patrols since late March 
that year.7 Carpenter, with his superior knowledge of the local terrain, was given overall command, 
and he tracked the raiders to the Rio Grande.8 From the signs he found, Carpenter he estimated 
there were eight Apaches; and he was certain that these had recently escaped from Fort Stanton. 
He also reported that the waterholes in the area were dry, and the grass thus very poor. For this 
reason, any units operating from Eagle Springs should carry their own forage.9
In reaction to the attack in Bass Canon, General Pope endorsed Grierson’s request that the 
three remaining companies of Tenth Cavalry stationed at Fort Sill be sent to the Department of 
Texas.10 General Sheridan accordingly ordered these companies to join Grierson in western Texas, 
with instructions to strengthen the defence of the District of the Pecos against Apache incursions 
from the Mescalero reservation. They were also to cooperate with troops from New Mexico. The 
lynchpin of this defence was the holding of three companies of Tenth Cavalry in readiness to ‘break 
up and destroy’ Victorio’s band should they venture into Grierson’s district.11 
During March 1880, in anticipation of future conflict with Mescalero Apaches, Grierson had 
sent an officer to the Ysleta Mission, close to El Paso, to recruit some Pueblo scouts.12 Nineteen13 
Pueblo Indians signed on and were formed into a unit under Lieutenant Frank H. Mills of the 
Twenty-Fourth Infantry.14 On 11 June, this detachment, in the process of following an Indian 
trail, was breaking camp in Viejo Pass when it was suddenly attacked by approximately 20 Apaches. 
Sergeant Simon Olguin and one horse were killed outright, and two horses were later shot and 
a wounded mule abandoned. Mills’s party was not best placed to retaliate, as the US Army had 
not yet furnished all his scouts with enough weapons.15 This left Mills with only 12 men who 
6 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 18 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.450-452; Smither to CO, 
Fort Davis, 18 May, 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.249-250, Letter No.148.
7 Viele to AAG, DoTx, 28 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.500-502; Tabular Statement 
of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the DoTx, during the Year ending Sept. 30, 
1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.628.
8 Carpenter to AAAG, DoP, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.459-461; Carpenter to AAG, DoP, 
20 Jun., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 2Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the 
DoTx, during the Year ending Sept. 30, 1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.628.
9 Carpenter to AAAG, DoP, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.459-461.
10 Pope to AG, Chicago, Illinois, 17 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.444-446.
11 Ord to AG, Chicago, 25 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.389 & p.390; See also Special 
Orders No. 109, HQ , DoM, 21 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
12 Smither to CO Fort Davis, 3 Mar., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.206, Letter No.78.
13 Woodward to AAAG, DoP, 23 Mar., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.110, Letter No.122.
Permission to recruit nineteen Pueblo scouts had been authorised on the 19 Feb., 1880. (See Vincent 
to CO, DoP, 19 Feb., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2).
14 Report of Indian Scouts serving in the DoTx on Mar. 31. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.391; 
Report of Indian Scouts serving in the DoTx on 31 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.494; 
Matthews, 1993, p.37.
15 District HQ were aware of the shortage of equipment and though there is no mention of firearms, on the 
3 June, 1880 the CO Fort Davis was instructed to order Lt. Mill’s detachment to Fort Davis to supply 
the Pueblo scouts with their outstanding equipment, noting that while the detachment had ‘horses, 
pack mules, pack saddles, ammunition and canteens, but no cartridge belts nor lariats, and only twelve 
canteens [carbines?].’ (Smither to CO Fort Davis, 3 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.273-274, Letter No.183) Another 
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were armed with carbines.16 The skirmish lasted about four hours and ended when Mills directed 
some of his men to seize higher ground, which overlooked the Apache positions. When these men 
opened fire, the Apaches quickly dispersed. Mills did not mount a pursuit as those members of 
his detachment who were armed had run low on ammunition.17 (see document file no. 85.) His 
superiors were aware of the unit’s shortages,  and around 3 June he was instructed to march to 
Fort Davis to supply the Pueblo scouts with their outstanding equipment. The scouts had ‘horses, 
pack mules, pack saddles, ammunition and canteens, but no cartridge belts nor lariats, and only 12 
canteens [carbines?].’18 It would appear that Lieutenant Mills was en route to Fort Davis to pick up 
these supplies when he picked up the trail of the Apaches and decided to follow them. Lieutenant 
R. Read led a detachment of 20 Tenth Cavalrymen after the Apaches, but failed to catch them, the 
trail having been destroyed by heavy rainfall.19 It was assumed, correctly or otherwise, that these 
Apaches were scouting the lie of the land on behalf of Victorio.20
Other intelligence was received from the authorities in the State of Chihuahua. Roman Aranda, 
in acknowledging receipt of authority from Governor Terrazas to cooperate with the commanding 
officer, Fort Bliss, also sent word to the latter that on 6 July, ‘five Indians on foot crossed near Ft 
Quitman21 on the second inst. into Texas & returned on the fourth. I start at once with fourteen 
men to scout for these Indians.’22 Aranda also passed on word that Victorio and his men were 
communication gave the above list but clearly stated that the detachment had no revolvers and only 
twelve carbines. (Vincent to Grierson, 1 Jun., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.134-135, Letter No.183). It would 
appear that Lt. Mills was en-route to Fort Davis when he picked up the trail of the Apaches.
16 Carpenter to Post Adjutant, Fort Davis,, 11 Jul., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Vincent to Grierson, 1 Jun., 1880 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.134-
135, Letter No.183.
17 Frank H. Mills 1st Lieut, 24th Infantry to Post Adjutant, Fort Davis, Texas, 10 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.505-507; Mills to Adjutant, Fort Davis, 10 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 
Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.296-297, 
Letter No.219 See also Whipple to AG Wash. D.C. 15 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
527; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 
13, p.357; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the DoTx, since Sept. 
30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633; Record of 
Engagements, p.95; Leckie, 1967, p.223; Baylor, 1996; p.307 & p.320, note 7; Matthews, 1993, p.37.
18 Smither to CO Fort Davis, 3 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.273-274, Letter No.183.
Another communication gave the above list but clearly stated that the detachment had no revolvers 
and only twelve carbines. (Vincent to Grierson, 1 Jun., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 
1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.134-135, Letter 
No.183)
19 Lt. Col. Yard, Fort Davis to AAG, DoP, 25 Jun., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 
Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.161, Letter No.251; Tabular 
Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians, &c., made in the DoTx, during the Year ending 
Sept. 30, 1880., NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.628.
20 Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.260.
21 In 1876, Fort Quitman was de-activated as a military establishment. A stage station was built on the 
site in 1879. In early 1880, Col. Grierson sent Captain Carpenter to investigate its re-establishment. 
(Vincent to CO Fort Davis 12 Feb., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2).
22 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 10 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.576-577; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 13 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.605-606.
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Plates 9.1 and 9.2 Two photos taken in Bass Canyon, where James Grant and Margaret Graham were killed 
in May 1880. These photos were taken on the same day (12 September 2006) and show how quickly the 
weather can change in the South West. (Photos: author)
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40 miles to the south west of Gallegos for the purpose of trading with its citizens.23 At the same 
time, the Apaches, having regrouped after their defeat on the Palomas River, commenced raiding 
in northern Chihuahua. Even the property of the Governor Luis Terrazas was not safe. His San 
Lorenzo Ranch was raided, on or around 21 June, and 100 horses lost, their herders slain. The same 
raiders then moved south and repeated their actions at a ranch near Santa Clara.24 In just two raids, 
Victorio managed to remount most or all of his warriors. The Apaches were reported to have raided 
in an arc about 30 miles out from Chihuahua City and were trading with the inhabitants of the 
town of Galejos (possibly Galeana).25
Attacks by Apaches in western Texas indicated only the possibility that such incidents might 
represent a shift in Victorio’s area of operations. It should also be noted that, while these raids were 
carried out by Apaches, it does not necessarily mean that these were members of, Victorio’s band or 
allied to it. If we consider the army’s treatment of the Mescaleros in April 1880, while attempting 
to disarm and dismount them, it is small wonder that some Mescaleros may have been provoked 
into retaliating. Yet it was clear that the US Army was concerned that Victorio should, at all costs, 
be prevented from returning to the Mescalero Reservation. To this end, Hatch made it clear that if 
the Tenth Cavalry could be moved to New Mexico, he would have enough men to guard the area to 
prevent Victorio from trading for guns and ammunition. This would leave him with enough troops 
to prosecute an active campaign against the Apaches.26 (see document file no. 86.)
Requests to use the Tenth Cavalry in New Mexico had been made almost from the moment that 
Grierson’s battalion had returned to their stations in Texas.27 So far, these requests had failed to 
bear fruit; but such redeployment was being seriously considered. By 26 May, thoroughly alarmed 
at reports that the Ninth Cavalry were ‘about dismounted’, Sheridan considered the transfer of five 
companies of the Tenth Cavalry to Fort Stanton.28 This request had come from Hatch, who also 
telegraphed Grierson on 27 May, enquiring how many companies of the Tenth Cavalry would be 
deployed to Fort Stanton.29
23 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth quoted in ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 24 Jul., 
1880, p.1048.
24 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 30 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.571; See also Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 2 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 3 Jul., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, 
pp.285-286.
25 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.605-606 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to AAG Ft Leavenworth, 13 Jul., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Hatch to Grierson, 14 Jul., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.193, Letter No.329; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.284; Thrapp, 1967, p.203; Haley, 1981, p.328.
26 Hatch to AAG, SF, 22 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, 
p.269.
27 Platt to Captain Loud SF 20 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.74; See also Hatch to 
Department HQ , 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.273.
28 Sheridan to Townsend, 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.274-275; Sheridan to Ord, 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.271; Vincent to 
Grierson, 26 May, 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.126-127, Letter No.164.
29 Hatch, Fort Craig, to Grierson, Fort Concho, 27 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.494; Hatch to Grierson, 27 May, 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 
1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.130, Letter No.172; 
Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 28 May, 1880 & Grierson to Hatch, 29 May, 1880 in Telegrams 
Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.268-
269, Letter No.’s 174 & 175.
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Unfortunately, Hatch’s appeals for more 
troops to counter Victorio in New Mexico30 
threatened to disrupt Grierson’s own careful 
strategy. The original instructions, that 
Grierson should establish pickets backed 
by a central reserve of three companies, 
were soon changed. Grierson was ordered 
to take a battalion of the Tenth Cavalry to 
Fort Stanton, thereby allowing Hatch to 
concentrate his regiment on the western 
side of the Rio Grande.31 While in New 
Mexico, this Tenth Cavalry battalion would 
be under the direct orders of Hatch.32 This 
proposed deployment was complicated by 
Grierson’s commander, General Ord, who 
tried to insist that while the Tenth Cavalry 
aided Hatch in the District of New Mexico 
and Department of Missouri, Grierson’s 
battalion would remain under Department of 
Texas command.33 At first, General Sheridan 
seemed to accept this position stating that 
Ord could retain control of the Tenth Cavalry 
battalion, even suggesting that Fort Bliss be 
transferred to the Department of Texas.34 
Ultimately, Sheridan, suspecting Ord of 
‘empire-building’, was forced to remind him 
that ‘the object is to destroy the indians in New Mexico, and in giving orders to General Grierson 
you should exercise your discretion as to the best means of accomplishing that end.’35
Sheridan’s vexation with Ord had had been prompted by a complaint from General Pope that 
Ord had refused to send any Tenth Cavalry until the three companies of the Tenth Cavalry had 
been sent from Fort Sill to Texas. Pope was worried that trouble with the Navajo was brewing, 
which had necessitated the moving of Colonel George P. Buell to Fort Wingate. The perceived 
urgency of the situation in New Mexico, where the Ninth Cavalry was in effect ‘out of action’, left 
30 See for instance Hatch to AAG, SF, 22 May, 1880, in ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 475, Vol. 5, p.269.
31 Sheridan to Pope, 22 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Pope to Whipple, 
AAG Chicago, 3 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Dinges, 1987, p.87; 
McChristian, 1982, pp.49-50.
32 Platt to AAAG, DoNM, 31 May, 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
33 Vincent to Grierson, 25 May, 1880 & 28 May, 1880, Ord to Grierson, 4 Jun., 1880 in Register of 
Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
2, p.124, p.132, & p.137, Letter No.159, 177 & 189; Whipple AAG to Gen. Pope 5 Jun., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.323; 
Dinges, 1987, p.87; Matthews, 1993, p.37.
34 Sheridan to Ord, 21 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Vincent to Grierson, 
28 May, 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.131-132, Letter No.176.
35 Whipple to Ord, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, 
MDoM, Vol. 13, p.339; Whipple to Ord, 11 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
General Edward Otho Cresap Ord.
Commander of the Department of Texas, proved to 
be more interested in internal US Army politic than 
cooperating with troops outside his Department in 
the effort to defeat Victorio. (National Archives)
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Pope facing the possibility of having to move other cavalry units from Indian Territory, leaving that 
region dangerously undermanned, because of Ord’s refusal to act on the moment.36 Pope also made 
it quite clear that this was a temporary measure and that he did not want the Tenth Cavalry trans-
ferred and would return them as soon as the Apaches were defeated.37 Nevertheless, General Ord 
continued to use the war with Victorio in an attempt to increase the size of his own Department.38
This was not the first time that Ord had proposed a redrawing of department boundaries. In 
January 1880, comments attributed to General Ord were reported in the Texas Press, suggesting 
that the Fort Stanton and Indian Territory reservations should be transferred to the Department of 
Texas. This would prevent raids into Texas from these reservations. Pope pointed out to his superiors 
that Ord had as many troops in Texas as Pope had across the entire Department of the Missouri. 
He thought that Ord would be well-advised to use some of his considerable forces to counter the 
raids he talked about and not publicly blame another military department for failing to stop Indian 
raids.39 When Ord repeated this suggestion on 11 June 1880,40 Sheridan concluded that quibbling 
over command protocol and jealous protection of military resources was not the best means of tack-
ling Apaches. It also showed what could potentially go wrong when attempting to combat Apache 
guerrillas using three separate headquarters (the Departments of Arizona, Missouri and Texas).
In the meantime, General Pope took the decision to move three companies of the Fourth Cavalry 
and two companies of Infantry to New Mexico. This, he noted, would leave no garrisons at Forts 
Gibson, Hays, Lyon, Riley and Wallace; and the rest of the military garrisons in Indian Territory 
and Kansas were left much weakened. While Pope regarded this as a huge risk, he could see no 
alternative.41
Grierson himself wanted nothing to do with guarding the Mescalero reservation. He believed 
that his troops would be wasted in fruitless trailing through New Mexico, and would continue to be 
plagued by responsibilities to both the Interior Department and the War Department which would 
pull them in different directions. He also thought that a move to Fort Stanton would put undue 
pressure on the Tenth Cavalry’s logistic support. He suggested that a more limited transferral to 
El Paso and the Guadalupe Mountains, as far north as the Seven Rivers, with the authorisation to 
scout the Sacramento and White Mountains as far as Fort Stanton, would suffice.42 Grierson was 
convinced that a strategy of patrolling or picketing known waterholes, passes and river crossings in 
western Texas, ground already well-known to the Tenth Cavalry, would be a more effective means 
of preventing Victorio reaching the Mescalero reservation, if the latter tried to move through 
western Texas.43 Having seen what had happened to the Ninth Cavalry in New Mexico, he was 
certain that this was not the means to defeat Victorio. By the end of May, his regiment was almost 
36 Pope to Whipple 22 May, 1880, & Pope to AAG HQ MDoM, 25 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
37 Pope to Whipple, 24 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
38 Ord to AG Chicago, 3 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
39 Pope to Col. W.D. Whipple, AAG, 18 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp310-314.
40 Ord to AG, Chicago, 11 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.495-496 & p.497.
41 Pope to Sheridan, 26 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Special Orders No. 113, 
HQ DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 26 May, 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
42 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 4 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.277-280, Letter No.190.
43 Grierson to Col. Hatch 19 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.551-53; Grierson to AAG, San 
Antonio, 24 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.18-19, Letter No. 249; Grierson’s Report of the Campaign in Western Texas, 
Jul. –Aug. 1880: submitted 22 Sept., 1880 (hereafter referred to as ‘Grierson’s Report Sept. 1880’); NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Dinges, 1987, p.87; Matthews, 1993, p.37; Temple, 1957, 
pp.49-50; Temple, 1959, pp.99-100; McChristian, 1982, p.50.
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in position to achieve this goal:44 Half the regiment was already in the field and assigned to specific 
areas between the Pecos River and the Rio Grande. These troops were instructed to patrol their 
respective areas vigorously. Another three companies were resting and refitting; and the remaining 
three were marching towards the area of operations. It was hoped that by the end of June the whole 
of the Tenth Cavalry Regiment would be deployed in this area. As we have already seen in earlier 
chapters, detachments of the Tenth Cavalry had, between 1877 and 1879, thoroughly scouted and 
mapped extensive sections of Texas west of the Pecos River. It was knowledge gained from these 
trips that which allowed Grierson to adopt these tactics.45 
A cursory glance at the annual reports submitted for 1877–79 shows a mixture of scouting expe-
ditions, some of which lasted two months, and most of which which involved fruitless pursuits of 
Mescalero Apache raiders.46 Yet, a serious effort had been made to explore and map the interior, in 
order ultimately to frustrate raids made by Mescalero Apaches.47 The first test of Grierson’s strategy 
proved to be a false alarm. Hatch telegraphed Grierson on 9 June, stating that, having been driven 
out of New Mexico, the Apaches were thought to have crossed the Rio Grande to the south east 
of Old Fort Quitman. Grierson alerted his field detachments to be on their guard, but the rumour 
proved to be groundless.48
Throughout June, Grierson struggled to oppose orders to disperse his regiment in support of 
Hatch in New Mexico.49 He continued to lobby General Ord on the wisdom of his own plan, and 
General Sheridan ultimately accepted this alternative on 27 June.50 General Pope’s only concern 
was that Grierson should guarantee he would continue to picket the country to the east of the 
Pecos, following a line drawn from Fort Stanton to El Paso.51 Indeed, on reflection, it looks as 
though the original orders to re-deploy the Tenth Cavalry battalion to Fort Stanton were more 
an unthinking response to Hatch’s requests for more support than a co-ordinated effort to trap 
Victorio. However, General Sheridan’s instructions were clear on one thing: Grierson was inde-
pendent of any operations planned by Hatch.52
44 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 28 May, 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.267-268, Letter No.173.
45 See for example Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879’, 
pp.119-120 & document file no’s 1.1-1.4, pp.326-344.
46 Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians & c., made in the DoTx during the Year 
ending Sept. 30, 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports of Departments 1879-1881, 
MDoM; Col. Grierson’s Report for Year ending 31 Dec., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.319-334.
47 Annual Report, DoTx, 1 Oct. 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports of Departments 
1879-1881, MDoM, p.1 & p.2.
48 Smither to CO Fort Davis & AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 9 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 
1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.285-287, Letter 
No.200 & 201.
49 See for example Pope to Whipple 3 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
50 Vincent citing Sheridan’s telegram of the 27 Jun., 1880 to Grierson, 28 Jun., 1880 in Register of 
Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
2, p.167, Letter No.262; Vincent to Grierson, 28 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 
1881,HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Dinges, 1987, p.87; Matthews, 1993, p.37; Temple 1959, 
p.101; McChristian, 1982, p.50; Haley, 1981, p.329; Haley, 1952, p.331; Rister, 1928, pp.204-206.
51 Pope to Sheridan, 1 Jul., 3 Jul. & 4 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
52 Sheridan to Pope, 4 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements 
Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.417; See also Platt to CO, DoNM, SF, 5 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
440, p.6.
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Table 9.1 Disposition of Companies of the Tenth Cavalry Regiment, 28 May 1880.53
Company Location Instructions
A En route to District from Fort Sill
B Chinati Mountains Scout surrounding countryside
C Fort Davis Recuperating but also scouting surrounding country
D Grierson’s Springs Scout surrounding countryside
E Fort Stockton Recuperating but also scouting surrounding country
F Black River Falls Scout surrounding countryside
G En route to District from Fort Sill
H Eagle Spring Scout surrounding countryside
I En route to District from Fort Sill
K Fort Davis Recuperating but also scouting surrounding country
L Near Guadalupe Peak Scout surrounding countryside
M Head of the North Concho River Scout surrounding countryside
Grierson Mobilises His Forces54  
Colonel Grierson set his command in motion in early July, despatching his troops to cover the 
known passes and waterholes in western Texas.55 Captain Carpenter, already stationed at Eagle 
Springs, had earlier reported there was now very little water there. Near the end of June, two large 
trails were discovered, believed to be Apaches, passing though Viejo Pass. Carpenter was ordered to 
move his company to that point on 30 June 1880.56 Lieutenant Mills and his detachment of Pueblo 
scouts remained stationed at Eagle Spring, as was H Company, Twenty-Fourth Infantry.57 This 
would relieve the pressure on the levels of water at Eagle Springs, which Grierson intended to use 
as his field headquarters if the Apaches attempted to enter western Texas. 
Grierson left Fort Concho on 10 July, with his teenage son Robert and a small escort detachment58 
of one NCO and three privates taken from Captain Keyes’ company at Grierson’s Spring,59 which 
53 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 28 May, 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879–22 Jun., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.267-268, Letter No.173
54 See document file no.87 for Grierson’s overall report of his campaign against the Apaches in Western 
Texas in July & Aug. 1880 and Robert Grierson’s and Lt. Leighton Finley’s Diaries kept during this 
campaign.
55 Ord to CO, DoNM, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, pp.32-33; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie, 1989, p.130; Matthews, 1993, 
pp.37-38.
56 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2, pp.172-173, Letter No.276.
57 Yard, fort Davis to AAAG, DoP, 30 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 1881,HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4; McChristian, 1982, p.50.
58 Robert Grierson’s Diary, 10 Jul. to 1 Sept., 1880. Copy courtesy of the Fort Davis Museum Archives 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Robert Grierson Diary’); Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 8 Jul., 1880 in 
Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.44, 
Letter No.295; Leckie, 1989, p.130; Matthews, 1993, p.38; Temple, 1957, p.49; Temple, 1959, p.101; 
McChristian, 1982, p.50; Haley, 1952, p.332.
59 Smither to Keyes, 9 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.49, Letter No.304.
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the Colonel passed through on the following day.60 Grierson appointed First Lieutenent Smither 
as his acting adjutant general to relay information and instructions from Fort Concho. Second 
Lieutenant William H. Beck was appointed as Grierson’s personal aide-de-camp and acting assis-
tant adjutant general in the field.61 Grierson was also accompanied by a telegraph operator named 
McCarthy.62 In fact, Grierson has asked for the services of two telegraph operators. McCarthy 
was assigned to Grierson, whilst Charles Palmer was sent to set up a telegraph station at Old Fort 
Quitman.63 At Old Fort Quitman, Palmer was provided with a small escort of nfantrymen from 
Fort Davis.64 The Colonel was quite clearly aware that it was not just guarding known waterholes 
passes that would enable him to successfully combat the sudden appearance of Apache raiders: 
the waterhole guard detachments were usually large enough to deny the use of these facilities to 
Apaches, but were not strong enough to decisively defeat them. He also needed to be in a position 
to concentrate his forces quickly enough to engage and defeat the Apaches.
Grierson travelled westwards visiting his detachments in the field. From Fort Concho, he visited 
Forts Stockton and Davis, arriving at the latter on 15 July 1880.65 Following their experience of 
raids deep into the State of Chihuahua in June, the Mexicans informed the US authorities that 
between 400 and 500 troops under Colonel Adolfo66 J. Valle intended to attack Victorio on or 
around 15 July 188067. Colonel Valle also had permission to pursue the Warm Springs Apaches 
over the border into the United States.68 (see document file no. 88.) This information was received 
60 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’. See document file no. 87.2 this volume.
61 General Orders No. 3, 9 Jul., 1880 in General Orders, 28 Jan., 1878-7 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 5; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.639-644; See also Smither to CO, Fort Davis, 9 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.48, Letter No.303.
62 McCarthy, a civilian operator was recorded as having arrived at Fort Concho on the 21 Jan., 1880 
(Tingle to Grierson, 21 Jan., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.72, Letter No.34).
63 McChristian, 1982, p.50; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; 
‘Robert Grierson Diary’; See also Smither to CO Fort Davis, 9 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 
Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.49, Letter No.305; Grierson 
(Eagle Springs to Cols. Hatch and Buell 24 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.24; Ord to CO 
DoNM, SF, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.33.
64 Grierson to CO, Fort Davis, 9 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.49, Letter No.305.
65 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’; McChristian, 1982, p.51.
66 Referred to as ‘Adolpho’ in some US State Department correspondence.
67 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 14 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.539; Brinkerhoff Ft Bliss to 
AAAG SF, 15 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.542-547; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 
14 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.611; 
Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 16 Jul., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Ord to CO, 
DoNM, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.32; Sheridan to AG Washington D.C. 20 Jul., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 
13, p.451; Ord to Pope, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.460-461; Pope to AAG HQ  MDoM, 19 Jul., 1880, & Ord to 
AG Chicago, 21 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; The Grant County Herald, 31 
Jul., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
68 Brinkerhoff to CO, Fort Davis, 15 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 
Jun.-14 Sept., 1880 HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4; Ord to CO, DoNM, 
22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.32; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 17 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.629; Sheridan to 
AG, Washington D.C. 20 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.451; Ord to Pope, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.460-461; Carr to AG DoAz, 
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at Fort Bliss on 15 July, and passed to both Colonel Hatch and General Ord.69 Grierson received 
this information on 18 July, and he promptly sent word to Valle of his troop deployments and of his 
‘hearty cooperation.’70 
When General Trevino had taken to the field against Victorio in December 1879, Grierson had 
been instructed to maintain communication with the Mexican authorities through Dr Mariano 
Samaniego.71 Grierson had immediately contacted Samaniego and informed him that the troops 
based at Forts Stockton and Davis had been instructed to cooperate with Mexican troops and 
repulse any attempt by the Apaches to cross into Mexico. This would be accomplished by commu-
nicating any news concerning the latter to General Trevino via Dr Samaniego.72 As the historian 
Bruce J. Dinges points out, the key problem was the slow and unreliable transmission of such infor-
mation.73 It took 10 days for General Trevino to respond to Grierson’s telegram of 16 December 
1879. The information that Trevino’s local field commander was Colonel Ponciano Cisneros, ‘who 
had instructions to enter into communication with you’ via Dr Samaniego, was not received by 
Grierson until 4 January 1880.74 Both Hatch and Grierson maintained this link with Dr Samaniego 
via the offices of Captain Brinkerhoff, then commanding Fort Bliss, which lay in close proximity 
to both El Paso and El Paso del Norte. 
This unreliable conduit of communication was still the only one available to the US and Mexican 
forces, and would be utilised to coordinate the movements of Grierson’s force with that of the 
Mexican forces about to move against Victorio in July 1880.75 . In January, Victorio had not elected 
to cross the border into Mexico, thus the problems in communication between Grierson and the 
Mexican forces had not had any effect upon Morrow’s campaign against the Apaches. All the indi-
cations in July were that, if Victorio did move into the USA, it would be to cross the Rio Grande 
into western Texas. The delays in communicating information between the two forces did not bode 
well for their chances of defeating Victorio should he attempt to cross the border.
Valle’s plan was to march the majority of his force (200 cavalry and 120 infantry) directly to 
the village of Guadalupe on the Rio Grande and close to El Paso Del Norte. Another force of 
120 cavalry was to follow Victorio’s trail which, at that point, led in the direction of the Sierra del 
Fierro.76 Valle intended place a strong force near the Rio Grande in readiness to catch the Apaches 
as they crossed the river. To ensure that he struck at the right time and place, he had sent the 
21 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May, 1880 – 6 
Sept., 1880, p.26; Thrapp, 1974, p.286; Thrapp, 1967, p.204; Stout, 1974, p.152.
69 Brinkerhoff Ft Bliss to AAAG SF 15 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.542-547; See also 
Pollack Capt. 9th Infantry, AAAG, SF to Col. Buell, CO Fort Cummings, 17 Jul., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.621-623; See also Ord to AG 
Chicago, 21 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
70 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, 20 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.63-64, Letter No.330.
71 Vincent, AAG, DoTx to District Commander, Fort Concho, 11 Dec., 1879 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.43, 
Letter No.73; Smither to CO’s, Fort Davis & Stockton, 16 Dec., 1879 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 
1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.135-137, Letter No.’s 
290 & 291.
72 Grierson to Samaniego, 16 Dec., 1879 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.137-138, Letter No.292.
73 Dinges, 1987, p.85.
74 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 4 Jan., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 24 Apr., 1879-22 Jun., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.161-162, Letter No.4.
75 Ord to Pope, 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements 
Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.460-461.
76 Brinkerhoff Ft Bliss to AAAG SF 15 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.542-547; See also 
Pollack Capt. 9th Infantry, AAAG, SF to Col. Buell, CO Fort Cummings, 17 Jul., 1880, Telegrams 
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120 cavalrymen to follow their trail. This unit would keep Valle informed of the movements of 
the Apaches by courier to alert him when the time was ripe to attack with his main force. In the 
meantime, Valle seems to have adopted a similar strategy to Grierson’s in picketing known water 
holes along the border:
Colonel Valle writes doctor Samaniego July 18th that the Indians are still in the state [of 
Chihuahua] but ????ing that he had sent troops to intercept them to Tinaja De Victorio to 
El boracho to El Nino & to El Cerrizeilillo? Col Valle’s head qrs will be at the tanks for the 
present I have requested him to transmit information of his movements & those of the Indians 
if deemed advisable couriers can be employed here.77
As a result of this information, Grierson ordered LieutenantMills78 to deploy his Pueblo scouts 
along the Rio Grande to provide as early a warning as possible of any incursion.79 Grierson also 
warned his field detachments at Viejo Pass, Eagle Springs, Chenati Mountains and the Guadalupe 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.621-623; See also Ord to AG 
Chicago, 21 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
77 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 19 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.540-541.
78 Lt. Mills appears to be conspicuously absent from the record of Grierson’s campaign against Victorio. 
The reason for this is that the unfortunate Mills fell sick from ‘agne’ at Eagle Springs and was evacuated 
to Fort Davis on the 4 Aug., 1880 (Robert Grierson’s Diary, 4 Aug., 1880. Copy courtesy of the Fort 
Davis Museum Archives).
79 Ord to AG Chicago, 24 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Rister, 1928, p.208; McChristian, 1982, p.51.
Captain Brinkerhoff.
As CO Fort Bliss he played 
a pivotal role as a conduit of 
information between US field 
commanders and their Mexican 
federal and state counterparts in 
their efforts to combat Victorio 
on both sides of the border 
during 1880. (Carlisle Barracks)
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Mountains of these developments. He finally informed Captain Brinkerhoff that Grierson would 
reach Eagle Springs or Quitman on or around 22 July 1880.80
On 21 July, Grierson received a telegram from Colonel Buell informing him that the latter 
had taken over command of troops in the field against Victorio in New Mexico. Buell asked that 
Grierson keep him posted concerning any information concerning Victorio and promised to do the 
same in return.81
Additional troops arrived from Fort Sill (A, G and I Companies, Tenth Cavalry) on 17 June 
1880, under the command of Captain Nicholas Nolan. Grierson found them to be ill-prepared for 
the coming campaign, being poorly mounted, equipped and provisioned. He submitted an urgent 
request for 180 improved Springfield carbines with their associated equipment.82 Nevertheless on 20 
July, before the equipment arrived, these troops were sent into the field, leaving for El Muerto. The 
following day, Grierson with K Company, left Fort Davis and joined them that night.83 Grierson 
also contacted headquarters, Department of Texas, to remind them that the Tenth Cavalry urgently 
required 100 cavalry mounts and 60 pack mules.84 The pack mules were particularly required as 
Grierson wanted to attach them to scouting detachments, as wagons were clearly unable to traverse 
the terrain.85
By 24 July, Grierson received word that no additional horses were to be assigned to the regiment 
and he issued instructions that every effort be made to ensure that broken down horses should be 
allowed to recover rather than being deemed unserviceable.86 On 1 August 1880, Grierson contacted 
General Ord to remind him of his own earlier request for 100 additional horses.87 Once again, 
budgetary constraints were cited and Sherman informed Sheridan that out of the overall appropria-
tion of $200,000 for remounts, the Division of the Missouri had already received $116,000, and 
that any further expenditure would have to be taken from the Division of the Pacific’s allowance. 
Sherman concluded that this was ‘hardly fair’ and suggested88 that additional remounts for the 
Department of Texas be diverted from the Department of the Platte.89 (see document file no. 89.)
It was on 21 July 1880 that Grierson deployed his battalion to meet Victorio should he cross 
the border. Captain Lebo was sent to occupy Fresno Springs in the Carizzo Mountains90 and to 
scout from that point, with a view to denying passage through that section of the country to the 
80 Grierson to CO Fort Bliss, 18 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.108.
81 Buell (through Capt. Brinkerhoff) to Grierson, 21 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in 
the Field 30 Jun.-14 Sept., 1880 HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4.
82 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 26 Jun., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.21-22, Letter No.253.
83 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’.
84 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, 20 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.63-64, Letter No.330.
85 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, 22 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.65, Letter No.333.
86 Beck to Maj. Mills, Fort Concho, 24 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.72, Letter No.345.
87 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 1 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.94-95, Letter No.376; Ord to AG, Chicago, Ills. 4 Aug., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.568 & 572.
88 One suspects that a suggestion from General Sherman should be interpreted as an instruction.
89 Sherman to Sheridan 9 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.569-570 & 571.
90 The location of the Springs as being in the Carrizo Mountains is given in Grierson to AAG, San Antonio 
TX., 14 Jun. 1878 in Telegrams Sent 29 Jan., 1878-21 Apr., 1879, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.48.
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Plates 9.3 and 9.4 Two shots of Fort Davis, Texas (Photos: author)
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Apaches.91 Captain Nolan, with A Company, Tenth Cavalry, was ordered to proceed via Eagle 
Springs to Old Fort Quitman.92 Captain Baldwin, with I Company, was directed to march his 
company to Viejo Pass, while Lieutenant R.S. Colladay was instructed to march G Company, 
Tenth Cavalry, to Eagle Springs.93 Three days later, Captain Viele, with C Company, was ordered 
to proceed from Fort Davis to El Muerto and there to await further orders as to their deployment.94
From El Muerto, Grierson proceeded to Captain Carpenter’s picket in the Viejo Pass and then 
proceeded to Eagle Springs, arriving on 23 July.95 Captain Carpenter was ordered to remain at Viejo 
Pass and patrol the Rio Grande between the Capote Mountains and Eagle Springs. Carpenter 
was also ordered to pursue and attack Victorio with vigour, should the Apache leader cross the 
Rio Grande between these points.96 Lieutenant Jones, commanding B Company, Tenth Cavalry, 
was ordered to move from his station in the Chinati Mountains to join Carpenter at Viejo Pass.97 
Grierson also sent word to Colonel Valle that:
Have established telegraph office at Quitman and have an operator with me at this point. I 
would be glad to keep up communication with United States and Mexican troops and will 
thank you for any information you may be able to furnish me relative to the movements and 
whereabouts of the hostile Indians. Will be pleased to have you forward telegrams to Bliss any 
communications you may wish to send to Chihuahua, or elsewhere.98
When Grierson arrived at Eagle Springs, he received reports that, on 21 July, Valle and Victorio 
had clashed in the Sierra de Los Pinos. Six Mexican soldiers were killed at Ojo del Pino.99 The 
91 Beck to Lebo, 21 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.116; See also ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.52; Leckie & Leckie, p.261.
92 Beck to Nolan, 21 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.117; See also ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.52; Leckie & Leckie, p.261.
93 Beck to Baldwin & Colladay, 21 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1Letter No.’s 118 & 119; See also ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Tabular Statement showing Stations, 
Positions and Movements of Troops operating against Victorio and his hostile Indians, in the DoP, 
from 1 Jul., 1880 to Sept. 20 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug. -31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, McChristian, 1982, p.52.
94 Beck to CO Fort Davis, 24 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.68, Letter No.337.
95 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’; 
Temple, 1959, p.101; Matthews, 1993, p.38.
96 Beck to Carpenter 22 & 23 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No. 120 & 121.
97 Beck to Jones, 23 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No,122; Beck to CO, Fort Davis, 23 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 
23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.66-67, Letter 
No.335
98 Grierson to CO, Mexican Troops, near Quitman, 24 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.68-69, Letter No.339.
99 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 24 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.563; Grierson, Eagle Springs 
TX, to Col’s. Hatch and Buell, 24 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.24; Grierson to Hatch 
& Buell, 24 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.69-70, Letter No.341; Ord to AG Chicago, 24 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; The Grant County Herald, 31 Jul., 1880; Thrapp, 1967, p.204; Thrapp, 
1974, p.286; Leckie & Leckie, p.261; Stout, p.153; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 28 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.659-660; Ord to AG 
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New York Times reported that there was a long battle, and that the losses of the Apaches were 
unknown.100 Reports also came in that Roman Aranda and two other men had been killed in a 
clash between Valle’s advance guard and the Apaches ‘thirty miles below Quitman’.101 The report 
that Aranda had been killed was false, but does not rule out the possibility that three men had been 
killed in a skirmish with the Apaches.
A large force of 200 Mexican troops arrived opposite Old Fort Quitman on 23 July, but did not 
linger, setting out again during the night towards Ojo Del Pino in pursuit of the Apaches.102 Valle 
must have decided that when the Apaches entered the Sierra del Fierro, he would try to trap them. 
While Valle’s detachment of 120 cavalry followed Victorio to the southern side of the mountains, 
the troops briefly seen opposite Fort Quitman were probably part of Valle’s larger force, which had 
earlier marched to the vicinity of the village of Guadalupe and were now advancing to cover the 
northern edge of the Sierra del Fierro. Brinkerhoff states that there was no major battle as a result 
of this operation, but that some skirmishes had taken place.103 He also reported that the Apaches 
had an abundance of stolen cattle and horses gained over almost a month’s raiding in Mexico.104 As 
a result, Grierson delayed Captain Nolan’s departure for Fort Quitman, holding A Company with 
him at Eagle Springs until 27 July.105 
On 25 July, Valle’s troops were reported to have fared better. Once again in the Sierra de los 
Pinos, they claimed to have killed four Apaches for the loss of one Mexican soldier.106 Three 
Mexicans were also reported as being wounded with 10 horses being stolen.107 Valle also sent word 
Chicago, 24 Jul., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, 
Vol. 17, 31 Jul., 1880, p.1068; ‘Punishing Victorio’s Band’, The New York Times 30 Jul., 1880.
Ojo Del Pino was reported to be opposite Ojo Caliente TX forty miles from Fort Quitman TX. 
(Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 28 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.659-660; Platt, citing Hatch’s report, Fort Leavenworth to AAG, HQ 
MDoM, 29 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
100 ‘Punishing Victorio’s Band’, The New York Times 30 Jul., 1880.
101 Brinkerhoff Ft Bliss to AAAG SF 24 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.558; Hatch to AAG 
Fort Leavenworth, 27 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.653; See also The Grant County Herald, 31 Jul., 1880.
102 Grierson to Hatch & Buell, 24 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.69-70, Letter No.341; Brinkerhoff Bliss to AAAG SF 24 
Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.564; Grierson, Eagle Springs TX, to Col’s. Hatch and 
Buell, 24 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.24.
103 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.581-582; Grierson to CO, Fort 
Bliss, Texas, 26 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.68.
104 Ord to AG Chicago, 24 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Thrapp, 1974, p.286
105 Beck to Kennedy, 27 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.127; McChristian, 1982, p.53.
106 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 28 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.659-660; Grierson to CO, Fort Bliss, Texas, 26 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 440, p.68; Grierson to Col’s Hatch & Buell, 26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.74-75, Letter No.349; Grierson to 
Ord sent via Fort Bliss to General Ord, 29 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.668-669; Platt, citing Hatch’s report, Fort Leavenworth to AAG, 
HQ MDoM, 29 Jul., 1880 & Platt to AAG, HQ  MDoM, 1 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 29 Jul., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
527 Thrapp, 1974, p.286; Rister, 1928, p.208; Haley, 1952, p.332.
107 Translation of Valle’s letter to Grierson dated 25 Jul., 1880 at Camp in Sierra Borracho attached to 
Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.76-78, Letter No.352; Valle to Grierson, 25 Jul., 1880 in 
Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 1881,HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
4; Grierson to CO, Fort Bliss, Texas, 26 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.68; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF 27 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.559-560; Grierson to Col’s Hatch & Buell, 
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to the United States that he was gearing up to make a full scale attack on Victorio in the Sierra del 
Fierro and Borracho, and that the US army should occupy the passes north of the international line 
to prevent the Apaches escaping. Finally, he requested that the US authorities transmit his report to 
the Governor of Chihuahua, who could then keep the Federal Government of Mexico informed as 
to his movements.108 Valle also communicated directly with Grierson informing him that after the 
fight at Ojo del Pinos, the Apaches had turned southwards and had ‘made a stand’ in the Sierra del 
Fierro. This point was estimated to be approximately fifty miles south of Eagle Springs.109
On receipt of the first reports of fighting between Valle’s federales and the Apaches, Grierson 
sent out two Pueblo scouts to contact Valle. They returned a couple of days later confirming the 
details of the recent clash in the Sierra de los Pinos. At this point, Grierson estimated that Colonel 
Valle commanded approximately 600 troops110 made up of both federal and state troops.111 The 
Pueblo scout couriers were stationed at Old Fort Quitman and the telegraph operator, Palmer, 
described how the two men and their horses returned with dispatches from Valle in a dreadfully 
exhausted condition, having been in the saddle for a couple of days. He informed Grierson that 
fresh horses were required at Quitman if this form of communication was to be maintained. Palmer 
also reported that a Mexican courier from Fort Bliss with urgent dispatches for Colonel Valle had 
arrived, stating that he needed a horse as his own mount was all in.112
On 26 July, with a better idea of the broad location of the Apaches, Grierson issued further 
orders to his detachments. Captain Lebo was warned that Victorio might be aiming for the Eagle 
and Carrizo Mountains. Lebo was to fortify his camp and scout the country to the south and south 
west of Fresno Springs, as far as Van Horn Wells.113 Captain William B. Kennedy, at Camp Safford 
in the Guadalupe Mountains, was also instructed to keep his command in readiness and to patrol 
southwards in the broad direction of Old Fort Quitman.114 Captain Viele was also ordered to move 
his company from El Muerto to Eagle Springs. Viele was instructed to follow the telegraph line 
between El Muerto and Eagle Springs and to repair any damage done to it.115 
26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, pp.74-75, Letter No.349; Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 29 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.565-566; Dinges, 1987, p.89; Grierson to Ord sent via Fort Bliss to General Ord, 29 Jul., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.668-669; Platt 
to AAG, HQ  MDoM, 1 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
108 Valle, Camp in Sierra Borracho to Grierson via telegraph at Fort Quitman, 25 Jul., 1880 in Register of 
Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
2, pp.198-199, Letter No.339 & in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-14 Sept., 
1880 HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4; Brinkerhoff Bliss to AAAG SF 27 Jul., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.561; Brinkerhoff Bliss to AAAG SF 27 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 439, p.566.
109 Beck to Kennedy, 27 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.127; Grierson to Col’s Hatch & Buell, 26 Jul., 1880 in 
Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, 
pp.74-75, Letter No.349.
110 Grierson to CO, Fort Bliss, Texas, 26 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.68
111 Grierson to CO, Fort Bliss, Texas, 26 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.68; McChristian, 
1982, p.52.
112 Palmer to Grierson, Eagle Springs, 26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 
30 Jun.-14 Sept., 1880 HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4.
113 Beck to Lebo, 26 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.125.
114 Beck to Kennedy, 27 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.127.
115 Beck to Viele, 26 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.123.
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On 26 July, Grierson had informed Fort Bliss that the telegraph line was down to the east of 
Eagle Springs, and he requested that Captain Brinkerhoff forward information to General Ord 
via the telegraph line to Santa Fé and beyond.116 A repairman had been sent eastwards from Fort 
Bliss, but on reaching Fort Quitman he had wisely refused to proceed further and returned to Fort 
Bliss.117 A repair team was also sent out from Fort Davis; but a day later, Robert Grierson noted 
that the line was still down.118
That same day (27 July 1880), Grierson started out from Eagle Springs for Old Fort Quitman, 
leaving instructions for Captain Nolan to follow with his troop the next day. The following day, 
Colonel Valle and his command arrived on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande.119 Having run 
out of, or lost, their supplies, the Mexican troops were in no position to complete their part of the 
operation. Grierson gave the Mexicans some provisions, but sent an urgent telegram to Hatch 
asking if the Mexican troops could be supplied from Fort Bliss.120 Victorio had apparently managed 
to cripple Valle’s expedition by capturing the bulk of the Colonel’s provisions: ‘Victorio is evidently 
holding his own in Mexico. Brinkerhoff telegraphs today from El Paso that Mexican Troops at 
Quitman report Victorio capturing their supplies.’121 Palmer and Robert Grierson also mention 
the capture of the Mexican’s supply train.122 Valle was able to inform Grierson that his scouts had 
tracked Victorio to the Bosque Bonito or the Carresalillo Mountains, which was roughly opposite 
a line drawn between Alamo and Vieja Springs on the US side of the border. (see document file 
no. 90.) This was, as we shall see, a crucial piece of intelligence which helped to point Grierson in 
the right direction as to the location of the Apaches. Grierson was able to reassure Valle that he 
had troops covering these points. Valle planned to advance downriver from opposite Fort Quitman 
to strike Victorio. He also stated his intention to keep the US army informed of developments via 
courier and telegraph using the stations at Fort Quitman or Eagle Springs.123 The federales were 
low on provisions and despite Grierson supplying approximately: ‘2000lbs of flour and grain’ and 
presenting some personal goods for Valle’s use, the latter felt that without re-supply by his own 
government, he might have to terminate his operation.124 In the meantime, Colonel Grierson and 
116 Grierson to Col’s Hatch & Buell, 26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.74-75, Letter No.349; Grierson to Ord sent via Fort 
Bliss to General Ord, 29 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.668-669.
117 Brinkerhoff Bliss to AAAG 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.581.
118 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’; McChristian, 1982, p.52; See also Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 29 Jul., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.567-568.
119 Platt to Comdg Off DoNM 2 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp. 47-49; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG DoNM 29 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.566-567; Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 
30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.569; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
120 Hatch to Pope, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.678; McChristian, 1982, p.53.
121 Hatch to Pope, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.677; See also Temple,1959, p.102; see also Matthews, p.38; Dinges, 1987, p.89; Miles, 1971, p.21.
122 Palmer to Grierson, Eagle Springs, 26 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 
Jun.-14 Sept., 1880 HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4; Robert Grierson’s Diary 
28 Jul., 1880. Copy courtesy of the Fort Davis Museum Archives.
123 Grierson to CO Fort Bliss & AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 29 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 
Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.82-83, Letter No’s .357 & 
358; Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, pp.96-97; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.569.
124 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.569-570; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Rister, 1928, p.208; Temple, 1959, pp.101-
102; Matthews, 1993, p.38; McChristian, 1982, p.53.
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his officers invited Colonel Valle, Captains Lestrade and Valdez, and Don Juan Terrazas , the 
Governor of Chihuahua’s nephew, to dine in the officer’s field mess. The invitation was accepted, 
and Grierson’s son Robert, reported a generous donation to the Mexican Officer’s supplies when 
they left the following morning.125 It is also noteworthy that Governor Terrazas had placed a 
nephew on Colonel Valle’s staff.
Given the logisitical challenges facing Valle, Grierson was faced with the certainty that Victorio 
would attempt to cross the Rio Grande without the disadvantage of having Mexican troops in 
pursuit. It was clear to Grierson that he needed to return to his field headquarters at Eagle Springs 
to prepare his forces.
Approval for this action was relatively quickly granted at the highest level of the U.S. Army. (See 
Drum, AG Washington D.C. to the Commanding General of Subsistence, 19 Aug., 1880 in Letters 
Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2).
125 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’.
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Grierson’s Texas Campaign 1: Tinaja de las Palmas, July 18801
 
Grierson departed Old Fort Quitman for Eagle Springs on 29 July 1880. The other members of his 
detachment were Lieutenant Beck, one sergeant, five troopers and his son, Robert.2 Arriving at at 
Tinaja de las Palmas, they had a brief skirmish with a lone Apache warrior, and Grierson guessed 
that this insignificant spring was Victorio’s destination.3 Tinaja de las Palmas was located where:
The road passed at an angle between two small hills paralleling the much larger Devil Ridge to 
the northeast. The jagged spine north of the road was known as “Rocky Ridge,” an appropriate 
name for it was indeed a solid pile of rock which rose about one hundred twenty five feet above 
the surrounding desert. A similar but smaller hill stood south of the road.
At the foot of Rocky Ridge, in the natural drainage formed with the adjacent hill, the stage 
road traversed an area of deep sand bounded on either side by rocky flats.4 
Grierson sent his sergeant and two men after the warrior, but the latter fled, sped on his way with 
a couple of shots.5 
Shortly after the Apache scout had been driven off, couriers from Eagle Springs arrived at Tinaja 
de las Palmas. They reported that approximately 40 Apache warriors had been spotted across the 
Rio Grande, opposite Ojo Caliente, Texas. A vidette party, with at least one Pueblo scout, had 
spotted this group from a hill six miles from the Rio Grande at about 7:00 a.m. on the morning of 
29 July. On returning to Eagle Springs to report, they twice exchanged fire with Apaches near the 
river, but no casualties were inflicted on either side. In the first exchange, they had been fired at by 
a lone Apache who had fled towards the Rio Grande. A few miles further on, they had skirmished 
1 There are slightly differing versions of the prelude of this skirmish. See Appendix One at end of this 
Chapter.
2 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-
49; Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.569-570; Platt to Comdg Off DoNM 
2 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.47; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 7 
Aug., 1880; See also McChristian, 1982, p.53. On reading some of Grierson’s reports of this period 
and his son’s own diary, it is clear that his son was not present in an official capacity and if included, the 
number of men including Col. Grierson originally stationed at Tinaja de Las Palmas would be nine. 
One suspects that the Colonel was not sure what his superiors may have made of his allowing his son to 
participate in this skirmish.
3 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Matthews, 1993, p.38; 
Leckie, 1967, p.224; Temple, 1959, p.102; Haley, 1952, p.332; Miles, 1971, p.21.
4 McChristian, 1982, p.54; Chronological List, p.50.
5 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 29 Jul., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.54.
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with four Apaches who also made off towards 
the river. Captain Gilmore, in charge at 
Eagle Springs in Grierson’s absence, had sent 
another patrol back to the general area to 
monitor the situation. One significant piece 
of information was that the members of the 
first patrol thought that the Apaches they had 
encountered had been heading south towards 
the Rio Grande, away from the Eagle Springs 
to Fort Quitman road.6
This news, combined with Grierson’s 
encounter with a lone Apache scout on the 
same day, suggests that Victorio had sent 
out scouts to discover the location of any US 
troops stationed between Forts Quitman and 
Eagle Spring. That evening, Gilmore sent 
further word that his second patrol had been 
‘driven’ back to Eagle Springs by an estimated 
60 Apaches. They also reported finding two 
camps of 16 and 6 wickiups approximately 
16 miles to the south west of Eagle Springs.7 
Captain Nolan, whose detachment had 
remained on the alert at Old Fort Quitman, 
had subsequently been informed by his own 
patrols that over 60 Apaches had crossed 
the Rio Grande. Captain Gilmore then sent 
couriers along the route to Fort Quitman, 
where they encountered Grierson at Tinaja de las Palmas.8 These couriers confirmed Grierson’s 
suspicions.
Grierson had probably not previously stationed a picket at this point because ‘tinaja’ (tank), 
suggests that it was only an irregular resource, where water periodically collected in natural 
rock tanks.9 It should be noted, however, that it was also known to the army as ‘Eighteen Mile 
Waterhole’, situated about 18 miles equidistant from both Old Fort Quitman and Eagle Springs.10 
This name suggests a more reliable source of water than ‘Tinaja de las Palmas’.
6 Gilmore, Eagle Springs to AAAG, DoP, Fort Quitman 12:15 p.m., 29 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d 
by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-4 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 4; See also ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 29 Jul., 1880. 
7 Gilmore, Eagle Springs to AAAG, DoP, Fort Quitman, 7:00 p.m. 29 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d 
by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-4 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 4.
8 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.639-644; Leckie & Leckie, pp.261-262; Miles, 1971, p.21 It has been generally assumed that 
Captain Nolan sent Lt. Henry Ossian Flipper as a courier to Grierson at this point and Flipper’s own 
memoirs suggest that this was the case but on closer reading of Flipper’s recollections suggest that this 
ride took place in October 1880 in the aftermath of an Apache ambush of a Tenth Cavalry picket at Ojo 
Calientes, Texas on 28 October, 1880 (See Chapter 16 this volume for further comment).
9 McChristian, 1982, p.54.
10 See Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
Lt. William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry.
Appointed as Grierson’s personal aide-de-camp and 
acting assistant adjutant general in the field for the 
upcoming campaign against Victorio. As such he 
was one of the original tiny garrison at Tinaja de Las 
Palmas. (Carlisle Barracks)
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The Colonel and his companions took up positions on a part of ‘Rocky Ridge’ which overlooked 
the spring.11 In geological terms, while Rocky Ridge is not particularly high, it is effectively a knife-
blade with precipitous sides before sloping more gently towards the level ground. 
The small detachment created two emplacements and named them Forts ‘Grierson’ and ‘Beck’,12 
These were virtually impregnable being almost as wide as the top of Rocky Ridge. The Apaches 
would not have risked the loss of unnecessary lives trying to take such a position by a frontal assault. 
These two emplacements also have a clear line-of fire along the narrow ridge making it very risky 
for the Apaches to try to take these positions by a flanking attack.13 Tinaja de las Palmas was on 
the stage line, which passed through both Eagle Springs and Fort Quitman. Grierson used a stage-
coach arriving from Fort Quitman to transmit orders to Captain Viele at Eagle Springs to march 
his troops to the Tinaja de las Palmas group’s immediate support.14 A second stagecoach travelling 
out of Eagle Springs delivered a message that Captain Viele was on his way with C Company.15 
During the night, further messages from Old Fort Quitman informed Grierson that the Apaches 
were camped less than 10 miles away. They had twice skirmished with scout detachments, and one 
Pueblo scout was reported to have been killed.16 These messengers were immediately sent back 
to Old Fort Quitman with orders for Captain Nolan to gather A Company and bring it with due 
speed to support Grierson.17 
In the meantime, they finished constructing their forts, Robert Grierson noting that ‘The rocks 
were very rough and we got our hands scratched like everything.’18 Robert Grierson also noted that 
their transport and animals were placed behind the ridge19 and the nature of Grierson’s chosen 
position would certainly place horse drawn vehicles and any horses and mules out of sight of 
11 Thrapp, 1974, p.287; Thrapp, 1967, p.204; Record of Engagements, p.95; Stout, 1974, p.153; Leckie, 
1967, p.224; Temple, 1959, p.102; McChristian, Handbook of Texas Online; McChristian, 1982, p.54; 
Bigelow, USACMH webpage; Wellman, 1957, p.169; Miles, 1971, p.21; Longstreet, 1970, p.95.
12 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; Matthews, 1993, 1993, p.39; Temple, 1959, p.102; McChristian, 
1982, p.54; McChristian, 1982, p.57.
13 The author got permission to visit Tinaja de las Palmas on 11 June 2018 and comments upon the terrain 
are based upon personal observation. 
14 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.639-644; Leckie, 1967, p.224; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.262; Rister, 1928, p.209; Temple, 1959, 
p.102; McChristian, 1982, p.55; McChristian Handbook of Texas Online entry; Stout, 1974, p.153; 
Haley, 1952, p.332; Miles, 1971, p.21.
15 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.55.
16 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie & Leckie, p.262; 
McChristian, 1982, p.56; McChristian Handbook of Texas Online entry ;Rister, 1928, p.209; Miles, 
1971, p.21.
Nineteen Pueblo scouts were originally recruited with Simon Olguin being killed on 12 June. By 
the end of September seventeen Pueblo scouts were recorded as being in service which would seem to 
support one of their number being killed at this time. (Tabular Statement showing Stations, Positions 
and Movements of Troops operating against Victorio and his hostile Indians, in the DoP, from Jul., 
1 1880 to Sept. 20, 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1).
17 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie, 1967, pp.224-225; 
Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.262; McChristian, 1982, p.56; Temple, 1959, p.102; Rister, 1928, p.209.
18 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. Having descended the ridge from the right of Grierson’s position 
the author can attest that these rocks are very difficult to grasp without inflicting numerous superficial 
scratches upon one’s hands.
19 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880
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Apaches approaching from the Mexican border on the reverse side of Rocky Ridge. Grierson’s son 
also reported that each fortlet was well supplied with water and other supplies.20 He also stated that 
the two emplacements were built up as breastworks on the side facing Tinaja de las Palmas21 yet the 
remains of the forts today suggest that they were built for all-round defence.
However, at 4:00 a.m. the following morning, Grierson’s plan started to unravel. His orders to 
Captain Viele had been misinterpreted. Fearing for Grierson’s safety, Gilmore had sent a detach-
ment of 15 men of G Company, Tenth Cavalry, led by Lieutenant Finley,22 to provide an escort 
back to Eagle Springs.23 An exasperated Grierson sent two of Finley’s troopers back to Eagle 
Springs with ‘peremptory’ orders for the balance of the Eagle Springs garrison to march to Tinaja 
de las Palmas as soon as possible.24 Grierson immediately reassigned the rest of Finley’s detachment 
to a position lower down the ridge and presumably closer to the water. Finley’s men constructed 
additional rock breastworks for cover.25 This was placed further down Rocky Ridge as it descended 
towards the flat ground. 
Finley’s men found a point where large boulders already protected their front and rear and they 
constructed walls to close off either flank of their emplacement. This also covered a potential weak 
point in Grierson’s own position. As noted earlier, it would have been difficult to assault Grierson’s 
positions from left or right. Yet the Apaches could have approached to very close range of Grierson’s 
left before exposing themselves to fire from the defenders: the ridge quickly drops down signifi-
cantly to where Finley constructed his fortlet. Thus, any attempt to try to flank Grierson’s left 
would have been exposed to close-range fire from Finley’s men.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 On hearing that Leighton Finley had managed to gain a transfer from the 15th Infantry to the Tenth 
Cavalry, Lt Walter Finley, Ninth Cavalry, commented that ‘he will have a pleasant service down in 
Texas, not much scouting and easy service’. (Letter dated Fort Bayard, 30 Nov., 1879 in The Walter 
Lowry Finley Collection).
23 Leighton Finley Diary 30 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson. 
There is some confusion as to the number of men in Finley’s detachment though Finley himself 
states that his command consisted of fifteen men. Some accounts mention ten (Leckie, 1967, p.225; 
Burton, 1999, p.189) or fifteen (Matthews, 1993, p.39; Temple, 1959, p.102; McChristian, 1982, p.57; 
McChristian Handbook of Texas Online entry; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.262; Wellman, 1957, p.170; 
Miles, 1971, p.62). Finley’s diary is quite clear that he was accompanied by fifteen men to Tinaja de 
Las Palmas and that ten of those men accompanied him when he charged at Victorio’s warriors during 
the battle. However, The number thirteen seems to be the most likely figure as Grierson quoted this 
number as being involved in the fight within hours of the event. (See Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version quoted in Loud to Hatch, 
31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-
681) However he also makes it clear that prior to the skirmish he had sent two of the fifteen men back 
to Eagle Springs to summon reinforcements. (See ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880).
24 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Stout, pp.153-154; 
Matthews, 1993, p.39; McChristian, 1982, p.57; McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry; 
Miles, 1971, p.62.
25 Leighton Finley Diary 30 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; 
‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; Leckie, 1967, p.225; Temple, 1959, p.102; McChristian 
Handbook of Texas Online entry; Burton, 1999, p.189.
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Plate 10.1 One of Grierson’s emplacements on the highest point of Rocky Ridge looking east towards the Eagle 
Mountains on the horizon. Author is seated on the edge of the emplacement for scale. The low range of hills 
below these mountains and behind the author’s head are where the approaching Apaches were first spotted.
Plate 10.2 Finley’s larger emplacement looking west along Rocky Ridge. Grierson’s two emplacements are 
just behind the high point at the top right of the photo. The Quitman Mountains can be seen marching 
along the left-hand horizon.
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Tinaja de las Palmas: Skirmish between Victorio’s Apaches and Grierson’s Tenth Cavalry, 30 
July 1880 (see Map 10.1)
Grierson, with between 23 and 25 men, was left to hold Tinaja de las Palmas and await both 
reinforcements and Apaches. The Apaches arrived first, at about 9:00 a.m. on 30 July 1880.26 (see 
document files no’s. 87 and 91.) Robert Grieson reported that ‘the vedettes holloed: “Here come 
the Indians!!!” We made for our posts immediately. The Indians came through a canyon in the hills 
S.E. of camp & got within half a mile before we saw them.’ ]27 The Apaches were obviously aware 
that there was a Tenth Cavalry detachment holding the water, either through spotting them as they 
approached, or through the report of their own scout who had escaped the previous day. It should 
be noted that, from the Apaches’ point of view, that Finley’s position is difficult, but not impossible 
to detect. However, Grierson’s breastworks are impossible to spot from this direction.28 
They apparently swung to the east to avoid a battle with the troops.29 Grierson sent out Lieutenant 
Finley with 10 of his men to challenge this manoeuvre.30 Lieutenant Finley laconically noted that 
this was his ‘first charge’.31 . As the detachment skirmished at long range with the visible warriors, 
other Apaches infiltrated down through thick vegetation between two hills south of the stage 
road. Once the Tenth Cavalrymen had passed them, they suddenly opened fire, and Finley’s men 
turned and stood their ground and skirmished with the Apaches for approximately one hour.32 
Robert Grierson noted that the Apaches made more use of their horses than was usual during this 
campaign. However, their horses were used by the warriors to speed their movement around the 
battlefield, and they dismounted before firing on their opponents.33
26 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; 
Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Grierson’s Report 
on Tinaja de Las Palmas in NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.355; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.262; 
Matthews, 1993, p.39; Miles, 1971, p.62.
27 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880.
28 On visiting the site in June 2018, I first passed Finley’s position, climbed up to Grierson’s position then 
climbed down Rocky Ridge. Periodically, I took photos from below sighting upon a small bush where I 
knew Grierson’s fortlets were located. I knew they were there but could not spot them.
29 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie, 1967, p.225; 
Matthews, 1993, p.39; Burton 1999, p.189.
30 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leighton Finley Diary 30 
Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 
Aug., 1880; Record of Engagements, p.95; McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry: Stout, 1974, 
p154; Matthews, 1993, p.39; Thrapp, 1967, p.204; Thrapp, 1988, p.493; Leckie, 1967, p.225; Bigelow, 
USACMH webpage; Wellman, 1957, p.170; Rister, 1928, p.210; Miles, 1971, p.62.
31 Leighton Finley Diary 30 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; 
See also Dinges, 1988, pp.165-166.
32 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 
1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.59.
33 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. 
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Plate 10.3 Apache view of Finley’s position from the south-east. They are just below and to the left of the 
spiky Yucca plant clearly visible silhouetted on the skyline. While well hidden it is possible to detect this 
position from a distance.
Plate 10.4 The top of Rocky Ridge from the point of view of any Apache to the south. Until the defenders 
rose up and opened fire, Grierson’s two small emplacements are virtually impossible to detect.
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Captain Viele and C Company, and 
Lieutenant Colladay with part of G Company, 
arrived around 10:00 a.m.34 Lieutenant Finley 
was in the process of dislodging some Apache 
warriors from behind a rock outcrop35 when 
Captain Viele and Lieutenant Colladay came 
into view: 
When the companies came upon the 
Indians, Cap. Viele and Lt. Colladay were 
riding about 300 yds ahead of their troops. 
As Lt. C was dismounting an Indian shot 
him in his leg36 and broke his horse’s leg. 
The Indian then shot at Capt. V. as he was 
getting off. Capt. V. then got good aim and 
killed the Indian dead.37
At first glance, the actions of Captain Viele 
and Lieutenant Colladay, riding in advance 
of their command, may appear to have been 
somewhat foolhardy. However, Lieutenant 
Finley noted that Pueblo scouts, commanded 
by Lieutenant Mills, arrived with Viele and 
Colladay.38 Mistaking Finley’s detachment 
for Apaches, the reinforcements volleyed into 
them and forced them to abandon their stand 
and ride back to their original positions.39 
This was not before Lieutenant Finley’s 
men returned fire, assuming that more Apaches had appeared to work their way around their 
flank.40 The Apaches took advantage of the mistake to try and close with Finley’s retreating detach-
34 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; 
Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Platt to Comdg 
Off DoNM 2 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp. 46-49; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.287; McChristian, 1982, p.60; 
McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry;  Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.263; Matthews, 1993, p.39; 
Stout, 1974, p.154.
35 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. 
36 Colladay never recovered from this wound and other privations suffered during his long service in the 
Tenth Cavalry, remaining present but sick or on sick leave until dying on 14 Jan., 1884 (Personal File 
Samuel R. Colladay, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 66).
37 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.60.
38 Leighton Finley Diary 30 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
39 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’;MDoM: Letters Received 1879-1881 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; 
Matthews, 1993, p.39; McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry: Leckie, 1967, p.225; Stout, 
p.154; O’Neal, p.125; Wellman, 1957, pp.170-171; Rister, 1928, p.210; Miles, 1971, p.62.
40 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880.
Lt. Samuel R. Colladay, Tenth Cavalry.
Part of the relief force arriving at Tinaja de Las 
Palmas from Eagle Springs. Riding ahead of the force 
with Lt. Viele, he was wounded when they suddenly 
encountered Apache warriors engaged in the assault 
upon Grierson’s small garrison. (Carlisle Barracks)
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ment.41 One trooper, Private Samuel Prescott,42 was forced to run for his life when his horse was 
killed and he received a minor graze on one of his fingers. He paused once to discourage close 
pursuit with his revolver, before he turned and ran. This respite allowed him to reach a point where 
Grierson and his men on Rocky Ridge could safely open fire.43 This volley took the Apaches by 
surprise, as they were apparently unaware of the two emplacements built by Grierson before the 
arrival of Finley’s patrol. Robert Grierson thought that the Apaches had probably assumed that 
Lieutenant Finley’s detachment were the only ones guarding the water.44 The pursuing Apaches 
were driven off by this sudden covering fire, and Lieutenant Finley’s detachment, including the 
dismounted Prescott, were able to escape.45 
Once the reinforcements under Captain Viele had correctly identified the Apaches, they coun-
terattacked. The fighting was now focussed in Viele’s detachment, as they attempted to reach 
Grierson. During this part of the fight, Private Martin Davis had his horse shot from under him. 
He continued to fight on foot but was shot dead by the Apaches.46 At this point, some of the 
Apaches spotted dust to the west announcing the approach of Captain Nolan’s company from 
Fort Quitman.47 This broke up the Apache attack and they pulled back, allowing Captain Viele’s 
command to link up with Grierson.48 This gave Grierson the opportunity to send out a courier with 
orders for Nolan to bring his men on as fast as possible, and they completed the last 10 miles at a 
‘lope’.49 Meanwhile, the Apaches returned to the attack, occupying a ridge to the south of the stage 
road. Captain Viele mounted his men and drove them off the ridge.50 The Apaches re-grouped and 
were again attempting to flank their enemies when Captain Nolan with A Company was judged to 
have come too close for comfort.51 Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, the first African-American 
to be commissioned into the army from West Point, noted that they ‘got right into it and soon had 
the Indians on the run … [t]his was the first and only time I was under fire, but escaped without a 
scratch’52 Whereas the reinforcements from Eagle Springs had swept in from the east, these rein-
forcements were advancing at a forced march from Old Fort Quitman to the west. The reinforcement 
41 McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry; Stout, 1974, p.154; Leckie, 1967, p.225; Leckie & 
Leckie, 1984, p.264.
42 Bi Monthly Muster Rolls for Company G, 10th Cavalry, NA, RG94; Record of Events Jul., 1880 in 
Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-191610th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 
1880, NA, M744, Roll 96.
43 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.61; Miles, 1971, p.62.
44 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.61.
45 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 
1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.61; McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 1967, 
p.225.
46 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.61.
47 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.61.
48 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 10 Jul. to 1 Sept., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.61.
49 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, p.61. It is only fair to note that The Grant 
County Herald reported a rather different story which can only be referring to Captain Nolan. A letter 
alleged to be from ‘An Old Sergeant’ in the Tenth Cavalry stated ‘There was a certain captain in the 
10th cavalry ordered to join Gen. Grierson at the time he had first contact with Victorio’s warriors. At 9 
o’clock the following morning the captain ordered his company to mount, started to join Gen. Grierson 
at a walk, dismounted and walked his men five or six miles, or until he got in sight of Gen. Grierson, 
then mounted his company and brought them up at charge, after the Indians had fled; Gen. Grierson 
having whipped them back with small detachments.’ (‘A Plea for the Colored Soldier’, The Grant County 
Herald, 9 Oct., 1880).
50 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; Leckie, 1967, p.225; Leckie & Leckie, p.264; McChristian 
Hand Book of Texas Online entry.
51 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.62.
52 Harris, 1997, p.34.
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Plate 10.5 View south-east from Grierson’s position. The Ocotillo plant with the very long and thin 
branches provides excellent pointers for two other positions on the battlefield. The lower branch on the left 
points to the rocky outcrop which Finley was clearing of Apaches when fired upon by the reinforcements 
arriving from Eagle Springs. The much taller Ocotillo branch to the right ends just to the right of the small 
ridge where the Apaches regrouped.
Plate 10.6 A clearer view of the same rocky outcrop and ridge taken from the flat ground some distance 
from the base of Rocky Ridge.
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Plate 10.7 View northeast from the ridge where the Apaches regrouped. There may have been some 
skirmishing upon the small hill in the distance almost at the centre of the picture. The end of Devil’s 
Ridge can be seen on the left of the photo while the Eagle Mountains dominate the right horizon. The 
reinforcements from Eagle springs would have arrived on the battlefield from between Devil’s Ridge and 
this small hill. Much of their initial fighting with the Apaches on their immediate arrival from Eagle 
Springs would probably have occurred in the area around this small hill before they managed to link up 
with Grierson’s force.
Plate 10.8 Western perspective from the top of the same ridge. The Quitman Mountains run along the far 
horizon. Captain Nolan’s company advancing from Old Fort Quitman would be seen coming from this 
direction at some distance from the fighting. The greenery visible in the middle of the photo indicate where 
water is located today. In 1880 it was reported that there were natural rock tanks holding water. I could not 
see where these might have been but in June, when completely dry, these tanks would be difficult to detect.
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of Grierson’s position at Tinaja de las Palmas had won the day. From the Apaches’ point of view, to 
continue the fight was pointless. Their primary goal was now to evade their enemies and avoid any 
further casualties. They broke off the engagement and retreated southwards, and it was presumed 
that they had crossed the Rio Grande and returned to Mexico.53 
Grierson claimed seven Apache warriors slain, with Private Martin Davis of C Company killed, 
and Lieutenant Colladay and Private Prescott of G Company wounded.54 The Tenth Cavalry had 
also lost 10 horses killed and four horses and a mule wounded.55 If the Apaches had chosen to 
return to Mexico, there was nothing to stop them. Colonel Valle’s large detachment of federales, still 
in need of supplies, had apparently withdrawn towards El Paso del Norte.56 Grierson had presumed 
that Valle’s force was, by this point, directly to the south of Eagle Springs, on the opposite bank of 
the Rio Grande,57 as Valle had informed Grierson that he was going to march in the direction of 
53 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; 
Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Platt to Comdg Off 
DoNM 2 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp. 47-49; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, 
p.355; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880: McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 
1967, p.225; Leckie & Leckie, p.264; Thrapp, 1967, p.204; Thrapp, 1974, p.287; Stout, 1974, p.154; 
Burton, 1999, p.189; Wellman, 1957, p.171; Miles, 1971, p.62.
54 Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version 
quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Leighton Finley Diary 30 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University 
of Arizona Library, Tucson; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; Grierson to 
HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, 
or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the DoTx, since Sept. 30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company G, 10th 
Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; Record of Events Jul., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army 
Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; 
The Fort Concho Post Return for Aug. 1880 mentions one Tenth Cavalryman killed in action or died 
of wounds in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Concho, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 1889, 
NA, M617, Roll 242; Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, RG391, Entry 933, pp.19-20; 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.355; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880; ‘Town and County’, The 
Grant County Herald, 7 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.639-644; See also Record of Engagements, p.95; Leckie, 1967, p.225; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.264; 
Burton, 1999, p.189 McChristian, 1982, p.62; McChristian Hand Book of Texas Online entry; Thrapp, 
1974, p286-287; Matthews, 1993, p.39; O’Neal, 1991, p.125; Bigelow, USACMH webpage; Wellman, 
1957, p.171; Haley, 1952, p.333; Rister, 1928, p.211; Miles, 1971, p.62.
The Chronological List adds three wounded ‘enlisted’ men to this total (Chronological List, p.50; 
Webb, 1976, p.89). There are claims that four troopers were wounded (Stout, p.155) and a suggestion 
that a second trooper was killed. According to Thrapp Grierson mentions a trooper from E company 
being killed (Thrapp, 1974, p.287).
55 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. 
56 Ord to AG Chicago, 4 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
57 Beck to Carpenter, 30 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.128; Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Whipple 
to CO DoNM, 2 Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 
Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
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Ojo Caliente down the Mexican side of the Rio Grande.58 It was not until 3 August that Grierson 
discovered that Valle’s command had been seen passing Quitman going west on the evening of 2 
August. Grierson acknowledging himself completely mystified, and somewhat angered, concluded 
that Valle’s departure had allowed Victorio an easy escape route into Mexico.59 
The accusation that Valle had abandoned the frontier was not quite accurate. In the short term, 
he had turned and marched to El Paso del Norte for supplies, although he had already sent word to 
Grierson on 4 August that he had proceeded down the Rio Grande. His scouts found no signs of 
Apaches, and Valle assumed that they had all crossed into the United States.60 Captain Brinkerhoff 
reported that Valle had contacted him on 9 August, stating that he had been unable to follow up 
the pursuit of Victorio on 29 July, due to lack of supplies and the Rio Grande being too high. Valle 
added that he was going to leave 50 troops in El Paso, while he intended to lead 150 men into the 
vicinity of the Laguna de Guzman Lake. ‘Colonel Valle informs me that should it become neces-
sary he will cross into the U.S. under authority given in pursuit of hostile Indians.’61 Brinkerhoff 
had received news from Grierson that same day of his engagement with Victorio at Rattlesnake 
Springs (see Chapter 11) and had obviously transmitted this news to Valle in El Paso del Norte, as 
he notified District Headquarters, Santa Fé, that at 3:00 p.m., 9 August, Valle was going to take 
out 200 men in an attempt to intercept Victorio.62 One day later, Brinkerhoff reported that Colonel 
Valle was still in the field and awaiting reports from his scouts63. Then came the report of a clash 
between a small group of Mexican irregulars or scouts and a party of Apaches, north of the border, 
on 10 August 1880. The Mexicans were implied to be scouts sent out from Valle’s force,64 and it 
is clear that, up to 15 August, Colonel Valle was still in the field.65 However, this marked, for the 
moment, the end of Mexican operations against Victorio, and Valle was soon reported to have left 
the area to seek supplies and additional troops. It was also reported that he had been summoned 
back to Chihuahua to thwart a threatened internal revolution.66 In the meantime, at least some 
of his troops were divided up into detachments to guard Mexican settlements to the east of the 
58 Valle in the field 7 miles below Quitman to Grierson, Eagle Springs, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d 
by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-4 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 4.
59 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 3 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.79, Letter No.353; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Dinges, 1987, p.90; McChristian, 1982, p.63.
60 Valle to Grierson, 4 Aug., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
61 Brinkerhoff to AAAG, DoNM, 9 Aug., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
62 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
63 Brinkerhoff to Buell, 11 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.725.
64 Brinkerhoff to Buell, 11 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.725; Platt, citing Brinkerhoff’s report, to AAG HQ MDoM, 12 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Whipple to Sheridan 12 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.506; Whipple to Sheridan, 12 
Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.360; Sheridan to Whipple, 14 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.580; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 12 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Thrapp, 1974, p.288.
65 Hatch (citing telegram from Samaniego to Brinkerhoff) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 17 Aug., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.749.
66 Whipple to Sheridan, 26 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.541.
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Candelaria Mountains.67 Finally, on 31 August 1880, Brinkerhoff informed District Headquarters, 
Santa Fé, that there was a force of 200 federales and ranchmen concentrated at Carrizal.68
Grierson claimed that he had sent scouts, presumably the Pueblo Indians, to follow Victorio, and 
that they had reported that Victorio had retreated back to Mexico, where he was camped opposite 
Ojo del Alamo in the Bosque Bonito.69 One suspects that Grierson’s command was too tired to have 
sent out scouts, and had merely assumed that the Apaches had fled back to their camp in Mexico. 
This location had, after all, been reported to him by two separate sources. The Pueblo scouts had 
pinpointed it and had returned to Eagle Springs to report this on 29 July. The same information 
had been delivered to Grierson by Colonel Valle, based on intelligence delivered by the latter’s own 
scouts. In the days following the hostilities at Tinaja De Las Palmas, Grierson’s scouts confirmed70 
the precise location of this camp. Indeed on the day after the fight there, scouts reported a large 
camp of Apaches with a large herd of stock camped miles below Quitman on the Mexican side 
of the border.71 Grierson certainly sent a message to Valle on 1 August, repeating the information 
he had given Valle earlier, on 30 July,72 that the main camp of the Apaches was opposite Ojo del 
Alamo. Grierson also sent four scouts to Valle to act as couriers.73 This was prompted by a message 
from Old Fort Quitman that, while they had received Grierson’s information, they could not see 
anybody to contact on the other side of the river. Palmer, the telegraph operator at Quitman, was 
instructed to ‘Hire a Mexican, make a raft, or go to the river and get someone to come over – show 
them the paper. Do not fail in getting some one from either side to take the dispatch across at 
once.’74 Palmer himself took the dispatch across the river and was later commended for his prompt 
initiative.75
There is some evidence to suggest that the Apaches who fought Grierson at Tinaja de las 
Palmas did not return to Mexico. When the Mexicans first reported Victorio’s move northwards 
to Grierson, the latter had, as part of his defence efforts, asked the Texas Rangers to help trap 
and destroy the Apaches.76 Thus, a small group of 13 Texas Rangers and Ranger Sergeant James 
B. Gillett departed from their base at Ysleta77 on 2 August 1880, under the command of Ranger 
Lieutenant George W. Baylor, responding to Grierson’s request that they scout eastwards to Eagle 
Springs.78 They arrived at Old Fort Quitman two days later, and Baylor was in the middle of 
reporting to Colonel Grierson by wire when the Apaches again cut the line between the Fort and 
Eagle Springs. Following their original orders, the Texas Rangers arrived at ‘Eighteen Mile Water 
67 Brinkerhoff to Hatch, 19 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
68 Brinkerhoff to AAAG, 31 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p. 807.
69 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; McChristian, 1982, p.62; 
Rister, 1928, p.211; Miles, 1971, p.62.
70 On 1 August, Robert Grierson observed that ‘Scouts are kept out all the time and are coming in often 
with news. Victorio is on the other side of the river, and Col. Valle, Mexican Army, is moving towards 
him.’ (‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880).
71 Grierson to CO Mexican Troops opposite Quitman, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.85, Letter No.360.
72 This message was actually sent on the 31 as noted in Grierson’s own correspondence.
73 Grierson to Valle, 1 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.131.
74 Beck to Palmer, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.87, Letter No.362.
75 Beck to Palmer, 1 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.92, Letter No.372.
76 Gillett, 1976, p.180; Stout, 1974, p.159.
77 Ysleta is approximately 10-15 miles east of El Paso.
78 Baylor, 1996, p.253.
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Plate 10.10. Eagle Spring (Photo: author)
Plate 10.9 Eagle Mountains from the north, in the vicinity of Eagle Springs. (Photo: author)
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Hole, where General Grierson’s troops had had an engagement with Victorio’.79 Baylor reported 
seeing bullet and blood marks, dead cavalry horses and Grierson’s hasty entrenchments.80 Having 
passed beyond Tinaja de las Palmas on Victorio’s trail, they spotted the remains of a stagecoach 
ambushed by the Apaches on 30 July.81 Frank Wyant, who had been driving the coach, and one of 
his passengers, E.C. Baker, had been killed. A second passenger, Captain Coldwell, had managed 
to escape.82 The Apache warriors: 
had cut the mail sacks open, cut canvass off the buck board & tore the mail matter into shreds-
the men were mutilated83 and papers stuffed in their wounds. Capt. Coldwell escaped by a 
miracle.84
The wreckage had first been discovered by Grierson and his force, presumably when they were 
on their way back to Eagle Springs on the evening of 30 July. Robert Grierson had noted that a 
mule had been butchered for steaks and speculated that the Apaches were short of supplies.85 The 
following day, the driver and passenger, and Private Davis, had been buried near Eagle Springs 
stage station.86 
The Rangers tracked the Apaches south and east as they detoured around the Eagle Mountains, 
and they discovered that the Apaches had destroyed the telegraph line along a quarter of a mile of 
its length, smashing what they could not take with them.87 If the Rangers had followed a trail from 
Tinaja de las Palmas, they made no mention of it crossing the border. Moreover, if the telegraph 
line was cut on 4 August, then some or possibly all the Apache warriors had remained in the United 
States for at least four days. The key questions are: why had they remained in the area; and why had 
they suddenly cut the wire on 4 August? These actions suggest that Victorio may have deployed 
his men in an attempt to wrong-foot his opponent. For instance, Coldwell’s escape appears to be 
particularly fortuitous; could Victorio have needed a survivor to draw the army’s attention to this 
particular area? Answers to these questions will be investigated as the next chapter unfolds.
Grierson, with his entire command, had arrived back at Eagle Springs by the evening of 30 
July.88 Once there, he summoned Captain Carpenter from Viejo Pass, with B and H Companies, 
Tenth Cavalry. Captain Baldwin, with I Company, was left in charge of Viejo Pass.89 Carpenter 
79 Gillett, 1976, p.180.
80 Stout, 1974, pp.159-160; Baylor, 1996, p.253 & p.257 note 10.
81 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 10 Jul. to 1 Sept., 1880. Some sources (List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or 
Captured, by Indians, &c., in the DoTx, since Sept. 30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.633; Chronological List, p.50; Record of Engagements, p.95; Baylor, 
1996, p.257 note 11) list this attack as having occurred on the 31 July, 1880 but Robert Grierson is clear 
that it occurred late on the 30 July, 1880.
82 Wellman states that Capt. Coldwell was travelling on the eastbound stage which discovered the 
wreckage of the westbound stage. (1957, p.169).
83 This is probably hearsay as the site was cleared by a detachment of the Tenth Cavalry as they repaired 
back to Eagle Springs on the 31 Aug., 1880.
84 Baylor, 1996, p.257 note 11 see also Stout, 1974, p.160.
85 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. 
86 Ord to AAG, DoTx, 3 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.573-574; Leighton Finley Diary 
31 Jul., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 
1 Aug., 1880; McChristian, 1982, pp.62-63; See also Webb, 1976, p.89.
87 Baylor, 1996, p.253; Gillett, 1976, pp.180-181; See also Whipple to Sheridan, 11 Aug., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.359.
88 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 1 Aug., 1880. 
89 Beck to Carpenter, 30 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.128; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company I, 
10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; Matthews, 1993, p.39.
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was to proceed to Eagle Springs via Van Horn Wells, with a view to contacting Captain Lebo, who 
had earlier been instructed to scout in that direction, and instructing him to move to Eagle Springs 
as well.90 As luck would have it Carpenter failed to contact Lebo, and as we shall see in the next 
chapter, this failure was to be fortuitous. There was no attempt to pursue Victorio, Grierson being 
more concerned to concentrate a force to counter the Apaches’ next move.91 Most of the Tenth 
Cavalrymen involved in the battle had reached Tinaja de las Palmas from Fort Quitman or Eagle 
Springs at a forced march, and were in no condition to mount an immediate pursuit. At Eagle 
Springs, Grierson found time to write a letter reassuring his wife of his safety. He characterised his 
stand at Tinaja de las Palmas as:
the best thing that could possibly have been done under the circumstances …. If I had not 
made my stand as I did Victorio and his whole outfit would have gotten through without a 
fight, and we would have had only the uncertain chance of pursuit.92
The key issue, from Grierson’s point of view, was that, as far as he was concerned, he had success-
fully prevented the Apaches from penetrating his defences. In doing so, he had avoided being 
drawn into the kind of horse-killing pursuit which he had seen cripple the Ninth Cavalry in New 
Mexico. A number of Grierson’s reports state quite categorically that no Apaches had managed to 
pass his defences and proceed north towards New Mexico.93 This was a claim he reiterated with 
vigour on 24 September 1880 in response to reports to the contrary received in New Mexico.94
However, at least one communication from Grierson shows that he had failed to block the passage 
of some Apaches. On 31 July, from Eagle Springs, Grierson had alerted Hatch and Buell that they 
should send infantry to cover water sources in the Comidas [Cornudas?] and Wind Mountains, 
particularly San Antonio Springs. He had also recommended that they send cavalry to picket the 
Sacramento Mountains. While Grierson had two companies of Tenth Cavalry stationed in the 
Guadalupe Mountains, he did not have the troops to cover the Sacramentos. He noted that such 
steps were necessary as ‘pursuit indicates the hostile Indians will go either there [the Sacramento 
Mountains] or to the Guadalupes’. This message post-dates Tinaja de las Palmas, as Brinkerhoff 
mentions that Grierson’s ‘dispatch of this morning concerning fight with Indians was put through 
directly request from here’.95 (see document file no. 92.) Hatch responded that he would, for the 
moment, place the New Mexican troops on the alert. The District Commander was not going 
to scatter his forces to cover specific points until Buell could be given more specific information 
concerning the Apaches’ movements. The matter was also complicated by the fact that the area was 
90 Beck to Carpenter, 30 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.128.
91 Ibid.
92 Temple, 1959, pp.103-104.
93 Beck to Carpenter, 30 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879-11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.128; Grierson to Hatch SF 30 Jul., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; See slightly tidied up version quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan 
to AG Wash. D.C. 2 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO DoNM, 2 
Aug., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-49; Grierson to HQ DoP, 31 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Sheridan to AG, Washington D.C. 2 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.483-485.
94 Grierson to CO Fort Bliss, 24 Sept., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.169-170, Letter No.504.
95 Grierson to CO Fort Bliss, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.85-86, Letter No.361; Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31 Jul., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.572-574.
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flooded on account of recent and prolonged heavy rain.96 At a later stage of Grierson’s campaign 
against the Apaches, Buell did move ‘his command to the west bank of the Rio Grande’97 so as to 
be best placed to move into action should the Apaches penetrate Grierson’s defence or retreat into 
Mexico and attempt to return to New Mexico somewhere between the Florida Mountains and El 
Paso.
96 Hatch to Grierson, Eagle Springs, and to Col. Buell, Fort Cummings, 1 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan.-Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.685-686.
97 Whipple to Sheridan 12 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.506; See also Whipple to Sheridan, 12 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2538, p.360; Platte to AAG HQ MDoM, 14 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 528; See also ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880.
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Grierson’s Texas Campaign 2: Rattlesnake Springs, August 1880
 
Grierson now had five companies of Tenth Cavalry (A, B, C, G and H), together with H Company, 
Twenty-Fourth Infantry, concentrated at Eagle Springs. To the north, K Company, under Captain 
Lebo, earlier tasked with scouting the area between Van Horn Wells and the Sierras Carrizo and 
Diablo, commenced their scout on 1 August 1880.1
At Eagle Springs, Grierson was informed that a section of 13 miles of the telegraph line between 
Forts Davis and Stockton was ‘down’. While this might have been the work of the Apaches, the 
extent of the damage suggests adverse weather conditions. A strong detachment had been sent out 
to repair the line, but in the meantime, Grierson’s communications to Fort Stockton would have to 
be carried by courier.2 In the immediate aftermath of Tinaja de las Palmas, Grierson suspected that 
Victorio would try to penetrate his defences further to the east, between the Eagle and Van Horn 
Mountains.3 At least some troops were sent out from Eagle Springs on 1 August, to guard Alamo 
Springs. This small detachment, its members drawn from several companies of the Tenth Cavalry, 
was commanded by Corporal Asa Weaver.4
On 3 August 1880, the Apaches fought a running battle with Weaver’s detachment near Alamo 
Springs,5 a location described as ‘a trickle of water between Eagle Mountains and Van Horn 
Mountains’.6 Weaver lost Private Willie Tockes (C Company), whose horse bolted right into the 
middle of the Apaches;7 and another trooper, Julius Londin (or London) was wounded.8 Robert 
Grierson recorded that one of Weaver’s men had been shot in the foot, and that the 125 Apaches 
1 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; 
‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Fort Davis Museum 
Webpage.
2 Yard, CO Fort Davis to Grierson, Eagle Springs, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson 
in the Field 30 Jun.-14 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4
3 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 31 Jul., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.80-81, Letter No.355.
4 Glass, 1971, p.135.
5 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Record of Events Aug., 
1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Davis, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 1891, NA, 
M617, Roll 298; Record of Engagements, pp.95-96; Leckie, 1967, p.226; Dinges Handbook of Texas 
Online entry; Leckie & Leckie, p.265; Thrapp, 1967, p.205; Miles, 1971, p.62; Webb, 1976, p.89.
6 Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
7 Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, RG391, Entry 933, pp.19-20; Leighton Finley Diary 
3 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson (Finley named the dead 
man as Pvt. George Jockoe); Leckie, 1967 p.226; see also Wharfield, p.173. My copy of the Chronological 
List has a smudge under ‘enlisted’ men killed but definitely notes a trooper as being wounded in this 
skirmish. (Chronological List, p.50) The Regimental History of the Tenth Cavalry notes that Tokes 
remains were not found until ‘months afterwards.’ (Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, 
RG391, Entry 933, pp.19-20).
8 Record of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96.
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involved had just crossed the Rio Grande with many horses.9 Weaver received an immediate 
promotion to sergeant for his conduct in this skirmish.10 His patrol returned to returned to Eagle 
Springs at approximately 3:30 p.m. on 3 August, and Weaver reported that the Apaches were to 
the east of Eagle Springs and were approximately 15 miles south of the road between Eagle Springs 
and Van Horn Wells.11
This skirmish raises a question as to the strategy deployed by Victorio. The Tenth Cavalry detach-
ment cannot have been large, if it was commanded by a corporal, and its small size prompts the 
question: why did the Apaches choose to fight a running battle? If Victorio and most of his warriors 
had been present, they should have had the numbers to put out a strong rearguard, thereby stopping 
Weaver’s detachment in its tracks; but if Weaver’s detachment had clashed with Victorio’s depend-
ants, accompanied only by a few warriors, this would explain why the Apaches did not attempt to 
drive off such a small detachment.
If the Apaches were operating in two groups, as appears to have been standard practice12 for 
Victorio when attempting to move dependents or plunder, they might have made arrangements to 
rendezvous further to the north. Victorio appears to have designated Fresno Springs, between the 
Sierra Diablo and the Carrizo Mountains, as the rendezvous.13 Study of the USGS maps suggests 
this would have been an ideal spot for both groups to unite in preparation for a move north into 
New Mexico. The warriors who had confronted Grierson at Tinaja de las Palmas also attacked 
a stagecoach, leaving a convenient survivor to spread the alarm. This would hopefully draw the 
Tenth Cavalry detachments westwards from Eagle Springs. The second group of Apaches (families 
and plunder escorted by a few warriors) would then cross the border, pass between the Eagle and 
Van Horn Mountains, and make for Fresno Springs, arriving from the south east. The bulk of the 
warriors, after creating their diversions, would arrive from the south west.
Yet the success of this diversionary tactic was threatened from the outset by the reports of 
Grierson’s and Valle’s scouts of the large camp 60 miles south east of Fort Quitman. Grierson 
would naturally have assumed that the next attempt to penetrate his defences would be made from 
this location. So, it is important to consider that he had knowledge from two sources of the broad 
location of the second group of Apaches before the first group drew attention to themselves. After 
Tinaja de las Palmas, the Tenth Cavalry returned to Eagle Springs because, as far as Grierson was 
concerned, this was the best place from which to counter any further manoeuvring by the Apaches 
camped opposite Ojo del Alamo in Mexico. Corporal Weaver’s skirmish would only confirm his 
commander’s assessment. Weaver’s detachment had intercepted the Apaches’ dependants travelling 
with a relatively light escort of older warriors. These Apaches would not have had any other option 
but to throw out a rearguard that became engaged in a skirmish while the rest made a run for it. 
When the telegraph line east from Fort Quitman was cut, on 4 August, this was probably a 
second attempt to draw the Tenth Cavalry to the west. Victorio appears to have based himself in 
the Eagle Mountains after Tinaja de las Palmas. One suspects that he was hoping to draw Grierson 
in pursuit into those mountains, fight a rearguard action or two, then draw the Tenth Cavalry into a 
horse-killing pursuit. When Grierson failed to take the bait, Victorio was ideally placed to monitor 
Tenth Cavalry movements. The Eagle Mountains soar high above Eagle Springs, and it would not 
9 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 4 Aug., 1880. 
10 Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, RG391, Entry 933, pp.19-20; Schubert, 1997, p.165; 
Bigelow, USACMH webpage.
11 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 4 Aug., 1880. The Handbook of Texas Online places Van Horn Wells twelve 
miles to the south of present day Van Horn, Texas. Van Horn Wells was originally established as a small 
military post on the California Trail sometime between 1859 and 1861. J.J. Van Horn of the 8th U.S. 
Infantry Regiment the first commander of this post gave his name to the post. (Thrapp, 1988, p.147).
12 See in particular , Chapter 14 for an illustration of this strategy.
13 Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
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have been difficult to station a scout or two on the heights around Grierson’s field headquarters. 
While Grierson could only speculate as to how many Apaches had cut the telegraph line to the 
west, he had already received confirmation of the location of what he assumed to be the main group 
of warriors. The location of Corporal Weaver’s running battle with Apaches, south east of Eagle 
Springs, was approximately where Grierson had expected a large party to appear. (See Map 11.2)
The Colonel now had what he thought was a strong lead on a large group of Apaches, and he 
assumed that this was Victorio’s main force of 125–150 warriors. As Weaver had reported that 
the Apaches had fled to the north east, towards the Van Horn Mountains, Grierson supposed 
the party was travelling to Viejo Pass, Van Horn Wells or Bass Canyon, before turning towards 
the Guadalupe Mountains.14  His prediction was that Victorio was aiming to pass through Bass 
Canon,15 and he marched from Van Horn Wells to block the canyon.16 On reaching the area and 
finding no signs of the passing of these Apaches, Grierson concluded that Victorio had continued 
east along the southern side of the Van Horn Mountains. He therefore sent some of his men south 
eastwards to block the passage around the eastern end of the Van Horn Mountains,17 covering 
the passage between Needle Peak and the Van Horn Mountains. In their records, A, B and H 
Companies, Tenth Cavalry, recounted moving beyond Van Horn Wells to what is now termed 
the Devil’s Racecourse18 or Race Track, on 3 August 1880.19 Grierson himself reported that his 
command had covered the passes between the Eagle Mountains and Van Horn Wells on the 
evening of 3 August. By the following morning, some of his troops were picketing the only pass 
between Bass Canyon and Capote. The Colonel had also received word by courier from Viejo Pass 
that all was quiet there. He was thus confident that the Apaches had not passed through his picket 
line.20 Robert Grierson and Lieutenant Finley stated that, by the time they camped on the evening 
of 4 August, they were 10 miles to the south east of Van Horn Wells.21 Robert Grierson also noted 
that they had reached a flat plain which stretched away for many miles, but had found no sign that 
a large group of Apaches had crossed the road.22 However, Grierson knew Apaches well enough 
not to make assumptions and, from his camp near Van Horn Wells, he sent out scouting parties 
southwards towards the border with Mexico, in search of the Apaches.23
This time it was the second group of Apaches who anticipated Grierson’s response to their 
discovery. On being discovered by Corporal Weaver’s detachment, they had fled to the north east, 
14 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 3 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.79, Letter No.353.
15 Ord, Citing Grierson’s report of the 3 Aug., 1880, to AG Chicago, 4 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.355; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
16 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Matthews, 1993, p.40; 
Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
17 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
18 On passing the site of Van Horn Wells in September 2006 enroute to Fort Davis we passed through a 
long flat grass covered plain running east from that point, which could be described as a race course. In 
July and August I am reliably informed by my companions that the temperatures at that time of year 
could be very hot. Hence the Devil’s racetrack.
19 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A & B, 10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; 
Record of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Davis, Texas Jan. 
1879-Jun. 1891, NA, M617 Roll 298; See also Glass, pp.134-135.
20 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 4 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.81-82, Letter No.356.
21 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 4 Aug., 1880.; Leighton Finley Diary 4 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, 
University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
22 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 4 Aug., 1880.
23 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 4 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.81-82, Letter No.356.
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to give the impression that they were going to pass east of the Van Horn Mountains. Having 
thrown off their pursuers, they turned north west and headed for Fresno Springs pass, to the west 
of Van Horn Wells.24 On 4 August, around midnight, Grierson learned that the Apaches had not 
attempted to pass to the east of the Van Horn Mountains. An east-bound stage, attempting to 
travel from Eagle Springs to Van Horn Wells, reported that they had seen between 50 and 100 
Apaches with about 100 horses. The driver claimed to have identified Victorio at approximately 
800 yards. The stage returned to Eagle Springs and tried to pass through again under cover of 
darkness. They discovered that the telegraph line between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells had 
been ripped up, with some of the poles burned and all of the insulators smashed. The driver thought 
that he passed within a mile of the Apaches’ camp and estimated that they were making for the 
Guadalupe Mountains.25 (see document file no. 93.) Grierson also stated that similar information 
had been delivered to him by one of his scouting detachments that same evening.26 He immediately 
alerted his counterparts in New Mexico and advised them to send troops eastwards to cover the 
Sacramento Mountains.27
Hatch alerted Fort Stanton and the detachment stationed at the Mescalero agency; and he 
approved Buell’s movement of forces to the Rio Grande and the sending of scouts into the San 
Andres Mountains.28 Major Morrow’s command was left intact at Knight’s Ranch,29 with a suffi-
cient garrison left at Fort Cummings to keep a close eye on the Mexican border west of the Rio 
Grande.30 This was the last that Hatch heard from Grierson until 10 August 1880. This was a 
recurring problem throughout the Victorio campaign, as troops moved away from close proximity 
to the telegraph lines in pursuit of the Apaches.
Subsequent events show that Grierson correctly concluded that Victorio was aiming for 
Rattlesnake Springs in Salt Flat Valley.31 For the moment, he had been completely outmanoeuvred 
by Victorio, and between 11:00 p.m. on 4 August and 3:00 a.m. on 5 August, he concentrated his 
battalion 10 miles southeast of Van Horn Wells.32 This concentration might have been accom-
plished more rapidly, had not one of his couriers failed to find the cavalry camp south east of Van 
24 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Thrapp, 1974, p.288; 
Leckie, 1967 p.226; Matthews, 1993, p.40; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.265; Dinges Handbook of Texas 
Online entry.
25 Loud to Buell, 7 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.713-714.
26 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 8 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.99-101, Letter No.384; Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d 
from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 
Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
27 Hatch (repeating Grierson’s telegram of 4 Aug., 1880) to CO Fort Stanton, 6 Aug., 1880 & AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 7 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.707, 710 &711; Grierson to AAAG SF 4 Aug., 1880 (It is worth noting that this message reached 
Capt Brinkerhoff at Fort Bliss on the 6 August, 1880 and this information was duly telegraphed to SF) 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.128; See also ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; 
Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
28 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 6 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.711; see also p.710.
29 The refitting and re-deployment of the troops in New Mexico will be covered in the following chapter.
30 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.711.
31 Fort Davis Museum Webpage. Rattlesnakes Springs were approximately 17 miles to the north of Fresno 
Springs and 10 miles from Apache Springs in the Sierra Diablo. (Capt. Viele to AAAG, DoP, Fort 
Concho, Texas, 24 Jan., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.25-40).
32 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
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Plate 11.2. The Devil’s Racecourse runs south-east from Van Horn Wells and, as the name suggests, it is 
unusually level and very hot during the summer. (Photo: author)
Plate 11.1. The Van Horn Wells of Grierson’s time was a number of miles to the south of the modern town. 
All that remains at the original site today is a couple of historical markers and some debris. (Photo: author)
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Horn Wells in the dark.33 Grierson had a lot to lose if he let Victorio’s Apaches slip through into 
New Mexico. After all, it had been Grierson who had lobbied his superiors to accept his plan to 
stop Victorio in western Texas, rather than further north in New Mexico. If the Apaches reached 
the Mescalero reservation, Grierson would be to blame. The Colonel did not panic, and rather than 
trying to pick up and pursue the trail, he sought to get ahead of Victorio and head the Apaches 
off at Rattlesnake Springs.34 Once again, he refused to be led into a horse-killing pursuit by the 
Apaches. If successful, this manoeuvre would prevent Victorio deploying most of his warriors as a 
strong rearguard, if the Tenth Cavalry did manage to catch up with them.
Setting out in the early hours of 5 August, Grierson sent A, B, C, G and H Companies, Tenth 
Cavalry, numbering 17035 or over 20036 troopers, on their way towards Rattlesnake Springs. He 
and his headquarters staff followed his cavalrymen in two ambulance wagons. This group in turn 
was followed by a supply wagon train, under Captain Gilmore, with 25 men of the Twenty-Fourth 
Infantry Regiment.37
Grierson marched northwards, keeping out of sight of the Apaches, by moving parallel to them 
on the east side of the Baylor Mountains.38 His command swung round the northern end of the 
Baylor Mountains and marched west across Salt Flat Valley and reached Rattlesnake Springs in the 
early hours of 6 August 1880. The command had covered an estimated 65 miles,39 from the camp 
10 miles to the south east of Van Horn Wells to Rattlesnake Springs, in just under 24 hours,40 an 
accomplishment in itself. The Tenth Cavalry battalion reached their destination around midnight, 
with Grierson himself arriving at half past three in the morning.41 The wagon train, being much 
slower, was not expected to arrive before the afternoon. Lieutenant Flipper recalled that campfires 
and use of lamps was strictly forbidden, saddles were left on their horses and the troops had cold 
food and coffee for their supper.42
While Grierson thought that his battalion had out-marched the Apaches, he did not immedi-
ately know this for sure. This is confirmed by Lieutenant Flipper’s account of the troops occupying 
33 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 6 Aug., 1880. 
34 Lt. Flipper’s memoir states that Victorio’s destination was Fresno Spring but then assumes that the 
Destination of their long night march was that location and did not realise that they had arrived at 
Rattlesnake Springs. While mistaken it does lend credence to the argument that Victorio had used 
Fresno Spring as the rendezvous point for the two groups of Apaches.
35 Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry.
36 Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
37 Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry.
38 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, 
p.265; Thrapp, 1974, p.288; 1967, p.204; Stout, 1974, p.155; Miles, 1971, p.62. Thrapp notes that the 
original despatches are too vague to pinpoint the exact route (Thrapp, 1974, p.288) However, the Fort 
Davis Museum webpage provides a clear location of Rattlesnake Springs as being just to the west of the 
Sierra Diablo Mountains and southeast of the opening into Victorio Canyon.
39 Grierson to AAG DoTx, San Antonio, 14 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 
14;See also Whipple to AG Wash. D.C. 13 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; 
Leighton Finley Diary, 5 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; 
‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30.
40 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG SF 
NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF, 13 Aug., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.737; ‘By Telegraph’, 
The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880. ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
41 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880. Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; Fort Davis Museum 
Webpage.
42 Harris. 1997, p.34.
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positions all round Rattlesnake Springs 
during the night.43 Captain Nolan, with 
A Company, was absent from the scene, 
having been sent to scout the Sierra Diablo.44 
It is probable that Grierson dispatched A 
Company, Tenth Cavalry, to scout across the 
Sierra Diablo and check that the Apaches 
had not attempted to pass to the west of the 
Sierra, thereby avoiding Rattlesnake Springs 
altogether.
Scouts45 sent out in the early hours of the 
morning found the Apaches to the south, 
confirming that the Colonel had regained 
the initiative.46 From these reports, Grierson 
predicted that Victorio would use Rattlesnake 
Canyon47 to reach Rattlesnake Springs. 
Remaining at the water hole, he delegated 
command to Captain Carpenter, who 
deployed C and G companies, under Captain 
Viele and Lieutenant Ayres respectively, in 
ambush along Rattlesnake Canyon,48 though 
Lieutenant Finley claimed to have effec-
tively commanded C Company during the 
skirmish.49 B and H Companies were held 
in reserve, under the command of Captain 
Carpenter.50 
It should be noted that the contemporary 
accounts of the deployment of the troops to 
43 Ibid.
44 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; 
Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; See also Thrapp, 1974, pp.288-289; Leckie, 1967, p.226; 
Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.265; Thrapp, 1967, pp.204-205; Stout, pp.155-156; Matthews, 1993, p.40; 
Worcester, 1979, pp.230-231; Rister, 1928, p.212; Miles, 1971, p.62; Fort Davis Museum Webpage; 
Burton, 1999, p.190; Glass, 1971, p.134.
45 The Pueblo scouts are not mentioned in the accounts of the move to Rattlesnake Springs but Grierson 
moved the majority of his immediate command from Eagle Springs to Van Horn Wells and on to 
Rattlesnake Springs and it seems unlikely that he left his Pueblo scouts behind.
46 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 
7 Aug., 1880. Rister, 1928, p.212.
47 The Fort Davis Museum webpage states that today Highway 54 runs through Rattlesnake Canyon.
48 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
49 Leighton Finley Diary 6 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; 
Dinges, 1988, p.166.
50 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; 
Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; See also Thrapp, 1974, pp.288-289; Leckie, 1967, p.226; 
Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.265; Thrapp, 1967, pp.204-205; Stout, 1974, pp.155-156; Matthews, p.40; 
Worcester, 1979, pp.230-231; Rister, 1928, p.212; Miles, 1971, p.62; Fort Davis Museum Webpage; 
Burton, 1999, p.190; Glass, 1971, p.134.
Captain Louis H. Carpenter, Tenth Cavalry.
Grierson placed him in direct command of the four 
companies of Tenth Cavalry which engaged Victorio’s 
warriors at Rattlesnake Springs. (Carlisle Barracks)
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ambush Victorio are quite ambiguous. Victorio would indeed have to pass along the arroyo in order 
to enter the canyon leading to Rattlesnake Springs but as the arroyo left the mountains it runs east 
and slightly north out into the plains. The southern side of the canyon entrance forms a spur which 
hides the opening from anybody approaching from the south along the edge of the Sierra Diablo. 
Therefore, the dismounted Tenth Cavalrymen would be concealed along the arroyo facing the 
approach of the Apaches from the south. In other words, they were not deployed along the arroyo 
in the canyon but immediately after it left the Sierra Diablo in an attempt to open fire at close range 
without warning. The intention was to catch the Apaches in the open ground immediately to the 
south of the arroyo. The spur of the Sierra Diablo would conceal both the horse holders of the two 
dismounted companies. It would also conceal the two mounted Tenth Cavalry companies poised 
to charge the Apaches after their comrades opened fire from the arroyo.51 In theory it was a good 
plan, see Map 11.3.
Rattlesnake Springs, 6 August 188052 (See document files no’s. 87, 94, 95 and 96.)
In the early afternoon, around 2:00 p.m., Victorio’s following was spotted approaching the area.53 
Probably detecting something suspicious, the Apaches stopped well short of the ambush.54 Indeed, 
Kaywaykla mentions an episode where Victorio and his band refrained from accessing a water-hole 
because they detected a ‘bluecoat’ ambush. His short description of events almost certainly refers 
to the events around Rattlesnake Springs.55 On seeing the Apaches draw back, their would-be 
ambushers fired several volleys at long range, which failed to do any physical damage, but were 
sufficient to cause the Apaches to take cover.56 So far, they had only spotted the two companies 
in ambush. Victorio’s warriors regrouped and, using the rough ground to their advantage, they 
fanned out and sought to infiltrate their targets’ lines, firing as they dodged from cover to cover. 
51 I visited this site in June 2018. The land is privately owned but I could see the lie of the land from the 
main road. This, in combination with looking at the area on Google-Earth strongly suggested the above 
deployment.
52 There is some confusion in some of the records as to whether the skirmish occurred on the 6 or 7 August. 
‘Robert Grierson Diary’ if carefully read shows this to be the 6 of August though the fact that he wrote 
up two days events on the 7 August can be confusing. One of Grierson’s own reports has been obviously 
changed from the 6 to the 7 August for reasons unknown. (Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 8 Aug., 1880 in 
Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, 
pp.99-101) Until clear evidence comes to the fore the author will remain with the 6 Aug. as the date.
53 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 
Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880.; 
‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army 
& Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30; Thrapp, 1974, p.288; Thrapp, 1967, p.205; Leckie, 1967, 
p.226; Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry.
54 Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.266.
55 Ball, 1970, p.76.
56 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 
Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880.; ‘By 
Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Thrapp, 1974, p.288; Thrapp, 1967, p.205; Record of Engagements, p.96; 
Leckie, 1967, p.226; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.266; Stout, 1974, p.156; Dinges Handbook of Texas 
Online entry; Rister, 1928, p.212; Miles, 1971, p.62; Burton, 1999, p.190.
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Plate 11.4 Closer view of the entrance to Victorio Canyon this time seen from the east. One can see the flat 
ground to the left over which the Apaches would approach from the south. The spur running out from the 
Sierra Diablo hiding the entrance to Victorio Canyon can be seen. This would have hidden the two reserve 
companies of mounted Tenth Cavalrymen from the approaching Apaches.
Plate 11.3 Entrance to Victorio Canyon leading to Rattlesnake Springs in the Sierra Diablo as seen from 
the northeast. In the immediate foreground is the arroyo running down from present-day Victorio Canyon.
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By attempting to close with their enemy, they hoped to force the latter away from the spring.57 
However, they had failed to spot the Tenth Cavalrymen held in reserve. Carpenter’s B and H 
Companies flanked and charged the Apaches.58 Victorio’s warriors broke off and took cover in 
the higher slopes of the Sierra Diablo Mountains. For two hours, the two sides skirmished, with 
neither gaining any advantage.59
Late that afternoon, the supply train, escorted by Captain Gilmore, appeared around the northern 
end of the Baylor Mountains.60 The escort of African-American soldiers from H Company, Twenty-
Fourth US Infantry, was riding inside the wagons.61 Though some contemporary accounts claimed 
this as a cunning ploy, the troops were unaware of the stand-off between Grierson and Victorio.62 
All the Apaches saw was an apparently unescorted wagon train. The two small groups of warriors 
who launched attacks were completely surprised by the infantrymen jumping out of the wagons and 
opening fire. At least one Apache was seen to fall from his horse, and others were believed to have 
been wounded before they could withdraw.63 Captain Carpenter then intervened, leading his four 
companies to the rescue.64 Company A may have returned from the Sierra Diablo, or have been 
able to see this portion of the battle from the mountains, as Lieutenant Flipper left a brief account 
which matches this part of the battle.65 
The Apaches made one final attack on the Tenth Cavalrymen stationed round the water hole in 
an attempt to panic their pack mules and horses; but the confident defence put up by the troops 
thwarted this attack.66 At one point, Victorio feigned a retreat, which triggered a pursuit by three 
companies led by Captain Carpenter. A hidden group of Apaches then burst out of cover behind 
57 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880.; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.639-644; Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; Thrapp, 1974, p.288; Thrapp, 1967, p.205 Stout, 
1974, p.156; Leckie, 1967, p.226; Miles, 1971, p.62.
58 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG SF 
NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880.; ‘By Telegraph’, The 
Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.639-644; Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 1967, p.226; O’Neal, 1991, p.67.
59 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30; Thrapp, 
1974, pp.288-289; Thrapp, 1967, p.205; Thrapp, 1988, p.744; Stout, 1974, p.156; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, 
p.266; Matthews, 1993, p.40; Rister, 1928, p.213.
60 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30; Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
61 Record of Engagements, p.96; Leckie & Leckie, p.266; see also ‘24th U.S. Infantry at Fort Davis Texas’ 
web-site.
62 Thrapp, 1967, p.205, note 50.
63 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 
Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880.; ‘By 
Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie, 1967, pp.226-227; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.266; Thrapp, 1967, 
pp.205-206; Thrapp, 1974, p.289; Stout, 1974, p.156; Dinges Handbook of Texas Online entry; Rister, 
1928, p.213; Miles 1971, p.62.
64 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
65 Harris, 1997, p.35.
66 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & 
Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30; Handbook of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 1967, p.227.
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Plate 11.5 The northern end of the Baylor Mountains from behind which Grierson’s supply train would 
appear only to become embroiled in the closing stages of the battle.
Plate 11.6 The Sierra Diablo to the south of Rattlesnake Springs. Victorio and his people approached and 
retreated from the Tenth Cavalry along this side of the mountain range.
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the pursuing Tenth Cavalrymen and made for the pack train. However, the troops left on guard 
held their nerve and averted a minor disaster.67 The Apaches finally retreated to the south, towards 
the Carrizo Mountains. A pursuit, led by Captain Carpenter, was terminated by the fading light, 
and the troopers regrouped and returned to Rattlesnake Springs.68
Grierson at first thought that he had suffered no casualties in this engagement,69 but it was later 
found that Private Wesley Hardy was missing. He was ‘last seen on the day of engagement with 
Victorio’s band of hostile Indians, has not been seen since’.70 Grierson himself could only say that 
he knew of four Apaches who had fallen from their horses during the engagement,71 though it was 
later claimed that the Apaches might have sustained as many as 30 casualties.72 A stock US army 
phrase,73 ‘Carried off their dead and wounded,’ was applied to Rattlesnake Springs and indicates 
that the Tenth Cavalry were unable to confirm Apache casualties for this battle.74 This event was 
certainly a setback for Victorio; but we should avoid hyperbole when describing it. The fact that 
Grierson and his men had managed to prevent Victorio’s band from infiltrating through West 
Texas was an outstanding achievement in itself; accomplished without the aid of Apache scouts, 
and speaks volumes of the skill of their commander and the discipline of his troops.
It is only fair to record that Grierson himself seems to have been disappointed in the outcome 
of the battle. His son Robert recorded in his diary hearing, but not seeing, the fighting, and 
commented:
I wish Papa had gone with the troops yesterday after the Indians – the movements could’ve 
been decidedly better made – a lot of Indians ought to’ve been captured. Papa wishes he’d 
gone, but he supposed the movements would be made according to his directions.75
If Grierson was disappointed, then he had only himself to blame for not being present at the battle. 
From the outset, the engagement did not go as planned. The Apaches detected their would-be 
ambushers in Rattlesnake Canyon, and so Captain Carpenter and his men found themselves facing 
experienced Apache warriors who were aware of their presence, rather than springing an ambush 
on a completely unsuspecting foe. Grierson may have committed the cardinal sin of assuming 
that the Apaches would blithely ride into an ambush. The standard Apache practice of throwing 
67 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Leckie & Leckie, p.266; 
See also Miles, 1971, p.62.
68 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Fort Davis Museum webpage.
69 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Stout, p.157; see also Chronological List, p.50.
70 Record of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th 
Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96.
71 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
72 Handbook of Texas Online entry: see also Record of Engagements, p.96; Webb, 1976, p.90; Leckie, 
1967, p.227; Stout, 1974, p.157.
73 See comments by Thrapp, in Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio 
Campaign 1879’, p.52.
74 Thrapp, 1967, p.206.
75 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 7 Aug., 1880. Fort Davis Museum webpage.
Grierson’s Texas Campaign 2: Rattlesnake Springs, August 1880 267
out scouts well in advance, to the flanks and rear of the main body, clearly led to detection of the 
ambush and alerted the main body.
In the meantime, Captain Lebo, in command of K Company, Tenth Cavalry, had separately 
inflicted significant damage on the Apaches. On 1 August,76 Lebo’s company found and captured 
a supply camp hidden in the Sierra Diablo. The Apaches guarding the camp were alert, spotting 
the Tenth Cavalrymen in sufficient time to make good their escape. Lebo’s men captured some 
live steers and ponies; and also captured a large stock of dried meat which was assumed to be 
being prepared in advance of Victorio’s arrival.77 (see document files no’s. 95 and 96.) In capturing 
the camp, K Company had deprived the Apaches of at least some of their provisions.78 It may 
have been this loss of supplies, plus his inability to reach Rattlesnake Springs ahead of Grierson’s 
forces, which forced Victorio ultimately to retreat back into Mexico. Captain Lebo attempted to 
pursue the Apaches, who fled north towards the Guadalupe Mountains, but gave up the chase at a 
place called Escondido. Lebo’s company scouted back down the western side of the Sierra Diablo, 
arriving at Fresno springs at their southern end and discovering abundant signs of Victorio’s having 
passed north the previous day. This trail was followed north to the point where Lebo made contact 
with Captain Nolan’s company in Rattlesnake Canyon, before the two detachments linked up with 
Grierson at Rattlesnake Springs on 7 August.79 
There were two further clashes between the Tenth Cavalry and the Apaches in the Guadalupe 
Mountains, and these involved detachments belonging to F and L Companies, Tenth Cavalry. On 
4 August, Sergeant William Richardson, with 11 men, was caught in a well planned and executed 
ambush. The detachment was pursuing a trail into a canyon on the south western side of the 
Guadalupe Mountains. The Apaches had occupied the higher ground and peaks which dominated 
the canyon, from where they killed Private William Taylor and forced the rest of the detachment 
to withdraw from the canyon under a hail of bullets ‘necessitating the abandonment of a number 
76 Leckie and Dinges etc. date this to Aug. 3 1880; Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, 
RG391, Entry 933, pp.19-20; Handbook of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 1967 p.227; Leckie & Leckie, 
1984, p.266; O’Neal, 1991, p.156; Bigelow, USACMH webpage; see also Haley, 1952, pp.333-334; 
Miles 1971, p.62; Webb, 1976, p.89). Thrapp, while acknowledging that two of his sources, (The 
Chronological List and Record of Engagements) list this as occurring on the 3 of Aug., he places it on 
the 9 of Aug.. (Thrapp, 1967, p.206; See also Stout, 1974, p.157; Chronological List, p.50; Record of 
Engagements, p.96).
There may be a simple explanation for this discrepancy. The Chronological List is quite definite that 
Captain Lebo attacked the Apaches in the Sierra Diablo, Texas on the 3 August, 1880. (p.50) However, 
on page 49 of the Chronological List, Captain Lebo’s attack, on 9 April, on a party of Mescaleros at 
Shakehand Springs is listed. Could one author have mistaken the April 1880 entry for the August, 1880 
entry while the other just assumed the former was correct? He may also have relied upon Rister’s account 
of this campaign where he argues that Lebo attacked Victorio and captured his supplies a few days after 
Rattlesnake Springs. (p.214).
77 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. in NA, RG94; See also 
Record of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Davis, Texas Jan. 
1879-Jun. 1891, NA, M617, Roll 298.
78 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF, 13 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.737; Thrapp, 1967, p.206; Dinges, Handbook of Texas Online entry; Leckie, 1967, 
p.227; O’Neal, 1991, p.156.
79 Leighton Finley Diary 3 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; 
‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Matthews, p.41; 
Fort Davis Museum Webpage.
The National Archives Wash D.C. contain a succinct summary of the campaign from Tinaja de las 
Palmas to Rattlesnake Springs. (Regimental History 1866-98 10th Cavalry, NA, RG391, Entry 933, 
pp.19-20).
268 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
of horses80 & other Government property’.81 Richardson was thought to have been ambushed a 
few miles to the north of Bowen Springs.82 On receipt of this news, Grierson was convinced that 
this was the same Apache party that had fled from Captain Lebo in the Sierra Diablo.83 Captain 
Kennedy, with a detachment drawn from men of both companies, set out after them; but following 
a five-day pursuit, they had to acknowledge failure, due to the weakening effect of lack of water on 
their horses.84 (see document file no. 95.) However, on 6 August, Kennedy stumbled on another 
party of Apaches, killing a Mescalero woman, and killing one pony and wounding another.85
In the aftermath of Rattlesnake Springs, Grierson despatched several detachments to likely 
waterholes and passes. On 7 August, Captain Carpenter, with companies G and H, was sent to 
picket Sulphur Springs. On the following day, a small detachment under Lieutenant Finley was 
sent to occupy Apache Springs.86 Grierson was confident that in picketing these three water sources 
(Rattlesnake, Sulphur and Apache Springs) he had denied access to the only water in this particular 
section of the county, thus denying the Apaches passage to New Mexico.87 Yet Lebo’s arrival from 
the south, on 7 August, must have caused Grierson some concern. Lebo’s detachment had not 
encountered any apparent sign of Victorio’s withdrawal from Rattlesnake Springs as they moved 
north towards that location from Fresno Springs. 
80 Grierson received news of this skirmish on the 9 August while still camped at Rattlesnake Springs and 
recorded that nine horses had been ‘shot’ during the attack. (Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from 
Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 
Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644).
81 In all the detachment lost 5 Saddles, 5 Curb Bridles, 2 Watering Bridles, 5 Cavalry Links, 5 Halters 
& Straps, 4 Surcingles, 5 Saddle Blankets, 4 Lariats, 5 Picket Pins, 3 Side Lines, 3 Nose Bags, 5 Curry 
Combs, 5 Horse Brushes, 4 Haversacks, 1 Saddle Bag, 5 Meat Cans, 2 Knives, 3 Forks, 3 Spoons, 
10, Canteens & Straps, 1 Springfield Carbine, 1 Carbine Sling, 1 Swivel, 1, Cartridge Belt, 1 Jointed 
Ramrod, 1 Shell Extractor, 1 Colt Pistol, 1 Pistol Holster, 50 Carbine Cartridges, 20 Pistol Cartridges. 
(Proceedings of a Board of Survey convened at Camp Safford, 21 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 
1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2) Bi-Monthly Company Muster 
Rolls for Company F, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94).
It was stated in the L Company bi-monthly return that four horses were lost. Whether this refers to 
L Company or the overall detachment’s losses is not made clear. (Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls 
for Company L, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. in NA, RG94) The Grant County Herald also stated that the 
Sergeant also lost four horses but held his ground for two hours. (The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 
1880).
82 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 Aug., 1880, p.30.
83 Beck to Kennedy, 11 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879 – 11 Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.137; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
84 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company L, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
85 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company F, 10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94; For a 
slightly different version of events see Chronological List entries, p.50; Record of Engagements, p.96; 
Webb, 1976, p.90.
86 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644. Sulphur Springs were on 
the eastern side of the Sierra Diablo and to the north of Rattlesnakes Springs. Apache Springs are in the 
Sierra Diablo, 22 miles from Sulphur Springs and 10 miles from Rattlesnake Springs. (Capt. Viele to 
AAAG, DoP, Fort Concho, Texas, 24 Jan., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.25-40) Captain 
Lebo stated that the Apache Springs are located high in the Sierra Diablo and some approximately 9 
miles north of Rattlesnake Springs. (Capt. Thomas Lebo to Post Adjutant, Fort Davis, Texas, 16 Feb., 
1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.68-104).
87 Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 Aug., 1880, to AAAG 
SF NM 10 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, DoTx to AG Chicago, 11 Aug., 
1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Matthews, 1993, p.41; Rister, 1928, p.214.
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That evening K Company, Eighth Cavalry, accompanied by a handful of Lipan Apache scouts, 
and led by Captain William R. Livermore, arrived at Rattlesnake Springs. A detachment from 
this company was detailed to scout southwards on the following morning, to follow Victorio’s trail 
from Rattlesnake Canyon.88 The detachment duly picked up the trail and followed it ‘some distance 
west into the mountains’, clearly implying that the Apaches had retreated into the Sierra Diablo.89 
That afternoon, Captain Baylor’s detachment of Texas Rangers finally caught up with Grierson at 
Rattlesnake Springs.90 
On 9 August, Grierson, with Captain Gilmore’s infantry company, and the Pueblo and Lipan 
scouts, scaled the eastern side of the Sierra Diablo and searched a portion of the range without 
encountering any Apaches.91 According to Grierson’s son, this force went out in advance of Grierson, 
who mounted up and followed their trail alone into the Sierra Diablo. On reaching the top, where 
the land levelled out into a relatively flat mesa, the Colonel spotted a number of men, whom he took 
for Apaches, and had defensively positioned himself with his back to the cliff before realising that 
the men were Charles Berger92 and some Pueblo scouts.93 Grierson returned to Rattlesnake Springs 
and on the following day placed Captain Nolan in charge a small battalion made up of the Captain’s 
own A Company, Tenth Cavalry, K Company, Eighth Cavalry, the Lipan Apache scouts and the 
Texas Rangers, and sent these troops south to Fresno Springs. From there they were to scout the 
southern reaches of the Sierra Diablo.94 Captain Lebo’s and Captain Gilmore’s companies were left 
to picket Rattlesnake Springs, while Grierson took C Company, Tenth Cavalry, north to Sulphur 
Springs.95 On arrival at Sulphur Springs, Captain Carpenter, with B and H Companies, Tenth 
Cavalry, were dispatched around the northern end of the Sierra Diablo to scout down its western 
flank, with Grierson remaining at Sulphur Springs with C and G Companies,Tenth Cavalry.96 This 
series of manoeuvres was designed to trap the Apaches in the Sierra Diablo or, at the very least, 
force their withdrawal and allow Grierson to set his forces in pursuit.97
Grierson appears to have stated that there was another clash between the Tenth Cavalry and the 
Apaches, on 11 August; but this report turned out to be erroneous.98 (see document file no. 97.) The 
88 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Leighton Finley 
Diary 7 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
89 Ibid.
90 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Leighton Finley 
Diary 7 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; See also Baylor, 
1996, p.253; Temple, 1959, p.106; Haley, 1952, p.334.
91 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Leighton Finley 
Diary 7 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson; See also Record 
of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Davis, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 
1891, NA, M617, Roll 298.
92 Berger had come to the attention of Grierson by being on hand to help operator Palmer at Fort Quitman 
to translate messages from the military authorities in Mexico. Berger expressed a desire to enlist as a 
scout and Palmer heartily endorsed his recruitment as a man to be ‘trusted.’ (Palmer to Grierson, 25 Jul., 
1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-14 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4).
93 ‘Robert Grierson Diary’, 11 Aug., 1880. 
94 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. 
98 ‘As a result of the fight of the 11 instant, and the activity and disposition of the troops, Victorio and his 
band have again been driven into Mexico. The trail leads in the direction of Ojo Caliente, and troops are 
in pursuit with Gillmore’s company of Infantry, and Livermore with his scouts and Pueblos.
We climbed the rough and precipitous cliff of the Sierra Diablo, two thousand feet in height, this, 
with the march of sixty-five miles in one day, and rapidity with which the mountains were encircled, and 
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only sign of Apaches were the two ponies picked up by Lieutenant Finley between Apache Spring 
and Rattlesnake Springs on 9 August.99
Captain Carpenter finally picked up Victorio’s trail on 11 August, and followed it to the west, to 
a point approximately 45 miles from Fort Bliss, where it turned south towards the Rio Grande.100 
Carpenter sent word to Captain Nolan, who was camped at Carrizo Pass. Carpenter, whose horses 
were showing signs of exhaustion, then made for Eagle Springs, where he was joined by Captain 
Nolan in the early hours of the following morning. Nolan pressed on towards Tinaja de las Palmas 
and picked up the trail two miles before that location.101 The trail of the Apaches was reported to 
have reached the Rio Grande, but then to have turned southwards, away from Old Fort Quitman 
and down towards Ojo Caliente, Texas.102 A Mexican scout working from Quitman reported 
having seen some of the Apaches camped on the US side of the river, within five miles of the Fort, 
on or around 12 August.103 It was supposed that the Apaches might have hidden in the mountains 
just north of the river, and Nolan’s detachment was reported to be investigating this possibility.104 
On 13 August, Nolan finally confirmed that the Apaches had crossed back into Mexico.105 It was 
reported that the hurried manner in which they had torn strips of meat from the dead animals 
found in their camps indicated a rout rather than a retreat.106 It was also reported that a group 
of Colonel Valle’s scouts had been attacked on 13 or 14 August, in the mountains across the 
the Indians were driven from their stronghold, the haste with which they fled, fully attests the energy, 
pluck and earnest activity of the troops’ (Grierson to AAG DoTx, San Antonio, 14 Aug., 1880 ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14;sSee also Whipple to AG Wash. D.C. 13 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Miles, 1971, p.62) At first glance one would presume Grierson is refer-
ring to the fight at Rattlesnake Springs on the 6 August. Yet on reflection it seems difficult to see how 
Grierson, writing on the 14 August, could mistake the 6 with the 11 August.
However if one consults the same document as recorded as ‘Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 12 Aug., 1880 
in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
1, p.105, Letter No.389’ it becomes clear that Grierson has himself recorded Rattlesnake Springs as 
happening on the 7 Aug. and the manner in which the ‘7’ has been written in this record it can be misin-
terpreted as the number ‘11’.
99 Leighton Finley Diary 9 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
100 Whipple to Sheridan, 14 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.514; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.639-644.
101 Carpenter to Beck, AAAG, 16 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
102 Whipple to Sheridan, 14 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.514 & Whipple to Sheridan, 15 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.513.
103 Brinkerhoff, 12 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.725.
104 Nolan to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.735; Whipple to Sheridan, 14 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, 
Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.514; Platt to AAG, HQ MDoM, 
14 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
105 Brinkerhoff to AAAG, SF, 13 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.739; Platt to AAG, HQ MDoM, 15 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Record of Engagements, p.96; Leckie, 1967, 
p.227; Leckie & Leckie, p.266; Thrapp, 1974, p.289; Thrapp, 1988, p.1059; Matthews, 1993, p.41; 
Haley, 1952, p.335; Miles, 1971, p.62.
106 Grierson, Eagle Springs to AAG, San Antonio, 19 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
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river from Fort Quitman; though the veracity – let alone the details – of this skirmish remained 
unconfirmed.107 
The Texas Ranger company had joined Captain Nolan’s company in their pursuit of Victorio, 
following the Apaches west to Carrizo Springs108 and then south past Tinaja de las Palmas and on 
towards Fort Quitman.109 On returning to the site of Grierson’s stand at Tinaja de las Palmas, they 
discovered what Baylor chose to interpret as a message to Grierson from Victorio:
When they [the Apaches] got to General Grierson hill they perpetrated a small joke at his 
expense. They had managed to get a woman’s bonnet and dress, probably in the murder of Mrs 
Graham and old man Grant at Bass Canyon,110 and they placed it on top of Standemoffski,111 
making a scarecrow of dagger stalks, intending as much to say, “ why didn’t you come out and 
fight on open ground and not hide behind rocks, like an old woman?”112
This story is potentially corroborated by Robert Grierson. On 25 August, when passing Tinaja de 
las Palmas on his way towards Fort Quitman, his son Robert described how:
The Indians had been there & knocked down the walls. Papa found a sort of wrap made of 
calico & red flannel-we stuck it away up on a dagger bush.113
Ironically the Texas Rangers had probably thrown down this scarecrow only to have it effectively 
reinstated by the Grierson’s. In fact, such an overt display of contempt or frustration on the part 
of the Apaches, is unusual as it did not reflect their own attitudes towards warfare. If this was a 
message left by the Apaches, it was more likely one of defiance than contempt; they may have been 
forced back into Mexico, but the fight for their Ojo Caliente reservation was by no means over.
During their move south past Tinaja de las Palmas, the Apaches encountered a stage coach 
and riddled it with bullets, killing ex-civil war General, J.J. Byrne.114 The attack occurred on 9 
August, and it was initially reported that a passenger had been wounded.115 The stage’s driver, 
107 Carpenter to Beck, AAAG, 16 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
108 Presumably in or by the Carrizo Mountains. (See Leckie, p.156) According to Baylor’s Editor these 
springs are approximately: “seven miles northwest of present-day Van Horn” (1996, note 14, p.257).
109 Gillett, 1976, p.181.
110 See Chapter 9. If Baylor is correct then this attack was probably carried out by Mescalero raiders who 
subsequently allied with Victorio’s band. On May 12 1880 Victorio and his people seem to have been 
operating in New Mexico. See chapters 7 and 8.
111 Baylor seems to have nick-named Grierson’s Hill ‘Standemoffski’ for it’s defensive qualities. On the 13 
of September 1861 five Texans had held off a large Apache warparty from the same hill. (Baylor, 1996, 
pp.250-252 & p.256 note 4).
112 Baylor, 1996, p.254; Baylor 1925, pp.12-13.
113 Robert Grierson’s Diary, 24 August 1880. Copy courtesy of the Fort Davis Museum Archives; Temple, 
1959, p.106.
114 ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, p.290; Stout, pp.158-159; Baylor, 
1996, p254; Temple, 1959, p.107; Cutrer, Handbook of Texas Online entry
115 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 10 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.724; List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the 
DoTx, since September 30, 1879, officially reported by post commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, p.633; Gillett, 1976, p.181; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.268; Webb, 1976, p.90.
Some reports suggested that the attack had occurred on the following day. (Whipple to Sheridan, 11 
Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.359; See also Cutrer, Handbook of Texas Online entry.) 
Others suggested the attack may have occurred as late as the 19 August. Thrapp, (1974, p.372 note 56) 
notes that Col Grierson reported this attack on the 19 August (Grierson, Eagle Springs to AAG, San 
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Ed Walde, had suddenly found himself confronted by a large dismounted group of Apaches in 
Quitman Canyon. He managed to swing his team around, but the Apaches had immediately 
opened fire, hitting Byrne in the side. The Apaches mounted their horses and charged after the 
fleeing coach. During the chase, an Apache warrior who had caught up with the coach fired a bullet 
and it smashed Byrne’s hip. Byrne was unarmed, and Walde only had an old Spencer carbine with 
one bullet. According to Walde, he handed the gun to Byrne who, despite his injuries, managed 
to badly wound one of the following Apaches. Walde eventually succeeded in getting away and 
returned to Fort Quitman; but Byrne died of his wounds on 13 August.116 (see document files no’s. 
98 and 99.) Gillett reports that driver Walde (or the name may have beenWest) joined the Rangers, 
so eager was he to exact revenge on the Apaches.117 The Texas Ranger detachment came across the 
signs of the attack as they ‘passed through the worst part of Quitman Canyon and beyond what 
was known as the Apache Post Office, where the Indians had some hieroglyphics on the rocks’.118 
Gillett was able to examine the stagecoach at Fort Quitman a few days later, and reported: 
I examined the little canvas-topped stage and found it literally shot to pieces. I noticed where 
a bullet had glanced along the white canvas, leaving a blue mark a foot long before it passed 
through the top. Three of the spokes of the wheels were shot in two and there were fifteen to 
twenty bullet marks on and through the stage.119
The same raiders then carried on to kill a Mexican herder on a ranch belonging to Jesus Cota and 
made off with 140 cattle.120 The Apaches then finally crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico.121 (see 
document file no. 99.) The Texas Rangers, following up, found approximately 40 cattle mired in 
the mud of a riverbank. Some of the trapped cattle had had chunks of meat torn from them before 
being abandoned by the Apaches. Some of these unfortunate animals were still alive when the 
Texas Rangers found them.122 Gillett interpreted this as heartless savagery; but Grierson is closer to 
the truth when he interprets this as starvation on the part of the Apaches, having lost a significant 
proportion of their provisions to the Tenth Cavalry in the Sierra Diablo, combined with a desperate 
need to keep moving in an effort to evade pursuit.123
As a final comment, it should be noted that the Apaches had, in shooting retired General Byrne, 
killed a severe critic of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry Regiments and their commanders. Only days 
before he was killed, Byrne had written to a Texas congressman: 
Antonio, 19 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14) and suspects that the attack took 
place on or around that date. However, Grierson did not receive this information for some days as he was 
still in the field coordinating his regiment’s pursuit of the Apaches.
116 ‘The Driver’s Account of how Gen. J.J. Byrne was Killed’, The Grant County Herald, 9 Oct., 1880; 
See also Gillett, 1976, pp.181-182; Thrapp, 1988, p.203Stout, pp.158-159; Baylor, 1996, pp.257-258; 
Ruhlen, 1971, p.112. Cutrer names the driver as Charles D West and adds that Byrne was not carrying 
a weapon and that West had only two bullets for his Winchester. He also states that Byrne died of his 
wounds on the 14 Aug., 1880. (Cutrer, Handbook of Texas Online entry; see also Thrapp, 1988, p.203).
117 Gillett, 1976, p.182.
118 Baylor, 1996, p.254 see also Cutrer, Handbook of Texas Online entry; Smith, 1994, p.185.
119 Gillett, p.182.
120 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 28 Aug., 1880, p.62; Gillett, 1976, p.182; Stout, p.189.
121 Whipple to Sheridan, 26 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.540-541.
122 Gillett, 1976, p.182; Stout, 1974, p.159.
123 Grierson, Eagle Springs to AAG, San Antonio, 19 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, 
Roll 14; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 28 Aug., 1880, p.62; Gillett, 1976, p.182; Stout, 
1974, p.159.
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For God’s sake … have some other soldiers sent … besides Negroes, and another commander, 
MacKenzie, Merritt, Davidson – anybody but Grierson or Hatch.124
He also somewhat misrepresented Grierson’s conduct, presumably at Tinaja de las Palmas, by 
castigating the Colonel for fleeing ‘to an almost impregnable mountain fortress when Victorio 
appeared’.125 Unfortunately, the death of a retired general who had fought for the Union in the 
Civil War was an event which distracted public attention away from the Tenth Cavalry’s success 
in forcing the Apaches back into Mexico. It must have provided critics of the Ninth and Tenth 
Cavalry Regiments with yet another small piece of ammunition for their attacks. Byrne’s widow 
even wrote to Grierson on 24 October 1880 accusing him of refusing to provide:
a few negro soldiers – some of them probably having been slaves of mine – to protect the body 
of him who was murdered on a frontier that is supposed to be protected by you.126 
In the weeks following the campaign, the Tenth Cavalry’s regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Robert 
G. Smither, robustly rebutted these criticisms, going so far as to describe the reports of one Judge 
Blacker as coming ‘from his soggy and alcoholic brain or, they are the wild imaginations of a scared 
man’.127 Yet such reports clearly illustrate the hostility faced by the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry from 
the very people they were trying to protect, in addition to the very real threat posed by Apaches.
Gillett and Baylor also portray the often contradictory relations between Anglo-Americans and 
Mexicans. As we have seen, and shall see, the Texas Rangers were happy to ally with, and indeed 
had great respect for, those Mexicans pursuing the Apaches south of the border. Yet their comment, 
on finding the slain Mexican herder, betrays a casual contempt for Mexicans north of the border:
The redskins, with a freakish sense of humor, perpetrated a grim joke on the murdered herder. 
He was rendering tallow when surprised and killed, so the murderers rammed his head into 
the melted tallow to make him a greaser.128
We must, of course, remind ourselves to refrain from applying today’s morality to past events; but 
one wonders whether Gillett or Baylor would have seen anything humorous in the victim’s end if 
he had been an Anglo-American cowboy? However, it also has to be acknowledged that Baylor 
had made sterling efforts to reduce ethnic tensions across the Rio Grande between Texan and 
Mexican.129 Having originally set out to hunt for Victorio on 2 August, the Rangers, after covering 
a distance of approximately 500 miles, returned to their base at Ysleta on, or around, the 22 August 
1880.130
124 ‘General Byrne’s Last Letter’, The Grant County Herald, 11 Sept., 1880; Leckie & Leckie, 1984, p.268
125 ‘General Byrne’s Last Letter’, The Grant County Herald, 11 Sept., 1880; Leckie & Leckie, 1984,  p.268; 
Temple, 1959, p.107. As noted in the previous chapter, Grierson’s position was undoubtedly impregnable 
but can hardly be described as the top of a mountain.
126 Temple, 1959, p.107. From the language used it is somewhat unclear as to whether Mrs Byrne’s is refer-
ring to Grierson as directly responsible for her husband’s death by refusing to provide an escort through 
Quitman Pass or whether Grierson had refused to provide an escort for her husband’s body.
127 Smither to Gen. Tho. M. Vincent, San Antonio, TX., 22 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent 19 Sept., 1879 – 11 
Aug., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.136; Temple, 1959, 
pp.105-107.
128 Gillett, pp.182-183; see also Baylor, 1996, p.254.
129 See Thompson’s comments in the introduction to Baylor’s works 1996, p.21.
130 Baylor, 1996, p.258 note 17.
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If we take an overview of the campaign in western Texas during July and August, it can be 
argued that much of the US success can be put down to the able direction of the Tenth Cavalry by 
their commander. 
Most importantly, Grierson had not been tempted into a futile pursuit of his enemy; and this 
was his stated intention before Victorio made any attempt to pass through western Texas. At the 
critical point, at Rattlesnake Springs, Grierson had held off Victorio by getting in front of him. 
Had Grierson, from Van Horn Wells, followed the trail of the Apaches and come up from behind, 
Victorio would have been able to hold him off with ease while his families and plunder were got 
safely away to the Guadalupe Mountains. By that point, Kennedy had been drawn into a fruitless 
pursuit north against a group of Apaches who had penetrated Grierson’s picket lines undetected, 
until surprised by Lebo in the Sierra Diablo. The way would have been clear for Victorio. The only 
other company in the area, Lebo’s, was scouting down the western side of the Sierra Diablo, and 
did not detect the fighting that occurred at Rattlesnake Springs. Therefore, Grierson’s knowledge 
of Apache strategy and tactics played a part in his victory.
Key to Grierson’s strategy was the fact that he had been alerted, first by the Mexicans, and then 
by his own scouts, to the approximate location of the second group of Apaches, before the first 
group of Apaches attempted to distract him. This meant that he never really lost sight of the very 
group of Apaches whom Victorio hoped to conceal from him. This is all the more important as it is 
clear that none of Victorio’s opponents had realised what the Apache leader was trying to accom-
plish. For example, Colonel Hatch, a more effective Apache campaigner than most give him credit 
for, in October 1880, would state that: ‘The Apache is crafty enough to lead the main column as 
far away as possible while his small parties are sent out to the war.’131 This observation is reasonably 
accurate under some circumstances. When the Apaches thought that their dependents and plunder 
were safely hidden, or did not need to be moved, they would adopt such techniques. This is exactly 
how Victorio operated in March 1880 when the Rio Grande valley was raided. However, it was 
not how Victorio would move dependents or plunder from one location to another in the presence 
of hostile forces.
Grierson also benefitted from being able to rely on his officers and men to react swiftly to his 
orders as intelligence reached headquarters. Some of these orders were transmitted by telegraph 
and, as chance allowed, via stagecoach. Yet by implication, much of the communication between 
Grierson and his detachments was carried by hard-riding couriers who knew the country. 
The strategy of picketing passes and waterholes was an important one, and the factor most high-
lighted in contemporary sources, and indeed by history. As early as 14 August 1880, the Grant 
County Herald argued that Grierson’s occupation of known water sources had frustrated Victorio’s 
attempt to return to New Mexico and was forcing a retreat into Chihuahua.132 Yet this tactic only 
provided the foundation from which Grierson achieved his success. It was the use of small active 
patrols and scouts, plus close cooperation with Mexican forces from these bases, which was the key 
to his success.
Most US army successes against Apaches were spearheaded by Chiricahua or Western Apache 
scouts. However, the Tenth Cavalry managed to defeat one of the most successful Apache leaders 
without the aid of such scouts. It is true that Pueblo scouts were involved in confirming the intel-
ligence received from Colonel Valle. But the Pueblo scouts also failed to find the Apaches after 
Rattlesnakes Springs, when Grierson lost track of the latter for almost five days. If there had been 
a Chiricahua or Western Apache scout company with Grierson at this point, it is unlikely that the 
Apaches could have remained hidden in the Sierra Diablo for at least two days. It is even possible 
131 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 6 Oct., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 
94.
132 ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 14 Aug., 1880.
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that, with six companies of Tenth Cavalry in and around the Sierra Diablo, the presence of an 
Apache scout company might have brought about the end of the Victorio Campaign.
Nevertheless, both Colonel Grierson and General Ord were confident that the Apaches had 
suffered at least 30 casualties and were in no condition to oppose ‘any organized force’, arguing that 
the large force gathering in New Mexico under Colonel Buell (see next chapter) would be able to 
catch and finish off the remaining Apaches.133 The argument that Victorio had taken serious losses 
appears to have been optimistic. First, an Apache leader losing at least 30 warriors in the space of 
just over two weeks would rapidly have lost his influence. Second, on 25 August 1880, Brinkerhoff 
received the following information:
American scouts from Carrizal yesterday report that Victorio travelled for several miles with 
his herds and people directly on the stage road from this place [Fort Bliss, Texas] to Chihuahua, 
while enroute to Candelaria Mountains. Mexican people reports the bands as strong, defiant 
and aggressive.134
This does not sound like a spent military force. Victorio may have been outmanoeuvred by Grierson, 
but the Apaches had not been badly physically damaged by the campaign. The most decisive long-
term element of the Tenth Cavalry’s success was in preventing the Apaches from reaching New 
Mexico to sell their loot for fresh supplies of rifles and ammunition. The campaign in the Trans-
Pecos region had consumed a significant amount of ammunition yet, as we shall see in Chapter 14, 
it had not quite precipitated a critical shortage of ammunition for Victorio.
Victorio retreats to Mexico
Grierson’s requests that he be allowed to pursue Victorio into Mexico were turned down,135 though 
there were enough rumours to the effect that Grierson had crossed into Mexico to generate an 
urgent request from the Adjutant General to General Ord asking the latter to verify such infor-
mation.136 Grierson had to content himself with sending some scouts to shadow the Apaches south 
of the border. The scouts reported that Victorio had returned to the Candelaria Mountains by the 
middle of August 1880 to rest and recuperate, his warriors having been ‘very severely punished 
during their short stay in Texas’.137 
These scouts, two Lipan Apaches, two Pueblos, and Sergeant Tippett from the Seminole scouts, 
led by Charles Berger, were sent across the border by Grierson on 18 August.138 Berger discovered 
133 Ord to AG Chicago Ill. 27 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
134 Brinkerhoff to AAAG, SF, 27 Aug., 1880  in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 
2601, Box 93.
135 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Matthews, 1993, p.41.
136 Whipple to Ord, 20 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.527; Mason, AG DoTx to AG Chicago 20 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio 
Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
137 ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Ord to AG Chicago, 
25 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Whipple to Sheridan, 26 Aug., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.540; 
see also Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF, 13 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.737; Whipple AAG to Sheridan, 19 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2538, p.364; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 28 Aug., 1880.
138 Berger to Beck, 23 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Beck to CO Fort Quitman, 18 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug., to 31 Dec., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.146; ‘Grierson’s Report, 
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that the Apaches had camped for two days approximately two to three miles across the border, and 
had hastily killed about 20 cattle. Berger reported that the main trail then traversed very rough 
ground to a spring in the Borracho Valley. He also noted that at that point a trail of about 20 horses 
split away from the main trail and made off westwards. He assumed this group to be warriors.
Information that this smaller trail passed round the northern flank of the Sierra Borracho was 
reported by other Pueblo scouts sent over the river from Fort Quitman by Captain Nolan. The 
Captain was less than impressed when they returned within two days stating that the Apaches 
were making for the Candelaria Mountains and citing the poor state of their horses for their quick 
return.139 
Berger noted that the main group of Apaches had attempted to hide their trail leading from 
the spring in the Borracho valley by scattering. Berger, who knew that there was a good source of 
water five miles distant, made straight for the Ojo Del Borracho,140 but was surprised to find that 
there was no sign of the Apaches having rendezvoused at this point. He camped for the night above 
the spring and, on the morning of 21 August, looked for, but could see, any smoke indicating the 
near presence of an Apache camp. The trail was re-discovered at a rendezvous to the south west of 
Berger’s camp, in a canyon with both good water and grass. The Apaches had stayed at this spot 
for two days and had killed their remaining cattle and cured the meat. Berger also found evidence 
that they were caring for a number of wounded and that some of their horses were exhausted. The 
trail from this camp was easy to follow, going in a direction slightly south of east for about 22 miles 
before arriving at the Alcapparra Mountains. Here, Berger concluded that the trail was going 
towards the Candelaria Mountains, and left it and made for Canta Recio. From that point, he was 
confident that he could pick up the trail, as Canta Recio was only 20 miles, as the crow flies, from 
the Candelaria Mountains.
This manoeuvre would allow Berger to avoid an arduous and potentially dangerous journey, as 
the trail deliberately crossed the most difficult terrain, in a very dry section of the country. Berger 
also wished look for the smaller trail, which he estimated would pass to the north of the main trail. 
Finally, he estimated that he was six days behind the main group of Apaches, and needed to make 
up some time. Berger cut the second trail 14 miles to the north, before camping at the Passo del 
Amargosa. This trail was also moving in the direction of the Candelaria Mountains. Berger arrived 
at Canta Recio on 22 August, and entered the settlement ahead of the party, for fear that, if not 
forewarned of the presence of US army Indian scouts, Mexican soldiers or citizens would attack 
his companions.
At Canta Recio, the small garrison of soldiers under Francisco Mesa informed Berger that 
the Apaches had passed 25 miles to the south of them on the morning of 15 August.141 Mesa 
also informed him that, in the late afternoon of that day, five Mexican scouts attached to Mesa’s 
command had skirmished for about half an hour with five Apaches near Canta Recio, losing one 
horse killed, before federal soldiers from Carrizal and San Jose arrived and drove the Apaches 
off. These troops had then followed the Apaches towards the Candelaria Mountains. Prior to this 
skirmish, the Apaches had ambushed three Mexican smugglers in the Passe de la Ventana. Two 
Sept.1880’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; See also Thrapp, 1967, p.207; Haley, 1952, 
p.335; Rister, 1928, p.215.
139 Nolan to AAG, DoP, 19 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-14 
Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4.
140 Berger estimated that this spot was 30 miles S.E. of Fort Quitman on the slope of the Borracho 
Mountains.
141 Berger to Beck, 23 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
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of the smugglers had been killed, with the third managing to escape.142 At least one other attack 
was reported from northern Chihuahua: on 15 August, herders guarding horses belonging to the 
Mexican Army had been attacked. A vigorous fire-fight had ensued, but with no casualties. The 
Apaches had managed to make away with only one horse.143
Grierson later stated that his scouts had confirmed that the Apaches were in the Candelaria 
Mountains ‘in a badly crippled and demoralized condition’.144 An apparent casualty, was Victorio’s 
sister, Lozen, who failed to reappear when the Apaches re-grouped in Old Mexico. As the Apaches 
did this at least twice between May and August 1880 the date of her disappearance is difficult to 
determine. A careful reading of Kaywaykla’s account suggests that this separation took place as the 
Apaches retreated over the Rio Grande in August 1880.145 This remarkable woman, had apparently 
rejected marriage for fighting alongside the warriors. She also had ‘power’. Most successful Apache 
warriors and war leaders were credited with some form of ‘power’. In Lozen’s case she was credited 
with an ability to detect enemies.146 At some point Lozen became separated from the band, staying 
with a Mescalero woman in labour, and escorting her back to the Mescalero reservation.147 She 
did not rejoin her companions until after the climax of the Victorio Campaign at Tres Castillos in 
October 1880.
Yet if one reads Berger’s report, while the Apaches were carrying wounded, it hardly reads as 
if they were in a crippled state. The information noted above, which was relayed to Brinkerhoff, 
regarding the strength and aggression displayed by the Apaches as they travelled to the Candelaria 
Mountains, also undermines this impression. Thus, when one reads that Berger accused Mexican 
troops of making no attempt, unless directly attacked, to block the Apaches as they made for the 
Candelaria Mountains,148 one suspects that these scattered detachments were too weak to confront 
Apaches who were in no mood to give up the fight. Indeed, Grierson was contacted by Dr Mariano 
Samaniego, who had examined the trail left by the Apaches as they made towards the Candelaria 
Mountains. Samaniego estimated that there were at least 500 cattle and horses in this group, 
and stated that the federales had ‘made some marches, but no advance against the main body of 
the Indians’.149 Samaniego also reported that the Apaches were closely monitoring every move-
ment made by the Mexican troops.150 The latter were split into small detachments to guard the 
settlements near the Candelaria Mountains.151 Samaniego predicted that, if not pursued, Victorio 
142 Report of Francisco Mesa, In Command of Detachment camped at Santa Recio, 22 Aug., 1880 trans-
lated by Charles Berger & Berger to Beck, 23 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; See also Hatch (citing telegram from Samaniego 
to Brinkerhoff) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 17 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.749; Platt to AAG HQ MDoM 18 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Platt to AAG HQ MDoM, 18 Aug., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14.
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148 Berger to Beck, 23 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Ord to AG Chicago Ill. 27 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
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would linger in the Candelaria Mountains before drifting on to the Laguna de Guzman.152 It 
seemed likely Colonel Valle, with a small detachment of troops en route from El Paso del Norte to 
Chihuahua City, had had a narrow escape, as the main party of Apaches had crossed the road the 
Colonel was on only hours after his troops had passed.153
Grierson argued that the failure of the Mexican Army under Valle to blockade the Rio Grande, 
combined with the refusal of the Mexican Government to allow Grierson to cross the border, had 
allowed the Apaches an easy escape, perhaps not realising, or forgetting, that he had managed to 
lose track of Victorio in the Sierra Diablo. Nevertheless, Grierson accused many Mexican citizens 
of actively colluding with the Apaches to facilitate their flight. Grierson stated that:
There seems to be a tacit understanding between Victorio and many Mexicans, that so long as 
he does not make war upon them in earnest, he can take whatever food and other supplies he 
may need for his warriors.154
While this accusation had a great deal of truth to it, the Colonel did not appreciate that this often 
reflected a less than stable political situation south of the border. Ordinary Mexican citizens in 
isolated settlements or ranches often depended on good relations with the Apaches to ensure their 
very survival.
Grierson also reported that the Mexican troops had withdrawn to Chihuahua City to counter a 
threatened internal insurrection.155 However, far from undermining operations against the Apaches 
prior to their return to the Candelaria Mountains in mid-August, these troop movements had not 
been ordered until late August. This news was transmitted to Captain Brinkerhoff by Samaniego 
on 1 September 1880.156 It is also quite clear that Valle intended to return to the frontier to resume 
operations against the Apaches once the internal difficulties had been resolved.157 (see document 
file no.100.)
Grierson was too harsh on the Mexican Army. He had already erroneously claimed that it had 
left the corresponding section of the border in the aftermath of the engagement at Tinaja de las 
Palmas, when it had temporarily withdrawn to El Paso del Norte for additional supplies. In fact, 
Valle had only withdrawn from the border in mid-August. Grierson was so annoyed at what he 
perceived to be Valle’s actions that he went so far as to contact Captain Brinkerhoff, instructing 
him to contact Valle to demand the return of the supplies that Grierson had sent over to the 
Mexicans when Valle and Grierson had met at Old Fort Quitman.158 One can only hope that 
Captain Brinkerhoff had the diplomacy to ignore this request.
152 Hatch (citing telegram from Samaniego to Brinkerhoff) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 17 Aug., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.749.
153 Report of Francisco Mesa, In Command of Detachment camped at Santa Recio, 22 Aug., 1880 trans-
lated by Charles Berger & Berger to Beck, 23 Aug., 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Ord to AG Chicago Ill. 27 Aug., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
154 Rister, 1928, p.215.
155 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 26 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.131-133, Letter No.444; ‘Grierson’s Report, Sept.1880’; 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644.
156 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 1 Sept., 1880 & Brinkerhoff to AAAG 2 Sept., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.808-809 & pp.803-804.
157 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 8 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.821; CO Ft Bliss to Hatch, 8 
Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.807; See 
also Pope to AAG, HQ MDoM, 10 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
158 Grierson to CO, Fort Bliss, 18 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.108-109, Letter No.403.
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This situation was exacerbated by the US troops’ inability to cross the border in hot pursuit of 
the Apaches. First, in February 1880, a clear instruction that US troops could pursue Apaches 
across the border had been suspended as a result of diplomatic pressure from Mexico. On 22 June 
1880, the Mexican Federal Government refused permission for US troops to cross the border. (See 
Chapter 8.) The State Department had persevered in its efforts to persuade the Republic of Mexico 
to allow US troops to cross, but these efforts were in vain, and on 29 July 1880, the US Minister 
to Mexico was again informed, by the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, that such permission 
would not be granted.159 On 26 August 1880, Grierson was sent word by Ord that, ‘There are no 
orders permitting troops to cross into Mexico when in pursuit of Indians.’160
The next stage of the Victorio Campaign would show that, in response to the continued resist-
ance of Victorio’s Apaches, actors within both the United States and Mexico would find an ‘unof-
ficial’ diplomatic solution to cross-border relations. A hint of what this might entail was given 
when Charles Berger, returning from his scout into Mexico, encountered Roman Aranda. The 
latter informed Berger that he had ‘papers and credentials from both the Governor of the State of 
Chihuahua, and the officer commanding the Mexican forces, empowering him to make a proposi-
tion to the District Commander to cross his troops into Mexico for the purpose of aiding in the 
contemplated movement against Victoria, now at Laguna Guzman’.161
Before we examine the diplomatic negotiations between the USA and Mexico concerning the 
war with Victorio, we must return to New Mexico. While Grierson was campaigning against the 
Apaches in western Texas, the troops in New Mexico had been re-fitted out and reinforced.
159 Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, 30 Aug., 1880 in Papers relating to the Frelinghuysen-
Romero Agreement of Jul. 29, 1882, providing for reciprocal crossings of the international boundary by 
troops of the United States and Mexico in pursuit of hostile Indians, Feb. 1862-Jun. 1867; Letters Rec’d 
by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
160 Mason, AG, DoTx to Grierson, Eagle Springs via CO Fort Davis, 26 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d 
by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-14 Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 4.
161 Nolan to AAAG, DoP, 16 Sept., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878, 14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
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While Grierson and Valle were directing operations against Victorio, the US field commanders in 
Arizona and New Mexico were faced with several problems. First, the effect Victorio’s continued 
resistance might have on other potentially hostile American Indians: in particular, the Navajos, on 
their reservations to the north of Victorio’s territory; the remaining Mescalero Apaches, held on 
their reservation near Fort Stanton; and the Chiricahua Apaches on the San Carlos reservation. 
Second, was it too late to negotiate a settlement with Victorio? Third, Colonel Hatch had to try and 
rest, re-equip and reinforce the New Mexico garrison. Finally, once these troops had been rested, 
if Victorio remained at large, how should they be deployed against him? 
Navajo and Mescalero Apaches
The persistent failure to defeat Victorio had encouraged other potentially militant American Indian 
warriors. For the Navajos, the Victorio war became a factor in an already problematic situation. 
Captain Bennett, CO Fort Wingate, had reported Navajo hostility, up to and including death 
threats against Galen Eastman, their reservation agent, as early as 16 April 1880. Bennett correctly 
identified Eastman’s evangelical approach to his work as the source of the unrest. Frustrated by 
the Navajos’ complete indifference to his strict Christian practices, Agent Eastman refused to 
issue government supplies to his charges until they adopted his beliefs. Bennett also noted that 
the trouble, at that point, was confined to a small group of Navajos, but that the Utes were also 
attempting to foment trouble on the reservation.1 The previous year, Colonel Buell, commanding 
the Fifteenth US Infantry Regiment in the area, had reported that a lack of clarity concerning the 
southern boundary of the Navajo reservation had led to friction between them and settlers in the 
San Juan Valley. This concerned perceived incursions of Navajo herders with vast flocks of sheep. 
Buell argued that the situation would become increasingly tense unless the boundary was clearly 
marked and enforced.2 
There had been several potentially explosive incidents involving Apaches from various tribes. On 
17 May 1880, the driver of the mail buckboard was stopped between San Mateo and Bacon Springs 
by a group of five Navajos, all reported to be drunk. One of the Navajos threatened and assaulted 
the driver, and cut the mail bags, before the driver made his escape on the buckboard. No mail was 
1 Bennett to AAAG DoNM, 16 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Bennett to AAAG, DoNM, 24 Apr., 1880 in Letters 
Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Loud to 
Hatch, Mescalero Agency (Operator Mesilla to forward by first mail), 20 Apr., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.322-323.
2 Buell to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 4 Nov., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.239-243.
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lost, and the other four Navajos made no effort to intervene on either side.3 Also in May, Navajos 
killed three Anglo-Americans and wounded another in two separate instances. In the second case, 
agency workers had gone out to bury one of the men and had been threatened with the same fate 
by Navajos.4
During May 1880, fearing a Navajo revolt in response to a combination of Victorio’s successes 
and agitation sponsored by emissaries from the Utes and Mormons, Colonel Buell was sent with 
a force of five companies of the Fifteenth Infantry to pre-empt any trouble on the Navajo reser-
vation.5 In a council with the Navajos, it was found that the unrest amongst them was mainly 
caused by their agent.6 Dudley and Buell also reported that Navajo resistance had been somewhat 
encouraged by Victorio’s successes.7 There were rumours that Victorio had held a council with the 
Navajos and Zunis at Alamocito, and that some Navajo warriors had joined him.8 Captain Bennett, 
Commanding Officer, Fort Wingate, had already recommended that the Agent should not be 
re-appointed,9 and then found himself recommended for that post by Buell.10 By mid-June, Bennett 
was able to report that the tension on the Navajo Reservation had been much reduced.11 
This sparked yet another conflict between the War Department and the Indian Bureau, and 
the latter reinstated their employee. The Navajo immediately reacted against the evangelising 
agent and the army, now very concerned about Navajo warriors joining Victorio, simply removed 
Eastman for a second time. Captain Bennett, sent to replace Eastman, found the agency in a very 
poor physical and financial situation. In a further council with the Navajos, he found them to be 
very hostile towards Eastman. He also reported that this state of affairs had been exacerbated by 
news of troubles with the Utes to the north and the Apaches to the south.12
The situation on the reservation was reported to have deteriorated again by November 1880. This 
time, the problem centred around the sale of alcohol. Hatch telegraphed General Pope concerning 
what powers of arrest he might have over traders selling alcohol. Pope informed him that, if these 
men were caught on the reservation, there was no doubt as to his power. Such people should be 
arrested and turned over to the civil authorities. A more challenging problem arose when traders 
3 Affidavit of George A. Taylor given to Lieut. T.F. Davis, Adjutant 15th Infantry, Fort Wingate, 18 May, 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.469-470.
4 Bennett, Captain Ninth Cavalry, Monthly Report (July) from the Navajo and Moqui Indian Agencies 
to the Honorable CoIA, Washington D.C., 8 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.581-590.
5 Sheridan to Townsend, 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.274-275; Platt to Colonel Hatch, Fort Craig, New Mexico, 
7 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.19; Platt AAG, to AAAG, DoNM, SF, N.M. 9 Jun., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.23.
6 Buell to AAG Fort Leavenworth 16 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.526-528.
7 Dudley to AAAG, DoNM, 4 Jun., 1880 & Buell to AAG, DoM, 8 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by 
HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880; Moore, p.230 & 
p.236.
8 Hatch to AAAG, SF 12? Jun., 1880; ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, 
p.367.
9 Loud to Hatch, Mescalero Agency (Operator Mesilla to forward by first mail), 20 Apr., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.322-323.
10 Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 13 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
11 Buell, Fort Wingate to AAAG, DoNM, 14 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-
Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
12 Platt to AAAG DoNM 26 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, pp.39-40; See also Platt AAG 
to Colonel Hatch, Fort Craig, New Mexico, 7 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.19; Pope’s 
Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.611-612; Cozzens, 
p.331.
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in alcohol chose to set up their businesses in close proximity to the reservation.13 On 23 November 
1880, Pope commented that those Navajos who remembered their defeat by the US army in the 
1860s were being superseded by younger men. The Navajos could muster a considerable force of 
fighting men who might, if provoked further, decide to opt for war. In view of this situation, Pope 
recommended that it would be wise to send reinforcements to Fort Wingate.14
Where the Mescalero Apaches were concerned, instructions were given to the Commanding 
Officer, Fort Stanton, to maintain a close guard on the captive Mescaleros. He was to prevent their 
escape to Mexico, where the rest of the Mescaleros were assumed to have fled. It was also assumed 
that the Mescaleros who had left the reservation would have returned, had it not been for the ‘influ-
ence of Victorio’.15 It was suggested that messengers be sent to these Apaches to persuade them to 
return ‘as the Troops are not allowed to cross the border for them’.16 As noted earlier, this effort to 
contact at least some of the Apaches allied to Victorio failed to materialise when the Commanding 
Officer at Fort Stanton informed Santa Fé that he could not find any Mescalero willing to under-
take this mission.17 In September 1880, the Mescaleros changed their minds. Messengers were sent 
in search of the independent Mescalero Apaches on the 26 and 27 September, but had not returned 
by the end of October.18
The San Carlos Chiricahuas and Negotiations with Victorio
As we shall see, the reorganization of troops in New Mexico indicated that a major operation against 
Victorio was being prepared, with the strong probability that it would involve significant numbers 
of US troops entering the Republic of Mexico. Yet Hatch was still willing to enter into negotia-
tions with Victorio. Two days after the Palomas River fight, on 26 May 1880, Hatch responded 
to a query from Department Headquarters concerning the possibility of persuading Victorio to 
capitulate. He responded that, providing that Victorio and his warriors were given an amnesty and 
their families were returned to Ojo Caliente, they would probably surrender. The main difficulty, 
in Hatch’s opinion, was that the Warm Springs Apaches ‘will be in the future suspicious and easily 
alarmed, the promises made the Hot Springs have been violated in nearly every instance by the 
Interior Department’.19 
Equally, as noted in earlier chapters, Hatch vacillated between two polar opinions concerning 
Victorio. On the one hand, he sympathised with Victorio’s plight; but at times he also advocated 
the complete destruction of the Apaches:
I do not approve of asking him to come in, he should be driven to terms or killed. Probably the 
Indians who are asked to visit him will bring in his head if paid for it. I don’t believe Victorio 
13 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 20 Nov., 1880, & Pope to Sheridan 29 Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp659-661.
14 Letter written by Pope 23 Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.662-666.
15 Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 28 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.317, pp.210-211.
16 Ibid.
17 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 22 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.369, p.239.
18 Conrad, CO Fort Stanton, to AAAG, DoNM 27 Oct., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
19 Hatch to Department HQ , 26 May, 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 
5, p.273.
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will ever live at San Carlos. If he surrenders it should be unconditional. Jeffords can undoubt-
edly manage Victorio if that cause is considered advisable.20
The Indians Hatch refers to were probably involved in efforts to contact Victorio from San Carlos, 
in July 1880. In June 1880, Carr had a meeting with Juh and Naiche where they complained that 
sickness had taken a significant toll of their people since their removal to San Carlos. At least a 
third, possibly closer to half, of Naiche’s following had died since coming to San Carlos in 1876. 
This had not been an issue at their old reservation in the Chiricahua Mountains.21 They were also 
not happy at being kept under closer scrutiny than other Apaches on the reservation. Juh reminded 
Carr that he had come in voluntarily, and Naiche pointed out that he had been living peacefully 
at San Carlos for four years. Tom Jeffords informed Carr that these factors had almost led the 
Chiricahua Apaches to leave the reservation in June. Jeffords had intervened and persuaded them 
to stay.22 The mortality rate at San Carlos was one of the factors which persuaded Victorio to leave 
the reservation in 1877. Nevertheless, Carr thought that because Victorio’s wife and children were 
at San Carlos, he might be persuaded to come into the reservation. Communication with Victorio 
could be opened in the same way as Juh had first been contacted, in 1879. Emissaries from the 
Warm Springs Apaches living at San Carlos could be sent into Mexico. Carr, through Bennett, 
Chief of the San Carlos Indian Police, let the Chokonen and Chihenne Apaches know that he 
was open to negotiation about contacting Victorio.23 Jeffords also advised that the only chance of 
bringing Victorio in peacefully was on the ‘promise of a white man in whom he has confidence; and 
that there is only himself and one other man, now in New Mexico, [probably Andrew Kelley] who 
could or would fill that bill’.24
At the same time, Hatch contacted Willcox ‘to see if arrangements can be made with Victorio 
to live at San Carlos with his family’.25 Willcox ordered Carr to quietly liaise with Hatch in order 
to see if Victorio could be contacted and persuaded to surrender.26 As part of this process, Tiffany, 
the new Indian agent at San Carlos, moved the Chiricahuas ‘from an unhealthy location to a more 
salubrious one’.27 While openly reluctant28 to make the opening moves in any negotiations with 
20 Hatch to Carr, Camp Thomas, 11 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.600; Carr quoting Hatch to AG DoAz, 13 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE 
Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.396, pp.118-
119; See also Carr to AAG DoAz, 30 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.273, pp.104-108; Carr to Hatch, 10 Jul., 1880, 
Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter 
No.384, p.113.
21 Carr to AAG DoAz, 30 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, 
Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.273, pp.104-108; Carr to AG DoAz, 5 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE 
Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.374, p.108.
22 Carr to AAG DoAz, 30 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, 
Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.273, pp.104-108.
23 Ibid, pp.104-108.
24 Ibid, pp.107-108.
25 Martin to Carr, 8 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.312.
26 Carr to Hatch, 10 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.384, p.113; Carr to Genl Hatch Comd Dist of NM 10 Jul., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.578.
27 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 13 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.318; 
Carr to AG DoAz, 10 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 
18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.385, pp.113-114.
28 Bell, Acting Secretary, Dept. of the Interior to The Secretary of War, 24 Aug., 1880, citing a letter dated 
20 Jul., 1880 from Agent Tiffany concerning his meeting with Col. Carr in ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14. Part of this reluctance was on general principle, Carr’s reluctance to negotiate with 
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Apaches, Carr was pragmatic enough to realise that the attempt to bring an end to hostilities 
was feasible, as there were Chihenne Apaches at San Carlos who could open negotiations with 
Victorio.29 Carr also noted that Tom Jeffords was amenable the idea that he should participate in 
this cross-border venture.30 However, while Willcox clearly agreed that an attempt to end hostili-
ties by negotiation should be undertaken, he also suggested that Carr investigate other means ‘for 
bringing in Victorio dead or alive and probable expense’.31 Yet it was also clear that Willcox was 
aware of the circumstances behind Victorio’s resistance:
It is believed by many that Victorio was unjustly dealt with in the first instance by the abrupt 
removal of his people from Ojo Caliente N.M. to San Carlos and that such removal if not a 
breach of faith was a harsh and cruel measure from which the people of New Mexico have 
reaped the bitter consequence.32
General Pope shared this opinion, noting that while Victorio and his followers would probably 
have to be hunted down, the leader was believed to be willing to surrender if all the Warm Springs 
Apaches were given a reservation at Ojo Caliente. As far as Pope was concerned, the whole trouble 
with Victorio had been caused by the Department of the Interior’s insistence that the Warm Springs 
Apaches be deported to San Carlos.33 (see document file no.102.)
However, it was Tiffany who pointed out the key flaw in any effort to persuade Victorio to settle 
at San Carlos. Tiffany argued that it was unlikely that Victorio would now be able to settle at San 
Carlos, as he would be a ‘marked man’ as far as the ‘San Carlos’ Apaches were concerned, due to 
the casualties inflicted among them by Victorio’s followers during the campaign. Indeed he pointed 
out that at Ash Creek in May 1880, a popular leader had been killed and his followers had vowed to 
shoot Victorio on sight.34 (see document file no. 101.) Therefore, we not only have to appreciate that 
Victorio was fighting for a reservation at Ojo Caliente, but we also have to realize that the manner 
in which he was doing so completely ruled out any peace settlement which had Victorio returning 
to the San Carlos reservation. It also has to be acknowledged that Victorio’s followers, had they 
returned to San Carlos, might have wished to settle scores for those Chihennes killed by San Carlos 
scouts on the Palomas River on 24 May 1880. Any return to San Carlos by Victorio was a recipe 
for future trouble between the two groups of Apaches.
In September 1880, the Warm Springs Apaches at San Carlos contacted Lieutenant Wright, 
then recruiting Apache scouts, and reiterated their desire to live at Ojo Caliente, for the same 
reasons as advanced before: the poor water, poor health and poor relations with other Apache 
groups at San Carlos. They also stated that they thought Victorio would return to Ojo Caliente and 
live in peace. Wright also revealed that he had not only sat down and talked to Loco and Jaralche, 
Apaches can also be explained by the fact that he was worried that Victorio might move from Chihuahua 
into Arizona and had sent out scouts in an attempt to frustrate such a move. (Willcox to AG, Presidio, 
San Francisco, 13 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.318.
29 Carr to Genl Hatch Comd Dist of NM 10 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.578-579.
30 Carr to Genl Hatch Comd Dist of NM 10 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.579; Carr to 
Hatch, 10 Jul., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 
Sept., 1880, Letter No.384, p.113.
31 Willcox to Carr, 15 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.32.
32 Martin to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.418-
419; Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. 
I, p.206.
33 Pope to Whipple, AAG Chicago, 3 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
34 Bell, Acting Secretary, Dept. of the Interior to The Secretary of War, 24 Aug., 1880, citing a letter dated 
20 Jul., 1880 from Agent Tiffany concerning his meeting with Col. Carr in ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14.
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but had also spoken with Victorio’s wife. Unfortunately, Wright did not make it clear if she was 
with the two leaders. If it was a separate meeting, he gave no details as to what Victorio’s wife had 
to say on the matter.35 
The Ninth Cavalry Regroups
Hatch, or more accurately General Pope, now took the opportunity to reorganise the troops in 
southern New Mexico. At the beginning of June, General Pope informed his superiors that the 
Ninth Cavalry were effectively crippled, and would not be able to perform field duty for some time. 
Pope recommended that approximately 75 Apache scouts be stationed in New Mexico. In view of 
the vociferous press campaign against the troops in New Mexico, and in particular against their 
commander, Colonel Hatch, General Pope was quick to point out that much of the information 
coming from the press and other sources in New Mexico was inaccurate, and though he promised 
to investigate such reports, he predicted that most would be found to have little foundation.36
In June 1880, Pope visited New Mexico to see the current state of affairs for himself. While 
praising Hatch and his command’s strenuous efforts, and crediting them with having cleared 
the area of Apaches, he also censured Hatch for deploying his troops too widely, thus leaving 
each detachment (Pope gently derided Hatch’s term ‘column’) too weak to effectively counter the 
Apaches. He also pinpointed this as the source of the very bad feeling, indeed hostility, towards 
Hatch expressed by the local population.37 (see document file no. 103.) Nevertheless, J.J. Coppinger, 
Inspector General for the District of New Mexico, filed a report underlining the point that many of 
the leading critics of Hatch and, to a lesser extent Morrow, were a deeply unreliable source of infor-
mation, listing an admixture of alcoholism, cowardice, excessive opium consumption and thievery 
as reasons for this unreliability.38 Coppinger added, ‘There are here many southern men who seem 
to delight in insulting negro soldiers, their officers & their Regt.’39 However, the damage had been 
done; and it should be remembered that Hatch had inflicted some of this damage upon himself.
Orders were issued to post commanders to collect a record of all scouts and expeditions from 
the previous campaign.40 Pope ordered a radical reorganisation of the troops in the area. This was 
intended to restore discipline among the Ninth Cavalry and Fifteenth Infantry Regiments. He 
thought that discipline had been undermined, due to prolonged detached service.41 What he was 
35 Wright to AAAG, New Mexican Column (thro. CO Batt. 9th Cav.) 18 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
36 Pope to Whipple, AAG Chicago, 3 Jun., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to 
Col. Whipple AAG Chicago, 16 Jun., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527.
37 Pope to Sheridan 1 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.521-527; See also Pope’s Annual 
Report Year ending Sept. 22 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.613.
38 Coppinger to AAG, DoM, 6 Jul., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, 
Box 92.
39 Coppinger to AAG, DoM, 6 Jul., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, 
Box 92.
40 General Order No. 3, 18 Jun., 1880, Printed Special Orders 1869-1888, DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 446; See also Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 21 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.543.
41 In his Annual Report for year ending 22 September, 1881, Pope made the same point that the Ninth 
Cavalry and Fifteenth Infantry needed to be sent to another district on account of their long and arduous 
service against Apaches had had a detrimental effect upon effectiveness and discipline. These two regi-
ments needing ‘to re-establish discipline and tactical knowledge, which have been considerably impaired 
by the service they have had to perform for a number of years past.’ (HQ DoM, Annual Report for Year 
ending 22 Sept., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.850).
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referring to was the need to split company strength into smaller detachments. Pope wanted to 
ensure that a situation would be created where any return by Victorio to New Mexico could rapidly 
be crushed.42 One of the first reorganisations was the disbanding of the three battalions of New 
Mexico Troops organised by Hatch in February 1880.43 As we shall see, this reorganisation was 
intended to be offensive as well as defensive, international borders notwithstanding.
US army bureaucracy also made its presence felt. Just before the Hembrillo Canyon operation, 
District Headquarters, New Mexico received a missive from the Department of the Missouri 
complaining that the majority of company commanders from the Ninth Cavalry and Fifteenth 
Infantry had not complied with Circular Number Two. This circular was a ‘statement of the amount 
of ammunition they have on hand manufactured prior to January 1 1877’.44 On 1 June 1880, the US 
army’s Adjutant General, Edward D. Townsend, ordered that all officers in the field fill out their 
monthly returns promptly, and that the returns for New Mexico for February–April were ‘desired 
at the earliest possible date’.45 Loud informed the Adjutant General that:
District Returns are made from the Post Returns. There has been but little opportunity 
afforded Company Commanders during the Campaign now going on in the District to render 
to their Post Commanders promptly the proper Returns, showing Casualties in district. They 
have been continuously in the field and on the march.46 
Hatch notified his officers on 7 June 1880 that a full record of the operations of March, April and 
May 1880 should be submitted to the Adjutant General.47 It should be noted that the information 
which was published in the Annual Report for the Secretary for War for 1880 cannot be described 
as ‘a full record’ of events.
One of the first things Hatch himself had set in motion was the recruitment of a handful of 
experienced Mexican-American and Anglo-American scouts to monitor Victorio’s movements in 
Mexico. As we have seen, individuals such as ‘Hurricane’ Bill and ‘Cherokee’ Jim were not neces-
sarily reliable sources of information. (See Chapter 8.) On 24 June, District Headquarters contacted 
Lieutenant Davenport, Fort Craig, concerning information that there was a Mexican living in the 
area who knew the Warm Springs Apaches and who might be prevailed upon ‘to go into Mexico 
to obtain information’.48 On the same day, Morrow, at Fort Bayard, was also asked if he could find 
a couple of ‘reliable persons’ for scouting into Mexico to locate Victorio’s band.49 Morrow quickly 
found two men willing to undertake this difficult task and, on the following day, was instructed 
42 Pope to Sheridan 1 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.521-527.
43 General Order No. 4, 26 Jun., 1880, Printed Special Orders 1869-1888, DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 446; See also Telegrams Sent (10 Jul., 1880) DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, p.599.
44 Platt, AAG Fort Leavenworth to Co DoNM, 2 Apr., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
45 Townsend to Comdg. General, DoM, 1 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 40, Jan.-Jun. 1880.
46 Loud to the AG, U.S. Army, Washington D.C., 6 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.270, pp.175-176.
47 ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.29.
48 Loud to Davenport, Fort Craig, 24 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.546.
49 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 24 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.547) Similar instructions were passed to the CO Fort Bliss. (Loud to CO 
Fort Bliss, 25 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.549.
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to employ the pair and send them off into Mexico with all expediency.50 Another scout had been 
sent out from Fort Stanton around the same time;51 and a man named Valentine, who was believed 
to have been attached to Lieutenant Maney’s Indian Scouts, was also sought for scouting duties. 
Instructions were sent that, as soon as Valentine was located, he was to report to Fort Cummings, 
no doubt to participate in this scouting activity.52
You will use the men whom you were authorised to employ to watch Victoria’s band, so that in 
case he crosses the Rio Grande to the east side below El Paso, the very earliest information of 
such movement can be telegraphed to Buell and to General Ord, at San Antonio.53
As to who these men were, the telegram is frustratingly silent, though it does confirm that Hatch’s 
superiors approved his action in recruiting them. Some of this scouting was straight intelligence 
gathering concerning the number and movement of Victorio’s following. A report was received on 
28 August 1880, at Fort Cummings, stating that Victorio was in the Candelaria Mountains with 
a few wounded. It was estimated that he was accompanied by 100 to 120 men, 50 women and 500 
animals.54 It is significant that some of the people sought for scouting duties were known to be on 
familiar terms with the Chihenne Apaches, which suggests that negotiations were still considered 
an option. 
Reinforcements were also dispatched to New Mexico. On 26 May 1880, Hatch was informed 
that three companies of the Fourth Cavalry and two companies of Infantry were to be sent to his 
district.55 In mid-June, he also received word that the Thirteenth Infantry Regiment had been 
transferred from its station at New Orleans and was to be allocated to the District of New Mexico.56 
By 14 June, the reinforcements promised in May had begun to arrive in the area. L Company, 
Fourth Cavalry, was sent to Fort Cummings, while elements of the Sixteenth Infantry were sent 
into the San Mateo Mountains.57 The other two companies of the Fourth Cavalry arrived at Fort 
Cummings, having taken almost a month to move from Kansas to New Mexico:
Table 12.1 Time Taken to Re-Deploy Companies A and H, Fourth Cavalry, from Kansas to New 
Mexico, June 1880
1 June Companies depart Caldwell, Kansas, and march to AT&SF Railroad at Wellington same day.
6 June Arrive Belen, New Mexico.
14 June Depart Belen New Mexico.
18 June Arrive Fort Craig: distance marched 86 miles.
22 June Depart Fort Craig for San Jose: distance marched 16 miles.
23 June Depart San Jose for Canada Alamosa: distance marched 20 miles.
24 June Depart Canada Alamosa for Cuchillo Negro: distance marched 15 miles.
25 June Depart Cuchillo Negro for Las Palomas: distance marched 21 miles.
26 June Depart Las Palomas for camp on Las Animas River: distance marched 15 miles.
27 June Depart camp on Las Animas River for McEvers’ Ranch: distance marched 15 miles
28 June Departs McEvers’ Ranch to camp in vicinity of Fort Cummings: distance marched 25 miles
Within two days, A Company, Fourth Cavalry, was scouting the road between Fort Cummings 
and Lloyd’s ranch, and I Company had been despatched to scout the land to the south of the 
Florida Mountains.58 In the meantime, Colonel Carr was ordered to send two cavalry companies 
58 Lt Budd, Co. I, 4th Cav. To AAAG, Dist of N.M., & Lt. Parker to AAAG, DoNM, 6 Jul., 1880 in 
Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
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Plate 12.1. Old Fort Cummings was used unofficially as a location to base small garrisons and scouting 
parties throughout the Victorio Campaign. However, it was officially reactivated in the summer of 1880 
as the main base for a major offensive against the Apaches. Its strategic location cannot be overstated. The 
photo looks towards the eastern entrance of Cooke’s Canyon. (Photo: author)
Plate 12.2. The scattered stone outcrops seen in the brush below the hill at the centre of the photo are 
all that remains of the ruins of Old Fort Cummings. This photo gives a clear idea of the flat ground 
surrounding the fort, which was used by Buell to bivouac his troops as he concentrated his forces for the 
projected campaign against Victorio. (Photo: author)
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and an Apache scout company to scout the San Francisco River area.59 The reinforcements and 
support from troops from Arizona allowed Hatch some leeway to reorganise his existing forces. 
Captain Dawson, with B Company, Ninth Cavalry, was immediately ordered to guard the mail 
route where it crossed the Mimbres River.60 Detachments of Ninth Cavalry were also sent from 
Fort Cummings to Aleman and Las Palomas.61 It was also clear that Fort Cummings, or more 
accurately the Fort Cummings reservation,62 was intended to be the hub of any future operations 
against the Apaches. On 4 August 1880, Hatch recommended that Fort Cummings itself 
be re-occupied for ‘operations against Indians in the future’, being ‘important in regards to the 
Mexican Frontier’.63 Yet as early as 24 June, the commanding officer of troops stationed at Fort 
Cummings was asked to inform District Headquarters whether the water there could support nine 
companies of cavalry.64 While this reorganization was completed, Major Morrow, at Fort Bayard, 
was ordered to keep some of his Apache scouts stationed close to the border, to give early warning 
of any move north on the part of the Apaches.65
The dreadful state of the Ninth Cavalry Regiment’s horses had not improved by the end of June. 
Table 12.2 shows that the Ninth Cavalry recorded a dramatically reduced number of lost horses, 
yet the regiment still recorded a slight increase in unserviceable horses. By the end of June, not one 
company in the Ninth Cavalry Regiment was unable to mount 50 percent of its available manpower 
on serviceable horses. In fact, most companies were able to mount considerably less than half their 
men. (See Table 12.3.)
Table 12.2 Ninth Cavalry, Roster of Horses, January–June 188066
Ninth Cavalry Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses Horses Lost in Action, Died, etc.
January 1880 438 103 36
February 1880 425 129 34
March 1880 441 140 10
April 1880 345 213 54
May 1880 244 277 62
June 1880 237 282 10
59 Martin to Carr, 5 Jun., 1880, & Comdg Dept to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 10 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, P.265 & p.271; Loud to Hatch, Fort Craig, 19 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.537; See also Carr to Hatch, 8 Jun., 1880, 
Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, pp.74-75.
60 Special Field Orders No. 37, para.5, 14 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
61 Special Field Orders No. 38, para’s.1-3, 19 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Hatch to Morrow 
7 Jun., 1880, ‘DoNM/GSFO/L&T’, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.294.
62 i.e. the plot of land upon which the War Department had built Fort Cummings. Buell was authorised to 
establish a military camp on this ground even though the Fort itself was considered too ‘dilapidated’ to 
reoccupy. (Loud to Buell, 26 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.313 pp.207-208; Hatch to Buell, 7 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by 
‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.333 p.220).
63 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 4 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.404, p.259; see also Hatch to AAG, DoM, 4 
Aug., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 92.
64 Loud to CO Fort Cummings, 24 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.547.
65 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 25 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.551-552.
66 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88 
290 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
12.3 Serviceable, Unserviceable and Lost Horses to Available Men, Ninth Cavalry, June 188067
Company Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses Available Men
A 18 17 44
B 24 20 52
C 19 19 50
D 16 23 49
E 0 36 54
F 12 20 45
G 30 17 65
H 18 29 53
I 23 22 55
K 9 45 61
L 21 17 63
M 33 17 64
The bi-monthly returns for the Ninth Cavalry (Table 12.4) reveal the same trend:
Table 12.4 Available Men to Serviceable Horses, Ninth Cavalry, March–June 188068
Co. Available Men 
March–April 1880
Serviceable Horses March–
April 1880
Available Men 
May–June 1880
Serviceable Horses 
May–June 1880
A 24 18 47 18
B 58 22 46 24
C 47 16 46 19
D 26 15 49 No Entry
E 46 29 50 1
F 27 7 44 12
G 66 40 63 30
H 57 No Entry 48 28
I 54 20 55 23
K 55 50 61 9
L 57 30 Missing from 
Archive
Missing from Archive
M 67 No Entry 62 33
Indeed, if we examine the period from January 1879 to December 1881 (see Figure 12.1), we can 
perhaps more clearly see the overall effect of the campaign against Victorio between January and 
June 1880 on the Ninth Cavalry’s roster of horses:
67 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88.
68 Derived Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Jan./Feb. & Mar./Apr. 1880, 9th Cavalry in NA, RG94
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Figure 12.1 Ninth Cavalry, Bi-Monthly Summary of Serviceable and Unserviceable Horses, 1879–81.69
However, the bi-monthly company rosters also reveal a key issue concerning our use of data 
from the monthly and bi-monthly regimental returns and other archival sources. Quite simply, the 
numbers do not tally: for example, the regimental return for June 1880 states that there were 237 
serviceable and 282 unserviceable horses (see Table 12.2), whereas the bi-monthly roster for the end 
of June 1880 states that there were 197 serviceable and 241 unserviceable horses. (See Figure 12.1.)
What the reader must be aware of is that these returns, and indeed other sources from the 
archives, reveal trends but not absolutes. In this instance, both records indicate similar trends on 
the basis of similar, but different, sets of information. These records are dependent on the human 
foibles of their authors. Both sets of returns would have required the collation of detailed informa-
tion on a blank form which must have taken some time for the person responsible to complete. We 
have already seen that the completion of these returns had been delayed by participation in this 
campaign. Therefore, the historian has no guarantee that the forms were completed on, or around, 
the date given on the form. The helpfulness of these records also depends on the varying levels of 
accuracy and handwriting legibility of the individuals who compiled them. Moreover, there would 
have been a political element to the filling out of these returns. For example, the general condition 
of the clothing, equipment and training of the men of each company of the Ninth Cavalry between 
January and August 1880 was recorded in the bi-monthly return. (see document file no. 104.) Here, 
the company commander had considerable leeway as to the picture he presented in this informa-
tion. This meant that an officer who realised the importance of giving an accurate record of affairs 
could have submitted a very different return from a company commander desperate for promo-
tion. Some company commanders recorded the exact state of their company. Others recorded the 
information in a way that makes the reader wonder whether their company had left its barracks. 
The only way for the historian to engage with such issues is to be aware of them, and to examine 
as many different sources as possible, if there are multiple data sources available. The reader needs 
to be warned that these figures indicate broad trends and the historian cannot vouch for them as 
absolute fact.
69 Derived 9th Cavalry Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls 1879-1881: NA, RG94.
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With the above caveat in mind, it can be shown that there are jumps in horse fatalities during 
the Victorio War period; but can these be directly attributed to encounters with the Apaches? The 
Annual Report of the Secretary of War does not go into enough detail for us to be able to account 
for these casualties with any confidence as the result of the pursuit of the Apaches. However, where 
horses sold, died, lost or stolen are concerned, between 1876 and 1881 (see Figure 12.2), there are 
at least some indications that the Apaches were having an effect on the figures. 
The numbers of horses killed or otherwise lost in 1878–80 are similar to those lost in 1876–77 
(the Sioux War) and 1877–78 (the Nez Perce Campaign). It should be noted that, in 1879–80, the 
US army was not engaged in any sustained campaign against American Indians other than the 
Apaches.70 On the other hand, these figures refer to overall US army losses and make no indication 
of the geographic location of the casualties. They also make no distinction between horses killed in 
action, by exhaustion, or by natural causes. Therefore, on their own, these figures should be treated 
with some caution. 
However, by comparing the Ninth Cavalry’s Regimental Return with those shown on the above 
table, it can be seen that the total number of US army horses that died, or were lost or stolen, 
for 1879–80 and 1880–81, or amounted to 1181 and 569 respectively. In the same periods, the 
numbers of the Ninth Cavalry’s horses that died, or were lost and stolen, totalled 395 and 120 
respectively.71 In other words, the Ninth Cavalry, one of ten US Cavalry Regiments, accounted for 
34.4 percent of the US army’s overall losses of horses in 1879–80 and 21 percent in 1880–81. This 
strongly suggests that the Apache tactic of targeting of the US army’s horses had a major effect on 
the Ninth Cavalry’s ability to remain ‘fit for purpose’.
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Figure 12.2 Total US Army Horses Sold, Died, Lost or Stolen, 1876–81.72
70 The Ute Crisis of late 1879, while receiving far more attention than the Victorio Campaign, did not blow up 
into a major confrontation, though it did result in the commitment of a fairly large U.S. Army force to the area.
71 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Rolls 88 & 89.
72 Derived AR-WD, 1877, p.290; 1878, p.348; 1879, p.307; 1880, p.421; 1881, p.324.
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The number of mules sold, died, lost or stolen in the same period (see Figure 12.3), shows that 
during 1879–80 the US army suffered its highest loss in mules for the period 1876–81. This again 
suggests that the Apaches’ strategy and tactics were having at least some effect.
Mules were an essential commodity for the pursuit of Apache guerrillas. They were more versa-
tile than supply wagons, allowing detachments of cavalry to traverse very difficult terrain without 
losing contact with their supplies. The problem remained that, while increasing overall mobility, 
mules were just as susceptible to being irreparably ‘broken down’ or dying from exhaustion or 
gunshot wounds as the cavalry horses they accompanied.73
Figures 12.2 and 12.3 also show a high number of horses and mules being sold by the US army 
each year. There are two factors which are probably behind such a turnover of stock. First, the 
pursuit of Apaches was not only killing horses and mules but crippling them as well. Those animals 
that survived such service, but were judged no longer fit for active duty, could be sold on to other 
sources. Second, some of the animals bought by the US army were found, on delivery, to be unsuit-
able for field service and had to be sold.74
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Figure 12.3 Total US Army Mules Sold, Died, Lost or Stolen 1876–81.75
Where cost is concerned, there are some indications that the Apaches had some effect on the 
Army budget. The cost of horse purchases showed an overall downward trend between 1876 and 
1881.However, the cost of horse purchases rose in 1879–80, and, while decreasing again in 1880–
81, it did not drop below the lower cost recorded in 1878–79. (See Figure 12.4.) 
73 Unfortunately, the Ninth Cavalry Returns do not give any figures on mules died, lost and stolen etc.
74 See Hatch to AAG, DoM, 3 Sept., 1879 in Letters Received, DoNM Oct. – Dec. 1879 NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 39.
75 Derived AR-WD, 1877, p.290; 1878, p.348; 1879, p.307; 1880, p.421; 1881, p.324
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Figure 12.4 Total Cost ($) of US Army Horses (Cavalry and Artillery) Purchased 1876–81.76
These rates also correspond with the numbers of horses being bought between 1876 and 1881. 
(See Figure 12.5.) 
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Figure 12.5 Total US Army Horses (Cavalry and Artillery) Purchased 1876 – 81.77
76 Derived AR-WD, Report of the Quartermaster General 1877 to 1881.
77 Derived AR-WD, Report of the Quartermaster General 1877 to 1881.
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While the average cost of horse purchases dropped from $124.26 in 1876–77, ($495, 943.76 
(Figure 12.4) divided by 3991 horses (Figure 12.5)), to $92.62 in 1878–9 and then rose back to 
$125.12 in 1880–81, such fluctuations in price again suggest the Apaches had some effect on the 
increase in horse prices.
The cost and numbers comparison where mules are concerned shows, remembering that these 
are overall figures, a major peak in both numbers and cost which coincides with the year 1879–80 
and suggests that the Apaches were a significant factor in this trend. (See Figures 12.6 and 12.7.)
As we have seen, the strongest indication that the Apaches had made a significant impact on 
the US army budget came in late May 1880, when General Sherman himself was forced to inform 
Hatch that there would be no money available to buy additional horses and mules until Congress 
approved the Army’s appropriation in July.78 (See Chapter 8.) The problem for the Ninth Cavalry 
was that the budget could not be stretched to purchase the numbers of horses and mules required 
to maintain continual pressure on the Apaches in the field.
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Figure 12.6 Total Cost ($) of US Army Mules Purchased 1876–81.79
78 Sherman to Pope, 29 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.290-291; Loud quoting Sherman’s letter to Hatch, Fort Craig, 
31 May, 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.452-
453; Sherman to Sheridan, 28 May, 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
79 Derived AR-WD, Report of the Quartermaster General 1877 to 1881.
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Figure 12.7 Total US Army Mules Purchased 1876–81.80
The question is: did the Secretary of War take steps to inform Congress, through the President, 
that more money was required? The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1880 recom-
mended that the army be raised from 24,000 to 25,000 enlisted men, to increase the efficiency 
of an overworked force.81 However, this increase was more in reaction to a perceived overall 
lessening of the need to garrison the frontier, giving the US army the opportunity to turn its 
attention to becoming a ‘European’ army. It was not inspired by the need to combat Apaches, but 
by an ambition to ‘tend to the more thorough drill and discipline of our small Army, by bringing 
together full regiments and fostering a proper esprit de corps’.82 It would appear, from General 
Sherman’s recommendation that Hatch seek extra horses and mules from other military districts 
and departments, that the Apache ‘problem’ was not seen as significant enough to warrant a 
change in the army’s budget.83 Thus, while the Apaches were clearly having an effect on the 
New Mexico troops, they were not causing enough problems for the US army as a whole. That 
the Apaches had caused so much chaos in New Mexico with approximately 150 warriors was a 
considerable achievement; there just were not enough of them to bring the fight for a reservation 
at Ojo Caliente to the attention of Congress.
On 26 June 1880, Hatch ordered a comprehensive garrisoning of southwestern New Mexico. 
This encompassed the San Francisco Valley, to the west of the Mogollon Mountains, to the 
Sacramento Mountains in the east, using dismounted84 elements of the Ninth Cavalry.85 (See 
Table 12.5.)
Colonel Buell, commander of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment, with B, D, K and I Companies 
of that regiment, were ordered from Fort Wingate to take post at Fort Cummings. Five companies 
80 Derived AR-WD, Report of the Quartermaster General 1877 to 1881.
81 The AR-WD 1880, p.v..
82 The AR-WD 1880, p.vi..
83 See note 26 above.
84 Hatch had ordered Morrow to furnish him a list of all the serviceable horses in each company under his 
command. (Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 26 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.553 & p.554).
85 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, 26 Jun., 1880.
The Ninth Cavalry Regroups, June–August 1880 297
from the Thirteenth US Infantry replaced these troops.86 F Company, Fifteenth Infantry, was 
ordered from Fort Union, leaving a small detachment at that post, to join their commander at Fort 
Cummings.87 The men with serviceable horses from B, C, D, F, K and L Companies, Ninth Cavalry, 
were ordered to report for duty under Colonel Buell at Fort Cummings, as was Lieutenant Maney’s 
company of Indian scouts.88 The battalion of the Fourth US Cavalry (A, H and L Companies) 
under Major H.E. Noyes, already at Fort Cummings, were also ordered to place themselves under 
Colonel Buell’s direction when the latter arrived.89 In the meantime, they were to scout south to 
the Florida Mountains and east to the Rio Grande.90 By 4 July, Hatch was able to report that five 
companies of cavalry were at Fort Cummings and actively scouting the area.91
86 Loud to Buell, 25 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, 
Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.307 pp.197-198; NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 
2 & 3, 26 Jun., 1880; Special Order 73, par 2, 30 Jun., 1880; See also Fort Wingate Jul. 1880, Returns 
from U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, NA, M617, Roll 1449.
87 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 15, 26 Jun., 1880.
88 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 & 32, 26 Jun., 1880. The arduous 
nature of commanding Apache scouts can perhaps be appreciated in comments made by Hatch in 
removing Maney from this command on the grounds of ill health. ‘It is with pleasure the District 
Commander acknowledges the able and gallant manner in which Lieutenant Maney performed the 
arduous duties devolved upon him while in command of Indian Scouts.’ (General Orders No.6, 29 Jun., 
1880, Printed Special Orders 1869-1888, DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 446).
89 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 71, par 2, Jun. 28 1880; See also Loud to Noyes, Fort 
Cummings, 28 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.560.
90 Loud to Noyes, Fort Cummings, 29 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.564.
91 Hatch to Asst. Adjt. Genl, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 4 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.528-529 & p.560.
Colonel George Pearson Buell.
Commander of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment 
was brought in By General Pope to replace Colonel 
Hatch as field commander of the troops in the 
District of New Mexico. Hatch retained overall 
command of the District of New Mexico. Buell 
had a reputation with his superiors for picking 
unnecessary disputes and attempting to court-
martial subordinate officers. One cannot help 
suspecting that Hatch was left in overall charge by 
Pope to minimise this aspect of Buell’s behaviour. 
While a disruptive officer, Buell was also proved 
to be quite inept at internal US army politics. This 
leaves the suspicion that Buell, who without the 
benefit of any experience of the previous year’s 
campaigning against Victorio, was placed in 
charge of direct operations against the Apaches in 
order that he be thoroughly censured if he failed. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, Buell was not an 
incompetent field commander and even innovated 
in developing equipment designed for use in the 
field against the Apaches. (Carlisle Barracks)
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Table 12.5 Deployment of Dismounted Ninth Cavalry Detachments across Southwestern New 
Mexico.92
Parent Post Company Locations Number in 
Detachment
Fort Bayard Dismounted men of B, 
C, H and M Companies, 
Ninth Cavalry
Parson William’s Ranch 1 NCO, 9 Privates
San Francisco/Mouth of Mineral 
Creek
1 NCO, 9 Privates
Upper Plaza, San Francisco River 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Hillsboro 1 Lt., 20 Privates
Las Palomas 1 NCO, 9 Privates
McEvers’ Ranch 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Cuchilla Negra 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then receive rations from Fort Bayard. (Paragraph 4)
Ojo Caliente
Fort Craig
Dismounted men of 
K Company, Ninth 
Cavalry
Canada Alamosa 1 NCO, 9 Privates
San Jose 1 NCO, 5 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then former to receive rations from Ojo Caliente, latter 
from Fort Craig. (Paragraph 6)
Fort Bayard Dismounted men of 
D Company, Ninth 
Cavalry
Slocum’s Ranch 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Santa Barbara 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then receive rations from Fort Bayard. (Paragraph 8)
Fort Bayard Dismounted men of 
L Company, Ninth 
Cavalry
Lloyd’s Ranch 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then detachment at Lloyd’s Ranch to receive rations from 
Fort Bayard. (Paragraph 10)
Fort Bayard
Ojo Caliente
Dismounted men of 
E Company, Ninth 
Cavalry
Old Fort Tularosa 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Pattersons 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Luera 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then receive rations from Ojo Caliente. (Paragraph 23)
Fort Craig
Fort Bliss
Dismounted men of F 
Company Ninth Cavalry
Point of Rocks 1 NCO, 9 Privates
San Augustine 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then former receive rations from Fort Craig, latter from 
Fort Bliss. (Paragraph 12)
Fort Craig Dismounted men of 
I Company, Ninth 
Cavalry
Round Mountain (Toussaint) 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Aleman (Martin’s) Wells 1 NCO, 9 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then receive rations from Fort Craig (Paragraph 25)
Fort Stanton Dismounted men of 
A and G Companies, 
Ninth Cavalry
San Nicholas 1 NCO, 5 Privates
Riconada 1 NCO, 10 Privates
Dowling’s Mills 1 NCO, 10 Privates
Orders To be rationed for 30 days, then receive rations from Fort Stanton. (Paragraph 27)
92 Special Order 70 26 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450; Station of Troops by Companies – 
Station of Detachments of the Ninth Cavalry in the Field, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; See also 
Loud to CO, Company I, 9th Cav., Aleman, 29 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.564
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Captain Hooker was ordered to hand over the Hotchkiss gun assigned to his disbanded third 
battalion to Colonel Noyes.93 He was also ordered to hand over all his pack mules and equipment 
to Morrow, to equip the scout company at Fort Bayard with a full pack train.94 Major Morrow was 
carefully instructed that this particular company was not to be enlisted as Indian scouts, but to be 
taken on as ‘trailers and scouts’.95 Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Augustus Monroe Dudley 
was ordered to join and serve under Colonel Buell at Fort Cummings.96
Elsewhere, the mounted troopers of H and M Companies, Ninth Cavalry, a company of Indian 
scouts commanded by Lieutenant. Goodwin, and D Company, Sixteenth Infantry, were to march 
from Fort Bayard and take up a position at Knight’s ranch under the command of Major Morrow.97 
The mounted troopers from E and I Companies, Ninth Cavalry, were ordered to take up a posting 
at Fort Wingate. Fort Craig was occupied by H Company, Sixteenth Infantry, leaving behind a 
small detachment at Fort Marcy. From their new station they were directed to provide adequate 
escorts for surveyors from the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway.98 All surplus horses 
belonging to the headquarters of the Ninth Cavalry were to be handed over to ‘First Lieutenant G. 
Valois R.Q.M. Ninth Cavalry, A.A.Q.M. in the field, Fort Craig, New Mexico to be held by him 
for further orders’.99 Finally, the mounted element of A and G Companies, Ninth Cavalry, with G 
Company, Fifteenth Infantry, were ordered to ‘remain in camp at the Mescalero Indian Agency 
until further orders’.100 These men were tasked with guarding approximately 300 Mescaleros to 
prevent their aiding Victorio or other groups of independent Apaches.101 Another reason given for 
the continued confinement of the Mescalero Apaches, in the summer of 1880, was the employ-
ment of Apache and Pueblo scouts, who at any time could pursue Apaches onto the reservation. If 
friendly Indians left this confinement, they might be mistakenly killed by such scouts.102
The Apache raids on the San Lorenzo and Santa Clara ranches in Chihuahua for horses (see 
Chapter 9) put troops along the border on the alert. It was assumed that now Victorio had fresh 
mounts, he would soon return to New Mexico.103 Lieutenant Maney’s company of Apache scouts 
93 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 74, par 5, Jul. 2 1880. Major Noyes was ordered to send a 
detail with two mules to Ojo Caliente to move the Hotchkiss Gun to Fort Cummings. This type of gun 
must therefore have been small enough for the gun and its ammunition to be packed on two mules.
94 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 26 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.555.
95 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 28 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.558-559.
96 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 71, par 2 & 3, 28 Jun., 1880.
97 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 4, 26 Jun., 1880; See Station of Troops by 
Companies – Troops operating in the Field in Southern New Mexico – Knight’s Ranch, Aug. 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 26 Jun., 1880
98 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.583; NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 16 & 21, 26 
Jun., 1880.
99 Special Field Orders, No.40 para.3, (Fort Craig) 30 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
100 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 70, par 28, 26 Jun., 1880; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 3 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.583.
101 Letter dated South Fork, Jul. 3 1880, in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection.
102 Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 28 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.317, pp.210-211.
103 Hatch to Morrow, Fort Bayard, and Major Noyes, Fort Cummings, 30 Jun., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.571-572; Hatch to Coppinger, 2 Jul., 
1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.582.
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were ordered to search the area to the south of Fort Cummings.104 By 6 July, there was a small 
picket of US troops stationed in the Florida Mountains, with Apache scouts deployed further 
south.105 A week later, Lieutenant Goodwin’s scouts were also in the vicinity; but neither company 
of scouts found any signs of Apaches.106 Luckily for the troops in New Mexico, Victorio was then 
moving towards western Texas to challenge Grierson’s command. For the moment, the reorganiza-
tion of the US troops in New Mexico continued with an alert, and anxious, eye to the situation in 
western Texas.107
By early July, Hatch had turned his attention from the purchase and deployment of pack mules, 
wagons and horse trappings to Fort Cummings and Knight’s Ranch.108 By mid-July, as the campaign 
in western Texas was beginning, he had stationed seven companies of cavalry and one Indian 
scout company at Fort Cummings and two companies of cavalry and an Indian scout company at 
Knight’s Ranch. Five companies of infantry were making their way towards Fort Cummings, and 
a further company of infantry was en route to Knights Ranch. Hatch also requested that Knight’s 
Ranch be connected to the telegraph line to aid the prosecution of military operations.109 Finally, 
Colonel Buell notified Hatch that he was en route to Fort Cummings and expected to arrive at that 
point on 22 July, 1880.110 A large shipment of ammunition111 was ordered on 24 July, for delivery 
to Buell at Fort Cummings,112 though Hatch noted that the hire of non-army transportation was 
proving to be a very unreliable method of transporting supplies.113
On travelling through southern New Mexico, making his way to Fort Cummings, Buell was 
clearly shocked at the disposition of small, and seemingly useless, detachments of both infantry and 
cavalry scattered across the region. While he was quite correct to suggest this was a poor state of 
military affairs in theory, he clearly had had no understanding of the previous year’s campaigning 
against the Apaches. On his earlier-than-expected arrival at Fort Cummings, he sent a tactless 
letter to General Pope, dated 19 July 1880, which bypassed Hatch, and was not a good start. If 
104 Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 3 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p586-587.
105 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 6 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.594; Hatch to Carr, 11 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.601.
106 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 14 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.609 see also p.611.
107 See Loud to Morrow, 14 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 431, pp.611-612.
108 See Hatch, 3 & 6 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.584-585 & 591-593.
109 Loud to Lt. Allen, Officer in Charge of the Military Telegraph Line, New Mexico Division, SF, 30 
Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, 
Letter No.387.
110 249 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 14 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.612; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth 22 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.640.
111 76,000 rounds of Carbine and 5,000 rounds of Rifle ammunition. 400 Rounds & 575 Primers for the 
Hotchkiss Mountain Gun. (Hatch to Fort Union Arsenal, 24 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.648-649) Subsequently, Hatch increased the 
requisition for Rifle ammunition from 5,000 to 25,000. (Hatch to Fort Union Arsenal, 29 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.662).
112 Hatch to Fort Union Arsenal, 24 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.648-649.
113 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 28 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.660-661; See also Hatch to Grierson, Eagle Springs, and to Col. Buell, 
Fort Cummings, 1 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.685-686.
The Ninth Cavalry Regroups, June–August 1880 301
nothing else, the date meant that Buell had not bothered to contact the District Commander about 
his concerns, but had decided to report directly to General Pope: a clear breach of the military 
courtesy (at the very least) due to one’s immediate superior.114 To compound such political stupidity, 
Buell appears to have made no effort to investigate the practicalities and, more importantly, the 
impracticalities, of the prosecution of a war against Apache guerrillas. Conventional organisation 
and appearances were not going to win an Apache War. 
In response to this issue, General Pope wrote very detailed instructions to Buell as to how he 
expected the latter to prosecute the anticipated campaign against Victorio. Pope concluded this 
letter as follows:
I rely upon your energy and activity which are well known, and the only apprehension I have 
arrives from what is equally well known, viz: your strong propensity for controversy.
You see I write you with entire frankness. I am greatly interested in your success, both on 
your own personal account, and on account of the public interests and I wish you to understand 
exactly what I think to be your weak point, which should watch with particular solicitude.115
Where Colonel Buell was on firmer ground was in his condemnation of the state of the telegraph 
service in southern New Mexico. Between his arrival in mid-July and 27 July, the line was down 
twice, including a break for four days. The Colonel reported a general lack of energy among opera-
tors, and was flabbergasted to find that the lines were not manned in shifts for twenty-four hours 
a day. He was also cut off in the middle of the transmission of an important telegram by an opera-
tor.116 It may not have been practicable to routinely man the telegraph stations around the clock. 
Nevertheless, it would have made sense to so operate them during field operations against the 
Apaches. The immediate forwarding of scout reports and communications between headquarters 
was essential when campaigning against such mobile guerrillas.
By August 1880, Colonel Buell had a formidable force concentrated at Fort Cummings. Lieutenant 
Colonel N.A.M. Dudley was in charge of the mounted elements of six companies: B, C, D, F, K 
and L, Ninth Cavalry. Major H.E. Noyes commanded A, H and L Companies, Fourth Cavalry. 
Also present were B, D, F, I and K Companies, Fifteenth Infantry, and two assistant surgeons, J.J. 
Kane and W.R. Hall and two acting assistant surgeons, W.N. Handy and S.C. Benedict.117 In mid-
August, the Secretary of War authorised Buell to buy 40 pack mules.118 However, Buell expressed 
concern that replacement horses for the dismounted men stationed at various points in southern 
114 Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 19 Jul., 1880  in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, 
Box 92. While the letter was addressed to the AAAG, District of New Mexico, its opening sentence 
instructed its recipient, Captain Loud, to forward the letter to both Col. Hatch and General Pope. If 
Loud failed to transmit this communication on to Pope he would be disobeying the orders of a superior 
officer and one who already had a reputation for resorting to court martialling junior officers, often on 
the flimsiest grounds. Loud had been cleared of an earlier charge brought against him by Buell and 
would have been very wary of provoking him. If Buell had genuine concerns he should have first voiced 
them to Hatch, and if not receiving satisfaction, have approached Pope.
115 Pope to Buell, 30 Aug., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 93.
116 Buell to AAG, DoM, 27 Jul., 1880 & Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 4 Aug., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 92.
117 Station of Troops by Companies – Troops operating in the Field in Southern New Mexico – Fort 
Cummings, Aug. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; See also Hatch to Valois, 28 Jul., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.657.
118 Meigs, Quartermaster General to Comdg Gen’l, Div. Mo., 12 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.577-578 & p.579. Forty pack mules passed through Silver City on the 28 Aug., 1880 on their 
way to Fort Cummings. (‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 28 Aug., 1880).
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New Mexico had not arrived.119 Hatch, who had already been lobbying the Department of the 
Missouri for more horses,120 informed Buell that the replacement horses would be provided ‘as soon 
as they can be purchased in open market’.121 He also told Buell that General Pope had ordered the 
dismounted men to be stationed at scattered points throughout southwestern New Mexico and, for 
the moment, there was no urgent need to remount these detachments. General Pope recognized 
the political value of deploying these small detachments to provide some reassurance to the citizens 
of the Territory. Hatch pointedly reminded Buell that these detachments were not under Buell’s 
command, and until further notice, they were to remain at their allocated stations.122 
However, on 27 August 1880, the dismounted detachments of Ninth Cavalry at Las Palomas 
and Cuchillo Negro were ordered to join the detachment based at Hillsboro. Any men whose 
mounts had recovered were then ordered to join their mounted comrades at either Fort Cummings 
or Knight’s Ranch. The dismounted detachments stationed on the San Francisco River were 
also instructed to send any men whose mounts had recovered to their proper companies at either 
Knight’s Ranch or Fort Cummings.123
On 30 August 1880, a flurry of orders was issued directing various mule trains and supply wagons 
to report to either Knight’s Ranch or Fort Cummings.124 Those assigned to Fort Cummings would 
join the 251 mules, 28 wagons and associated equipment in various stages of repair already held at 
that post.125 This equipment included a large water wagon.126 In comparison to the resources avail-
able for Morrow’s earlier pursuits of Victorio, an unprecedented amount of logistical capability was 
being concentrated at Old Fort Cummings and Knight’s Ranch. An extension to the overall size of 
the military reservation at Fort Cummings was authorised on 4 September 1880, to accommodate 
the large number of troops stationed there.127
However, problems remained. Buell reported that:
no horse equipments available. Col. Dudley now trying to borrow some from Fourth cav’y to 
equip his command so soon as Lt. Dimmick arrives with [replacement] horses the cav’y from 
here will be mounted and put in condition to take the field & act under my orders. I understand 
company K has much property at Ojo Caliente including horse equipments which should be 
sent in transportation all needed here.128
119 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 3 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.692.
120 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 23 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.375, p.213; same letter in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 
393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 92.
121 Hatch to Buell. 4 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.698-699.
122 Hatch to Buell, 4 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.698-699.
123 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 98, par 1 & 2, 27 Aug., 1880; See also Humphreys to 
AAAG 4 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.800-801.
124 See in particular Various Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.772-774, pp.778-782 & p.785.
125 Buell to AAAG SF 28 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.399-403.
126 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 99, par 10, 30 Aug., 1880.
127 AG to Lieut General P.H. Sheridan, 4 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.593-594.
128 Buell to AAAG 20 ???? 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.106-107.
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It should be noted that the Chief Quarter Master, District of New Mexico, had been instructed, 
on 20 July 1880, to ‘take immediate steps’ to ensure that Colonel Buell’s command was properly 
supplied.129 He ordered the dispatch of the items listed in Table 12.6 by the end of July.
Table 12.6 Supplies sent to Colonel Buell’s Command130
Carpenter’s Equipment Blacksmith’s Tools Wheelwright’s Tools
From Fort Union Depot:
Three Months’ Supply of Horse Medicine and Instruments
100 Pack Saddle Blankets 150 Woollen Blankets 450 Rubber Blankets
40 Campaign Hats 20 Mess Pans 900 Rubber Ponchos
200 Common Tents 300 Shelter Tents 500 lbs each Horse and Mule Shoes
From Headquarters, District of New Mexico, Santa Fé
900 Forage Caps 600 Cavalry Blouses 600 Cavalry Trousers
400 Campaign Hats 300 Infantry Blouses 900 Drawers
900 Boots 1,800 Stockings
By the beginning of September, this situation was steadily improving. On 2 September, Special 
Order 101, noting the arrival of replacement horses, ordered the detachments stationed at Canada 
Alamosa, San Jose, San Nicholas, Rinconada, Dowling’s Mills, Slocum’s Ranch, Santa Barbara 
and Lloyd’s Ranch to report to Fort Cummings.131 These redeployments imply that the US army 
had concluded that the Apaches were, in the main, based in Mexico. This negated the need for 
widespread detachments across southwestern New Mexico, and allowed the concentration of all 
available cavalry near the Mexican border. 
On 20 September, E Company, Ninth Cavalry, and two companies of the Thirteenth Infantry 
were redeployed from Fort Wingate to Fort Craig,132 with E Company detachments based along 
or near the San Francisco Valley being ordered to march to Fort Craig by way of Ojo Caliente.133 
The Ninth Cavalry detachments based at Aleman and Round Mountain were also redeployed to 
Fort Craig.134 These deployments were designed to provide some protection to the local economy 
should Victorio’s Apaches evade Buell and attempt to return to their mountain strongholds in the 
United States.
Hatch also made renewed efforts to recruit additional Apache scouts from San Carlos. While 
Carr estimated that approximately 220 Apache scouts might be recruited, he reported that there 
were no reliable civilian ‘leaders’ available to direct these scouts, though he again voiced his belief 
that, even with such ‘leaders’, Apache scouts would not be much use unless backed by US army 
units.135 He was also certain that sufficient numbers of rifles were not readily available to arm such 
a dramatic increase in the numbers of Apache scouts. 
129 Loud to Chief Quartermaster, DoNM, 20 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.363, p.236.
130 Chief QM, DoNM, to Post QM, Fort Cummings, 28 Jul., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, 
RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 92
131 Special Order 101, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, paragraphs 2 & 3.
132 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 111, 17 Sept., 1880, paragraphs 1, 2 & 3.
133 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 112, 20 Sept., 1880, paragraph 4.
134 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450, Special Order 114, 23 Sept., 1880, paragraph 6.
135 Carr to Hatch 10 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.396-398; Carr to AG DoAz, 10 Sept., 
1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept., 1880 – 12 Dec., 
1880, Letter No.543, pp.7-8.
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From San Carlos, Agent Tiffany136 reported that between 100 and 150 San Carlos Apaches 
were willing to volunteer to go out after Victorio. Hatch thoroughly approved, and he estimated 
that the employment of the San Carlos scouts would end the war in six months.137 He even offered 
to lead this group himself, if no other officer could be found, arguing that such units even helped 
to ‘civilise’ the Apaches by showing them disciplined army service.138 General Pope agreed with 
the principle behind this proposal. He thought that the obvious hostility between the San Carlos 
Apaches and the Chihenne Apaches could be put to good use in hunting Victorio down. However, 
Pope was also concerned that such Apache volunteers should be accompanied by an experienced 
officer and detachments of US troops, in order that these warriors ‘do not engage in hostilities with 
anybody except Victorio’.139 However, Pope decided that he would wait to see if the next stage in 
the campaign met with any success before making a final decision as to whether these volunteers 
should be recruited.140 Hatch’s offer to feed and arm the volunteers would involve an expense of 
which he disapproved.141  
By mid-September, most of the mounted elements of the Ninth Cavalry, and a battalion of the 
Fourth Cavalry, were stationed near the Mexican border. Every effort had been made to ensure 
that they could operate with a full complement of wagon and mule transportation. Therefore, it was 
clear that the US army in New Mexico was gearing up for a major operation against the Apaches. 
Were such preparations geared towards detecting, and quickly defeating, Victorio’s warriors the 
next time they crossed into New Mexico? Or was something bigger planned? Hatch’s original 
orders to Colonel Buell, dated 26 June 1880, certainly suggest that no incursion into Mexico was 
planned:
The Force now concentrating at old Fort Cummings will be under your Command. You are 
charged with the protection of the Mexican Frontier West of the Rio Grande River. It is prob-
able the Hostiles who are driven into old Mexico will either return in force or in raiding parties 
to New Mexico. You will keep out Companies of Cavalry scouting the Country and guarding 
the main line of Travel West from the River.
Should the Indians cross the border and pass your line, they must be followed with energy 
and persistency.
(You are authorized to draw on Fort Bayard for Supplies so far as that Post can furnish 
them. It is however probable you must look to [Fort] Craig and the Terminus of the Rail Road 
for the great bulk of them.)142
136 Bell, Acting Secretary, Dept. of the Interior to The Secretary of War, 24 Aug., 1880, citing a letter dated 
20 Jul., 1880 from Agent Tiffany concerning his meeting with Col. Carr in ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; Tiffany to CoIA 13 Sept., 1880 (referring to Tiffany’s original offer of the 20 Jul., 
1880) in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Tiffany’s offer was eventually endorsed by the Acting 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. E.M. Marble, Acting Commissioner to The Secretary of the Interior 
14 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
137 Hatch to AAG DoM, 11 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
138 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 11 Sept., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.481, pp.310-312; Hatch to AAG DoM, 
11 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
139 Pope to Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 29 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
140 Pope to Whipple, AAG, Chicago, 29 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope 
to Whipple AAG Chicago, 29 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
141 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 15 Sept., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.488, pp.315-316.
142 Loud to Buell, 26 Jun., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, 
Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.313, pp.207-208.
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The post surgeon for Fort Bayard also noted a number of troop movements from Fort Bayard to 
Knight’s Ranch and Fort Cummings and stated that, ‘All these movements of troops were occa-
sioned in the deploying of troops, at different points, for the inauguration of a new campaign 
against Victorio’s Indians, whose return from Mexico into the territory is expected soon to take 
place.’143 
On 3 July 1880, General Pope had informed Hatch that, ‘It would be a very serious misfortune to 
military character should Victoria recross the line into New Mexico, without immediate knowledge 
of the fact & prompt action with sufficient force.’144 The following instructions concerning Buell’s 
role, issued to Hatch on 14 July, suggested that something more than a secure border was being 
planned:
Buell must have all the troops I specified as soon as possible. Give them to him with all infor-
mation you have or can get about Indians, but leave him to act himself. He is responsible and 
must have freedom to act as he thinks best.145
The clearest statement of intent was delivered by General Pope on 1 July 1880:
unless I get orders absolutely forbidding it, I shall, if these Indians of Victoria again enter the 
Territory, have them pursued into Mexico or elsewhere until they are caught. We have now or 
will have in a few days have a force on hand sufficient for the purpose and it would be foolish 
if not worse to fail to use it when the opportunity arises.146
Once it was realised that Victorio had not been crushed by Colonels Grierson and Valle in their 
campaigns of July and August, serious negotiations commenced between Colonel Buell and the 
Chihuahuan authorities to combine their efforts to catch and finish off the Apaches, and that this 
would involve a substantial force from the United States entering Chihuahua.
The main obstacle left to overcome was the difficult relations between the Republic of Mexico 
and the United States of America. The key to understanding this complex relationship is to realise 
that there were two levels of political action in both countries: the local and the federal. Actors 
at the local level were very aware of the nature of the problem and acted with the tacit approval 
of certain individuals within the more distant federal political structures. Individuals at the local 
level on both sides of the border were also more willing and able to cooperate with their opposite 
numbers. This was not a luxury necessarily open to both sets of superiors at the federal level.
The following chapter will examine these difficulties and argue that the proposed solution to the 
‘Victorio’ problem was constructed through local ‘unofficial’ relations between local actors on both 
sides of the border, but in such a way that federal support for these measures could be officially 
denied.
143 Medical History, Fort Bayard NM May 1880, NA, RG94, Entry 257 Vol. 896, p.29.
144 Pope to Colonel Hatch, 3 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Entry 440, p.42.
145 Platt AAG to General Hatch, SF, 14 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.27.
146 Pope to Sheridan 1 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.521-527; See also Pope’s Annual 
Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.613.
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Mexico and the United States Unite: ‘Unofficial’ and ‘Official’ Diplomacy Prevail, 
September–October 1880
 
The United States and Mexico: Official and Unofficial Relations
The central problem for the United States was trying to persuade the Mexican federal government 
that the US government had no ulterior motive for sending troops into Mexico. When, during June 
and July 1880, the US Department of State tried to apply diplomatic pressure by arguing that the 
Republic of Mexico was granting the Apaches asylum, it provoked an angry response from Mexico. 
Foreign Minister Miguel Ruelas rejected this rather undiplomatic accusation on the grounds that 
to grant such permission would be unconstitutional. He also condemned the US Indian reservation 
system for arming the Apaches, who then used these weapons indiscriminately on both sides of the 
border. Ruelas pointed out that the recent campaigns by General Trevino, and the current punitive 
expedition directed by Colonel Valle, clearly contradicted accusations that Mexico had granted 
asylum to the Apaches. Ruelas finally pointed out that the Mexican government had indicated its 
willingness to enter into negotiations concerning a reciprocal cross-border agreement between the 
two counties. That the US government had, so far, refused to countenance the idea of Mexican 
forces following Apaches into the United States was not the fault of the Republic of Mexico.1
We have already commented on the internal politics and lack of resources that the Mexicans 
faced when trying to confront the Apaches. However, the above situation reflects a long and difficult 
relationship between the two republics. Within living memory, the United States had thrown the 
Mexicans off a large portion of their sovereign territory, principally during the Mexican-American 
War of 1846–48 . Texan independence was a continuing source of annoyance. Though the United 
States had not officially involved itself, the driving force behind achieving Texan independence 
from Mexico had been Anglo-American immigrants. However, immediately after the end of the 
American Civil War, the US government had thrown considerable support behind the Mexican 
Republican President, Benito Juarez, to help him overthrow Emperor Maximilian.
Where the recent activities of Apaches were concerned, diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Mexico revolved around whether Mexico should grant passage to US troops before 
the United States recognised Diaz’s regime, and whether it should wait till after recognition was 
granted to allow border crossings.2 As late as 1 June 1877, in what came to be known as the ‘Ord 
order’3, the US government had unilaterally declared its right to pursue American Indians across 
1 See Ruelas to Morgan, 23 Jul., 1880, Morgan to Ruelas, 24 Jul., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14.
2 Dinges, 1987, pp.83-84.
3 So named as it was addressed to General Ord, Commander of the DoTx.
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the border into Mexico, whether or not it had been given permission to do so by the Mexican 
government.4 (see document file no. 105.) 
It should also be noted that strict instructions were issued in this order concerning the conduct 
of US troops while on Mexican soil:
The same courtesy and co-operation will be extended to Mexican troops, who may, when in 
pursuit of such raiders, cross into the United States, as we would be pleased to receive from 
them, when operating on their side of the river.5
It was also clearly stated that such courtesy would not be extended to Mexican ‘revolutionists’, and 
any such persons were to be disarmed and interned.6 Finally, if there was a Mexican force present 
that was capable of apprehending any raiders being pursued by US forces, then the latter should not 
continue their pursuit into Mexico.7
While this order was attacked in the US Congress, it must also have been a very fresh and 
painful reminder to the Mexican government of the United States’ assumption of supremacy over 
the western hemisphere under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. This ‘doctrine’ fostered 
the later expression of ‘Manifest Destiny’ as the rationale behind American expansion across the 
North American continent – an idea that was still very much in vogue in 1880. The problem for 
the Mexican federal government, in the light of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny, 
was internal revolutionary activity, which centred around who would succeed Benito Juarez. Until 
Porfirio Diaz finally established his presidency of Mexico, the federal structures of government in 
the country could not control much of what transpired on the country’s borders with the United 
States. Such border instability might provoke the US government to go further than it had done 
so far. In the interests of its citizens caught up in the turmoil, and with popular support, fuelled 
by notions of manifest destiny, it might annexe more of Mexico declaring itself more qualified to 
govern.
The Vice Consul’s reports from El Paso del Norte and Chihuahua City for 1872–74 recount the 
rise and fall of various political factions within Chihuahua. It is clear from this correspondence 
that, during this period, most political actors in the State of Chihuahua had to focus all their efforts 
on their own political survival, which did not make for a coherent, let alone an effective, border 
security policy.8 Even when Porfirio Diaz had established his regime, federal control of Mexico’s 
border states was not assured in the face of the relative autonomy of the office of state governor. 
This office was prone to corruption and state-level revolution, and the federal authorities did not 
4 Secretary of War,1 Jun., 1877, to the General of the Army in Papers relating to the Frelinghuysen-
Romero Agreement of 29 Jul., 1882, providing for reciprocal crossings of the international boundary 
by troops of the United States and Mexico in pursuit of hostile Indians, Feb. 1862-Jun. 1867 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’); Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, 
NA, M689, Roll 81; Hatfield, 1999, pp.23-24; see also Dinges, 1987, p.84; Wooster, 1988, p.95 & p.186; 
Sayles, 1976, p.296.
5 General of the Army, 9 Jun., 1877, to the Lieutenant General commanding MDoM; and by latter 
to Commanding General DoTx in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
6 General of the Army, 9 Jun., 1877, to the Lieutenant General commanding MDoM; and by latter 
to Commanding General DoTx in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
7 Secretary of War, 14 Jul., 1877 to the Commanding General DoTx in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; 
Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
8 See Consular Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NA, Wash. D.C., M184, Roll 2 & Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 1.
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have the resources or, on occasion, the inclination, to intervene if the incumbent governor was a 
supporter of the federal government. 
Thus, the Diaz regime had to engage with the United States to convince the latter that the 
Mexican government could bring stability to the border. At the same time, such action could 
provoke resistance from regional political actors, even though the latter’s sources of power could 
be quite ephemeral. The danger was that, if the federal government moved too quickly against 
such relative autonomy, these actors might garner more support and prove able to resist, or even 
possibly overthrow, central government. Nevertheless, despite the outrage felt at the Ord directive, 
the federal government of Mexico made a serious effort to calm its turbulent border regions.9 Diaz 
had already despatched General Geronimo Trevino to calm the area. After the Ord directive was 
issued, General Trevino was given orders ‘to repel with force the crossing of American troops into 
Mexican territory’.10 There were a couple of incursions into Mexico by US troops where Mexican 
troops were encountered, but no shots were fired, Then, in June 1878, came what was potentially 
the most dangerous encounter between Mexican troops and a large US force – an encounter near 
Piedras Negras with US troops led by Colonel R.S. MacKenzie. However, both sides declined to 
enter into direct hostilities.11
Trevino’s successes in pacifying the regions south of the border led to recognition of the 
Diaz regime in April 1878; but they failed to lead to the rescinding of the Ord directive, and 
led to Mexican nationalists blocking US-backed railroad construction proposals in the Mexican 
9 Hatfield, 1999, 1999, pp.26-27.
10 Dinges, 1987, p.84.
11 Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians & c., made in the DoTx during the Year 
ending 30 Sept., 1878, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports of Departments 1879-1881, 
MDoM
Porfirio Diaz.
 President of the Republic of Mexico during the 
Victorio campaign. He was faced with the difficult 
task of negotiating with the nationalist and anti-
American members of his government and the US 
government in negotiating cooperation between 
American and Mexican forces against the Apaches. 
He was unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement 
to allow both Mexican and American troops to 
cross each other’s borders in pursuit of the Apaches 
in 1880. Nevertheless, Diaz probably turned 
a blind eye to unofficial cooperation between 
Mexican state troops and the US army in pursuit 
of Victorio in what became known as the Buell 
Expedition of September-October 1880. (National 
Archives)
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Congress.12 That same month, General Willcox informed his superiors that a telegram had been 
received informing him that the Mexican government had forbidden the troops of either country 
to cross the international border.13 His superior, General McDowell noted that, up till that point, 
scouting parties from the military on both sides of the border could follow the trails of brigands and 
Indians into the other’s territory and concluded that: 
Mexico cannot justly … nor can we … take exception to troops crossing the line in red hot 
pursuit, and there is no force on the opposite side to disarm the fugitives, who else can carry 
their depredations with utter impunity.14
However, as far as the Department of Arizona was concerned, the instructions from Mexico forbid-
ding cross-border pursuits allowed some leeway in interpreting the term ‘hot pursuit’ in relation 
to Apache raiders. ‘Orders cannot be given to pursue an enemy through Mexican Territory, but it 
is believed that in a close and hot pursuit, the command following would hardly have time to stop 
to examine as to exact boundary lines.’15 By May 1879, General Trevino stated his aim to launch a 
campaign against Indians who were entering Mexico from the US. He also sought to coordinate 
his troops’ efforts in conjunction with the US army ‘to co-operate, as far as possible, with a view to 
securing a successful result of the campaign’.16
Unfortunately, while efforts were being made to convince the US government that the Mexican 
Federal government was trying to assert control over its side of the border, other incidents suggested 
that the Diaz regime was making very slow progress. The San Elizario ‘Salt War’ of 1877–78, to the 
east of El Paso, caused some concern to the US authorities when it was discovered that Mexican 
US citizens were being aided by Mexican citizens in their fight to retain their salt rights. It was 
reported that the Mexican authorities in El Paso del Norte were less than cooperative in appre-
hending some Mexican murder suspects indicted in the United States, and very tardy in recovering 
the possessions of those US citizens killed during this dispute.17 
Reports were received, during July and August 1878, that a large number of Mescalero Apaches 
were trading horses and mules stolen in the USA for guns and ammunition, in the town of Presidio 
del Norte. This prompted instructions from Sherman that raiding Indians be, if necessary, pursued 
into Mexico.18 
The failure to resolve the general situation of lawlessness along the US-Mexican border prompted 
General Sherman to contact General Sheridan. The former suggested that martial law could be 
12 Sayles, 1976, p.297; See also Dinges, 1987, p.84.
13 McDowell 8 Apr., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 
1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
14 McDowell 8 Apr., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 
1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
15 Martin AAG to CO DoAz, 22 Jun., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 9, p.205.
16 Evarts U.S. Secretary of State (citing Ambassador Zamacona 10 Jun., 1879 and General Trevino10 May, 
1879) to McCrary, U.S. Secretary of War, 2 Jul., 1879 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
17 See Schutz to the 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, 6 Mar., 1878 & 3 Dec., 1878 in Consular Despatches 
Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2. 
Schutz knew from January 1878 from a U.S. Citizen, Thomas Collins that a ‘buggy’ and horses 
belonging to two of the slain men, one Judge Howard & John Atkinson were in possession of Mexican 
citizens from Carrizal but these items were not returned until 12 January, 1879. (Schutz to 2nd Assistant 
Secretary of State, 12 Jan., 1879 & Schutz to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, 18 Jul., 1880 in Consular 
Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2).
18 Vincent, AAG, DoTx to CO, DoP, 27 Aug., 1878 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
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declared in all the Texas counties bordering Mexico. Furthermore, a Mexican town could be 
temporarily seized, and a number of animals corresponding to the number stolen in Texas could 
be confiscated at random, to point out to the Mexican people the benefit of resolving the overall 
situation. Finally, Sherman suggested that the US break off diplomatic relations with Mexico until 
the border question was settled.19 As far as Sheridan was concerned, the declaration of martial law 
might make sympathetic Mexican US citizens think twice about aiding and abetting Mexican 
citizens raiding in the United States The other proposals, he felt, would at the very least cause 
confusion, and might force the Mexican government into a situation of either declaring war on the 
United States or being deposed by its citizens. The breaking off of diplomatic relations would serve 
no purpose, and the idea failed to take account of the fact that the federal government of Mexico, 
while having difficulty in policing its own border, was not actually hostile to the United States20
Having appeared rather sympathetic to the Mexican authorities, and having rejected Sherman’s 
more ‘radical’, if not inflammatory, suggestions, Sheridan then proposed an even more provocative 
solution.
I would suggest as the best way to settle this Rio Grande border trouble, that Congress pass 
an Act, providing that after a certain date from its passage, should any further raids from 
Mexico be made upon our soil by Indians or Mexicans, the President of the United States 
shall be authorized to occupy and hold the country from the Rio Grande to the Sierra Madre 
Mountains, and that such territory be retained until the Government of the United States is 
satisfied that its citizens will be no longer in danger of losing their lives and property. This 
declaration on the part of Congress will accomplish, in my opinion, the purpose desired, 
without further complications and without war. The fear of the occupation of this section by 
United States troops will be so great among its inhabitants that I believe it will effectually stop 
their marauding. If it does not, we can then get into position to stop it effectually ourselves.21
General Ord suggested a more conservative measure: the location in the border area of a mobile 
force with a pontoon train to pursue raiders into Mexico. The Mexican government should also be 
informed that any ad hoc attempt by Mexican citizens or the Mexican army to interfere would be 
considered as aiding the fugitives and, as such, would face attack by US forces. He also suggested 
that reprisals be aimed at those persons receiving stolen property. However, his primary recom-
mendation was that those Indians haunting the borderlands be at first approached and offered land 
in the Indian Territory.22 
Sherman rejected the idea of annexing the northern section of Mexico. In his opinion, this 
would not solve the problem and might lead to a situation where all of Mexico would eventually 
be annexed. This he felt could threaten the national character of the United States23 ‘Instead of our 
making them Anglo-Saxon, they may make us Mexicans. Therefore I am firm in my conviction 
that in no event, and under no circumstances should our national boundary move further south.’24 
Sherman then recommended that, as a first step, Mexico should be held accountable for border 
19 Sherman to Sheridan 29 Jun., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
20 Sheridan to Sherman, 2 Jul., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
21 Ibid.
22 Ord to Sherman, 1 Jul., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
23 Sherman to McCrary, 6 Jul., 1878 ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
24 Ibid.
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security through naval action against its major ports. This could involve their blockade, occupa-
tion or destruction. Secondly, the US forces on the border should be strengthened, and all efforts 
made to catch and destroy raiders. Finally, Sherman proposed that the existing railroads in Texas 
be extended to the border. ‘These would Stimulate Emigration and Trade, and Encourage a Class 
of men to settle who would defend their own property and lives, leaving the troops to deal with the 
larger parties.’25
This discussion of options does show the differing interpretations of the concept of manifest 
destiny at play: Sheridan was quite willing to risk a war with Mexico to solve the problem of a 
lawless border; Sherman, though quite willing to engage in limited hostilities with Mexico, was 
also aware of cultural ‘threats’ to the US’s development of the North American continent. Whilst 
such concerns may appear ethnocentric, even ridiculous, in today’s terms, these issues were taken 
very seriously at the time. The most effective measure proposed by Sherman was also cultural: his 
long-term solution was to thoroughly ‘Americanise’ the borderlands.
This discussion was academic. The Secretary of War had been informed that a conflict with 
Mexico, provoked by an act of the US forces, would not be countenanced by the President of the 
United States. For the moment, President Hayes was content that Ord should continue to act under 
the instructions issued on 1 June 1877.26
Unfortunately, any slight warming of relations between the two countries was interrupted 
when Victorio raided Chihuahua in January, and again in November, 1879. George W. McCrary, 
Secretary of War, had noted in his annual report for 1878 a significant reduction in cross-border 
incursions into Texas.27 In Arizona, Colonel O.B. Willcox, who had recently taken over from 
Colonel Kautz, reported that the government of Mexico had forbidden their troops to pursue 
Apaches into the United States, and vice versa. However, Willcox noted a spirit of cooperation 
on the part of Mexican troops along the border that he could only ascribe to a change of policy 
on the part of the federal government of Mexico. Yet Willcox also recommended that, should this 
situation deteriorate, the order to remain on the US side of the border be suspended, in the short 
term, and that ‘the common enemy be followed in the heat of pursuit across the border’.28 By 1879, 
General Ord recommended that the Ord directive should be revoked, though the course of the 
Victorio war rapidly persuaded him to reverse this opinion.29
At first, the US diplomatic and military communities did not view Victorio’s declaration of 
war as a threat to US-Mexican relations.30 In reaction to Mexican complaints about raiding in 
Chihuahua in January 1879, the US authorities argued that US Apaches could not be held to 
account. First, they argued that many of these raids were more likely the work of Indians based in 
Mexico. Second, they pointed out that the US army regularly patrolled the border with its troops, 
whereas the Mexican army was nowhere to be seen along the Mexican side of the border.31 This 
25 Sherman to McCrary, 6 Jul., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
26 McCrary to Sherman, 6 Aug., 1878 & Sherman to Sheridan, 9 Aug., 1878 in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero 
Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
27 Report of the Secretary of War in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 30, 1878 Vol. I-II, pp.v-vi.
28 Report of Col. O.B. Willcox in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 30, 1878 Vol. I-II, pp. 193-194.
29 Annual Report, DoTx, 1 Oct., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports of Departments 
1879-1881, MDoM, p.6; Ramsey to General of the Army, 24 Feb., 1880, in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero 
Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81; Dinges, 1987, p.86.
30 Sayles, 1976, p.298.
31 See correspondence attached to letter from F.W. Seward, Acting Secretary of State, to George W. 
McCrary, Secretary of War, 16 Aug., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.272-287; See also 
Foster to Ruelas, 18 Jul., 1879 & Foster to Evarts 23 Jul., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 38 Jul.-Sept. 1879.
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assertion was angrily rejected by the Mexican authorities, who argued that the Apache raiders 
could be shown to have been originally from US Indian reservations. They also pointed out that 
elements of the US government had recently praised the cooperation of US and Mexican forces 
along the border.32 Indeed, it was privately acknowledged on the US side that, if there were incur-
sions into Mexico, these were almost certainly coming from the Mescalero reservation.33
While the two countries bickered as to who was responsible for the Apache raids, on 1 October 
1879, the US Consul in Mexico City made inquiries on behalf of the US government concerning 
the potential for the US and Mexican forces to co-ordinate their efforts against Victorio.34 What 
is immediately apparent in this series of letters is a lack of any mention of cross-border opera-
tions. The United States merely expressed willingness to mount expeditions to pursue and punish 
Apaches. This received a warm welcome from Ruelas, but the thorny issue of just where these 
expeditions would operate was not mentioned.35
Over and above the understandable reluctance of the Mexican authorities to admit US troops 
into their territory, the former still harboured grave doubts concerning the direction of the USA’s 
Indian policy. Mexico had never adopted a reservation policy towards Indians, and they viewed the 
US reservation system as merely providing the Apaches with secure bases from which they could 
raid Mexico with impunity.36 Not only could Victorio gain arms and ammunition, he could also 
sell the plunder taken from raids in Mexico on US Indian reservations.37 The Mexicans even went 
so far as to employ a spy on the San Carlos reservation in an attempt to keep track of Apaches and 
US troops.38
The spate of attacks in Mexico in November 1879, which, from a Mexican point of view, could 
have been interpreted as a result of Major Morrow’s forcing Victorio into Mexican territory, 
prompted the Mexican federal army to take to the field. This must have had a positive effect, as 
the US Government rescinded the Ord order on 24 February 1880.39 This decision was clearly 
influenced by the positive report concerning Mexican efforts to confront Apache raiders sent to the 
Secretary of State, William Evarts, by John Foster, Minister of the United States to Mexico, on 29 
December 1879. (see document file no. 106.) Foster also noted that, in his opinion, this renewed 
interest in the border by the Diaz regime had been aroused by the United States’ tough unilateral 
stance concerning pursuits across the border. Foster also warned that, while there had been positive 
32 M. de Lamacona to William M Evarts, The Secretary of State, 16 Mar., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 527; Ruelas to Foster, 19 Jul., 1879 notes Gen. Trevino in the field with two columns and 
noting the passage of at least two parties of ‘barbarous’ Indians crossing from the United States into 
Mexico on the 10 and 18 of Jun., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 38 Jul.-Sept. 1879.
33 See collection of reports attached to report submitted by Ord to HQ MDoM, 9 Jul., 1879, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.170-193; See also Pope to Whipple, 4 Sept., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.198-202; Hatch to the AAG, DoM, 14 Aug., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.202-205.
34 Dinges, 1987, p.84.
35 Wm. M Evarts, Secretary of State to George W. McCrary, Secretary of War, 10 Nov., 1879, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.244-249.
36 Hatfield, 1999, 1999, p.9, p.34, pp.41-42 & 56; Sayles, 1976, pp.304-305.
37 Hatfield, 1999, p.35.
38 Ibid, p.9.
39 Ramsey, Secretary of War, to The General of the Army, 24 Feb., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.343-345; Ramsey to General of the Army, 24 Feb., 1880, in ‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters 
Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81; Hatfield, 1999, p.37-According to 
Hatfield it was revoked on the 1 Feb., 1880; Sayles, 1976, p.298, Wooster, 1998, p.95; Dinges, 1987, 
p.84; Loud to General Hatch, Fort Bayard, 9 Mar., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.205.
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efforts on the border, the political situation in Mexico, with a looming presidential election, would 
not necessarily guarantee a continued state of stability on the question.40 
When the Apaches retreated to Mexico in late May 1880, the US Consul in Mexico City renewed 
the US’s request for permission to cross the border. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, 
some of the efforts to gain such permission were made in a rather undiplomatic way, and permission 
was twice refused. Nevertheless, there came a point when President Diaz initiated negotiations 
for reciprocal border crossings in pursuit of Apaches. On the one hand, he was all too aware of 
the negative effect of allowing US troops into Mexico during an election campaign. On the other 
hand, a failure to deal with the Apaches could delay Mexico’s economic and political develop-
ment. In fact, military cooperation between the two countries was to lead to further economic and 
political stability and development on both sides of the border. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé 
(AT&SF) Railroad, then nearing El Paso, had ‘secured charters’ from the Republic of Mexico and 
intended to construct a line from El Paso, via Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecos, to Leon. Work 
had already commenced on a railroad from Mexico City to Leon.41 In 1881 it was noted that the 
AT&SF intended to construct a railway line between El Paso and Guaymas.42
Filibusters and Counter-Revolutionaries
Another concern for the federal Mexican government was a resurgence in the potential for ‘filibus-
tering’ activity in what could be defined as an independent application of that vague term ‘mani-
fest destiny’. In other words, groups of independent political entrepreneurs, often backed by US 
capital, but not necessarily by the US government, would try to take advantage of the instability 
of Mexico to carve out ‘independent’ fiefdoms. It is clear from consular dispatches sent in 1872 
from El Paso del Norte (present day Cuidad Juarez), that, seeking to profit from revolutionary 
activity in Mexico at the time, ‘interested parties’ in Texas, and allegedly from both Chihuahua 
and Sonora,43 were lobbying the US Consul for the creation of a US protectorate over these regions. 
Some of the more extreme elements were even arguing that the states of Chihuahua and Sonora, 
if not Mexico itself, should be annexed.44 These sentiments were endorsed by some officials in the 
US State Department. The US Vice Consul at El Paso del Norte submitted a report stating that, 
in effect, Mexico, by 1872, was a ‘lost cause’ as an independent nation, having failed to thrive since 
throwing off Spanish rule:
40 John W. Foster to Wm. M. Evarts, 27 Dec., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.336-340.
41 Report of the General of the Army in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I-II, pp.55-56
42 Report of Major O.M. Poe, Aide-de-Camp, General of the Army in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 38, 
1881 Vol. I-II, p.2820. Poe had been commissioned by General Sherman to survey the progress of 
railway construction in Texas and southern New Mexico and this was carried out between 20 Dec., 1880 
and 22 Feb., 1881.
43 See letter dated 29 October to the Consul from F. Maemanno? ‘one of the most wealthy and popular 
merchants of the State of Chihuahua’ in William M. Pierson U.S.V. Consul to the 2nd Assistant 
Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 4 Nov., 1872 in Consular Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del 
Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
The motivation for such sentiment appears to be the unstable political situation in Mexico which was 
the despair of any businessman who required stability to maximise their business opportunities and the 
‘forced loans’ levied by the various political factions ‘revolutionary’ or otherwise.
44 William M. Pierson U.S.V. Consul to the 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 4 Nov., 
1872 & Pierson to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 17 Nov., 1872 with attached 
correspondence in Consular Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, 
Roll 2.
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Mexico in her present condition can hardly claim a greater right in the soil than was vested in 
the Montezummas when discovered by Cortez, namely possession, and occupancy, and such 
a title has ever been liable to be extinguished under international law by discovery, purchase, 
or conquest … Mexico is in a state of barbarism bearly45 above the common average of the 
Indian tribes of North America and that she is entitled to no greater consideration than other 
tribes of big Indians bordering on the United States, and in the very nature of things in order 
to preserve the peace and dignity of the family of nations on the American Continent, must, 
in time, be protected by, and counted46 within the limits of the union, and the sooner the rule 
is applied as laid down in the above cited cases47 the more speedy will the public interest be 
served, and the great an popular current of the public mind be gratified.48
One major incentive for the United States to intervene in Mexico was the country’s rich supply of 
precious metal and mineral resources, which had been exploited by the Spanish but abandoned by 
the Mexicans.49
Another consideration was that US merchants operating in Mexico were periodically subject 
to what was, in effect, official banditry. The nominated, but not yet appointed, US Consul in 
Chihuahua, Louis H. Scott, reported that one Henry Millar, a merchant in Chihuahua City, held 
to ransom by an armed faction in November 1876. Scott went so far as to enquire whether, if such 
an incident should occur in the future, for example, through kidnapping or imprisonment on refusal 
to pay a ‘loan’ to whatever political faction, he should ‘ask the assistance of the Military in Texas or 
merely advise the [State] Department?’50 Scott was convinced that such incidents would continue, 
and wanted assurance from the State Department that, when he was officially empowered to act as 
consul, he would have ‘ample power to protect all the American Citizens in this state from outrage 
and robbery, to which [they] have become so familiar during the past year, and I desire also to feel 
assured that my Govt. will sustain me in what I undertake to do’.51 His attitude did not prevent 
Mexican troops from violating the consulate, in November 1879, to remove money deposited there 
by US businessmen, which they took as a forced loan to pay for the revolution which, as we have 
seen, removed Governor Trias from office.52
In May 1877, the local garrison commander at El Paso del Norte, one Colonel Macharro, 
requiring money to pay his troops, levied it from 14 businessmen operating in that town, 10 of 
whom were US citizens. The consular agent protested this action, but noted that there was little 
that could be done as US troops at that time had been withdrawn from Fort Bliss. He further 
noted that, in effect, the Mexican side of the frontier was being run by political factions with very 
45 As spelled in original document.
46 I am reasonably certain that this word is ‘counted’ but am not 100 per cent certain. 
47 Johnson Vs. McIntosh & Fletcher Vs. Peek: In effect Peirson appears to be making an argument that 
certain unilateral federal actions within the United States, I suspect he is referring to post civil war 
reconstruction and the Kansas Missouri border wars can be applied outside the United States concerning 
Mexico.
48 William M. Pierson U.S.V. Consul to the 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 7 Nov., 
1872; See similar sentiments expressed in Pierson to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, 13 Jan., 1872 in 
Consular Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
49 Pierson, U.S. Vice Consul to the 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 8 Nov., 1872 in 
Consular Despatches Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
50 Scott to the Department of State. 23 Jan., 1877 in Consular Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, 
NA, M289, Roll 1.
51 Scott to the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 21 Mar., 1877 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 1.
52 Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 14 Nov., 1879 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 1.
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little respect for anything short of direct military force.53 In the event, when ‘Colonel Macharro’ 
attempted to widen the scope of this forced loan, he and his men were confronted by armed citizens 
and, after a lively gun battle, were forced to flee to the United States. The victorious citizens then 
proceeded to round up everybody who was supposed to have supported the previous petit-regime 
‘with the avowed purpose of shooting them’.54 The anarchy threatened to continue when the new 
‘petit-regime’ demanded the return of Macharro and threatened to invade the United States if this 
was refused.55
What is clear from the consular dispatches from El Paso del Norte and Chihuahua City is the 
state of official anarchy existing in Chihuahua, even after the establishment of the Diaz regime 
in Mexico. At least some Mexican authorities were inclined to blame ‘speculators’ and ‘enemies’ 
based in the United States for the inability of both countries to unite to exterminate the common 
enemy of both nations.56 However, the United States discouraged such political entrepreneurship 
on its side of the border by actively opposing the activities of filibustering or revolutionary bands. 
In August 1877, troops from Fort Duncan arrested a group of 44 suspected would-be invaders 
and turned them over to the civil authorities in Texas. In March and April 1878, patrols from 
Fort Duncan were turned out to search for a group of filibusters under a man called Salinas. One 
of these patrols captured four of these men, all Mexicans, and again turned them over to the civil 
authorities.57 Even as Buell was organising his forces in New Mexico and Grierson was finishing off 
his campaign in Western Texas, General Ord had to reassure the Mexican Consul in San Antonio 
that, contrary to some newspaper reports, there was no ‘Grand Army of Occupation organizing, 
partly in Texas, to invade Mexico’.58 
The reference to ‘enemies’ as well as ‘speculators’ above refers to political opponents of the Diaz 
regime who wished to overthrow his government by force. Again, while not supported by the US 
government, such groups could use the relatively sparsely populated southwestern USA as a spring-
board for their revolutionary activities. One Leonardo Marquez, presumably the person who held 
‘general’ rank under the Emperor Maximilian in the 1860s, was first reported to be in the border 
area in early May 1880. Willcox informed the Mexican Consul (in Tucson?) that Marquez was 
camped near Algadones station with between 60 and 130 men. He also reported that a Mexican 
gunboat and 400 troops were heading towards the mouth of the river (Colorado?) to oppose 
Marquez.59 Carr issued orders that one Sergeant Jerome Sawlor should ‘proceed to Sonoita in the 
state of Sonora, Mexico with dispatches for General Marquez or the leader of the Revolutionists 
in Mexico’.60 These dispatches politely informed Marquez that, should any of his forces cross the 
border, Carr would be obliged to disarm them, in view of the US Neutrality Laws. Carr also 
expressed the hope that recent depredations committed by Mexicans on Papago Indians had not 
53 Schulz to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 30 May, 1877 in Consular Despatches 
Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
54 Schulz to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 5 Jun., 1877 in Consular Despatches 
Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
55 Schulz to 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 5 Jun., 1877 in Consular Despatches 
Cuidad Juarez (Paso del Norte), NARA, Wash.D.C., M184, Roll 2.
56 Document “F” From the “Periodico Official,” Monterey, Saturday, 7 Sept., 1878 [Official organ of the 
Government of the State of Nuevo Leon, Mexico] in, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports 
of Departments 1879-1881, MdoM.
57 Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians & c., made in the DoTx during the Year 
ending 30 Sept., 1878, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2551, Annual Reports of Departments 1879-1881, 
MdoM.
58 Ord to AG, Chicago, Ills., 9 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.575 7 p.576.
59 Willcox to Mexican Consul, 7 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.211.
60 Special Orders No. 21, HQ Troops in the Field in SE Arizona, Fort Lowell, A.T. 27 May, 1880, Special 
Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 2, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, p.3.
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been carried out by any of Marquez’s forces.61 Carr did take the precaution of informing General 
Otero, the Mexican commander in Sonora, that he had been ordered to communicate thus with 
Marquez.62 Meanwhile, Willcox contacted the Mexican Consul, on 13 June, to inform the latter 
that he could not arrest Mexican fugitives unless they had violated the neutrality laws or intended 
to wage war. If either of these charges could be proved, then every effort would be made to disarm 
and confine such men.63 Two days later Carr was given permission to arrest Marquez, if he thought 
the latter intended to violate the neutrality laws.64
Marquez’s activities were investigated by Deputy US Marshall J.W. Evans. He found that 
Marquez had been operating in Mexico before moving into the United States, but that there was 
no evidence that neutrality laws had been violated. Marquez had subsequently attempted to invade 
Sonora, again from the United States, with followers he had partially gathered from Tucson. 
This was a clear violation of US neutrality, and Evans reported that there was enough evidence to 
warrant Marquez’s arrest.65 Colonel Carr reported that, in late June 1880, he had been directed by 
his district headquarters to break up a small expedition that Marquez had organised in Arizona 
to take action against Mexico.66 A group of approximately 40 revolutionaries were intercepted and 
scattered by a Sixth Cavalry company. This was probably a detachment commanded by Captain 
Rafferty, Sixth Cavalry, who was ordered to deal with Marquez on 21 June, 1880.67 Three days 
later, Rafferty sent word that Marquez had disbanded his group.68 When Marquez was subse-
quently spotted boarding a train for Yuma,69 Willcox ordered the commanding officer, Fort Yuma, 
to keep an eye on him.70 When Marquez departed north on a train for San Francisco, Willcox 
reported that, in his opinion, the attempted arrest by the Sixth Cavalry had, in the short term, 
neutralised Marquez’s revolutionary activities.71
A small band of brigands posing as revolutionaries, under the command of one Brigido Reyes, 
was reported to have crossed the border into Mexico on 9 August 1880. Reyes had set out with 
approximately 22 men, but news of their departure did not reach the US military until two days 
after the event. This meant there was not enough time for Reyes to be intercepted by the Sixth 
61 Carr to Marquez, 27 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 
18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.293, pp.50-51.
62 Carr to Otero, 27 May, 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.296, p.53.
63 Willcox to Prieto, Mexican Consul, Tucson, 13 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, 
p.276.
64 Martin to Carr, 15 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.278 see also p.280, p.281 & 
p.288.
65 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 12 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.317; 
See also “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.422; Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in 
AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.209.
66 Tabular Statement of Scouts and Expeditions of Companies 6th Cavalry from 1 Jul., 1879-31 Jul., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 240.
67 Record of Events Jun. 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry 
Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 63; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company M, 6th Cavalry, May/Jun. 1880 in NA, RG94.
68 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 24 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.291; 
Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880; Report of Col. E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, 
NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.218; See also Carr to Rafferty, 16 Jun., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, 
DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.354, pp.91-94.
69 And before anybody asks I don’t know if it was the 3:10 … 
70 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 26 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.293.
71 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 30 Jun., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.297.
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Cavalrymen sent in pursuit.72 Further activi-
ties by Reyes seem to have involved little more 
than political banditry in Magdalena, Sonora, 
where he was reported to have been raising 
forced loans, amounting to $10,000 for his 
‘revolution’.73 Reyes was then reported to have 
been defeated and to have fled back into the United States. Rumours that a sheriff had arrested 
20 of his men prompted Willcox to instruct Captain Rafferty to provide troops to support74 the 
civil authorities if necessary.75 Reyes was viewed by the US authorities as ‘a mere brigand’ and 
Headquarters, Department of Arizona, made strong representations that those now held in jail 
should not be viewed as ‘political refugees’,76 noting the effect their activities had on US citizens 
engaged in the economic development of the Republic of Mexico, including mining and railway 
construction:
72 Martin to U.S. Marshall, Prescott, Arizona Territory, 14 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1 Entry 169, 
Vol. 10, p.365; See also “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 
Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.422; Report of Col E.A. Carr, 29 Aug., 1880; 
Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, 
p.209.
73 Reports & Tabular Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, Capt Whitside, 6th Cavalry, to Kerr 
AAAG 16 Aug., 1880; NA, RG391 Entry 841; See also AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, 
p.223. Contributions to this loan were apparently encouraged by the summary execution of a local judge 
and a merchant. (‘News from Sonora’, The Grant County Herald, 28 Aug., 1880).
74 One is tempted to suggest that they were ordered to support their local sheriff … 
75 Willcox to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 25 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.376-
377; See also “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.422; Record of Events Aug., 1880 in Returns From Regular 
Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 6th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1875 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 
63; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company M, 6th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
76 See “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.422; Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 
1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.209.
Captain William A. Rafferty, Sixth Cavalry.
Throughout the campaign against Victorio, the 
Sixth Cavalry in Arizona provided periodic 
support to the troops in New Mexico by patrolling 
the border between the two territories and sending 
detachments to reinforce Hatch’s forces. They 
also had to contend with American and Mexican 
brigandage across the Arizona-Mexico border and 
the activities of Mexican ‘counter-revolutionaries’ 
using Arizona as a base for invading northern 
Mexico. Captain Rafferty was involved in the 
attempts to detain two groups of such ‘counter-
revolutionaries’ during the summer of 1880. 
(Carlisle Barracks)
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When these so-called filibusters swoop down on the peaceful inhabitants, our own citizens 
in Sonora suffer equally with the Mexicans, and for us to shield the robbers in their flight 
redhanded to our soil, is only to aid in the robbing of our own citizens.77
That the United States did act against such revolutionaries can be seen from the conviction of 
Brigido Altanaramo for ‘setting on foot a military expedition and enterprise against a foreign 
power’. Altanaramo was given two years in the Detroit House of Corrections.78
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that, over and above the conflict with the Apaches, in 1880 
there was a general level of organised brigandage, particularly horse thievery, operating across the 
Arizona, Chihuahua, New Mexico and Sonora lines. The posse comitatus laws prevented troops 
from aiding the civil authorities, ‘which in that sparsely settled region, amount to nothing’, in 
combatting such organised crime.79 In other words, if they were being honest, the US authorities 
would admit they had not established strong political control of the international border areas in 
Arizona and New Mexico.
An ‘Unofficial’ Solution to an Official Problem
Over and above the specific issues raised by filibusters and revolutionaries, the question of Mexico’s 
national sovereignty was a delicate issue, which raised significant obstacles to cross-border coopera-
tion in dealing with the Apaches. One such obstacle was: what would the federal Mexican govern-
ment be saying about its ability to rule if it allowed US forces to operate inside Mexico? 
In 1880, this problem was resolved by the Chihuahuan state government arranging a local 
agreement which allowed the US army to cross the border. The fact was that, despite the fluctua-
tions in their respective republics’ relations, the civil and military authorities on both sides of the 
US-Mexican border were in regular communication with each other. These communications were 
often quite cordial, and are aptly illustrated by General Ord’s communication to General Servado 
Canales asking him to convey his condolences to the President of the Republic of Mexico on the 
death of his wife. Canales’ response was to express his thanks, and promise that he would immedi-
ately telegraph Ord’s communication, via the Mexican Secretary of War, to President Diaz.80 While 
the Diaz regime had started to reverse this situation, in 1880, some Mexican State Governors were 
still able to exercise a great deal of independence in their relations with their federal government. 
The opportunity for the Chihuahua state governor to exercise enough relative autonomy to contem-
plate taking an independent attitude to US troops crossing the border had arisen in the past. In 
1862, in response to Confederate envoy James Reily’s inquiry about Mexican permission for Union 
troops to pass through northern Mexico, Luis Terrazas, Governor of Chihuahua, had informed 
him that even if the federal government allowed the passage of troops through Mexico to attack 
77 See “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.422; Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 
1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.209.
78 Report received dated 5 Aug., 1880 in Letters Rec’d 1880-1881, HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New 
Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, NA, RG393, M1081, Roll 5.
79 See “Border Troubles” Martin/Willcox to AG, MDoP, Presidio, San Francisco, 11 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.423; Report of General O.B. Willcox, 11 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 
1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, p.209.
80 Canales to Ord, 11 Apr., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.401-402: See also efforts made 
by Canales to apprehend men believed to have killed a Mr Bishop and attempted to rape his wife and 
servant on 16 May, 1880, over a supposed money debt owed by Bishop. (Ord to Sheridan, with enclosed 
correspondence, 20 May, 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.454-458).
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Texas, Terrazas would still not give them permission to pass through the state of Chihuahua.81 It 
is thus clear that the Governor had been willing to defy the government of Mexico should it pass 
a bill allowing the entrance of foreign troops. The Governor had implied to Reily that he had the 
authority to grant permission for a cross-border incursion lasting less than one month, but he also 
informed Reily that he was not in favour of a previous governor’s granting of permission for US 
troops to pursue Indians deep into Chihuahua. However, if Indian raiding persisted, then Terrazas 
undertook to ‘take the steps necessary to act upon it before the Congress of the Union’.82 Thus, in 
1862, Terrazas had made it clear that, while he was in charge of the governing of Chihuahua, he 
was quite capable of making his own arrangements concerning a foreign power, even if that ran 
contrary to the wishes of the ederal government of Mexico. Prior to the Ord order, the Chihuahuan 
authorities had approached General Ord concerning Indians ‘and invited our co-operation on their 
side of the river’.83 It should be noted that, by 1880, in taking such a path, Terrazas was pushing 
at the boundaries of what would be tolerated by the Mexican federal government. Nevertheless, in 
the face of the problem posed by Victorio’s Apaches, Terrazas clearly judged that this was a worth-
while risk. Indeed, while there was serious nationalist opposition to be overcome in the Mexican 
congress, President Diaz was finally granted the authority to officially allow US troops to cross the 
border on 16 October 1880.84 (see document file no. 107.)
In August, 1879, the state government of Sonora had also been in contact the Department of 
Arizona concerning operations against brigands and Indians.85 As part of these communications, 
Major A.K. Arnold, Fort Grant, sent a map of southern Arizona to Angel Elias, commanding 
troops based in Frontera, Sonora. This was in response to a wider request to help each other against 
the Apaches by communicating information concerning their movements. Arnold requested that, 
if the Mexican commander’s orders allowed him, he should send a corresponding map of ‘the 
northern and eastern States of Mexico’.86 Elias stated that he would be happy to coordinate move-
ments with US troops through the commanding officer, Fort Huachuca, or by courier contact 
with Camp Supply. He also hoped that any news from the United States would be sent as soon as 
possible:
We shall do badly the Military authorities of both Republics and not appear Brotherly if we 
do not try the most effacious means in our power to punish severely the Indians and evil-doers 
that are hostile to both sides of the line.87 
Elias thanked the US military for the map (suggesting that Mexican troops had been given tacit 
permission to cross the border) but regretted that, for the moment, the request by the US army for 
81 Hall, 1956, p.235; The Union authorities were aware of Col. Reilly’s activities see Carlton to Major David 
Fergusson, 13 Jan., 1863 & Fergusson to Carleton, 14 Feb., 1863 in Consular Despatches Chihuahua 
Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 1.
82 Hall, 1956, p.236.
83 Report of General Ord in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 26, 1876 Vol. I-II, pp.487-488.
84 Jose Fernandez, Dept. of Foreign Affairs to Morgan, U.S. Minister to Mexico, 15 Oct., 1880 in 
‘Frelinghuysen-Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 
81; See also Sayles, 1976, pp.301-302; Hatfield pp.37-38; Dinges, 1987, p.94.
85 Angel Trias to HQ , Troops in the Field, Territory of Arizona, 25 Aug., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 235, p.30.
86 Arnold to Commander of Mexican Forces Stationed at Fronteras, 11 Aug., 1879, Troops in SE Arizona, 
DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.4, 3 Jul.-13 Dec., 1879, Letter No.47, pp.29-30; See also 
Arnold to CO Camp Huachuca, 13 Aug., 1879, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 232, Vol.4, 3 Jul.-13 Dec., 1879, Letter No.56, p.36.
87 Angel Trias to HQ , Troops in the Field, Territory of Arizona, 25 Aug., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 235, p.31.
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equivalent maps could not be complied with: ‘I have asked for them from the Colonel Comd’g and 
as soon as they are sent me, I shall take great pleasure in sending them in charge of Lieut Bailey.’88
Prior to the operation to abolish the Chiricahua reservation in 1876, General Schofield had 
recommended that the Mexican authorities be alerted, to give them an opportunity to block any 
attempt by Chiricahuas to flee into Sonora. He had also strongly implied that Governor Safford had 
already contacted the military authorities in Sonora concerning this matter.89 It was thus under-
stood that US commanders in the Department of Arizona were actively encouraged to cooperate 
with their opposite numbers in Sonora: 
Commanding General directs me to acknowledge receipt your telegram regarding out-break 
of Mescalero Indians. Have you informed the commanding officer at Fronteras? If not, please 
do so.90
However, the sort of opportunities that allowed Mexican army and state actors to exercise relative 
autonomy were far less likely to lead to interpretation, or even defiance, in the United States. Lew 
Wallace, Governor of New Mexico, had already aroused the ire of no less a person than General 
Sherman when he had attempted to use the US army as a resource in his efforts to pacify the Lincoln 
County War. General Pope was immediately informed that the Governor had the right neither to 
call upon troops to intervene91 nor to ‘declare Martial law, nor to do any act which incidentally 
changes the status or duties of Army Officers’.92 Adjutant General Townsend wrote to Sheridan 
stating that Wallace’s request to use US troops to enforce martial law in Lincoln and Dona Ana 
Counties should not be obeyed.93 This was reinforced by a letter stating that the Governor had no 
powers to declare martial law. Only the President of the United States, as the Commander-in-
Chief, could make such a declaration and order the army to act.94 Finally, however, Special Field 
Order No. 1, District of New Mexico, 25 June 1878,95 ordered the Commanding Officer, Fort 
Stanton, to report to the Governor at Lincoln and place his troops under the latter’s command. 
Colonel Hatch had earlier that month issued orders that US troops could not be used as a posse 
comitatus and therefore could not be used to enforce civil law in Lincoln County. However, the 
state of anarchy had reached such a level that Hatch felt obliged to intervene to assist the Governor 
to restore order. Hatch’s order was described as ‘extremely unusual and doubtful of legality or 
policy’ by General Sherman, and as ‘objectionable’ by US Secretary of War, G.W. McCrary.96 These 
actions were thoroughly approved by Sheridan:
88 Ibid, p.32.
89 Schofield to AG U.S.A., 20 May, 1876 in Correspondence relating to the removal of the Chiricahua 
Apache Indians to the San Carlos Indian Agency, Arizona Territory, 1876-77: Letters Rec’d by the 
AGO (Main series). 1871-80. NA, M666, Roll 265.
90 F.A. Smith, AAAG to Major Arnold, Fort Grant, 10 Sept., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 235, p.7; 
See also NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 9, p.334.
91 AG Townsend to Comdg. General, DoM, 15 Mar., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 37 Apr.-Jun., 1879.
92 AG Townsend to Comdg. General, DoM, 21 Mar., 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 37 Apr.-Jun., 1879.
93 Townsend to Comdg. General DoM 15 Mar., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.65-67.
94 Townsend to Comdg. General DoM 21 Mar., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.108-110.
95 (Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 25 Jun., 1878 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 6, Letter No.299 p.212).
96 Comments made by Gen. Sherman & Secretary of War, G.W. McCrary transmitted by Gen. Sheridan 
through W.D. Whipple A.A.G. to Gen. Pope, Commanding DoM, 2 Apr. 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 2546, pp.113-116.
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Plate 13.1. Palace of the 
Governors, Santa Fé, New 
Mexico. (Photo: author)
Plate 13.2. The House of 
Luis Terrazas, Chihuahua 
City, Mexico. (Photo: 
author)
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the Governor seems imbued with the idea that he possesses the full powers of the President 
within the boundaries of New Mexico, particularly with regard to the land forces stationed 
therein.97
Wallace was quite capable of reaching beyond the legal limits of his powers, but it is also clear 
that the federal government of the United States was quite capable of quickly stopping such inde-
pendent policy initiatives when it chose to. However, not all of Wallace’s independent policy initia-
tives were blocked by the federal authorities. When he gave Mexican troops permission to cross 
the US border in pursuit of Apaches in January 1880, the US troops in New Mexico were given 
orders to facilitate such arrangements, much to the delight of the Governor of Chihuahua and the 
territorial press.98 (see document file no. 29.)
Thus, when Victorio returned to Mexico in May–June 1880, local authorities on both sides of 
the border tried to solve the problem within the parameters set by their respective federal govern-
ments. The first attempted solution was one where Mexican and US forces cooperated with each 
other, but did not cross the border. Colonel Valle had permission to cross the border in hot pursuit 
of Apaches during his campaign in July–August 1880; yet he did not do so. This may be due to the 
loss of his supply train to the Apaches crippling his room for manoeuvre; but there may be more 
to it than meets the eye. Valle, despite directing Chihuahua state troops as part of his expedition, 
was an officer in the Federal Army of Mexico. As such, he had to pay far more attention to the 
implications of cross-border operations for the Mexican federal government. Had Valle crossed the 
border, the United States could quite reasonably have expected a reciprocal arrangement which, at 
that time, was not going to be granted by the Mexican federal government. In other words, Valle 
may have been given verbal instructions not to cross the border under any circumstances, in order to 
avoid political and diplomatic complications for the Diaz regime. Therefore, cooperation between 
the two forces took the form of sending information relative to the whereabouts and predicted 
movements of the Apaches. This arrangement failed to bring the Victorio war to an end.
As noted in the last chapter, a major cross-border operation was certainly one option being 
considered by General Pope. The failure of joint operations between Valle and Grierson to bring 
about Victorio’s capitulation, or destruction, probably convinced Hatch and Pope that an incur-
sion into Mexico was necessary in order to defeat the enemy. From Luis Terrazas’ point of view, 
such an operation was relatively straightforward, as he could effectively ignore protests from 
Mexico City. According to Thrapp, on 22 or 23 August 1880, Luis Terrazas sounded out Colonel 
Valle concerning his cooperation in this venture; but the latter flatly refused. The reasons given 
for Valle’s refusal were that his troops and horses were exhausted.99 As noted above, Valle was 
answerable to the Mexican Federal Government. He may have become aware that Luis Terrazas 
was already entering into negotiations about activities in which he could not become involved. 
Captain Brinkerhoff reported that, on 16 or 17 August, Governor Terrazas had made the first 
moves to invite US troops into Chihuahua100 to cooperate with his forces in bringing about the 
97 Sheridan’s endorsement of Pope’s letter to the AAG, MDoM 28 Mar., 1879, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.111-112.
98 See Osborne to AAAG DoNM, 12 Jan., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.500-501 & 
Humphreys to AAAG SF 12 Jan., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p502-505; Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.38-39; Terrazas to Gen Edward 
Hatch Comd DoNM 17 Jan., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.429-430; Ashenfelter Editorial, 
The Grant County Herald, 17 Jan., 1880.
99 Thrapp, 1973, p.293.
100 We shall examine this correspondence in more detail in the following chapter.
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destruction of Victorio.101 In fact, Dr Samaniego had contacted Colonel Buell on 18 August to 
clarify the meaning of the word ‘pursuit’, and to confirm that this would refer to the pursuit of a 
clear trail left by the Apaches going into the State of Chihuahua. Samaniego also asked Buell to 
temporarily delay proceeding with his operations as, ‘Col. Valle has gone to Chihuahua to have 
an understanding with the General [Federal] Government & with the Gov. of the State.’102 On 
21 August, Buell instructed Brinkerhoff to, ‘Ask Dr Samaniego to get cooperation with his Gov’t. 
and the two of us will see what we can do with Victorio in or out of Mexico.’103 These discussions 
would have had serious implications for Valle’s position, and his refusal would strongly suggest that 
his loyalty was primarily focused on the federal government, which would not officially condone 
such an action. Yet Valle’s refusal did not give Luis Terrazas cause for pause, and he dispatched his 
nephew, Colonel Joaquin Terrazas, to raise the necessary state troops to take part in the operation.
However, one could not treat the US federal government in such a cavalier manner without 
risking career-threatening sanctions. One of the main obstacles to the launching of an opera-
tion against Victorio in Mexico was the ongoing State Department negotiations with Mexico’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs to allow US troops to cross the border into Mexico. These negotia-
tions ultimately bore fruit two years later; but the threat of Victorio’s continuing resistance was 
immediate. Thus the actors involved had to attempt to defeat the Apaches as quickly as possible, 
but they had to accomplish this without causing serious damage to official negotiations between 
the two countries.
It is not at all clear who came up with the tactic of presenting a letter from Colonel Valle, dated 
9 August 1880, which was interpreted as stating that authority had been granted to the US army to 
cross the border. (see document file no. 108.1.) It was clearly intended that, by the time the State 
Department translated this letter and realised that permission had not been granted, it would be 
too late to prevent the proposed field operation. (see document file no. 108.2.) The idea that Colonel 
Valle had written a letter confirming that US troops had been invited into the state of Chihuahua 
probably originated in the following letter from Dr Mariano Samaniego: 
Fort Bliss Aug. 16-80
To Genl Buell
Cummings
Capt. Brinkerhoff, Comd’g Fort Bliss, Tx.
Commissioned and amply authorized by the Governor of Chihuahua.
I have the honor to communicate to you that the U.S. troops may cross into the Territory of 
Chihuahua in pursuit of Victorio and his band operating in combination with the Mexican 
forces. Col. Valle assuring you at the same time if it should be necessary the Authority of the 
principal politico’s authority of this frontier.
(sgd) Dr. Samaniego
The Doctor states that if you come to El Paso, Tex., the highest local authority of the State will 
invite you formally to enter Chihuahua with your command:-
(sgd) Brinkerhoff,
Comd’g.104
101 Brinkerhoff to Buell, 16 & 17 Aug., 1880, Buell to Samaniego, 17 Aug., 1880, Samaniego to Buell, 18 
Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
102 Samaniego to Buell, 18 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
103 Buell to Brinkerhoff, 21 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
104 Samaniego to Buell, 16 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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It is immediately apparent that, while Valle’s agreement is implied by Samaniego, there is no proof 
that Valle was actually aware of this letter. Subsequent events would lend some weight to the idea 
that Valle, a federal army officer, did not agree with this venture. What is also clear from this 
letter is that Samaniego stated that he was speaking on behalf of the Governor of Chihuahua. This 
communication was accepted at face value at District Headquarters:
Headqrs Dist of New Mexico 
Santa Fé, N.M. August 18, 1880
Respectfully forwarded to the Asst Adjt General Dept of the Missouri, recommending the 
co-operation as suggested. The proposal, it is presumed, means that no regard is to be given to 
the lines between the United States and Mexico when troops of either country are in pursuit of 
Indians. The Indians mentioned are Apaches (the Indian supposed to direct their movements 
is Victoria) who are simply a large band of assassins, a general enemy, and if they can be hunted 
down and destroyed by joint arrangements between the two countries, I certainly recommend 
it in this instance. 
(Sgd) Edward Hatch
Colonel 9th Cavalry
Commanding.105
This information was passed up through the US army chain of command until it reached the Chief 
Clerk to the Secretary of War on 31 August 1880106 and was duly sent to the Department of State. 
The following day, the State Department very quickly informed the Secretary of War that, in their 
opinion, Colonel Valle’s letter did not grant permission for US troops to cross the border. (see 
document file no. 108.2.) This translation or interpretation appears to have originated in the above 
letter from Colonel Hatch, though Hatch phrased his interpretation very carefully. It is plain that 
Colonel Valle had not extended such an invitation. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the District 
of New Mexico had received a clear invitation to cross the border from the State of Chihuahua 
which implied that Colonel Valle, a servant of the Mexican federal government, was party to this 
agreement.
At this point, the Department of War was requested to suspend, for the moment, any troop 
movements across the Mexican border, and to provide the State Department with Valle’s original 
letter.107 The Department of War complied with these requests to the extent that it was stated 
that the Adjutant General had been ‘directed’ to ‘prohibit the crossing of the boundary by United 
States Troops until further orders’.108 The original letter was delivered to the State Department on 
6 September, and the latter’s translation confirming its interpretation of Valle’s letter was sent to 
the Department of War on 14 September 1880.109 It then took six days for the Adjutant General’s 
Office to inform the Division of the Missouri that, ‘It would appear that the Department of State 
105 Hatch’s 18 Aug., 1880 endorsement to a translation of Valle’s letter, to Capt Brinkerhoff, 9 Aug., 1880, 
‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
106 Chief Clerk for the Secretary of War (in his absence) to the Secretary of State, 31 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
107 John Hay, Dept. of State to Ramsey, Secretary of War 1 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 528.
108 Chief Clerk for the Secretary of War (in his absence) to the Secretary of State, 1 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
109 Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary of War, 20 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary 
of War, 25 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
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finds certain differences in the meaning of Col. Valle’s communication where the translation 
made by that Department is compared with that forwarded with the original.’110 This rather vague 
missive was only transmitted to the Department of the Missouri on 22 September 1880. The State 
Department had to reiterate its point of view to the Department of War on 25 September 1880,111 
by which time Buell’s forces had already crossed the border into Mexico.
The delays in transmitting the State Department’s instructions (the State Department perhaps 
not realising how a ‘request’ could be creatively interpreted), and the ambiguous manner in which 
it was transmitted, suggest that a cross-border operation against Victorio had tacit support at the 
highest level in the Department of War. Indeed, the way in which this whole episode unfolded 
shows that the group of individuals who connived at this deception were very keenly aware of the 
‘political’ implications of their actions. They had endorsed an invasion of a neighbouring country 
(albeit with the tacit support of key political figures within the State of Chihuahua), in such a way 
as to minimise the risk to their own positions once all was revealed. In other words, the whole 
incident could be portrayed as an ‘unfortunate misinterpretation’ of a letter – a misinterpretation 
which had been confirmed as such too late to prevent Buell’s expedition from entering Mexico. 
There is, of course, the possibility that Hatch genuinely misinterpreted the letter, but the manner 
in which information from the State Department was delayed long enough for Buell to cross the 
border suggests otherwise.
The careful deception must have been formulated at a much higher level than the Headquarters 
of the District of New Mexico. Hatch, with his record of clumsy public relations with the territo-
rial press, is not the most obvious candidate for this level of sophisticated politicking. However, 
although he had been less than politically astute in his dealings with New Mexican citizens and 
press, this does not mean that he was incapable of subtle political manoeuvring.112 It is also quite 
clear that, while Colonel Buell was at the centre of organizing the field expedition into Mexico113, 
he was unaware of the use of Valle’s letter. Buell based the justification for his incursion into 
Chihuahua on the letter from Samaniego noted earlier in this chapter, which had cited, but not 
given any proof of, Colonel Valle’s acquiescence, and a later –  legally rather ambiguous – invitation 
from Juan B. Olguin, the Political Officer for El Paso del Norte.114 
However, this politicking was probably part of a damage limitation exercise in Washington 
in support of independent action already taken in New Mexico. Buell and Hatch were probably 
not politically sophisticated enough to outmanoeuvre the State Department. Buell, in particular, 
adopted an attitude which reflected the local New Mexico perspective: that the defeat of Victorio 
was paramount, though this did not account for the wider diplomatic perspective concerning rela-
tions between the two federal governments. While the key individuals in the Department of War 
had to engage in some quick thinking to stave off the political consequences of an invasion of 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880; Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
110 Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary of War, 20 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary 
of War, 25 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880; Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
111 Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary of War, 20 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; See also Hunter , Acting Secretary, Dept of State to Ramsey, Secretary 
of War, 25 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880; Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
112 This becomes apparent in his dealings with Buell’s expenditure in the aftermath of his expedition.
113 See Chapter 14.
114 See Chapter 14.
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Mexico, the fact that they did so reflects their tacit (and deniable) support for a quick end to the 
Victorio campaign.
These consequences materialised in early November, when enquiries from Mexico City 
concerning an alleged invasion of Chihuahua by US troops prompted some pointed questions from 
the State Department. Governor Terrazas, in responding to Buell’s request that he reveal the corre-
spondence that took place prior to, and during, the ‘Buell Expedition’, makes the cryptic statement 
that ‘I agree with you – all of this trouble was caused by Col. Valle’,115 which only reinforces the 
suspicion that Valle had remained loyal to Mexico City and had reported back on the whole affair. 
This would be understandable, as it had been Valle whose letter had been misrepresented in the 
first place, and there is no reason to suppose that this officer was party to the apparent deception. 
The Department of War passed the questions it received down to Colonel Buell and, after some 
delaying tactics, the latter submitted his correspondence with various political actors116 from the 
State of Chihuahua. However, Buell insisted that the anonymity of these men be preserved and 
not revealed to Mexico City.117 Buell noted that, ‘I understand the Jeffe Politico has been arrested 
already, and do not wish to cause him more trouble.’118 This demand received the backing of the 
Secretary of War119 and was acquiesced to by the State Department.120 Buell made it quite clear in 
his response that he had been invited to enter Chihuahua and that his only motive, shared by the 
‘Jeffe Politico’ and others in Chihuahua, was to destroy Victorio and his followers, who had been 
causing such havoc on both sides of the border.121
Of interesting significance is the failure of the US consular official, an employee of the US State 
Department based in El Paso del Norte, to mention anything about these negotiations at the same 
time as Dr Samaniego and Captain Brinkerhoff were acting as conduits between the Chihuahuan 
and New Mexico authorities. Both US consuls, in El Paso del Norte and Chihuahua, make no 
mention of the Buell expedition, which lends weight to the argument that the State Department 
was kept in the dark at all levels. However, we should remember that an early, and enthusiastic, 
supporter of cross-border cooperation against the Apaches was Louis H. Scott, US Consul in 
Chihuahua City and an employee of the US Department of State.122 There is no proof that Scott 
was aware of the intended cross-border operation, but one suspects that, if he had known of the 
intended operation against Victorio, he would not have reported this to his superiors. The more one 
considers this situation, the more one suspects that, despite the on-going difficulties between the 
two countries, there were individuals on both sides of the border capable of acting independently, 
or of turning a blind eye to how the war against Victorio was prosecuted.
What remains unclear is the level of involvement of federal actors in the United States and 
Mexico. Was this a situation where state or territory actors decided to co-operate to deal with a 
specific crisis in spite of their federal colleagues, thus creating a situation where they could keep 
115 Terrazas to Buell, 9 Mar., 1881 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
116 Namely Juan B, Olguin, Dr M. Samaniego, Col. Joaquin Terrazas and Roman Aranda.
117 Buell to AAG, DoM, 12 Feb., 1881 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
118 Buell to Samaniego, 11 Feb., 1881 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
119 Ramsey to The Secretary of State, 5 Mar., 1881in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
120 Blaine, Secretary of State to Robert T. Lincoln, Secretary of War, 9 Mar., 1881 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, 
M666, Roll 528.
121 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.791-797.
122 Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, 4 Dec., 1879, Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, M1088, Roll 37 (Oct.-Dec. 1879); See also Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary 
of State, Washington D.C. 28 Nov., 1879 in Consular Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, 
M289, Roll 1; Scott to Hunter 28 Nov., 1879 in Evarts, Dept. of State to Alexander Ramsey, Secretary 
of War, 16 Dec., 1879, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14 see same letter in ‘Frelinghuysen-
Romero Papers’; Letters Rec’d by the AGO (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 81.
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the latter at arm’s length until they could present them with a fait accompli? What appears more 
likely is that certain individuals reporting to, or members of, the federal government unofficially 
gave their state-level colleagues the leeway they needed to tackle the problem posed by Victorio’s 
Apaches. For example, on 4 August 1880, General Pope instructed Hatch, ‘In short you must do 
everything possible to strengthen Buell & then leave him to do what he thinks best. This is best on 
all accounts.’123 This rather vague passage just reeks of a written reminder of earlier discussions, the 
details of which were never going to be committed to paper. It also suggests that, if any repercus-
sions did occur, Buell would be the US army’s preferred scapegoat.
There is another possible reason for why Buell’s expedition was allowed to proceed. This was 
the intention of Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United States, to pass through southern 
New Mexico during September or October of 1880, as part of a wider tour of the western United 
States. It was earlier noted that serious negotiations to cross the border were initiated on 16 August 
1880. General Pope had been notified of the intention of President Hayes to visit the area on 9 
August. He was ordered to inform Colonel Hatch, who was to record the details of any escort that 
was arranged, but to refrain from issuing any written orders until the visit was confirmed.124 (see 
document file no. 109.1.) By 26 August, it was known that the trip had been finalised and that 
the President and General Sherman, with various officials, would be crossing Arizona and New 
Mexico, travelling as far as they could by rail. They would be travelling east via the Southern Pacific 
Railroad (S.P.R.R.), then travelling by coach through southern New Mexico, via Fort Cummings 
and Fort Craig, where they would join the AT & SF railroad. They expected to pass through this 
area between 1 and 15 October 1880.125 This information was transmitted on 26 August 1880.
This news must have horrified Hatch, as it was clear that the President would be travelling 
through the centre of what was effectively a war zone. Hatch ordered Buell to carefully patrol 
the country between the terminus of the Southern Pacific and that of the AT & SF railway and 
to station detachments of troops at Soldier’s Farewell and McEvers’ Ranch. Troops from Fort 
Cummings were to patrol the Mimbres Mountains and Cooke’s Canyon.126 These orders were 
issued on 21 September 1880, just as the Buell Expedition started for Mexico. Instructions were 
also issued that, during the President’s visit, every effort should be made to maintain the telegraph 
lines. To this end, the COs of Forts Bliss, Cummings and Bayard were to provide properly equipped 
repair teams to act at a minute’s notice should they be required.127 General Sheridan was quick to 
dismiss any concerns about the President’s safety, on the grounds that there were approximately 
700 troops in the area.128 However, Sherman seems to have been less complacent, and General 
Pope was clearly instructed to ‘insure absolute safety’ for the President and his entourage.129 
123 Pope to Hatch 1 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.45.
124 Sheridan to Pope, 9 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.495-497; See also Sheridan to Crook 9 Aug., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.494.
125 Letter to Gen. Hatch 26 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.544-546.
126 Loud to Buell, 21 Sept., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, 
Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.502, p.324.
127 Allen to AAAG, DoNM, 30 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
128 Sheridan to Sherman 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.586-587.
129 Sheridan to Pope 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.584; See also Sherman to Sheridan, 10 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.600.
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Significantly, Sherman also instructed Sheridan that, ‘The troops should not cease to undertake 
to capture or kill the Victoria band.’130 Sherman pointed out that, if the dangers were so severe, the 
presidential party would not make the trip. In the meantime ‘some good officer’ should monitor the 
situation and make the necessary preparations for the visit.131
There were added complications, as evidenced by Captain Brinkerhoff’s consternation when 
Governor Terrazas requested that a Chihuahuan commission have talks with the President on 
3 October 1880. While he felt that such a meeting could clearly be of great benefit, he was wise 
enough to pass this request up the chain of command. (see document file no. 109.2.) One can only 
imagine the reaction of both the federal government of Mexico and the US Department of State to 
the diplomatic implications of such a meeting.
The instruction to ensure the absolute safety of the presidential party issued by the Commanding 
General of the United States Army does raise the possibility that a major operation by US troops in 
northern Mexico would have been seen as the perfect means to keep the Apaches well away from 
the most high profile of targets.132 This sentiment can only have been reinforced when, less than a 
month before the President’s party was due to pass through the area, Apache guerrillas struck, with 
deadly effect, only 20 miles east of Fort Cummings.133 This was on the very route it was proposed 
that President Hayes would travel. This development, combined with the presence of General 
Sherman in the presidential party, provided all the incentive required for collusion throughout the 
US army command structure to facilitate Buell’s expedition into Mexico.
Whether these contemporaneous arrangements extended to offering prior support for Buell’s 
expedition from the President or any of his entourage is doubtful, though not outside the realms 
of possibility. What may have been forthcoming was an indication of subsequent support for the 
army from the executive, should there be any repercussions from their unauthorised cross-border 
cooperation. It is only fair to note that, during October 1880, the presidential party passed through 
Apacheria without incident.134
130 Sherman to Sheridan, 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.596.
131 Sherman to Hatch, 14 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.606-607) The intended visit of 
the President to the territory was published in mid-September. (‘The Coming Guests’, The Grant County 
Herald, 11 Sept., 1880; ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 18 Sept., 1880).
132 The road between Forts Cumming and Craig is littered with terrain far worse than the myriad of grassy 
knolls which also frequent this particular route.
133 See next Chapter.
134 Special Field Order No. 41, para.3, 25 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 450.
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Buell’s Goodsight Mountain Expedition, 6-8 September 1880
 
Before we cover the progress of the Buell expedition into Mexico, it is worth noting an episode 
where either Colonel Hatch or Colonel Buell allegedly sent ‘Captain’ Jack Crawford, the ‘Poet 
Scout’, to make one last diplomatic effort to persuade Victorio to surrender, sometime in late 
August or early September 1880.1
‘Captain’ Jack Crawford’s ‘Adventures’ in Mexico
According to Thrapp, it was Hatch who commissioned Crawford’s mission;2 but Crawford’s own 
account (see document file no. 110) suggests that Hatch had ordered him to depart from Fort Craig 
to scout south from the Mescalero reservation, to garner intelligence of any Mescalero Apaches 
operating in the Sacramento Mountains. Once this mission was completed, he was to report to 
General Buell at Fort Cummings. According to Crawford, it was Buell who requested that ‘a man’ 
undertake a very dangerous mission to persuade Victorio to surrender to the US authorities. Of 
the four scouts3 accompanying Crawford, not one was willing to risk falling victim to brigands or 
Apaches by undertaking this mission. Crawford alone was prepared to do it.4 
Crawford’s account states that Colonel Buell sent him with ‘Navajo Charlie’, an Apache familiar 
with Victorio, and with Casimero, ‘a fearless little Mexican’, in search of Victorio.5 Thrapp suspects 
that ‘Casimero’ may have been one Zebina Nathaniel Streeter. Clearly one of the more colourful 
characters of the Apache Wars, Streeter was certainly closely associated with the Apaches, to the 
extent of being suspected of accompanying Juh on raids.6 Thrapp states that he had a Mexican 
alias ‘Cassimiro’.7 He was certainly fluent in Spanish, having been an interpreter at Fort Craig, and 
was known to have lived at Canada Alamosa, where he had been on speaking terms with Victorio 
himself.8 At the time, Streeter had a price on his head as a result of his Apache associations. He 
may have been using his alias to avoid official detection.9 Indeed, he may have taken advantage of 
1 See ‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications 
in History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965.
2 Thrapp, 1974, p.291.
3 Named as Jim Blain, Lew Fountain, Bill Crawford and Jim Dickinson. (‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By 
Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in History, Volume 1, Feb., 
1965).
4 ‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in 
History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965.
5 Ibid.
6 See Thrapp, 1988, pp.1378-1379 for a full biography; see also Thrapp, 1974, p.372, Note 60.
7 Thrapp, 1974, p.372, Note 6.
8 Thrapp, 1988, p.1378; see also Thrapp, 1974, p.372, Note 6.
9 Thrapp, 1974, p.372, Note 6.
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reports of his demise in 1879 to adopt this persona, for on 29 August 1879, the Arizona Citizen 
reported that Streeter had been killed in Janos in a ‘duel’ with a ‘Spanish Officer’. The paper made 
explicit comment on Streeter’s alleged raiding activity with the Apaches.10
Three days after crossing the border, Crawford and his companions reached Laguna de Santa 
Maria.11 From there, they made their way eastwards to the Candelaria Mountains, following a 
trail left by Victorio. One very significant detail garnered by Crawford during his two-day journey 
to the Candelarias concerned the Apaches’ lack of ammunition.12 Crawford and his fellow envoys 
apparently got to within sight of Victorio’s camp in the Candelaria Mountains when, with appar-
ently no explanation, Navajo Charlie refused to go on. Crawford attempted to persuade, and then 
coerce, his Apache guide, but to no avail. He considered entering Victorio’s encampment, but as 
he later explained, as Victorio’s warriors could not speak English and he had no Apache, he was 
forced to withdraw.13
This story beggars belief. Both sides could have conversed easily in Spanish, with the ‘fearless’ 
Casimero translating. Both Thrapp and Kaywaykla make it quite clear that Victorio himself could 
10 Arizona Citizen, 29 August, 1879 in Library of Congress ‘Chronicling America’ website <http://chroni-
clingamerica.loc.gov/> (accessed 13/09/2018).
11 The Laguna de Santa Maria was estimated as being thirty miles south of border (Price to Benjamin 
AAG Prescott 9 Jan., 1881 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 181 p.2). On modern maps the Laguna would 
appear to be approximately eighty kilometres south of Columbus or seventy-five kilometres from the 
international line. See NH 13-1 – El Paso (USGS) & H13-1-Cuidad Juarez (INEGI). This translates 
into a distance of approximately forty five miles.
12 ‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in 
History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.291.
13 ‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in 
History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965; Thrapp, 1974, p.292.
Poet Scout Jack Crawford.
Jack Crawford, known as the ‘Poet Scout’ was 
one of a number of American citizens employed 
as scouts by Hatch and Buell and deployed into 
northern Mexico to keep track of Victorio’s 
movements. While undoubtedly dangerous duty, 
not only risking attack by Apaches but also arrest 
by Mexican authorities, Crawford’s account of 
his scout into northern Chihuahua is probably 
exaggerated, though he did bring back important 
intelligence that the Apaches appeared to be short 
of ammunition. (National Archives)
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speak Spanish.14 It is far more likely that, by the time they had closed to within a mile of Victorio’s 
camp, Navajo Charlie had picked up a message the nuances of which suggested that a diplomatic 
overture would be unwelcome. The small party beat a hasty retreat.
Crawford, realising that he had at least located Victorio, returned to El Paso and informed 
General Buell about the location and condition of the Apaches. In response, Buell instructed 
Crawford to meet his command at Palomas Lake and guide them to the camp in the Candelaria 
Mountains.15
There is a major obstacle to giving credence to the thrust of Crawford’s version of events. As we 
have already seen, Buell and his superiors had been quietly negotiating with the Mexican authori-
ties to move Buell’s forces into Mexico, with the intention of defeating Victorio in the field. If 
Crawford’s peace mission really did take place, it would have undermined the detailed preparations 
for this expedition, and it would have been seen as a momentous breach of faith by Buell’s Mexican 
allies. The Mexican authorities had no faith in the US’s reservation system and, as far as they were 
concerned, if Victorio returned to any reservation, this would merely store up trouble for the future. 
One strongly suspects that Captain Jack had been ordered on a dangerous scouting mission so 
that he could monitor Victorio’s movements, rather than directly contact the Apache leader. This 
would fit with Buell’s use of non-Apache scouts to spy below the Mexican border prior to his expe-
dition. If one compares Crawford’s report of a skirmish he and two companions had with a small 
party of Apaches in the San Mateo Mountains ( 149) with his account of his trip into Mexico, the 
latter comes across as contrived, playing to a wider audience, rather than offering a clear military 
report. It is clear that Hatch was willing to make some effort to contact Victorio during June and 
July of 1880. Crawford makes it quite clear that Hatch had ordered him to leave Fort Craig16 and to 
scout south from the Mescalero reservation to garner intelligence of any Mescalero Apaches oper-
ating in the Sacramento Mountains. He was then to report to Colonel Buell at Fort Cummings. 
The one piece of information concerning Crawford’s role from a US army source does not mention 
a diplomatic mission, but reports that Hatch had ‘directed Crawford to at once go and scout the 
country desired by you’.17 Once again, Hatch seems to have swung back to a policy of unconditional 
surrender where Victorio was concerned: ‘No terms can be made with Victorio, and none should 
be.’18 
Meanwhile, north of the border, during August and September 1880, Colonel Buell continued 
to assemble a large expedition based at Fort Cummings and Knight’s Ranch.19 While the US 
army’s attention was focused on operations against Victorio in western Texas in July and August, 
the situation in New Mexico remained quiet. Early in September, Buell received word that Victorio 
was based 15 miles south of the Laguna de Santa Maria.20 On 28 August, eight Apaches ran off 
200 horses belonging to Dr Samaniego from within five miles of El Paso del Norte.21 The raiders 
drove the horses to the east before turning south and eventually turning to the west, towards 
14 Thrapp, 1974, p.xii; Ball, 1970, p. 53.
15 ‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in 
History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965.
16 Corporal Bode confirms Crawford’s presence at Fort Craig around this time. (Smith, 1994, p.147).
17 Hatch to Buell, 12 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.727..
18 Hatch to AAG DoM, 11 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
19 See Special Orders for late July and August 1880 cited earlier, NA, RG393 Part 3, Entry 450; Thrapp, 
1974, p.292.
20 Buell to AAAG SF 4 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.793.
21 Olguin to Brinkerhoff, 29 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Grierson to AAG, 
DoTx, San Antonio, 2 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’, NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
332 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
the Laguna de Guzman.22 Of course, there were the usual false alarms: 12 Apaches were seen 
within five miles of El Paso on the evening of 1 September, prompting Captain Brinkerhoff to 
alert District Headquarters, only to have to rescind his warning the following day. It turned out to 
be a group of armed Mexican ranchmen instead of Apaches.23 In mid-September, an attack on the 
Cosette Mine turned out to be no more than shots fired at a crow by one of the miners.24 
Despite having had almost three months to recover from the effects of their campaigns against 
Victorio, between January and early June, the Ninth Cavalry Regiment was still chronically short 
of horses. 
Table 14.1 Ninth Cavalry, Roster of Horses, June–August 188025
Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses Horses Lost in Action, Died, etc.
June 1880 237 282 10
July 1880 271 242 9
August 1880 323 170 8
As a whole, the number of unserviceable horses had dropped considerably; but by the end of 
August, the regiment still had 170 unserviceable horses. If we examine each company in the regi-
ment, the ratio of serviceable horses to available cavalrymen had generally improved; but Table 
14.2, based on figures from the regimental monthly returns, shows that a significant number of 
men were left without mounts. Therefore, despite having had almost three months to recover, most 
companies in the regiment were struggling to find serviceable mounts for between one third and 
one half of the available men.
Table 14.2 Serviceable, Unserviceable and Lost Horses to Available Men, Ninth Cavalry, June–August 
1880.26
Company Month Serviceable 
Horses
Unserviceable 
Horses
Lost Horses Available Men
A June 18 17 0 44
July 14 22 0 47
August 20 16 0 42
B June 24 20 1 52
July 26 17 1 55
August 29 11 3 50
C June 19 19 0 50
July 28 10 0 43
August 29 9 0 44
22 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 29 Aug., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field 30 Jun.-14 
Sept., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4.
23 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 1 & 2 Sept., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.810.
24 The Grant County Herald, 18 Sept., 1880.
25 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
26 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88 
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Company Month Serviceable 
Horses
Unserviceable 
Horses
Lost Horses Available Men
D June 16 23 0 49
July 16 23 0 46
August 26 5 0 51
E June 0 36 1 54
July 1 27 8 55
August 16 12 0 51
F June 12 20 0 45
July 16 16 0 41
August 14 12 3 42
G June 30 17 3 65
July 19 30 0 61
August 39 8 0 57
H June 18 29 1 53
July 22 36 0 60
August 25 31 2 49
I June 23 22 0 55
July 23 22 0 57
August 23 22 0 57
K June 9 45 1 61
July 45 9 0 58
August 30 24 0 55
L June 21 17 1 63
July 29 19 0 61
August 25 14 0 57
M June 33 17 2 64
July 39 11 0 63
August 33 6 0 66
The bi-monthly company returns reveal a similar picture, as shown in Table 14.3. Therefore, if 
Buell set his command in motion, the companies from the Ninth Cavalry would be would be much 
reduced in strength. Buell had complained that his overall command had fallen ‘several hundred’27 
short of its paper establishment. It was not the manpower which was to blame for this shortfall; it 
was the lack of serviceable horses.
27 Buell, HQ , Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; An 
almost illegible portion of this report is contained in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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Table 14.3 Available Men to Serviceable Horses, Ninth Cavalry, May–August 188028
Company Available Men  May–
June 1880
Serviceable Horses  
May–June 1880
Available Men 
 July–August 1880
Serviceable Horses  
July–August 1880
A 47 18 45 20
B 46 24 49 29
C 46 19 39 2? Entry  
indecipherable
D 49 No Entry 51 17
E 50  1 45 16
F 44 12 37 16
G 63 30 51 39
H 48 28 40 25
I 55 23 54 19
K 61  9 52 30
L Missing from Archive Missing from Archive 48 25
M 62 33 65 33
According to Buell, the Ninth Cavalry battalion which accompanied his expedition consisted 
of B, C, D, F, K, and L companies. If Buell had commenced his operation at the beginning of 
September, this battalion would have been able to field a maximum of either 153 or 146 mounted 
Ninth Cavalrymen.
14.4 Comparison of Monthly and Bi-monthly Returns of Cavalrymen Available for Field Service 
within Buell’s Ninth Cavalry Battalion.29
Company Monthly Regimental Return Bi-monthly Company Return
Serviceable Horses Available Men Serviceable Horses Available Men
B  29  50  29  49
C  29  44   2? Entry indecipherable 
(assume 29)
 39
D  26  51  17  51
F  14  42  16  37
K  30  55  30  52
L  25  57  25  48
Totals 153 299 146 276
In other words, by the beginning of September, Buell’s Ninth Cavalry battalion could, depending 
on which set of returns one examines, mount between 51 percent and 53 percent of the available 
men. Yet on 4 September 1880, in response to the news of renewed raiding by Apaches in Mexico, 
the War Department informed the State Department that the troops in New Mexico were, ‘in 
28 Derived Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for May/Jun. & Jul./Aug. 1880, 9th Cavalry in NA, RG94
29 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for May/Jun. & Jul./Aug. 1880, 9th Cavalry 
in NA, RG94
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good condition, well posted, and in sufficient force to deal with them if they cross to this side of 
the line’.30 Three days prior to this announcement, Apache guerrillas had mauled a Ninth Cavalry 
detachment in the Sacramento Mountains.
Agua Chiquita Canyon, 1 September 1880
Sergeant James Robinson, G Company, Ninth Cavalry, with 10 soldiers,31 was attacked in Agua 
Chiquita Canyon32 in the Sacramento Mountains on 1 September 1880.33 This detachment had 
been stationed at a point known as ‘Little Water’ since a local ranch belonging to ‘Messrs Dewlin 
and Co. of Fort Stanton’ had lost 53 cattle to Apaches in mid-August.34 The Apaches had suddenly 
opened fire from the cover of the thick woods surrounding the ranch building at between 10:00 and 
11:00 a.m. on 1 September, and Robinson estimated that there were between 25 and 3035 heavily 
armed Apaches. The purpose of the attack was for the Apaches to pin the Ninth Cavalrymen in 
the building, whilst one of their number tried to drive off four mules belonging to the detachment’s 
supply wagon. These had been turned out to graze. When the intent of the attack was divined, 
Robinson led his men in a charge which drove off the Apaches. While this prevented the Apaches 
from stealing the mules, all four mules were hit in the engagement and three died from their 
wounds during the night. Robinson also lost Privates Daniel Stanton and Robert Smith, who died 
of their wounds early the following morning.36 (see document file no. 111.)
In the aftermath of the attack, Sergeant Robinson sent Private Alonzo Drake to carry news of the 
attack to the military detachment based at South Fork, on the one surviving mule which, though 
wounded, was fit enough to travel the 70 miles in 21 hours. During his journey, Drake was refused the 
loan of a saddle for the mule by a rancher called Martin, whose ranch was situated on the Rio Penasco.37 
Both Sergeant Robinson and Private Drake were later cited for gallantry by Colonel Hatch.38
30 Chief Clerk to the Secretary of War (in his absence) to the Secretary of State, 4 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
31 Nine privates from the Ninth Cavalry, plus a single infantryman from Company C, Fifteenth Infantry.
32 Baylor mentions a small spring named the ‘Aqua Chiquita’ in the Sacramento Mountains. (Baylor, 1996, 
p.341).
33 March? Major 9th Cavalry to AAAG Dist New Mexico undated, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.409; 
Schubert, 1995, R Smith & D Stanton entries; Billington, 1991, p.97;see also web article The Ninth 
Regiment of Cavalry by Lt G. Hutcheson.
34 Russell to the CoIA, 6 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
35 On receipt of this News, Col. Grierson suggested that this might be the same party that had evaded Lebo 
by abandoning their supplies in the Sierra Diablo and attacked Kennedy in the Guadalupe Mountains 
on the 3/4 Aug., 1880. (Beck to Kennedy, 11 Sept., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.156).
36 Cusack to Adjutant, 9th Cavalry, SF, 15 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880; See also Buell to AAAG DoNM SF 14 Dec., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.53; Pope to AG of the Army, Washington D.C. 10 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Pope to AG of the Army, Wash. D.C. 10 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, 
NA, M666, Roll 528; Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.580-581; 
See also collection of telegrams from Hatch to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, 
RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Chronological List, p.51; Webb, 1976, p.90.
37 Cusack to Adjutant, 9th Cavalry, SF, 15 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-
Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880; See also Billington, 1991, p.98.
On the 11 December, Buell telegraphed HQ in SF that four Mescalero Apaches being held at Ft 
Stanton were members of the party who ambushed Robinson’s detachment. ‘I hope the Dist. Comdr will 
succeed in getting them sent to Leavenworth prison’ (NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.53).
38 Hatch, General Order No. 9, 7 Oct., 1880, General Orders, Circulars and Court Martial Orders 1870-
1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 183; See also General Orders No.9, 7 Oct., 1880, Printed Special 
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This attack heralded a flurry of attacks near the Mescalero agency. On 2 September, five 
Apaches accosted the agency herd and eventually took two horses, a revolver and a rifle, plus 
clothing and blankets, from the herders. The culprits were known to the herders as Mescaleros 
who had left the reservation in March and had been assumed to have joined Victorio. They were 
described by Russell as, ‘among the worst Indians belonging to the Mescalero tribe’.39 These 
Apaches appeared above the agency on the following day and offered to exchange their loot 
for their families, who were held at the agency. They threatened that if this was not done, they 
would open fire on the camp to force those Mescaleros held prisoner to scatter or be killed. Later 
that day, less than three miles from the agency, a boy was robbed of his horse and clothes. On 4 
September, Russell reported two further attacks. In the first, close to the agency, two Americans 
were ambushed and one was killed. The second occurred 30 miles to the west, with four men 
reported as being killed.40 It was later stated that Francisco Baca, Secundino Dominguez, Manuel 
Teal and Ramon Aguilar were killed near La Luz on 4 September 1880.41 Russell stated that 
this activity had, not surprisingly, paralysed herding and hay-cutting duties on the reservation. 
He also stated that the decision to hold the Mescalero prisoners at the agency, with its military 
guard, had discouraged this raiding party from doing much wider damage in the area42. Hatch 
thought that these attacks demonstrated that some Apaches had penetrated Grierson’s picket 
lines in western Texas.43 
The Army and Navy Journal also records the narrow escape of a Tenth Cavalry enlisted man from 
a small party of seven Apache warriors in the vicinity of Eagle Springs. This man had belonged to 
a small party who had spotted some loose horses, and he had become separated from the rest of 
the party. Suddenly he encountered six dismounted Apaches and a seventh Apache mounted on a 
mule. The trooper lost his horse but managed to outrun his pursuers. The Apache camp was later 
found, hurriedly abandoned, but equipment lost by ‘one of the men in the main fight with Victorio’ 
and some clothing belonging to a stage driver killed ‘some time since’ was recovered. The Apaches 
were trailed to the Rio Grande near Ojo Caliente, Texas.44
The Mescalero prisoners of war were not released until 12 September 1880.45 Earlier attempts 
to have the prisoners released were vigorously opposed by General Pope, despite the efforts of the 
Department of the Interior.46 The US army still believed that most of the Mescalero warriors were 
off the reservation. Yet it was clear that District Headquarters still thought that many were, as yet, 
acting independently of Victorio’s following. To dissuade them from joining the Chihenne chief, 
Orders 1869-1888, DoNM, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 446.
39 Russell to the CoIA, 6 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
40 Russell to the CoIA, 6 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; See also ‘Town and 
County’, The Grant County Herald, 18 Sept., 1880.
A miner named Gordon was killed at his mine. The Apaches attacked and were repulsed at Wilson’s 
Ranch. John Walters ranch was attacked. Walters lost one horse killed and another stolen. Finally, 
Rafael Andres Romero was stopped by the Apaches who demanded his horses. Romero, speaking 
Apache, dissuaded them but was warned to vacate the area. (‘Town and County’, The Grant County 
Herald, 18 Sept., 1880; See also ‘Outrages by Victorio’s Indians’, The New York Times, 10 Sept., 1880).
41 Delegation of Citizens of Dona Ana County, La Luz, to Hatch, 11 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by 
HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
42 Russell to the CoIA, 6 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
43 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 18 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p219., Letter No.387.
44 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 2 Oct., 1880, p.169.
45 Letter dated Fort Stanton, 12 Jul., 1880, in The Walter Lowry Finley Collection.
46 Pope to Whipple 19 Jul., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Schurz to the Secretary of War, 
24 Jun., 1880 in Letters Received, DoM 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 91.
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the Commanding Officer of Fort Stanton, Captain Conrad, was encouraged to offer an amnesty to 
these Mescaleros through the offices of the remaining Mescalero leaders.47
The attack in Agua Chiquita Canyon prompted demands that enough infantry be sent to the 
Mescalero agency to guard the Mescalero prisoners. This would free Captain Cusack’s two Ninth 
Cavalry companies, allowing them to scour the surrounding mountain ranges for an estimated 20–50 
Apaches held responsible for the attack.48 Buell decided that he was not in a position to immedi-
ately redeploy troops in response to Apaches at large in the Sacramento Mountains; he was about 
to launch an offensive against Victorio in Chihuahua. He suggested that, while he did not ‘presume 
to command’ Cusack, the latter should call in some of his small detachments, thereby mustering an 
effective force with which to scout the Sacramento mountains.49 However, by 23 September, even as 
Cusack’s cavalry were preparing to scout the Sacramento and Guadalupe Mountains, Conrad noted 
that the recently released Mescaleros were very quiet and that no further raiding had been reported.50
Buell’s Goodsight Mountains Expedition, 6–8 September, 1880 (see document file no. 112.)
On 6 September1880, a stagecoach was ambushed 16 miles51 to the west of Fort Cummings. The 
driver, Alexander Le Beau, and two passengers, E.S. Madden52 and I. Roberts were killed.53 Buell 
acknowledged that the Apaches involved had managed to slip across the border and had success-
fully evaded his scouting detachments.54 It seems likely that they had fled to the as-yet-undis-
covered campsite in the Goodsight Mountains (see Chapter 1), which was close to the stage road 
running from La Mesilla to Fort Cummings.55 Buell later claimed that his ‘citizen scouts’ had kept 
him well-informed of Victorio’s movements in Mexico until 2 September, that is, just before this 
attack, when they lost track of Victorio for several days.56 
47 Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 18 Aug., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.429, p.280.
48 March? Maj 9th Cavalry to AAAG undated, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.409-410.
49 Buell to AAAG SF 18 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.416-418.
50 Conrad to AAAG DoNM, 23 Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, 
NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
51 Stout places the attack to early August but Thrapp states that the attack took place in early September. 
As they both cite a report by Col Hatch dated 10 September, the latter date is correct. (See Stout, p.159 
& note 1, p.193; Thrapp, 1967, note 55, p.207; Thrapp, 1974, p.290) Another report states that the attack 
took place 38 miles from Fort Cummings. (NA, RG391, Entry 744, Miscellaneous Records 1880-1914 
– Orders Letters 4th Cavalry – document titled ‘Chronological List of Battles Engagements ETC. with 
Indians since April 30 1865’).
52 This was the son of Captain D Madden Sixth Cavalry (Carr to AG, Presidio, San Francisco, 9 Sept., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.399; Thrapp, 1967, p.207; Stout, p.159).
53 Buell to AAAG 7 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.820; See also collection of tele-
grams from Hatch to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; 
Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.804-805; Kerr AAAG to Arnold, Fort Grant, 8 Sept., 1880, Troops in 
SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.5.
54 Buell to AAAG 8 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.817-819; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.804-805; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. 
– Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.804-805; See also collection of telegrams from Hatch 
to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
55 Buell, HQ , Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
56 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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The troops at Fort Cummings were quickly mobilised to pursue the raiders when alerted by a 
courier from Captain Hale, whose company of Sixteenth Infantrymen were escorting a railroad 
survey party and were camped approximately two miles west of the ambush. The infantrymen had 
discovered the remains of the stagecoach and two of its occupants at around 10:00 p.m.,57 possibly 
alerted by the sound of gunfire. Between midnight and 12:30 a.m., two detachments of Fourth 
Cavalry left Fort Cummings in search of the Apaches. Captain Leopold Parker, with A Company, 
accompanied by 10 Apache scouts, was sent east to take up the trail from the site of the attack.58 
Major Noyes, with H Company, and also with 10 Apache scouts, was sent south to the Florida 
Mountains to intercept the Apaches should they be making for those mountains. Noyes was also 
ordered to look out for Lieutenants Maney and Goodwin and their Apache scout detachments and 
put them on the trail of the Apaches.59 
Captain Parker’s detachment reached Hales camp at about 3:00 a.m. and waited until daylight 
before proceeding to the ambush site. Here they found the body of the third occupant, and by 8:00 
a.m. they had started on the trail of the Apache raiders. Parker’s scouts had determined that 10 
to 15 Apaches had come up from the south and, after ambushing and looting the stagecoach, had 
returned south60. 
However, Parker reported that his scouts appeared to be reluctant to pursue the trail, and several 
times overtook them and questioned them as to the number of Apaches they were pursuing.61 
Parker does not mention this in his report, but he may have been concerned that the scouts’ ques-
tions and their reluctance to pursue the trail reflected a suspicion on their part that a stronger force 
of Apaches was present. However, the scouts reiterated their estimate.62 The trail of the Apache 
raiders was periodically marked by scattered mail and fruit63 taken from the stagecoach,64 and, 
given subsequent events, one suspects that this was a deliberate ploy on the part of the Apaches to 
ensure that they were followed.
By around 11:00 a.m., Parker’s command was starting to ascend a very gentle ridge between 
higher hills. He had stopped to consult with his scouts again when he received a volley from his left 
and centre at a range of between 45-50 yards, immediately followed by a volley from his front and 
right from a large number of concealed Apache warriors.65 One trooper, Private William Macfee, 
One has to admit some scepticism concerning this claim as it conveniently coincides and thus attempts 
to excuse the failure to detect the one raid launched by Victorio into New Mexico between June and 
September, 1880.
57 Hale to AAG, New Mexico Column, 12 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
58 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
59 Noyes to AAG, New Mexico Column, 13 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG 
DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881. For an overview of this mini-campaign see document 
files no’s.112-115.
60 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
61 Ibid.
62 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
63 I have examined Dudley’s report repeatedly and the only likely word I can decipher is ‘fruit’, so I can only 
conclude that the coach was carrying some fruit as part of its load.
64 Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
65 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; Buell to AAAG 8 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
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and two Apache scouts, were killed (which suggests that at least some of the Apache scouts had not 
hung back), and three other enlisted men – Farrier Peacock and Privates Aker66 and Lorenz – were 
wounded in the opening moments of the ambush.67 Lieutenant James Lockett, in his first action, 
was even closer to the Apaches. He had his horse wounded and received between three and four 
bullet holes through his coat, but was miraculously not hit by hostile fire.68 One A Company horse 
was killed, and another was so badly wounded that it had to be shot. Lieutenant Budd also reported 
that a horse from his company had been killed in action on 7 September.69 Parker himself noted one 
horse killed and several wounded, one of which later died. Two horses were also abandoned on the 
return journey to Fort Cummings.70
The Apaches had hidden themselves on a very gentle ‘slope’ in some dead ground below the crest 
of a very low ridge.71 This innocuous looking terrain bisected Parker’s line of advance and, as seen 
by the Fourth Cavalrymen, rose very gently from left to right, ending in a small hillock to Parker’s 
right flank.72 The dead ground blended into the ridge behind, by dint of being well-hidden by 
bushes and soapweeds.73 Buell reported that the Apaches had constructed small breastworks,74 but 
there were no sign of these in 2014. What were present were several lines of natural rock formations 
Entry 439, pp.817-819; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.804-805; See also collection of telegrams from 
Hatch to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Carr to AG, 
Presidio, San Francisco, 9 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.399; Pope to AG of 
the Army, Washington D.C. 10 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Pope to AG of the Army, 
Wash. D.C. 10 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.579-580; Sheridan to Sherman 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.586-587; 
‘Again’, The Grant County Herald, 11 Sept., 1880; Thrapp, 1967, p.207; Thrapp, 1974, p.290; Stout, 1974, 
p.159; Carter, USACMH webpage; Smith, 1994, p.164.
66 The unfortunate William Aker received a bullet wound ‘through fleshy part of thigh and scrotum.’ 
(Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Co. A, 4th Cavalry, 31 Aug.-31 Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94).
67 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Co. A, 4th Cavalry, 31 Aug.-31 Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94; See 
also Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters 
Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 
1881; NA, RG391, Entry 734 Regimental Histories 1855-1926, 4th Cavalry; 4th Cavalry 1878-1883 
Sept./Oct. 1880, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, NA, RG393, NA, M744 
Roll 43; See also Chronological List, p.51; NA, RG391, Entry 744, Miscellaneous Records 1880-1914 
– Orders Letters 4th Cavalry – document titled ‘Chronological List of Battles Engagements ETC. with 
Indians since April 30 1865’; Webb, 1976, p.90; Sheridan to Sherman 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.586-587.
Out of an entire box file relating to the Fourth Cavalry in NA, RG391, Entry 734 Regimental 
Histories 1855-1926, there are four versions of the regiments record of engagements with Indians. Only 
one mentions this skirmish in 1880.
68 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
69 4th Cavalry 1878-1883 Sept./Oct. 1880, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 
NA, RG393, NA, M744, Roll 43.
70 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
71 Hale to AAG, New Mexico Column, 12 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
72 Personal observation of the terrain by the author 9 July, 2014.
73 Personal observation of the terrain by the author 9 July, 2014., See also Hale to AAG, New Mexico 
Column, 12 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 
2601, Box 94.
74 : Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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which jutted out of the earth along the crest of the small hillock, and which provided perfect hard 
cover for the concealed Apache warriors.75
Confusion reigned, and the surviving Apache scouts retreated (or in Parker’s words ‘disap-
peared’, along with their interpreter and mule packer) and took no further part in the battle. Parker 
rallied his company after a retreat of about 150 yards. After organising horse holders, he had about 
30 soldiers available and deployed them in a skirmish line. Each man was ten yards apart, so the 
skirmish line was approximately 300 yards wide. The line advanced, and as they came within easy 
range, the Apaches opened up a heavy fire. Parker noted that the Apaches were still flanking him 
on both sides, which indicated a force considerably larger than the 10 to 15 Apaches whose trail 
they were following. Parker fell back and re-aligned his skirmish line to the right, in order to attack 
the slightly higher ground; but again he found the Apaches to be flanking him on both sides, and 
in no mood to vacate their positions. Moreover, he and one of his sergeants realised that some of 
the Apache warriors were using adjacent arroyos in an effort not only to surround his skirmish line 
but to threaten his horse-holders, who had been sent to the rear with the company’s horses. Parker 
withdrew and regrouped again, making a final advance with his skirmish line. Finding that the 
Apaches were still willing to hold their positions to his front, and were simultaneously making 
efforts to move around the skirmish line, Parker withdrew his horses and men to a ridge a mile and 
a half distant.76
75 Personal observation of the terrain by the author 9 July, 2014.
76 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; See also Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM 
Plate 14.1. Photo of map accompanying Buell’s Report.
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Despite the heavy fire, most of the serious casualties, human and equine, appear to have been 
sustained in the opening volleys from the Apaches.77 Parker himself estimated that his lack of 
casualties sustained during the engagement was due to poor marksmanship by the Apaches. He 
also thought it had helped that, when not attempting to advance his skirmish line, he had ordered 
his men to lie down in the tall grass which grew at the bottom of the slope.78 
Parker sent a courier to Captain Hale’s detachment requesting his support.79 It is not clear from 
the reports, but it would appear that this same courier brought the news which was telegraphed 
to Fort Cummings requesting their assistance.80 Almost as soon as he had dispatched the courier, 
however, the captain had second thoughts, having spotted a number of mounted Apaches to the 
west moving northwards towards Hale’s predicted line-of-march. Parker became concerned that he 
was facing a much larger force of Apache warriors than he had first anticipated, and that by calling 
for Hale’s aid, he might have put the latter in considerable danger. His surviving Apache scouts had 
by this time re-appeared and were adamant that Parker was confronted by ‘Victorio’s whole outfit’.81 
Parker therefore withdrew about eight miles, until he joined Hale’s detachment, and, shortly after 
that meeting, a courier from Buell and the first reinforcements from Fort Cummings joined them.82 
In response to the message from Parker, which had been received at Fort Cummings at around 
1:30 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Augustus Monroe Dudley had set out with a battalion 
drawn from the Ninth Cavalry, and these troops had taken with them a mountain howitzer, a 
Gatling gun and a water wagon. This force left to join Parker at about 2:15 p.m. About half an hour 
later, Buell had mounted some of his infantry in wagons to take up the pursuit.83 Buell had also 
sent a courier to Parker:
Hold your enemy in check by retreating slowly if you can not cope with him in same ground.
I come with whole command. Dudley far in advance with 9th Batt. Have sent courier to 
Noyes to come to you.84
(via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
77 Buell to AAAG Santa Fe, 10 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
78 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
79 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 & Hale to AAG, New Mexico Column, 12 
September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
80 Parker to Buell, 1:35 p.m., 7 September, 1880. in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
81 Ibid.
82 Parker to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 & Hale to AAG, New Mexico Column, 12 
September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; 
Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
83 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
See also Buell to AAAG 7 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.820; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.803-804; Collection of telegrams from Hatch to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio 
Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 & 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.801-802 & pp.803-804.
84 Buell to Parker, 7 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry 
A1-1 2601, Box 94.
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Plate 14.3. Opposite view, from behind the Apache position hidden on the low hill to the left down along a 
low hogback which provided excellent cover for the Apache warriors. (Photo: author)
Plate 14.2. Approaching the ambush site from Parker’s perspective. One cannot see the cover used by the 
Apaches until one is almost within easy range. On the right horizon is the low rocky hill with the natural 
rock breastworks. (Photo: author)
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Plates 14.4 and 14.5. Two views of the natural breastworks utilised by the Apache warriors. (Photos: author)
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Unfortunately, Parker had already retreated and joined Hale’s command before this message 
reached him.
Lieutenant Colonel Dudley’s battalion had managed to cover the 16 miles from Fort Cummings 
to, as far as he was concerned, an unexpected rendezvous with Parker’s company, in about one 
and three-quarter hours. Given that this haste was prompted by the need to relieve Parker from 
a difficult predicament, a less than amused Dudley gathered up Parker’s command and set out in 
pursuit of the Apaches.85 On arriving at the site of the attack, Dudley sent out detachments to 
scour the ground for signs, and it was quickly noted that the Apaches had scattered. From the top 
of the ridge, which formed part of the southern face of the Goodsight escarpment,86 Dudley could 
see a large dust cloud which he estimated was 15 miles away and only about five miles short of the 
Mexican border, which it was moving towards with all possible speed.87 As we shall see below, at 
least some of these Apaches travelled south east and moved through the West Potrillo Mountains 
and on to the East Potrillos before moving into Mexico. The scattered trails discovered around 
Dudley’s immediate position re-converged at a camp a short distance away. This was located down 
a steep ravine leading out of the Goodsight Mountains, and which had a good water supply. It was 
estimated that the Apaches had been encamped there for two to three days. Realising they had not 
thrown off their enemies, the Apaches had had sufficient time to poison the waterhole at this camp 
with horses’ entrails before they moved on towards Mexico. Dudley’s cavalry camped two miles 
beyond this point on the evening of 7 September, having lost the trail in the darkness shortly after 
emerging from the Goodsight Mountains.88
Buell’s infantry battalion followed the cavalry, at some point dismounting from their wagons and 
marching south through the night. This was in anticipation of helping Dudley, whom Buell hoped 
had surrounded the Apaches, to destroy the latter in the morning. They reached the camp recently 
abandoned by the fleeing Apaches, but could go no further and chose to bivouac at that point. 
This was estimated to have been 30 miles to the south east of Fort Cummings.89 Buell concluded 
that, without the presence of a mule train to carry food and water in casks, there was nothing to be 
gained by following these Apaches into Mexico.90 He also thought that this raid might have been 
85 Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
86 The Goodsight Mountains seen from the east and north appear as a low range of hills. Yet from the west 
and south they present themselves as a much higher range of small mountains. Thus a traveller reaching 
the Goodsight Mountains from the south and west has a tough climb to reach the top of the range. 
However, the descent on the other side is an easy and short walk down to the level ground on the other 
side of the mountains. Thus the Goodsight Mountains define the edge of an escarpment where the level 
ground on each side of the range is in significant comparative height to each other.
87 Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 & Buell to AAAG Dist. of New Mexico, 10 
September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
88 Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG 
DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
89 Buell to AAAG Dist. of New Mexico, 10 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-
98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; See also Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 
1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
Looking at the map on the following page thirty miles is a good estimate and it also places the camp 
very close to the place where Parker was first ambushed.
90 Buell to AAAG 8 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.817-819; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.804-805; Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. 
of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; See also collection of telegrams from Hatch to 
Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
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a diversion to draw the troops away from another, more serious, incursion, and he moved his men 
back to Fort Cummings on the morning of 8 September.91 On the march back to Fort Cummings, 
the force was joined by Major Noyes, whose detachment, finding no trace of Apaches and insuf-
ficient water in those mountains, had been contacted by a courier from Buell as they returned to the 
Little Floridas to water their horses.92 Noyes was instructed by Buell’s courier to march towards the 
engineer survey camp, and had already marched eastwards during the night when he spotted the 
dust cloud made by Dudley’s cavalry as the latter turned for Fort Cummings.93
Buell thought that very little damage had been sustained by the Apaches: ‘Do not think enemy 
recd more damage than loss of property by hasty flight.’94 The three men killed were hurriedly 
buried. When a detachment of Ninth Cavalry scouting from Fort Cummings passed the graves on 
29 November 1880, they found that coyotes had managed to dig up the bodies and had partially 
eaten them. The detachment reburied the remains of Private MacFee but ‘did not have the time to 
inter the bodies of the two Yuma Indian Scouts’.95
Dudley subsequently lobbied Buell to court martial Parker for retreating several miles to the rear 
in the face of the enemy.96 This demand was also reinforced by Dudley’s outrage at discovering, on 
first encountering the Fourth Cavalry company, that Parker had withdrawn without recovering the 
bodies of the three slain men.97 (see document file no’s. 112.3 and 115.1.) Buell was also critical of 
Parker, and he thought that the Captain had made an error of judgement in advancing with only 
two flankers, one posted on either side of the front of his detachment. Buell also thought that 
Parker had clearly erred in retreating approximately eight miles after extricating himself from his 
immediate predicament. However, he was more inclined to blame Parker’s Apache scouts, judging 
them to be worthless, as they had refused to take the point in Parker’s advance and had fled during 
the ambush.98 
Nevertheless, Buell concluded that, had Parker followed his instructions and retreated slowly, 
all the while holding the enemy at bay, the reinforcements from Fort Cumming would have been 
91 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
92 Noyes to AAG, New Mexico Column, 13 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
93 Noyes to AAG, New Mexico Column, 13 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG 
DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
94 Buell to AAAG 8 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.817-819; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 8 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.804-805; See also collection of telegrams from Hatch to Platt AAG 7 and 8 Sept., 1880, 
in ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
95 Parker to AAAG, Troops in the Field, Fort Cummings, 30 Nov., 1880 in Reports of Scouts 2 Nov., 
1880-1 Aug., 1882, HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, NA, 
RG393, M1081, Roll 8.
96 Dudley to AAAG SF 11 Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.609-613; See also Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 12 Nov., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.4, Nov. 1880 – Jan. 1881, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.35-36; Dudley to AAAG DoNM, 13 Nov., 1880, in Letters sent Vol. 7, 
25 Oct., 1880-24 Jun., 1881,in HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, 
NA, RG393, M1081, Roll 1, Letter No. 137.
97 Dudley to AAG, New Mexico Column, 9 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 
1868-98, RG 393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
98 Buell to AAAG Santa Fe, 10 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 
393, Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 
Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, 
File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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Plate 14.7. Similar perspective from the southern end of the Goodsight Mountains. The Florida Mountains 
are clearly visible on the right horizon, while the very edge of the West Potrillo Mountains can just be 
distinguished on the left horizon. (Photo: author)
Plate 14.6. View from the southern edge of the Goodsight Mountains. It was from a similar perspective 
that Lieutenant Colonel Dudley spotted the dust cloud approximately 15 miles out on the plain, making 
for the Mexican Border. The West Potrillo Mountains can be seen marching across the distant left-centre 
horizon. (Photo: author)
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able to destroy the Apaches.99 This conclusion is clearly flawed. The reinforcements from Fort 
Cummings followed Parker’s trail. Victorio would have had clear warning of the approach of a 
superior force, and the Apaches would simply have scattered in the face of such opposition.
Buell acknowledged that the operation against the Apaches near Fort Cummings had disrupted 
his plans to coordinate his movements with those of both Terrazas and Carr, in order to attack 
Victorio in Mexico.100 Nevertheless, a fresh trail leading into Mexico might give him the chance 
to launch an attack on Victorio. A few days after he had returned to Fort Cummings, Buell sent 
Captain Beyer, with approximately 80 Ninth Cavalrymen and 50 Apache scouts, into the East 
Potrillo Mountains. They were to establish the exact point at which the Apaches had crossed the 
border. Beyer located the crossing point, marched his command to Fort Bliss, and reported back 
to Buell by telegraph.101 Buell now had a clear trail into Mexico, which would allow him to follow 
General Pope’s instructions concerning crossing the border.102 
Therefore, while Grierson had reported that Victorio had been damaged in Texas, these attacks 
in early September 1880, and the numbers and ammunition expenditure they involved, suggest 
that the Apaches still had good stocks of ammunition at that time. Nevertheless, the encounter 
with Parker may have expended a significant amount of ammunition. 
For their own part, the Apaches appear to have been aware of the threat posed by Buell’s force at 
Fort Cummings, and to have thoroughly scouted the borderlands between the Florida Mountains 
and El Paso. Two scouts, of either Anglo-American or Mexican origin, returned to Fort Bliss to 
report that Victorio was now based near the Laguna de Guzman. On their return, they had passed 
through the Potrillo Mountains and had found clear evidence that the Apaches were sending small 
parties to the highest points of this range, simply to keep a watch for hostile forces making their 
way south into Mexico.103 (see document file no. 116.) The implication of this information was that 
if Victorio had scouts occupying the highest points of the Potrillo Mountains, any attempt to move 
large US forces south towards his position would be quickly spotted.
A remaining conundrum is the question of what Victorio was doing in the Goodsight Mountains 
in early September 1880? Why was the stagecoach attacked? And why did he ambush Parker?
That Victorio was present is strongly supported by the number of Apache warriors present at the 
battle. Moreover, Mescalero reports gathered by Buell in November 1880 at Fort Stanton include 
an interesting report by the widow of a Mescalero Apache leader called Cab-al-es-so. He had 
been shot dead by Victorio in a leadership dispute, sometime during September, in the Potrillo 
Mountains. As the Goodsight Mountains are the next range of mountains to the north by north 
west of the West Potrillo mountain range, and the former are sometimes described as an extension 
of the latter, this places Victorio in the immediate area. A number of possible explanations could be 
advanced for Victorio’s presence in the Goodsight Mountains.
First, the stagecoach was attacked by an advance party of 10 to 15 Apaches as a target of oppor-
tunity. What may have caught the Apaches out was the unexpected presence of Major Hale’s camp 
in the near vicinity. Thus, there was an unexpectedly quick response by the US army: first by Hale, 
then followed up by troops from Fort Cummings. This may have precluded a move north by a large 
99 Buell to AAAG Santa Fe, 10 September, 1880 in Letters Received, Dept. of Missouri 1868-98, RG 393, 
Entry A1-1 2601, Box 94.
100 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
101 Buell to AAAG 12 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.404; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., 
to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-
Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
102 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881
103 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.405-408.
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group of Apache warriors to distract attention from a second group of dependents. Victorio had 
done this in the past, both successfully (New Mexico, January–February 1880) and unsuccess-
fully (Texas, July–August 1880). He may have gathered his following together in the Potrillo and 
Goodsight Mountains in preparation for such a manoeuvre, but have been forestalled by the quick 
response by the US army. Therefore, the large dust cloud seen by Dudley retreating into Mexico 
may have been Victorio’s dependents, withdrawing across the border from the Potrillos, while 
the main group of warriors may have dispersed both into the Potrillos and down into Mexico in 
advance of the main party. 
Second, we know that the Apaches were beginning to run relatively low on ammunition by 
September 1880. It has been assumed that Victorio’s attempt to pass through Grierson’s picket lines 
in Texas had caused this ammunition shortage, though Parker’s fight on 7 September would appear 
to contradict this assumption. Nevertheless, Apache testimony and a couple of scout reports indi-
cate that Victorio’s following were short of ammunition from mid-September 1880. So, knowing 
that they had good, yet dwindling, ammunition stocks, could the Apaches have been trying to lure 
Captain Hale’s small detachment into an ambush, not necessarily to cause fatalities but to try to 
capture reserve ammunition from the company? Archaeological evidence from April 1880 shows 
that Victorio’s following used large numbers of Springfield rifles and carbines whose 45:70 and 
45:55 cartridges were interchangeable. Hale’s infantrymen were probably armed with Springfield 
rifles, so they might have been considered a tempting target. Parker’s troops, who were also prob-
ably armed with the Springfield carbines, may have offered the same opportunity.104 Could this 
small party of Apaches have been used in an attempt to lure a US army detachment into a situation 
where a much larger group of Apaches could separate them from the reserve ammunition they had 
packed on mules and horses?
Third, could Victorio, who was aware of Buell’s build-up of troops at Fort Cummings, have been 
merely testing out the preparedness of the troops in the immediate area? Finding the response 
faster than expected, the Apaches retreated, and stopped the initial pursuit in its tracks, before 
withdrawing into Mexico to take stock of the situation.
Finally, could Victorio have been trying to draw a significant number of US troops into a futile 
pursuit through the Potrillo Mountains, over the sand hill country in Northern Chihuahua, and 
into an ambush in the mountains to the north of the Lagunas de Guzman and Santa Maria? This 
had worked well for him in October 1879, when he had finally defeated Major Morrow’s battalion 
and forced them to terminate their pursuit after following the same route. If this could be repeated, 
then Victorio might be able to get his following safely across an undefended border into secure 
winter quarters in the Black Range, San Mateo and Mogollon Mountains.
It should also be noted that both attacks in New Mexico gave General Pope an ideal opportu-
nity to condemn the Mexican Government for, so far, refusing US troops permission to cross the 
border.105
As long as we are prevented by the refusal of the Mexican government from sending a force 
into Mexico to hunt down this band of indians we are liable to these raids. I again ask that the 
Mexican government be requested to permit us a passage and break up this band in Mexico. 
The troops are well posted and in sufficient force to deal easily with Victorio’s band; but whilst 
104 If I remember correctly at least some of the Fourth Cavalry were armed with a Hotchkiss carbine in 
1882.
105 Pope to AAG HQ  MDoM, 9 Sept., 1880’Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Pope to AG of 
the Army, Wash. D.C. 10 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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the Indians have a safe place ????? so near at hand they may at times be able to do such infamy 
as the above.106
The State Department, in response to Pope’s statement, instructed the US Minister to Mexico, 
P.H. Morgan, to renew his efforts to get the Mexican government to grant permission for US 
troops to cross the line.107 Morgan was instructed to ‘press upon Mexico the necessity of allowing 
our troops to pursue across the border or assume the responsibility of harbouring and yet not 
disarming them’.108 As late as 5 October, Hunter informed the Secretary of War that permission to 
cross the border could not be given until ratified by the Mexican Senate.109
106 Pope to AG of the Army, Washington D.C. 10 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press 
Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.581-582.
107 Hunter to Ramsey, Secretary of War, 15 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
108 Hunter to Ramsey, 15 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
109 Hunter to Ramsey, Secretary of War, 5 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Hunter 
to Ramsey, 15 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Hunter to Ramsey, 5 Oct., 1880 in 
Pope to Whipple AAG Chicago, 29 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
350
15
The Buell-Terrazas Campaign in Chihuahua, September–October 1880
 
Joaquin Terrazas Mobilises the Chihuahuan State Militia
South of the border, Luis Terrazas, Governor of Chihuahua, attempted to co-ordinate Mexican 
state and federal troops in a joint offensive against Victorio. 
He [Luis Terrazas] had secured a pledge of two hundred men from the political chief of 
Cuidad Guerrero, 111 miles by road west of Chihuahua City, and would immediately send 
rifles and ammunition for that number, money to hire mules, and supplies to pack them with. 
Orders had been issued to the political heads of Bravos and Galeana, 30 miles south-west of 
Casas Grandes, to raise what troops they could. Luis’ directive stated that ‘the government will 
pay four reales to the infantry and six to those who brought a horse and will pay rewards for 
Indian scalps, and the capture alive of women and children, according to the law, and 2,000 
pesos for Victorio, dead or alive’. It added that ‘all civilians enlisting for this campaign’ would 
be under Joaquin’s command.1
The Governor selected his cousin to head the State of Chihuahua’s latest offensive against the 
Apaches. In response to this commission, Colonel Joaquin Terrazas embarked on a remarkable 
recruitment drive in the towns to the west and north of Chihuahua City.2 He recruited a number 
of Tarahumara Indians as scouts and infantrymen. These men had the reputation of effortlessly 
keeping abreast of mounted men on the trail. Between 25 August and 29 September 1880, Terrazas 
passed through several towns collecting recruits or instructing them to follow in his path. He 
started at San Andres, then proceeded through Cuidad Guerrero, Namiquipa, Santa Clara, Ortega, 
San Lorenzo, and on to El Carmen. At the last location, he found a number of recruits, yet none 
of the guns promised by the central authorities. He also sent out messages asking volunteers from 
the Mexican border to link up with his forces at the Laguna de Patos. He continued on to San 
Buenaventura, Galeana and Corralitos, linking up with the expedition’s second-in-command, Juan 
Mata Ortiz, who had considerable experience of fighting the Apaches.3 Mata Ortiz had already 
gathered a group of over 100 volunteers, and had also sent out scouts to the north and west of Janos 
in search of the Apaches. By the time the force reached the Vado de Santa Maria, these scouts had 
returned without having seen any Apaches; but they had come across the tracks of 10 horses in the 
lakes region (presumably somewhere between the Laguna de Guzman4 and the Laguna de Santa 
1 Thrapp, 1974, p.294.
2 See Grierson to AAG, DoTx, San Antonio, 2 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 
14; See Thrapp, 1974, pp.294-301 for a detailed account of Terrazas’ recruitment drive and subsequent 
expedition against Victorio.
3 Thrapp, 1974, p.295.
4 Also known as Guzman Lake.
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Maria). The tracks were moving to the east, towards the Candelaria Mountains.5 The expedition 
carried on to the Laguna de Patos, where many of the militiamen promised for his force by settle-
ments visited on his recruitment drive caught up with Colonel Terrazas on 29 September 1880.6 
Even as Terrazas waited for his militia to converge on the Laguna de Patos, his scouts fanned out 
northwards towards the Candelaria Mountains. Their orders were to carefully scout for Victorio’s 
camp without alerting the Apaches. If there was a camp, Terrazas and his commanders would 
attempt a surprise attack. Once more, his scouts failed to find any Apaches, though they reported 
a trail moving eastwards out of the Candelaria Mountains.7
Terrazas’ forces continued to grow, as the militia raised in the border region around El Paso del 
Norte joined him.8 While the Colonel was encamped at the Laguna de Patos, he was also contacted 
by couriers from Buell.9 By the time he left the Laguna de Patos, he commanded approximately 350 
men.10 With most of his forces gathered, he was now ready to set out after Victorio’s band. 
Luis Terrazas opens negotiation with Colonel Buell
As Joaquin Terrazas was gathering recruits, his cousin Luis Terrazas had already initiated 
a dialogue11 (see document file no. 117) with Colonel Buell, principally through the offices of 
Dr Samaniego, though Juan B. Olguin and Roman Aranda were also used to help coordinate 
the campaign against Victorio. These men corresponded through Captain Brinkerhoff, at Fort 
Bliss, who provided the last link in the line of communication between Governor Terrazas and 
Colonel Buell. This correspondence opened on 16 August 1880, when Dr Samaniego informed 
Brinkerhoff that permission had been given for US troops to cross the border into Chihuahua in 
pursuit of Apaches.12 This message was further reinforced by the Jefe Politico of the district of El 
Paso del Norte, Juan B. Olguin, when he requested that Brinkerhoff ask Buell to lend the citizens 
of Chihuahua as much military aid as possible to confront the Apaches.13 As Buell had not yet 
received a direct communication from the Governor of Chihuahua, he asked for a letter to this 
effect, signed by Luis Terrazas.14 In the meantime, Buell stated that, even if the Governor did not 
respond, if ‘the people on your border want my assistance … they shall have it but, if a move is made 
I want it should be an effective one’.15 Brinkerhoff was contacted by Samaniego16 and told that the 
latter was expecting a letter from Luis Terrazas with further instructions. It was also stated in this 
letter that, ‘I think [author’s underline] the Jef. Politicos call is legal and sufficient to relieve you 
from all responsibility.’17 Buell quickly contacted Olguin, on 31 August, estimating that he could 
put his forces in motion on 8 September. He also asked Olguin to furnish him two reliable guides.18 
5 Thrapp, 1974, pp. 295-297.
6 Ibid, p.298.
7 Ibid, p.297.
8 Ibid, p.298.
9 Thrapp, 1974, p.299; Crimmins, 1935, pp.138-139.
10 Thrapp, 1974, p.298.
11 This correspondence is repeated in full in Appendix Two of the previous chapter.
12 Brinkerhoff to Buell citing Samaniego to Brinkerhoff, 16 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, 
Roll 528.
13 Olguin to Brinkerhoff, 29 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
14 Buell to Samaniego, 30 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
15 Buell to Jefe Politico, El Paso del Norte, 31 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
16 The letter does not mention him by name but it mentions the fact that the writer lost horses to the 
Apaches on the 28 Aug., 1880; this surely confirms the author as Samaniego..
17 Brinkerhoff to Buell, 31 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
18 Buell to Jefe Politico (through Brinkerhoff), 31 Aug., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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Plate 15.1. The well-preserved but abandoned hacienda at El Carmen, Chihuahua, Mexico. In September 
1880, one would have expected to see this as the centre of activity as Colonel Terrazas gathered his forces to 
march against the Apaches. (Photo: author)
Plate 15.2. The pass between Galeana and Casa Grandes. Terrazas probably used this route in September 
1880. The photo gives the reader some idea of the vastness of the country that both the Mexicans and 
Apaches traversed in their many campaigns against each other. (Photo: author)
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The following day, Buell informed Olguin that, unless the latter retracted his permission, the letter 
of 29 August, had, as far as Buell was concerned, sufficient legality for him to act.19 However, on 
this point, it should be remembered that Samaniego had only expressed the opinion that he thought 
that the Jefe Politico’s request was legal.
By 2 September, Buell and Samaniego were exchanging intended plans as to what US and 
Chihuahuan forces were available and where they should be deployed. Buell further asked for 
Mexican guides, and added a request for a map of the area. Finally, he also requested a meeting 
with Samaniego and/or Olguin at either Palomas Lake or Ascencion.20 By 4 September, Buell sent 
his first communication to Joaquin Terrazas, informing him of the number of available US troops, 
and that his scouts placed Victorio approximately 15 miles from the Laguna de Santa Maria on 
the Santa Maria River. Buell proposed that he and Terrazas, in ‘hearty cooperation’, launch a joint 
attack on the Apaches.21 In return, Joaquin Terrazas contacted Samaniego from the Hacienda de 
San Lorenzo, stating that he was more than willing to cooperate with Buell. He complimented 
Samaniego on the manner in which he had attempted to put the Governor’s wishes into action 
without leaving Luis Terrazas open to being held to account for those actions. Colonel Terrazas 
also informed Samaniego of his intended plans, but added that, as he was still waiting for his men 
to gather, he proposed that Buell be asked to concentrate his forces at Boca Grande and Palomas 
Lake on 24 September 1880.22 The stage was now set for these plans to be put into action, and on 
9 September 1880, Luis Terrazas informed President Porfirio Diaz that he was about to send an 
expedition of several hundred men after Victorio.23
The US Army Organises an Expedition into Mexico
The planned operation to attack and destroy Victorio in Mexico was, from the US point of view, 
two pronged: from Arizona, Colonel Eugene A. Carr with six companies of the Sixth Cavalry 
was to sweep south to Casas Grandes and then eastwards towards Laguna de Guzman. The Sixth 
Cavalrymen would be fronted by three Apache scout companies,24 who would operate in extended 
order, approximately 10 miles in advance of the US troops.25 By 1 August 1880, Carr was informed 
that General Willcox ‘desires you to cooperate with Col. Buell as far as possible’. The following day, 
Carr informed Buell that he did not possess a map of Northern Mexico.26 By 3 August, a map had 
been found and was en route to Carr at Fort Bowie.27 On 30 August, Carr had informed Willcox 
19 Buell to Olguin, 1 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
20 Buell to Brinkerhoff, 2 Sept., 1880, Samaniego to Buell 2 Sept., 1880, Buell to Samaniego, 3 Sept., 1880 
in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
21 Buell to Col. Joaquin Terrazas (through Brinkerhoff, Samaniego and thence by courier), 4 Sept., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
22 Joaquin Terrazas to Samaniego, 11 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
23 Hatfield, 1999, p.38.
24 One of these scout companies, commanded by Lt Frederick Von Schrader, had been transported by 
rail to join Colonel Carr’s expedition. This was the first time that U.S. troops had deployed by rail in 
Arizona. (Thrapp, 1988, p.1491).
25 Cruse, 1987, p.84; see also Thrapp, 1964, pp.218-219; 1974, p.299; Rasch, 1960, p.9; Carter, USACMH 
webpage.
26 Carr to Buell, 2 Aug., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, pp.131-132.
27 Martin to Carr 3 Aug., 1880 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10 p.352.
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that Victorio was, according to Buell, in the Candelaria Mountains. In Carr’s opinion, this placed 
the Apaches out of easy reach of troops from Arizona.28 This led Willcox to advise:
that in assisting Buell you can do only what seems practicable and that appears to be to take 
what troops and transportation you can without stripping or distressing the southern posts 
and proceed as far only as may be necessary to cover Arizona: say the valley between the Sierra 
Madres and Chiricahuas [Mountains] and the San Francisco country and incidentally to hold 
for Buell any route or pass leading from Guzman. If this disposition of your force should lead 
to the discovery of the trail of the hostiles, you are at liberty to follow it. Finally, if you cannot 
well carry thirty (30) days rations take twenty (20).29
Following Wilcox’s advice, Carr ordered the concentration of the units involved in the proposed 
expedition to commence around Fort Bowie, on 3 September 1880.30 He intended to be ready to 
move on 9 September, but admitted that a few more days would allow him to concentrate more 
troops for his expedition.31 Buell quickly responded that the forces in Arizona could have more 
than a few days to complete their mobilisation, as Buell was not quite ready to launch his expedi-
tion, due both to delays in recruiting Apache scouts for service with the New Mexican troops and 
to Colonel Terrazas’ mobilisation of the Chihuahua state militia. Carr was told to wait until Buell 
instructed him to commence his field operations. Carr calculated that he would be leading 280 
Sixth Cavalrymen and 55 Apache scouts into Mexico.32 His only worry was a shortage of pack 
mules; but he proposed to move with wagons till he reached the Mexican border, before transfer-
ring supplies to the pack mules.33
Willcox and Carr appear to have been aware of the dubious legality of the operation. Willcox gave 
careful instructions not to move beyond certain boundaries; and Carr, alerted Willcox that if Victorio 
was to be found in the Candelaria Mountains, this would place Carr beyond such boundaries.
Further to the east in New Mexico, Buell had already concentrated a large force at Fort Cummings 
and Knight’s Ranch. (See Chapter 12.) As the officer responsible for the overall direction of the 
US part of the campaign, Buell contacted Joaquin Terrazas, and a proposed plan of campaign was 
finalised by the beginning of September. The whole operation was aimed at coming upon Victorio 
from all sides. Carr was informed of the broad plan on 4 September 1880.34 (see document file no. 
118.) The US army’s part in the campaign could be visualised as a horizontal line running west 
along the border from El Paso into Arizona. As those involved in the operation swung into action, 
Carr’s segment in Arizona would act as a hinge on a door, pivoting on its junction with Buell’s right 
flank and swinging around to the east.35 (See Map 15.1.)
28 Martin to Carr (citing the latter’s telegram of 30 Aug., 1880) 7 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
169, Vol. 10, pp.394-395.
29 Martin to Carr (citing the latter’s telegram of 30 Aug., 1880) 7 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
169, Vol. 10, pp.394-395; Carr to Buell, 14 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 
1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.553, p.13.
30 Special Orders No. 47, HQ , Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Camp near Fort Bowie, A.T., 3 Sept., 
1880, Special Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 2, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, pp.23-25.
31 Carr to Buell, 4 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 18 
May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.503, p.171.
32 Carr to AG DoAz, 6 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.530, pp.2-3.
33 Ibid.
34 Carr to AG DoAz, 4 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 
18 May-6 Sept., 1880, Letter No.504, pp.171-172.
35 See Carr to Buell, 3 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.7, 
18 May-6 Sept., 1880, p.160.
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These plans were probably further refined on receipt of the news from Colonel Terrazas that he 
wished the US forces to be at Palomas Lake and the Boca Grande on 24 September 1880. Terrazas 
also outlined a detailed plan of campaign and sent this to Buell. This was written at San Lorenzo on 
11 September, and probably took a few days to reach Buell. Terrazas confirmed that he understood 
Buell’s intended plan of attack. He also informed Buell of the lay of the land between the Corralitos 
River and the Boca Grande Mountains, and indicated the likely camping places that Victorio 
might occupy. Finally, he sent proposals as to the sort of signals (fires at night; smoke during the 
day) the Chihuahua and US forces should use when operating within sight of each other. He even 
proposed a series of simple flag signals, should the two forces be close enough to see each other.36 
(see document files no’s. 117 and 119.) 
Joaquin Terrazas also informed Buell that he had received instructions from his cousin, on 31 
August, that Chihuahuan State troops were not to cross the border into the United States. He 
informed Buell that he would cross the border if necessary but indicated that he would stay north of 
the border for as short a period as possible. ‘I think with the good will manifested by the American 
Authorities, all will be right between the two Governments, if nothing is said about it.’37 Thus, the 
permission for, and planning of, Buell’s operation to trap Victorio was concluded with the authori-
ties in Chihuahua on, or around, 15 September 1880.38 This suggests that, before Buell entered 
Mexico, there was a three-to-four-day gap in in the transmission of information between him and 
Joaquin Terrazas, whose plan of action had been written on September 11. This potential time lag 
would only improve once scouts from each command located each other and could communicate 
directly by mounted couriers. All that remained was for Buell to set his forces in motion. 
In the meantime, Buell kept his superiors informed of his progress, though the latter were 
careful to downplay the point that the US army would be operating in northern Chihuahua. On 
20 September, General Pope informed Sheridan that ‘Buell, Carr and Terrassas, Governor of 
Chihuahua are making combined movement against Victorio which will probably culminate in 
Mexico.’39 (see document file no. 120.) Buell clearly stated, on 18 September 1880, that he was ‘now 
acting against Victorio in conjunction with Carr of Arizona & Terasas of Mexican forces’.40 Two 
days later, probably to help justify the entry of US troops into Mexico, Pope reiterated the argu-
ment that the war would probably not have occurred had the Department of the Interior not been 
so insistent on the removal of the Warm Springs Apaches to San Carlos. He noted that one of the 
reasons for their resistance to this deportation was the hostility of other Apaches living on San 
Carlos towards the Warm Springs Apaches and that, when Victorio’s followers had been settled at 
Ojo Caliente, there had been little trouble from them. Pope stated that the US army now faced a 
situation where Victorio and his followers had decided to fight to the finish and that their ‘capture 
is not very probable, but the killing (cruel as it will be) can, I suppose, be done in time’.41 (see docu-
ment file no. 121.) It is interesting to note that in this ‘official’ document General Pope was careful 
36 Joaquin Terrazas, San Lorenzo, 11 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
37 Ibid.
38 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM, Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
39 Pope to Sheridan copied to General Ord, 20 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies 
of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.621 & Sheridan to Ord, 20 Sept., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.384; Pope to Sheridan, 20 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14.
40 Buell to AAAG SF 18 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.417.
41 Pope’s Annual Report Year ending 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.613; Report of 
General John Pope, 22 Sept., 1880, in AR-WD 1880, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I, pp.88-89.
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to be quite ambiguous as to how US and Mexican forces were cooperating against the Apaches.42 
Yet on the same day, Pope stated that:
To crush out these Indians finally it will be necessary to have authority to pursue and hunt 
them down wherever they go – whether within our limits or in Mexico – and I think arrange-
ments now on foot will enable us to accomplish this object.43
The New York Times of 28 October 1880 quoted Buell’s report, in which the latter stated that his 
expedition had been ordered by a telegram from General Pope dated 10 September 1880.44 
Finally, the main concern for Buell was that Victorio might manage to elude US forces and take 
refuge in the Black Range.45 If Buell, Carr and Terrazas were unable to contact each other quickly 
in the field, there was every opportunity that the Apaches would slip through the net. With this 
danger in mind, we shall turn first to Colonel Carr’s part in the operation.
Colonel Carr’s Expedition into Mexico
Of all the expeditions which set off into Mexico, that commanded by Colonel Carr made the 
most uneventful progress. Carr set off from Fort Bowie on 19 September 1880, intending to be in 
a position to blockade the Boca Grande passes on 24 September.46 He commanded five compa-
nies of Sixth Cavalry (A, C, F, G, and M) and detachments from two more Companies (B and 
L), totalling 10 officers, including himself, and 243 other ranks divided into two battalions. He 
was also accompanied by A, C and D Companies, which were comprised of Indian scouts led by 
Lieutenants Cruse, Staunton and Mills, with 57 scouts, and a further 33 Sixth Cavalrymen who 
had been attached to these companies. The command was also accompanied by three guides, 27 
mule packers, 20 Apaches classed as mule packers, and seven clerks.47 (see document file no. 122.) 
Carr seems to have been most concerned as to how long he could keep his command in the field. 
Willcox moved swiftly to assure him that:
arrangement will be made to supply your command in the field for any given period you may 
desire, if there is any chance by so doing for you to accomplish results. The peace of Arizona 
is endangered as long as Victorio remains on the warpath and it may take some time to bring 
him in, and the troops had better keep at it until he is brought in. Please designate as soon as 
practicable the point or points to which you want subsistence stores sent.48
42 Ibid.
43 Report of General John Pope, 22 Sept., 1880 in AR-WD, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 Vol. I-II, p.88.
44 ‘The Death of Victorio’, The New York Times, 28 Oct., 1880.
45 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
46 Carr to AG DoAz, 17 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.17; Carr to Buell, 18 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.18.
47 Carr to AG DoAz, 19 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.569, pp.19-20; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Companies 
A, C, F, G, & M, 6th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94; See also Special Orders No. 58, HQ , 
Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Camp near Fort Bowie, A.T., 17 Sept., 1880, Special Orders Oct. 
1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 2, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, pp.28-29.
48 Martin to Carr, 22 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.415.
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One of Carr’s actions was to reduce the amount of ammunition carried by the troops in his 
command. Instead of each man carrying 250 rounds, only 150 rounds of rifle or carbine ammuni-
tion were issued to each man.49 Of the 150 rounds, each man was to carry 100 rounds on his person 
– or 60 rounds in the case of the Indian scouts – and the balance was to be carried by pack mules.50
Carr reported being delayed by heavy rains on the night of 20 September, and estimated that he 
would not be at the Corralitos River, let alone in the Boca Grande Mountains, by 24 September, 
as intended. Instead, he sent Lieutenant Mills, with his Apache scouts, ahead of his force, to make 
contact with Buell.51 Carr’s command reached Emory Springs, in the Hatchet Mountains, on 23 
September 1880. Finding too little water and wood in that vicinity,52 they marched on towards the 
Boca Grande Mountains.53 By the evening of 24 September, Carr was camped on the Corralitos 
River, and he was issuing instructions to his command to pass through the Guzman Mountains 
to the Laguna de Guzman. Even as he issued these orders, both Blocksom’s and Cruse’s Apache 
49 Para 3 Special order no.53.
50 Carr Special Orders No.54, 18 Sept., 1880, Special Orders Oct. 1879-Jan. 1881, DoAz, Vol. 2, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 239, p.30.
51 Carr to Buell, 21 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 
Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.570, p.20; Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort 
Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 
Entry 841.
52 This implies that Carr was intending to establish a temporary base at Emory Springs but found this to 
be impracticable on arrival.
53 Carr Emory Springs, to AG DoAz, 2 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.573, p.22-23.
Colonel Eugene A. Carr.
Commander of the Sixth Cavalry is probably best 
remembered for his victory over the Cheyenne 
Dog Soldiers at Summit Springs in 1869. He 
commanded the Arizona troops who entered 
Mexico in support of Buell in September 1880. He 
was a vocal critic of what he saw as overreliance 
upon Apache scouts during the Victorio 
Campaign. He thought that the scouts should only 
be used to guide US troops to the enemy and then 
the fighting should be the responsibility of the 
accompanying soldiers. In August 1881, Carr led 
a mixed force of Sixth Cavalrymen and Apache 
scouts to arrest an Apache spiritual leader at 
Cibecue Creek. The Apache scouts mutinied and 
in the subsequent battle, the spiritual leader and 
seven Sixth Cavalrymen were among those killed. 
One wonders whether Carr’s views concerning the 
proper deployment of Apache scouts led him to 
underestimate the capabilities of his Apache scouts 
and was partially to blame for provoking this 
violent incident. (National Archives)
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scout companies were scouring these mountains for any sign of Victorio’s people.54 They were to 
try to spot Buell’s command but, more importantly, should they encounter Victorio, they were 
to attempt to engage him until the main force under Carr arrived. Carr’s main concern was that 
Victorio should not slip through between his command and Buell’s.55 Lieutenant Mills linked up 
with Buell’s expedition on 24 September, but no firm contact was established between the New 
Mexico and Arizona troops.56 In fact, the first Carr knew of this contact was around 9 October, 
when Lieutenant Mills arrived at Fort Bowie, having left Buell’s command on 2 October 1880.57 
Lieutenant Mill’s detachment (the last to come in) had followed Carr’s expedition’s trail as it moved 
north from the Corralitos River.58 On his return, Lieutenant Mills stated that he had been informed 
that Captain Purington’s company had passed through the site of the battle between Victorio and 
Morrow on 27 October 187959, and that they had found human remains which were believed to 
be those of Private Cochlovins, who had been reported missing in action, believed killed in that 
fight.60 (See document file no. 123.) 
Carr did not reach the Boca Grande range until 26 September 1880. He reported no contact 
with Buell, but did spot a large dust cloud far to the east, which he supposed belonged to one of 
Buell’s columns.61 Word eventually reached Carr from Buell, probably via couriers from Arizona, 
informing him that Buell expected him to move towards Lake Guzman.62 While Carr stated that 
he was ‘tempted’ by such a move, he did not feel that he had authorisation to go that far.63 He then 
picketed the Boca Grandes for almost six days with no further contact from Buell. From these 
picket lines, Carr sent out scouting parties east and south, as far as a rough line from Palomas 
Lake to the vicinity of Janos.64 Seeing no signs of any human beings at all, let alone Apaches, Carr 
departed for Arizona on 1 October,65 and had arrived back at Fort Bowie by 6 October 1880.66 On 
his return to Arizona, he was asked to remain in the field by Department Headquarters. Carr noted 
that if he was to try to do so, he would require another 100 mules. He had not lost any mules during 
54 Kerr, HQ Troops in the Field Camp on Corraletos or Jannos River, Mexico, 8:00 p.m. to Lieut Mills 24 
Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 240.
55 Orders presumably by Carr instructing Kerr to transmit orders to Blocksom, undated instructions 
written on telegraph form, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 240.
56 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
57 Ibid.
58 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841; Carr to AG, Whipple Barracks, 
10 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Prt 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.456-457.
59 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879’, p.276.
60 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
61 Carr to AG DoAz, 26 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.572, pp.21-22; Return for Company G, 6th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 
in NA, RG94.
62 Carr to AG DoAz, 25 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.571, p.21.
63 Carr to AG DoAz, 26 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.572, pp.21-22; See also Carr to Hatch, 7 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE 
Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.579, pp.25-26.
64 Carr to Buell, 17 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 
Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.30.
65 Carr Emory Springs, to AG DoAz, 2 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, 
Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.573, p.22-23; Carr to Buell, 17 Oct., 1880, Troops 
in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.30.
66 Returns for Companies A, C, F, G, & M, 6th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94.
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his incursion into Mexico, but many were in a very poor condition. Moreover, the team mules he 
had taken with him to Mexico had not performed well as pack mules.67
The Texas Rangers Move South of the Border
In response to Victorio’s continued attacks on Mexican ranches, the local Chihuahuan Mexican 
militia commander, Ramon Aranda, asked a small detachment of Texas Rangers to cross the 
border and help combat the Apaches.68 Accordingly, Lieutenant Baylor, Sergeant Gillett and 12 
Texas Rangers crossed the Rio Grande on 17 September 1880, ‘to co-operate with him in exter-
minating the Apaches’.69 Baylor anticipated that Victorio would move east from the Candelaria 
Mountains, in the face of the forces arrayed against him, and planned to block such a move with 
his detachment.70 
67 Carr to AG DoAz, 5 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.575, p.23-24.
68 Gillett, 1976, p.183.
69 Gillett, 1976, p.183; Brinkerhoff to AAAG 17 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.825-826; 
Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 19 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.839-840; Thrapp, 1974, p.299; Stout, p.171.
70 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 16 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.215, Letter No.379.
Lt Stephen Mills with Apache Scouts.
Lt. Stephen C.Mills, Twelfth Infantry, seen in a contemporary with his Apache scout company. His was 
the only force from Carr’s expedition into Mexico which made direct contact with Buell’s New Mexico 
force. On returning to Arizona, they reported that troops from New Mexico had discovered the remains 
of a Sixth Cavalryman, missing in action, believed killed, during the fight between Morrow’s force and 
Victorio in Northern Mexico on the night of the 27-28 October, 1879. (See ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair 
of a Horse’s Tail’: The Victorio Campaign 1879, Chapter 11, p.276) (National Archives)
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By 18 September 1880, it was reported that 75 men were picketing the eastern edge of the 
Candelaria Mountains.71 The group that assembled at the Aranda Ranch numbered over 100, 
though not all would necessarily have been deployed to cover the Candelarias. As well as the 
Rangers, there were Mexican volunteers from both sides of the Rio Grande,72 and scouts from 
Colonel Grierson’s command were also believed to have joined this force.73 (see document file no. 
125.) It has always been assumed that the scouts from Grierson’s command were Pueblo scouts, 
but it now appears that they were a small group of volunteers drawn from the Tenth Cavalry 
and led by Charles Berger. Berger and six ‘soldiers’ are reported to have left Fort Quitman on 27 
September, ‘with instructions to ascertain the present whereabouts of Victoria’.74 Grierson clearly 
stated that some picked men from A and E Companies, Tenth Cavalry, accompanied Berger. He 
also noted that the six months’ term of service of his Pueblo scouts had expired on 21 September, 
and that they ‘could not be induced to re-enlist again for either love or money’,75 though he noted 
that some of these scouts were, in his opinion, ‘worthless’.76 In attempting to recruit more scouts, 
on 30 September, Lieutenant Nordstrom, Tenth Cavalry, found that the Pueblo Indians were very 
reluctant to re-enlist for their previous rate of pay. After several days of trying to recruit Pueblo 
scouts or Mexican citizens from the other side of the border, Nordstrom had to record complete 
failure to recruit any scouts. He attributed his failure to recruit more Pueblos to general indolence. 
His failure to recruit Mexican citizens he put down to rumours, spread by the Pueblo Indians, that 
if they served with the US army they would be kept on short rations and forced to ‘drill among the 
Negroes’.77
On 19 September, the Texas Rangers discovered a rain-obscured trail to the south of the 
Rancheria Mountains78 and spotted what they took to be signal fires to the east of the Aranda 
Ranch.79 Gillett, five Rangers and 10 Mexican militiamen scouted towards these fires on 20 
September. Before they could reach the area, they were ordered to occupy Rancheria Mountain and 
deny it to Victorio.80 In the following days, Victorio was reported to be operating between Carrizal 
and the Candelaria Mountains. Although the Mexican militia and Texas Rangers moved into this 
71 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 18 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.218-219, Letter No.386.
72 Gillett, 1976, p.183.
73 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 17 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.825-826; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 19 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, pp.839-840.
74 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 27 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.120-121.
75 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 31 Dec., 1880,  in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168 (Note: This latter report contained as Letter 
No. 3 in Letters sent 1881); Nolan, Fort Quitman, 21 Sept., 1880 in Register of Letters Rec’d 23 Mar., 
1878-30 Jan., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.54, Letter No.190; 
McLaughlan to Grierson, 21 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.220, Letter No.389.
76 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 23 Sept., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.165, Letter No.495.
77 Nordstrom to Battalion adjutant 10 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; See also Nolan to Smither, 6 Oct., 1880 in 
Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2, p.253, Letter No.457.
78 Thompson, Baylor’s editor, states that this mountain constitutes a single elevation lying some ten miles 
to the northeast of the Candelaria Mountains.
79 Gillett, 1976, p.183.
80 Ibid, pp.183-184.
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area, the Apaches managed to elude them.81 Having failed to prevent Victorio moving eastwards, 
these troops made for Samaniego’s ranch at San Jose.82 
At San Jose, the Mexican militia and Texas rangers rendezvoused with Joaquin Terrazas’ state 
troops, on 3 October 1880.83 By that point, Colonel Terrazas was accompanied by approximately 
200 cavalry and 100 infantry. Gillett described the cavalry and infantry as well-equipped with 
Remington pistols, carbines and muskets and ammunition,84 and he clearly admired the minimal 
amount of baggage and food carried by the state troops. Nevertheless, Gillett noted that the infan-
trymen, Tarahumara Indians, had no difficulty in keeping up with the cavalry and were actually 
more effective than the mounted troops when operating in the mountains.85 (see document file 
no. 126.2.) Reuben W. Creel, US Consul in Chihuahua City, writing in 1863, made very similar 
comments concerning the ability of the Chihuahua state troops to hold their own against the 
Apaches with relatively few resources.86 (see document file no. 126.1.) Creel asserted that if well-
armed and well led, the poor people who would make up the rank and file would ‘do their duty’; 
but he noted that they were poorly led and equipped. He stated that the only officer of worth was 
‘decidedly brave and energetic’ but was not formally trained, and was only fit to lead troops against 
Apaches or other guerrillas.87 If Creel was referring to Joaquin Terrazas, the latter would seem 
exactly the man to track Victorio down.
By the time that Joaquin Terrazas rendezvoused with the Mexican militia raised by Aranda, and 
their Texas Ranger allies, his mobilisation and concentration was complete.
Colonel Buell’s Expedition into Mexico (see document file no. 127.)
On 18 September 1880, Buell got his expedition under way. He contacted Samaniego, with a 
view to setting up an efficient system of couriers between his command, once it was in the field, 
and the telegraph office at Fort Cummings. He also advised Samaniego to organise a similar 
system between Terrazas’ command and the telegraph office in El Paso. Buell required Terrazas 
to inform him of Victorio’s current location, so that he could deploy his troops accordingly when 
Buell crossed the border.88 However, this system of couriers was not implemented, thus losing the 
allies the opportunity to prevent delayed transmission times, and allowing the Apaches to slip by 
their opponents.89 Where the use of the telegraph lines was concerned, a problem that had periodi-
cally plagued the US army surfaced again. Complaints by some officers that telegraph operators 
displayed ‘a want of cordial cooperation’ provoked a swift message to his men by the Acting Chief 
81 Ibid, p.184.
82 This is probably the San Jose de Patos mentioned in Buell’s report of the operation which almost certainly 
places its location to near the Laguna de Patos.
83 Gillett, 1976, p.184.
84 The term ‘musket’ may be a misnomer. This may refer to a breech loading rifle of longer barrel length 
rather than a muzzle-loading musket. The Winchester repeating arm came in carbine/rifle and musket 
variants. The latter was certainly a breech loading weapon with a longer barrel than the other two vari-
ants. (See Flayderman, pp.258-261; Finerty, 2001, p.238) Lt. Maus notes that in 1886, Terrazza’s mili-
tiamen were armed with .44 calibre Remington rifles. (p.245).
85 Gillett, 1976, pp.184-185; see also Shipp, 2001, p.529; Smith, 1962, p.24.
86 Creery, U.S. Consul Chihuahua to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C, 30 Nov. 1863 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 1.
87 Ibid.
88 Buell to Samaniego, 18 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
89 Note appended to Buell to Samaniego, 18 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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Signal Officer. ‘Instruct your men to render commanding officers every possible assistance and 
under no circumstances to treat their demands in any other than with the greatest respect.’90
On the same day, Buell sent orders to some of his detachments. Captain Beyer was to move from 
El Paso91 to the East Potrillo Mountains with his Ninth Cavalrymen, while Lieutenant Maney’s 
Apache scouts were to station themselves on the western side of the Potrillo Mountains. They were 
all to move southwards into Mexico during the night of 23 September.92 This first deployment was 
almost certainly in response to the news, brought to Captain Brinkerhoff on 11 September, that 
the Apaches were using the Potrillo Mountains to spy out the border. If there were any of Victorio’s 
scouts present, these would hopefully be driven out just before Buell marched his main force to 
Palomas Lake. Of course, if Victorio was in the vicinity of the Laguna de Guzman, the Sierras Las 
Lilas and El Cartucho, to the west, and the Sierra San Blas and the Cerros Prietos, to the east, he 
would be ideally placed for stationing lookouts. The lookout stations to the east may have had their 
view of the Palomas Lake obscured by the Cerros La Rosina, but would have been able to spot 
Beyer and Maney’s detachments at daylight on 24 September, as they moved into Mexico.93 (See 
Map 15.2 for a summary of the Buell and Terrazas campaign against Victorio.)
Other detachments of US troops, stationed at Knight’s Ranch and Fort Cummings, would 
also move south in several groups, and rendezvous south of the border at Palomas Lake by 24 
September. Captain Theaker, with 70 Sixteenth Infantrymen, was to move south from Knight’s 
Ranch, departing on 20 September.94 Theaker was to join up with Buell’s supply train and proceed 
to Palomas Lake.95 Theaker was also accompanied by at least one company of Ninth Cavalry, which 
was commanded by Captain Purington and Lieutenant Rucker.96 Theaker and Purington’s detach-
ments, while en-route to Palomas Lake, were encountered on the road by Captain Pollack, Acting 
Assistant Inspector General for the District of New Mexico, who was travelling to Knight’s Ranch 
to inspect those very units. Pollack was completely unaware of the mounting of a major military 
operation into Mexico, and telegraphed Hatch asking for information about this operation on 21 
September, after his encounter. He also used the occasion to observe that more pack mules were 
required if effective field service was to be rendered.97
Several detachments issued from Fort Cummings between 19 and 21 September: Buell’s supply 
train, commanded by Captain Hartz, was set in motion on 19 September; and the following 
day, approximately 80 Fifteenth Infantrymen under Major Osborne left Fort Cummings. This 
command was accompanied by a water wagon which could carry in excess of 400 gallons, and had 
90 Acting Chief Signal Officer to Lt Allen, SF, 16 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.608-609.
91 Brinkerhoff reports Beyer’s detachment as consisting of Companies D and L Ninth Cavalry with a 
detachment of Indian scouts and having arrived at Fort Bliss on the 18 September, 1880. (Brinkerhoff 
to AAAG SF 19 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.413).
92 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.136; Stout, 1974, p. 169.
93 See Cuidad Juarez H13-1 Map from the Instituto Nacional De Estadistica Geografia e Infromatica, 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
94 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.135; Smith, 1994, p.158.
95 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881 See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.138.
96 Pollack to Hatch 21 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.414.
97 Pollock to Hatch, 21 Sept., 1880 in NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 439 p.415; Pollack to AAAG, DoNM, 23 
Sept., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, 
Jul.-Dec. 1880.
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Plate 15.3. Fort Cummings. Little remains today of the large military fort around which Buell assembled 
his expedition. (Photo: author)
Plate 15.4. This photo gives at least an impression of the perspective that troops leaving Fort Cummings 
for Mexico would have had. As one rounds the hill to the right of the photo, one is confronted by a long, 
deceptively ‘flat’ stretch of desert country, punctuated by: the Floridas, the Tres Hermanas, and on into 
northern Chihuahua. (Photo: author)
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been designed by Buell himself.98 Finally, on 21 September, Buell departed Fort Cummings with 
two cavalry battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Dudley commanded the first battalion of approximately 
100 Ninth Cavalrymen. The second battalion, consisting of 109 troops from the Fourth Cavalry, 
was led by Major Noyes.99 The regimental returns suggest that this battalion consisted  of A and H 
Companies, Fourth Cavalry.100 The cavalry battalions were each equipped with a single Hotchkiss 
mountain howitzer.101 To maintain communication between his commands, Buell provided each 
detachment with several civilian scouts.  Sherman later upbraided him for employing such men, as 
this exceeded the army’s strength as authorized by Congress.102 Buell was making every effort to 
prevent Victorio from quietly slipping around his cordon and escaping into New Mexico, having 
had this possibility stressed to him by the Ninth Cavalry officers with the expedition, based on 
their previous experience. He thought that if he kept a number of civilian scouts active between 
his various detachments, such a manoeuvre by the Apaches might be detected quickly enough to 
prevent them evading his net.103 In this context, it is worth noting that Colonel Hatch was not 
convinced that Buell knew how to manage his Apache scouts in such a way as to realise their 
maximum potential in the field.104
At District Headquarters, Hatch lost contact with Buell’s command from 21 September until 2 
October 1880,105 when Roman Aranda arrived at Fort Bliss to report on progress up to that date.106 
Buell would then again ‘disappear’ for a few days, prompting Hatch to complain that he ‘has not 
communicated with these Headquarters for weeks though ordered to do so’.107
The Ninth and Fourth Cavalry battalions failed to find water in the southern reaches of the 
Florida Mountains. Buell had to continue on through the night to Palomas Lake, reaching it well 
ahead of schedule at 6:00 a.m. on 23 September.108 The original rendezvous was to have been at 
midnight on 23 September.109 Major Osborne had already arrived with his infantrymen, and the 
rest of the force were concentrated at Palomas Lake early on 24 September. That night, contact with 
Lieutenant Mills’s detachment of Apache scouts was established, but the actual location of Carr’s 
98 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, pp.136-137; Thrapp, 1988, p.186.
99 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
Note appended to Buell to Samaniego, 18 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; See also 
Crimmins, 1935, p.137; F. Nolan, 1994, p.35.
100 4th Cavalry 1878-1883, Sept./Oct., 1880, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916 
NA, RG393, NA, M744, Roll 43.
101 Crimmins, 1935, p.136.
102 Sherman, 10 Nov., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
103 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 15 Sept., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, 
NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.488, pp315-316.
104 [No Note Information ??????????????????]
105 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 25, 27, 28, & 30 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.869, p.872, p.874 & p.879.
106 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 2 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.889; Hatch to AAAG Fort Leavenworth, 2 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ 
NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
107 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 6 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.905.
108 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.137.
109 Pollack to Hatch 21 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.414.
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force could not be ascertained.110 Buell proceeded south to the Laguna de Guzman, being joined 
by Lieutenant Maney with his Indian scouts on 25 September.111 Buell stated that the trail left by 
the Apaches in the aftermath of the skirmish on 7 September was followed from where it crossed 
the border to this point. It then turned to the south-east, making for the Candelaria Mountains.112 
In the hope that Carr would rendezvous with him, he halted by the Laguna de Guzman for part 
of the day. He then marched on to the Laguna de Santa Maria. Here he spent a whole day (26 
September) waiting in vain for any sign of the Arizona troops.113 Jack Crawford rejoined Buell just 
south of the border, at Palomas Lake, as earlier instructed. Buell sent Crawford with three men to 
move towards the Rio Grande to check for any signs that the Apaches had passed Beyer’s left flank 
and made for New Mexico.114 
Information was received at Santa Fé, through Fort Bliss, that Victorio had left the Laguna 
de Guzman area and had moved into the Candelaria Mountains on or around 18 September,115 
but this information does not seem to have reached Buell. Lieutenant Mills reported that it was 
a courier from Beyer’s command who informed Buell that Victorio had gathered up his followers 
from around the Laguna de Guzman and made towards the Candelaria Mountains.116 Buell esti-
mated that Victorio had been surprised by such a major incursion of US forces, and had decided to 
withdraw to the Candelaria Mountains.117
The inference that Victorio had moved eastwards from the Laguna de Guzman can be drawn 
from the fact that the unfortunate Dr Samaniego’s property was struck again on 18 September 
1880. The raiders, 18 in number, were said to have captured 120 horses belonging to Dr Samaniego 
during a dawn attack on the San Jose stage station, on the road to Chihuahua City, 65 miles south 
110 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, pp.137-138; See also Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort 
Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 
Entry 841.
111 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
112 Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 15 Oct., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.260-267; Hatch (passing 
on copy of Buell’s Report) to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 15 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; same letter contained in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Buell, HQ Fort 
Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via Office of AAAG, DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by 
HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
113 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.138.
114 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
‘The Pursuit of Victorio’ By Captain Jack Crawford Socorro County Historical Society, Publications in 
History, Volume 1, Feb., 1965.
115 Hatch (citing Brinkerhoff, 20 Sept., 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 21 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.850; Information from Fort Bliss, 
20 Sept. cited in Whipple? To Ord, 24 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of 
Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.628; See also Crimmins, 1935, p.138; Stout, p.170.
116 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to 
AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 
1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
117 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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Plates 15.5 and 15.6. Two photos showing the terrain in northern Chihuahua to the south of Palomas 
Lake. The upper photo looks east towards the southern reaches of the Potrillo Mountains and Guzman 
Mountains. The lower photo looks north, and the Florida Mountains are just visible on the central horizon. 
This was the dry arid country that Buell’s expedition had to cross when they entered Mexico. These photos 
were taken in September (2005) to convey the heat experienced and distances covered by US troops in 
search of Victorio. (Photos: author)
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of El Paso. The captured horses were driven off in the direction of the Candelaria Mountains. One 
Mexican ‘boy’ was killed at the stage station.118 A force of Mexicans sent in pursuit recovered 65 
horses and reported that the Apaches had gone in the direction of Laguna de Guzman.119 It was 
later reported that, as the Apaches approached the Candelaria Mountains, they divided the herd, 
with one portion being driven off towards the Sierra del Fierro.120 
At Palo Blanco, it was reported that a ‘train’ had been attacked and 11 animals had been stolen.121 
Torrential rain had hampered the pursuit, giving the Apaches a number of hours’ start before they 
were pursued.122 The splitting of the herd suggested that Victorio was not going to make a stand in 
the Candelaria Mountains, but was going to make for the Sierra del Fierro. This time, the Apaches, 
critically short of ammunition, could not deploy the tactic of drawing off their pursuers by using 
the majority of their warriors, while their dependents slipped away quietly. Victorio had only two 
options left other than to surrender: first, to completely evade his pursuers; or, if that failed, to 
stay so far ahead of the enemy that the latter’s mounts would break down before his own horses 
collapsed. With the number of both Mexican and US forces converging on his position, Victorio 
must have known that his chances of giving all of these forces the slip would be small. Therefore, he 
raided for fresh horses, sending some to meet him in the Candelaria Mountains while the rest were 
driven on to the Sierra del Fierro to await his arrival. Thus he would be able to maintain a supply of 
fresh horses as he attempted to run those of his opponents into the ground.
From his bivouac at Laguna de Santa Maria, Buell also sent messages to forces in El Paso, and 
further east, to Colonel Grierson, warning them to watch out for any attempt by the Apaches to 
cross the Rio Grande.123 He also asked Grierson to move across the border in support.124 Much 
to Buell’s chagrin,125 Grierson refused, arguing that US troops had no authority to be operating 
118 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 20 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.851; Information from Fort Bliss, 20 Sept. cited in Whipple? To Ord, 24 Sept., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 
13, p.628; Brinkerhoff to AAAG, 20 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.419-420; Hatch 
to AG Fort Leavenworth, 21 Sept., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Thrapp, 1974, 
p.291; Stout, p.171; Gillett, 1976, p.183.
119 Rasch states that Lake Guzman is approximately 40 miles south of Columbus. (1960, p.9) On modern 
maps the Laguna would appear to be approximately sixty kilometres south of Columbus or fifty-five 
kilometres from the actual border. See NH 13-1 – El Paso (USGS) & H13-1-Cuidad Juarez (INEGI).
120 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 22 Sept., 1880 & Nolan to AAAG, Fort Davis 22 Sept., 1880 in Letters 
Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; 
Brinkerhoff to Grierson. 22 & 25 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.221-222 & p.227, Letter No.392 
& 399.
121 Baylor to Grierson, 30 Sept., 1880 Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4. The microfilm copy of this letter has not been properly flat-
tened before copying and thus Baylor’s report on the San Jose attack can be seen than a line is obscured 
but enough detail is left on the next page to suggest that the latter attack occurred about the same time.
122 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 31 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.806-807; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF, 23 Sept., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.866.
123 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
124 Buell (on road to Quitman, 4pm) to Grierson, 5 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 
1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Buell to Grierson, 5 Oct., 1880 in 
Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2, pp.248-249, Letter No.450.
125 Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 15 Oct., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.260-267; Hatch (passing 
on copy of Buell’s Report) to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 15 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; same letter contained in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; See also Buell, HQ 
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within the republic of Mexico.126 In response, Buell requested command of Grierson’s forces, but 
General Ord, while noting that that Grierson had been instructed to cooperate with Buell’s forces, 
refused this request.127
Berger, with his small detachment of six Tenth Cavalrymen, arrived at Cantareccio128 on 28 
September.129 They had already encountered three Apaches at the Tinaja de la Bandija, nine miles 
away. Berger had not charged them, being unsure whether these were Mexican volunteers or 
Apaches. At Cantareccio, he was informed that Roman Aranda, with 50 of his own men and 
the detachment of 13 Texas Rangers, were camped at Los Palos Blancos, near the Candelaria 
Mountains, waiting for the arrival of Colonel Terrazas. Berger concluded that the main part of 
Victorio’s following had already crossed to either the Sierras Borracho, de Los Pinos or del Fierro 
and that Joaquin Terrazas was making for the Candelaria Mountains to pick up their trail.130. 
He reported that Terrazas and Buell had lost Victorio’s trail on account of recent heavy rainfall 
between Laguna de Guzman and the Candelaria Mountains.131 Berger determined to join Aranda 
and Baylor, and so these were probably the first US troops to make contact with Terrazas’ forces. 
Indeed, Brinkerhoff reported that Terrazas’ forces had still not made face-to-face contact with 
Buell’s command by 29 September. Word had been received at Fort Bliss, from Baylor, that on 23 
September, the tracks of approximately 50 Apaches had been discovered going across the El Paso to 
Chihuahua City road. The trail led towards the Sierra de Los Pinos.132 Berger finally met Terrazas 
at a place called Los Blancos or Palos Blancos Buell was expected, but had not arrived by the time 
that Terrazas left that point for San Jose with 400 men, on 30 September. 
Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ 
DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; Dinges, 
1987, p.93.
126 Grierson to Buell 4 Sept., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.148-149, Letter No.466; Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 3 Oct., 1880 
in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, 
p.185, Letter No.540; Grierson to Buell, 6 Oct., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.196-198, Letter No.561; Grierson to AAG, 
DoTx, 31 Dec. in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168 (Note: This latter report contained as Letter No. 3 in Letters sent 1881.).
127 Vincent to Grierson, 8 Oct., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.260-261, Letter No.470; Vincent to Grierson, 
8 Oct., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 4; Hatch to Buell. 9 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.927.
128 Buell stated that Canta Recio was a Ranche owned by Roman Aranda. (Buell to Grierson, 4 Oct., 1880 
in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2, p.250, Letter No.453).
129 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 29 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.122-123.
130 Brinkerhoff to AAAG 29 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.122-123; Beck to CO, Eagle 
Springs, 2 Oct., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168; Brinkerhoff to Beck, 29 Sept., 1880 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 22 Sept., 
1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2.
131 Berger to Nolan, 28 Sept., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 2 Oct., 1880 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.240-
241, Letter No.435.
132 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 26 Sept., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.229-230, Letter No.406.
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From that point, Terrazas was going to advance towards the Sierra Borracho visiting all the 
springs and tanks to ensure that no Apaches had managed to get around behind him.133 This 
implied that Terrazas was going to leave detachments of troops to picket these waterholes. Berger 
also stated that scouts sent out from Palo Blanco had discovered fresh camp sites, but no Apaches, 
and indications that Victorio was moving a large herd of horses and cattle.134 This information 
reached Grierson, who immediately alerted Captains Nolan and Carpenter to double their vigi-
lance in case Victorio should attempt to cross the Rio Grande into Texas.135 By 7 October, Grierson 
had deployed two companies of cavalry at Old Fort Quitman and three cavalry companies near Ojo 
Caliente, Texas, and one company of cavalry had been ordered from Eagle Springs to Viejo Pass. 
This left one company of cavalry and one of infantry at Eagle Springs. A further company of cavalry 
was en route to Viejo Pass; and, finally, two companies of cavalry were based in the Guadalupe 
Mountains. Grierson’s only worry was that Victorio would try to move even further down the Rio 
Grande to bypass his picket line, and he requested that Colonel Shafter, Commanding Officer, 
District of the Bravo, alert Lieutenant Bullis and his Seminole-Negro scouts.136
Returning to Buell’s command, the Colonel’s couriers had informed Colonel Terrazas that, 
‘we would get a fight with Victorio in the Candelaria Mountains’.137 Late in the evening of 24 
September, Buell had addressed a letter to Terrazas informing him that his command was camped 
on the Corralitos River, 20 miles to the north of the Laguna de Guzman. He added that his troops 
were preparing to set off for the Candelaria Mountains, moving in three detachments. The most 
northerly detachment was following a trail leading towards these mountains. Buell requested that 
Terrazas manoeuvre his forces to approach the south and east sides of the Candelarias by the 
morning of 26 September. If Terrazas was convinced that Victorio was still in the Candelarias, he 
was to block these sides of the mountains while Buell’s forces would move in from the north and 
west. Buell also requested that Terrazas, ‘Signal to me with flags wherever you are and two (2) small 
fires at night twenty (20) feet apart.’138
Buell initiated his movement towards the Candelarias by ordering Captain Beyer to carefully 
scout those mountains. Beyer was to follow the trail left by the Apaches, from the Lagunas de 
Guzman and Santa Maria towards the Candelarias.139 His orders were not to attack the Apaches 
but to shadow them until Buell could bring the bulk of his forces into action.140 This particular 
move, however, was frustrated by a nervous sentry accidentally firing his weapon and stampeding 
Beyer’s mounts while his men were camped close to the Candelaria Mountains.141
133 Nolan to Carpenter 3 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
134 Nolan to Carpenter 3 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
135 Beck to CO, Eagle Springs, 2 Oct., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168.
136 Beck to Shafter, 7 Oct., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.171; Smither to McLaughlen, Fort Davis, 7 Oct., 1880 in Letters 
Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
137 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, pp.138-139.
138 Buell to Terrazas, 10.30pm, 24 Sept., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
139 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
140 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
141 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.235; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 1 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
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Buell then moved the bulk of his forces eastwards towards the Candelaria Mountains from the 
Laguna de Santa Maria. Thus, all the cavalry and 30 infantry volunteers, commanded by Buell, 
marched directly towards the Candelarias on 28 September. This included Lieutenant Mills’ 
Apache scout company, whom up until this point, the Lieutenant had declined to place under 
Buell’s command, and had stationed on the eastern slopes of the Guzman Mountains to watch 
the country. Mills sent up smoke during the day and lit signal fires at night.142 This was to both to 
attract the attention of Carr’s command, and to discourage Apaches from moving in that direction. 
The balance of Buell’s infantry and the supply train were sent on a long loop south up the Rio de 
Santa Maria, to San Jose de Patos (presumably near the Laguna de Patos), and on to El Lucero.143
During daylight on 29 September, Buell concealed his troops behind some small hills in the San 
Blas plains near the Candelaria Mountains and moved into those mountains during the night. The 
following day was spent in a fruitless search of the Candelarias,144 with Buell implying that he was 
rather glad that Victorio had not chosen to make a stand in this rough terrain.145 Buell himself esti-
mated that a ‘rearguard’ of approximately 20 Apaches had departed on 26 September.146 Lieutenant 
Mills reported that there was little water in the Candelaria Mountains, and that he had discovered 
only three tanks of water: one in the centre of the mountains, one on their west side, and one at their 
south-eastern tip. Victorio’s trail was followed to the central tank, where the remains of his camp 
was discovered. The trail of the Apaches then left this camp moving in a north-easterly direction.147 
Captain Beyer had also managed to send some scouts into the mountains, and they reported that 
the Apaches were four days departed.148 Buell was forced to march to El Lucero in search of water, 
reaching that point on 1 October. Beyer’s company, having eventually recovered their stampeded 
horses, re-joined him at that point. The recovery of Beyer’s animals was expedited by the assistance 
of the local Mexican population.149 Mills stated that Buell had passed by the San Jasito (San Jose?) 
431, pp.885-886; Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in 
Reports & Tabular Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841; Buell, HQ 
Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ 
DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See also 
Crimmins, 1935, p.139; Stout, 1974, p.170.
142 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
143 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.139.
144 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.234; See also Crimmins, 
1935, p.140.
145 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
146 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 30 Oct., 1880, p.241.
147 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
148 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.140; Thrapp, 1988, p.186.
149 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.232-233, Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.234-235 & Unsigned and undated note in 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.236; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 1 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent 
DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.885-886; Bi-Monthly Company 
Muster Rolls for Company L, 9th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton 
N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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Ranch, owned by Dr Samaniego, 12 miles to the south of the Candelaria Mountains. It was from 
this ranch that Victorio’s warriors had earlier run off 120 horses.150 Buell’s supply train arrived on 
the following day.151 Buell’s main concern was that the Apaches would split into small groups after 
leaving the Candelarias and attempt to infiltrate back into the United States. However, his scouts 
confirmed that Victorio had not scattered, and that a clear trail led away from the Candelaria 
Mountains.152 On 1 October, couriers from Terrazas also informed Buell that Victorio appeared 
to be making for the Sierra de Los Pinos.153 Brinkerhoff received a report from Roman Aranda 
on 2 October, to the effect that Buell was pursuing Victorio towards the Sierra de Los Pinos, and 
that he and Terrazas had arranged to join their commands in those mountains.154 Brinkerhoff also 
received a report, via stagecoach, that Buell and Terrazas had met face to face on 2 October, at 
Cantarrecio.155 Terrazas estimated that he could get to the Sierra Borracho by 5 or 6 October.156 
The plan, at that point, was to force Victorio across the Rio Grande towards Grierson’s forces.157 
Knowing that Terrazas was still to the south of him, Buell determined to move to Cantarrecio 
(or Santa Recia158), keeping himself between Victorio and the New Mexico border. To do this he 
marched his column up the Chihuahua to El Paso road and reached Cantareccio on 4 October. 
The following day, Buell sent couriers in search of Terrazas to inform him that he would station his 
forces to the north of the Sierra de Los Pinos while Terrazas was to approach these mountains from 
the south.159 Their limited off-road transportation (i.e. mules) and unfamiliarity with the lie of the 
land to the east of El Lucero, also influenced his move to the north.160 The clearest outline of the 
150 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
151 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
152 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.140.
153 Buell, Canta Recia to AAAG SF via Fort Bliss, 4 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.908-909; Crimmins p.140; Stout, p.170; Rasch, 1960, p.9.
154 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 2 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.237; Hatch to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 2 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.889.
155 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 5 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 5 Oct., 1880 in Register of 
Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, 
Roll 2, pp.247-248, Letter No.449; Hatch (citing Brinkerhoff telegram of 5 Oct., 1880) to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 6 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.905; Brinkerhoff to AAAG 5 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.242.
156 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.140.
157 Terrazas to Buell, 6 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG 
DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See also Crimmins, 1935, p.141.
158 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
159 Buell to Terrazas, 5 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., 
to AAG, DoM (via Office of AAAG, DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 
1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
160 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.140.
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Buell expedition’s course is given in the bi-monthly returns for D, I and K Companies, Fifteenth 
Infantry, taking as a starting point their departure from Fort Cummings on 20 September:
Table 15.1 Companies D, I and K, Fifteenth Infantry, during the Buell Expedition161
Date Campsite Distance 
Travelled
Date Campsite Distance 
Travelled
20 Sept. Kettle Springs 14 Miles 4 Oct. Canta Recio 22 Miles
21 Sept. Dry Camp 27 Miles 5 Oct. San Ignacio 18 Miles
22 Sept. Palomas Lake 18 Miles 6 Oct. Along the Rio Grande 16 Miles
24 Sept. Rio Janos 14 Miles 7 Oct. 4 Miles Below Quitman 12 Miles
25 Sept. Lake Guzman 31 Miles 8 Oct. Along the Rio Grande 14 Miles
26 Sept. Santa Maria Lake 8 Miles 9 Oct. Back up the Rio Grande 6 Miles
28 Sept. Slocum’s Ranch (Ojo 
Caliente)
11 Miles 10 Oct. Opposite Quitman 15 Miles
1 Oct. Carrisal 22½ Miles 11 Oct. Rice’s Station 17½ Miles
2 Oct. El Lucero 18½ Miles 12 Oct. Water Holes 22 Miles
3 Oct. Water Holes 18 Miles 13 Oct. San Elizario, TX 24 Miles
As far as the movements of the Chihuahuan state troops were concerned, Lieutenant Mills 
reported, on 2 October, that 100 Mexican volunteers belonging to Terrazas’ command had passed 
by Samaniego’s ranch marching to the north. More of Terrazas’ troops were reported to be six miles 
to the south at San Jose. Mills noted that Terrazas himself had already moved towards the Sierra de 
Los Pinos.162 Baylor observed that, if Victorio had occupied the Sierra De Los Pinos, the Apache 
leader would be difficult to defeat, as he invariably fortified his campsites. According to Baylor, the 
Sierra de Los Pinos offered a number of near impregnable grounds suitable for a camp.163 
Not all the Apaches had departed eastwards. Lieutenant Stafford, left in command at Fort 
Cummings, reported an attempt to steal the cattle at that post on 1 October.164 Hatch ordered out 
the available soldiers from Fort Craig to intercept these raiders.165 Much to Hatch’s annoyance,166 
161 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for D, I & K Companies, 15th Infantry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, 
RG94
It should be remembered that the above report lists the progress of Buell’s supply train between 26 
September and 2 October, while Buell had moved towards the Candelaria Mountains with his cavalry 
and some of his infantry.
162 Mills to AAAG Troops in the Field in S.E. Arizona, Fort Lowell, 11 Oct., 1880 in Reports & Tabular 
Statements of Scouting Expeditions 1867-91, NA, RG391 Entry 841.
163 Baylor to Buell, 6 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
164 Stafford to AAAG SF 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.232A; Stafford Ft Cummings 
to AAG, SF, NM, 1 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.91; Hatch to Carr 1 Oct., 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.880-881; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 1 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
165 Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.881-882; Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 1 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14.
166 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.908-909.
‘Buell is mistaken about no Indians in his rear. We are now scouting for small parties who have 
committed depredations.’ (Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.908-909).
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Buell dismissed Stafford’s report out of hand, on the grounds that Victorio’s trail led eastwards 
out of the Candelaria Mountains leading towards the Sierra de Los Pinos , and thus ‘he [Victorio] 
cannot beat this command into New Mexico either east or west’.167 This betrayed a confidence born 
of an ignorance of Apache tactics. Buell seems to have assumed that the Apaches would operate in 
one group. Apache testimony from this period states that at least one group of warriors was absent, 
foraging for supplies, particularly ammunition. Such groups were adept at concealing their move-
ments as a matter of routine. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Stafford was able to report that this party of 
Apaches passed on to El Colorado before doubling back to the Florida Mountains.168 Stafford’s was 
not the only report of Apache activity in New Mexico. Captain Brinkerhoff sent word to Grierson 
that two freight wagons en route to El Paso from Las Vegas had been attacked on 29 September, 
near San Augustin. Five Apaches wounded one of the freighters before departing to the south 
east.169
Hatch concluded that the presence of so many troops in Chihuahua had caused the Apaches to 
fragment into smaller groups, thus making them far more difficult to track down. As far as he was 
concerned, all that had been achieved by the combined efforts of Buell and Carr was to send small 
scattered raiding parties into New Mexico. This must have been of great concern to Hatch, given 
the pending arrival of the President’s entourage. He renewed his request for additional Apache 
scouts, and recommended that they be organized into companies of 25 scouts accompanied by a 
cavalry company with a pack train of 50 mules. He thought there should be a minimum of four 
such companies, but estimated that eight such companies would be required to finish off Victorio.170
Colonel Terrazas’ Expedition
Up to 29 September, Joaquin Terrazas’ offensive operations had been limited to opportunistic 
attempts to locate Victorio’s camp and to act with those troops he had managed to gather. Having 
concentrated approximately 350 men at Laguna de Patos he then initiated a concerted operation to 
track down and destroy the Apaches. On 30 September, his command took stock of their equip-
ment and gathered in limited food supplies from Carrizal. Terrazas also sent instructions to El Paso 
del Norte to arrange for more supplies to reach him on the march.171
The following day, Terrazas divided his command, sending one detachment to the north east, 
under the leadership of Mata Ortiz, while he lead the other  eastwards towards the Sierra de 
Alcaparria. Mata Ortiz’s command was to call at the waterhole at Cantarrecio to rendezvous with 
supplies from El Paso del Norte. He was then to swing to the south east and search the rough 
country along the Rio Grande until he reached the Sierra Borracho.172
If Gillett has the correct date, the remaining Chihuahua state troops and the Texas Ranger 
detachment joined Terrazas’ command somewhere between the Laguna de Patos Lake and the 
167 Buell to AAAG SF 4 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.240; Hatch (citing Buell telegram 
to Brinkerhoff, 4 Oct., 1880) to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 7 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, 
Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.908-909.
168 Stafford, Ft Cummings to AG, 8 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.90; see also Hatch to 
AAG Fort Leavenworth, 1 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 431, p.885.
169 Brinkerhoff to Grierson, 4 Oct., 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d, 18 May, 1880-4 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 4.
170 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 6 Oct., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.531, pp.340-341.
171 Thrapp, 1974, p.298.
172 Ibid, p.298.
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Sierra Alcaparra on 3 October.173 Terrazas scouted the Alcaparras and the surrounding country 
without encountering any sign of the Apaches. He then made his way north east to rendezvous with 
Mata Ortiz in the Sierra Borracho.174 Up until that point, his scouts had discovered nothing more 
than small trails leading eastwards. As the column passed over the plain between the Alcaparras 
and the Sierra Borracho, they reached Los Lagunas or Lagunita175, where Victorio’s band had 
obviously rested with a large number of horses and cattle.176 At the end of October 1880, Charles 
Berger, leading a scout after Apache raiders (see Chapter 16) found the remains of a large camp in a 
mountain area just to the west of the Los Lagunas and estimated that Victorio had rested for up to 
eight days at that spot.177 Terrazas’ command discovered this camp as darkness fell. They found the 
remains of eight animals that the Apaches had butchered and partially eaten. Terrazas’ men helped 
themselves to some of the meat.178
Assuming that Victorio had made for the Sierra Borracho, Terrazas was concerned about his 
supply train making for the same mountains. Without waiting for daybreak, he set his command 
marching through the night towards the Borrachos. In doing so, he lost contact with the Apache 
trail leading away from the Los Lagunas-Lagunita.179 On 5 October, Terrazas joined Mata Ortiz 
in the Sierra Borracho but found no signs of the Apaches. They sent scouts on to the Sierra de Los 
Pinos,180 and here they found signs that Victorio had camped on the top of these mountains for 
up to seven days.181 Charles Berger again later reported that he had found a heavily fortified camp 
on top of the Sierra de los Pinos from which he estimated that the Apaches could have stood off 
a regiment of troops.182 By 7 October, the command had been re-supplied by a wagon train from 
El Paso del Norte, with Terrazas allowing the Texas Ranger detachment to draw 10 days’ rations 
from his commissary.183
The Mexicans moved southwards to the Sierra de Los Pinos where they met some of Buell’s 
forces,184 in the form of Leutenant Maney, Henry K. Parker and 65 Apache scouts from the San 
Carlos reservation. They were accompanied by Lieutenant Schaeffer with 20 Ninth Cavalrymen.185 
Terrazas was now confident that he was between Victorio and the Rio Grande, and on 9 October 
1880, he requested that the US army and Texas Rangers withdraw to the United States.186
173 Gillett, 1976, p.185.
174 In trying to map this area it would appear that the Sierra Borracho is either the Sierra La Amargosa or 
the Sierra San Jose Del Prisco.
175 Lagunita appears to refer to three lagunas in close proximity known today as the Laguna Las Flores, 
Laguna la Cincuenta y Cinco and the Laguna Garza.
176 Thrapp, 1974, p.298.
177 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 
1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
178 Thrapp, 1974, pp.298-299.
179 Ibid, p.299.
180 Ibid.
181 Terrazas to Buell copied to Grierson by Nolan, 6 Oct., 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 
1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, pp.251-252, Letter 
No.455.
182 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 
1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
183 Gillett, 1976, p.185; Thrapp, 1974, p.299.
184 Thrapp, 1974, p.299.
185 Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 15 Oct., 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.260-267; Hatch (passing 
on copy of Buell’s Report) to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 15 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; same letter contained in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Thrapp, 1974, p.299; 
Gillett, 1976, p.186.
186 Thrapp, 1974, pp.299-300; Gillett, 1976, p.186; Thrapp, 1988, p.186; Haley, 1981, p.331; Wellman, 
1957, pp.174-175.
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Buell’s Expedition Returns to the United States
From Cantareccio, Buell had sent Lieutenant Maney’s Indian scouts and Lieutenant Schaeffer with 
a Ninth Cavalry Company to contact Terrazas in the Sierra Borracho. Buell then took the balance 
of his forces north and east around the Sierra Borracho and into the Rio Grande valley.187 As 
ever, Buell’s prime concern was that Victorio might have scattered and was attempting to infiltrate 
northwards into New Mexico.188 On 7 October, Buell’s command camped to the south east of Fort 
Quitman, on the Mexican side of the border. Buell sent out his scouts, supported by pack mules, to 
search further to the south east down the Rio Grande.189 On 9 October, Buell detached Lieutenant 
Colonel Dudley’s Ninth Cavalrymen and sent them back to Fort Quitman to counter any attempt 
by the Apaches to move north into Texas. Buell retained the Fourth Cavalry battalion,190 and he 
estimated that the forces now arrayed against Victorio would force the Apaches to move deeper into 
Mexico, though he conceded that Victorio might have escaped to the north east. With this in mind, 
he ordered that the remaining cavalry and pack trains at Fort Cummings be sent to Fort Bliss 
should Dudley have to operate against Apaches in the Guadalupe and Sacramento Mountains. This 
measure would allow relatively fresh soldiers to take over the pursuit, as the troops involved in the 
recent Mexico expedition would require rest.191 He noted in this report that, ‘Terrazas and a part 
of my command move into the Pinos Mts tonight from the north & west I move with packs to the 
South & South East.’192 This was probably on 8 October, as Brinkerhoff reported that Buell had 
moved towards the Sierras Borracho and de Los Pinos on the morning of 9 October 1880.193 That 
night, Buell received information, and chose to interpret this as a request, from Joaquin Terrazas, 
that all US army units quit Mexico as, ‘the farther advance of American troops into the territory of 
Mexico would be objectionable’.194
187 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company L, 9th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.141; Thrapp, 1988, p.186; Rasch, 1960, p.9.
188 Buell to Terrazas or Baylor, 7 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Crimmins, 1935, 
pp.140-141.
189 Buell to Terrazas, 11.20am, 7 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
190 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 10 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.930-931; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG 
DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See also Crimmins, 1935, p.141; Stout, pp.170-171; Rasch, 1960, 
p.9.
191 Buell to AAG Fort Leavenworth Camp in Mexico opposite Fort Quitman No date given NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 439, pp.253-256; See also Stafford to AAG, SF, 6 Oct., 1880; Letters Rec’d at AAG, 
DoNM, 1872-1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 477.
192 Buell to AAG Fort Leavenworth Camp in Mexico opposite Fort Quitman No date given NA, RG393, 
Part 3, Entry 439, pp.255-256; Brinkerhoff Captain 15th Infantry to AAAG, SF, NM, 9 Oct., 1880, 
NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 440, p.95.
193 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 9 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.258.
194 Buell to AAG Fort Leavenworth 15 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.264 & Buell to 
AAAG SF 19 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.272; Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 15 Oct., 
1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.260-267; Hatch (passing on copy of Buell’s Report) to AAG, 
Fort Leavenworth, 15 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; same letter contained in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Sheridan to AG of the Army, Washington D.C, 22 Oct., 1880 in 
‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Thrapp, 1974, p299; Crimmins, 1935, p.141; Stout, 1974, p171; 
Rasch, 1960, p.9.
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Much as I regretted to give up the chase, I felt that I was in Mexico by the invitation of 
the Chihuahua or state authorities more than by any legal or proper right. I felt satisfied 
that Terrazas had received an intimation or order to forbid my advancing further towards 
Chihuahua, and that he had sent this message to me in a most gentlemanly manner. I therefore 
commenced the withdrawal of my advance the 10th day of October, and started back myself 
the 10th, en route to the American side of the Rio Grande.195
This at least shows that Buell was aware that he was acting without the sanction of the federal 
government of Mexico. Maney reported that Terrazas had, at that point, asked that US troops 
move no further into Mexico, and that Maney had agreed to wait two days for further instructions 
from Terrazas. However, Lieutenant Maney also informed Buell that Terrazas had assumed, rather 
than confirmed, that 1) Victorio had gone to the Sierra de Los Pinos and 2) that Victorio’s trail had 
turned south, moving deeper into Chihuahua. Whether Terrazas had actually asked the US troops 
to leave Chihuahua is open to interpretation. However, the following day Buell received couriers 
from General Pope informing him that:
Orders from War Department issued some time ago prohibits operations in Mexico by our 
troops. You will therefore recross the Rio Grande with your Command at the nearest conven-
ient point & return to Cummings as soon as you can possibly do so without breaking faith with 
Gen’l Tarrasses & exposing him & his troops.196
These orders were not open to interpretation, and Buell reported that he had withdrawn all US 
forces from Mexico by 12 October.197 This was effectively the end of Buell’s expedition. Buell, as 
we saw earlier, was brought in to bring the Victorio campaign to a finish, and had failed to do so, 
Victorio being still alive and active in Chihuahua. For this reason, Buell lashed out at Carr for failing 
to cooperate with him in the field,198 and General Willcox sent an angry communication to Carr 
outlining Buell’s complaint and adding his own comments. He reminded Carr that his orders had 
been to remain in the field, and that Carr’s rejection of logistical support in the form of additional 
pack mules constituted ‘grave mistakes and are deeply regretted by the Dept. Comdr’.199 Carr, 
195 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; See 
also Crimmins, 1935, p.142.
196 Pope to Buell, (via CO Fort Quitman) 9 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; A note 
added to this correspondence stated that this message was received by Col. Buell on the 10 October.
See also Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in 
Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, 
Jan.-Apr. 1881; Smither to Nolan, 10 Oct., 1880 citing Vincent, AAG, DoTx to Grierson 9 Oct., 
1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, 
Roll 1, p.221, Letter No.599; Dinges, 1987, p.93; Nolan to AAAG, DoP, 10 Oct., 1880 in Register of 
Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1879-8 Oct., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 
2, p.266, Letter No.483.
197 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; 
Nolan, Quitman citing information rec’d directly from Capt Baylor, to Beck, AAAG, 12 Oct., 1880 
in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, 
Roll 2; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 16 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.952; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 19 Oct., 1880, Telegrams 
Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.960.
198 Carr quoting Buell Telegram of 11 Oct., 1880 to AG DoAz, 12 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, 
DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.30.
199 AAAG to Carr, 9 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, p.449.
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never one to take criticism lightly, hit back, accusing Buell of failing to send information about 
his movements and treating Carr ‘shabbily’.200 Carr also stated that he was surprised that Buell 
had expected him to join him, as that had never been his intention.201 Indeed, the first mention of 
Carr joining Buell comes in a telegram dated 18 September, received by Carr on 25 September, 
where Buell sent instructions that Carr should move beyond the Boca Grande Mountains towards 
Guzman Lake.202 As noted earlier, Carr felt that his orders from Headquarters, Department of 
Arizona, did not clear him to move beyond his positions in the Boca Grande Mountains. He 
also thought that Buell would have had more than enough men to deal with Victorio, had the 
New Mexico troops caught up with the Apaches.203 Eventually, on 17 October, Carr, perhaps 
being unconsciously provocative, sent Buell a telegram expressing regret that Victorio had not 
been caught and concluding: ‘wish you better luck next time. We must expect to make a great 
many fruitless expeditions to achieve a few successes.’204 This was a statement of what was common 
knowledge among officers with long experience of campaigning against Apaches. Nevertheless, 
such ‘sympathy’ cannot have been received well by Buell, who had been brought in to deal with the 
‘Victorio problem’ once and for all.
This seems to have been a clash born from the disappointment, and possibly humiliation, Buell 
felt from not inflicting a decisive defeat upon Victorio. If Victorio had moved west and managed to 
escape, then Carr’s withdrawal could have been significant. Carr, as far as one can see, did picket 
the land to the west of Buell, as instructed by General Willcox. Where he may have been at fault 
was not picketing the area for as long as Willcox intended. However, Carr was confident that once 
Willcox had read his report, any desire by his superior to ascribe any blame to him would be dissi-
pated.205 For a couple of days, it looked as if this row might drift towards a court martial. Before the 
acrimony could reach such a pass, events at Tres Castillos would intervene and effectively smother 
any quest to apportion blame.
Buell also complained that the logistic support for his expedition had not been very effective. He 
had had to operate supported by a much-reduced pack train, since an order of100 additional pack 
mules from Texas and an order of an equivalent number of pack mule harnesses from San Francisco 
did not arrive until after his return from Mexico.206
Buell himself came under scrutiny for the unauthorised recruiting of citizens and Apache scouts. 
Hatch, who himself had authorized the recruitment of extra Apache scouts as mule packers, was 
rather quick off the mark in reporting to Department Headquarters that Buell had greatly exceeded 
200 Carr to AG, Whipple Barracks, 10 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.456-457.
201 Carr to Hatch, 7 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 
Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.579, pp.25-26; See also Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 9 Oct., 1880 
in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter 
No.532, pp.341-342.
202 Carr to AG DoAz, 25 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 
6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.571, p.21.
203 See Carr to AG DoAz, 26 Sept., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, 
Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.572, pp.21-22; Carr to Hatch, 7 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE 
Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, Letter No.579, pp.25-26; 
Carr to Buell, 17 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 
Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.30.
204 Carr to Buell, 17 Oct., 1880, Troops in SE Arizona, DoAz, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 232, Vol.8, 6 
Sept.-12 Dec., 1880, p.30.
205 Carr to Willcox, 16 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 169, Vol. 10, pp.460-461.
206 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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the number of authorised Apache scouts, citizen scouts and mule packers.207 As such Hatch pointed 
out that these men would have to be paid, and asked General Pope to confirm that these costs 
would be met.208 It would appear that Buell had taken on up to 210 ‘employees’ during his expedi-
tion, at an estimated cost of between $15,000 and $25,000. Hatch recommended that this be paid 
for under ‘Incidental Expenses’ ($15,000) and ‘Transportation of the Army’ ($10,000). The cost 
of fodder and water had not yet been ascertained but could be covered by a ‘liberal’ amount under 
‘Regular Suppliers’. Hatch also recommended that the additional Indian scouts should be paid, as 
they would not comprehend any reason given them for not being paid.209 
Buell had most certainly exceeded his authority on the recruitment of US citizens as guides, 
couriers and mule packers; but he was probably not guilty of the hiring of unauthorised Apache 
scouts. What was ultimately at stake can be put no better than it was by General Sherman, when 
insisting that Buell had no right to hire Captain Fountain and six scouts as part of his force:
The pressure on Officers to accept the services of volunteers on the Frontiers is very great and 
must be resisted, else every Officer in pursuit of Indians will accept the services of these bodies 
which profess to understand so much of the Indian character. No matter what may be the fact, 
we are restricted by the plain requirements of the law, to restrict the Army to the organization 
and numbers fixed by the statute.210
Hatch had a very clear motive for wanting to disguise his creative recruitment of Apaches in the 
first place; but he could not have asked for a more appropriate scapegoat than Colonel Buell. While 
Hatch had remained commander of the District of New Mexico, he had been effectively removed 
from directing field operations, and had been replaced by Buell. Moreover, Hatch had already had 
to deal with the contentious and vindictive nature Buell displayed in his treatment subordinate 
officers. Buell was an officer who would not hesitate to lay charges against other, usually more 
junior, officers. For example, on 13 November 1879, he charged Lieutenant Loud, Acting Assistant 
Adjutant General, with ‘conduct unbecoming’. Hatch forwarded Buell’s complaints concerning 
both Captain Charles Albert Woodruff and Lieutenant Loud with the clearest statement that, 
in his opinion, Buell was ‘in the wrong’.211 Buell’s charges were completely dismissed by General 
Pope, who endorsed his decision with the statement that such charges should not be made lightly 
by a regimental commander.212
In a telegram (1 August 1880) to Hatch, General Pope gave the Colonel clear instructions 
concerning the spheres of control of both Colonel Buell and Major Morrow.213 These two officers 
do not seem to have agreed with each other, and, reading between the lines, it seems that Buell had 
made a comment that he had been ‘sent here to make a success of this campaign’,214 implying that 
those previously in charge had been found wanting. One suspects that Buell had also made these 
207 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 15 Oct., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
208 Ibid.
209 Hatch to AAG, DoM, 11 Dec. in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 6, 
Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.637 pp.403-404.
210 Drum, AG (enclosing Copy of Sherman’s Letter) to Commanding General, DoM, 19 Nov., 1880 in 
Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec. 1880.
211 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 22 Nov. 1879 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan.-Oct. 1879, Letter No.546, p.387.
212 Platt to Buell, 6 Dec. 1879 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 39, Oct.-Dec. 1879.
213 Pope to Hatch 1 Aug., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.45.
214 Buell to AAAG SF 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.555-557.
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comments verbally to Morrow, the officer who probably had the best record215 where maintaining 
contact with Victorio was concerned. Such statements, in telegrams to District Headquarters, 
cannot have made a good impression on Colonel Hatch. Buell accused Morrow of deliberately 
disobeying his orders, and there is some indication that Buell might have tried to have Morrow 
court martialled.216 Hatch had to censure Buell on 28 July 1880 for attempting to circumvent his 
authority by writing directly to Department Headquarters.217 On 31 July, Hatch responded to a 
telegram from Buell that District Headquarters was not competent to settle the controversy. He 
noted a number of ‘irregularities’ in Buell’s practice which had been ignored in the wider interests 
of the service. He also indicated that telegrams from Buell which ‘bordered on insubordination’ 
had been ‘borne’ in the interests of maintaining a secure frontier.218 Hatch and Pope seem to have 
reached an arrangement whereby Morrow was stationed out at Knight’s Ranch while Buell was 
preparing his expedition at Fort Cummings;219. but the situation needed a more lasting resolution, 
and this was found when Morrow was sent to Europe to observe French military manoeuvres, by 
order of the Adjutant General.220
Buell was to cause further trouble for Colonel Hatch. Almost a year after his expedition, in 
September 1881, Buell was informed of the formation of a field camp under Major Guy V. Henry, 
near Fort Stanton, and learned too that Henry was ‘independent of the orders of the post commander 
of Fort Stanton’.221 Buell, still stationed at Fort Stanton, lobbied Hatch for overall command of this 
detachment, because Henry’s command was supplied from that post. Hatch refused, and gave 
clear instructions that Henry’s command was to remain independent.222 Buell then appears to have 
vented his anger on Major Henry, accusing him of exceeding his authority in removing a company 
of the Fifteenth Infantry from Fort Stanton to his camp, and of personal disrespect, in removing 
an infantryman charged with looking after Buell’s personal effects.223 Henry replied that he had 
received clear instructions from the District Commander to act as he did, and that alternative 
arrangements had been made for the care of Buell’s personal effects.224 Henry also made it clear 
that he had not seen fit to complain about Buell’s own lack of courtesy as the commanding officer 
at Fort Stanton.225
215 It has been noted that this success may have been born of Victorio’s wish for Morrow to remain upon his 
trail and thereby cripple the ability of the U.S. Army to remain in the field.
216 Buell Fort Cummings, to AAAG SF, 21 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.554 & Buell to 
AAAG SF 22 Jul., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.555-557.
217 Hatch to Buell, 28 Jul., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.658.
218 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 31 Jul., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.391, pp.251-252.
219 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.45.
220 Hatch to Morrow, 17 Aug., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 431, p.747; NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.50; See also Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 7 Aug., 
1880, p.6.
221 Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 19 Sept. 1881 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 7, 1881, Letter No.394, p.37.
222 Loud to CO Fort Stanton, 19 Sept. 1881 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 43, May-Oct. 1881.
223 Buell to Henry, 10 Oct. 1881 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 43, May-Oct. 1881.
224 Henry to Buell, 14 Oct. 1881 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 43, May-Oct. 1881.
225 Henry to Buell, 14 Oct. 1881 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 43, May-Oct. 1881.
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Buell was finally placed under arrest, on 1 November 1881,226 for ‘wilfully failing’ to visit or report 
to Colonel Ranald MacKenzie when passing though Santa Fé. It was charged that it ‘was necessary 
that Colonel Buell be checked in the insubordinate course which he has elected to commence’.227 
General Pope finally felt compelled to intervene and rebuke Buell in the most forthright manner 
concerning his behaviour, describing the Colonel’s actions as ‘obnoxious to all military propriety, 
or proper courtesy, as practiced among Officers of the Army and required by both military custom 
and the Regulations of the Army, as to be without excuse’.228 (see document file no. 128.)
While these episodes show a thoroughly unpleasant side to Buell, which caused considerable 
annoyance to his superior officers, they also illustrate just what an ideal candidate he was, from 
Hatch’s point of view, to lead the expedition into Mexico. Buell was quite happy to act unilaterally, 
without any reference to higher authority, whether it be recruiting scouts without authorisation 
or attempting to circumvent his superiors without permission if his actions were blocked. If there 
was going to be any political backlash from the incursion into Mexico, such a propensity for inde-
pendent action made Buell an ideal scapegoat. Most importantly, if events did take such a course, 
Buell’s downfall would be as much due to his failure to maintain his ‘political capital’ amongst his 
superiors as to events in Mexico. If Buell was targeted as the person to whom culpability would be 
attached, it was highly unlikely that any of his superiors would come to his rescue.
The Buell expedition had taken its toll of its men and animals. Lieutenant Colonel Dudley, on 
his return to Fort Cummings, reported that the men under his command were lacking in proper 
clothing, and that he had over 100 broken-down horses. He believed that if these animals were not 
adequately rested and sheltered, most would die. Those that survived would take months to make 
a full recovery.229
Table 15.2 Ninth Cavalry, Roster of Horses, September–October 1880230
Ninth Cavalry Serviceable Horses Unserviceable Horses
Horses Lost in Action, Died, 
etc.
Sept. 1880 304 167 23
Oct. 1880 472 186 10
It is clear that Buell’s expedition had increased the number of unserviceable horses. However, 
the Ninth Cavalry Regiment, as a whole, had increased the numbers of serviceable horses during 
the months of September and October. (See Table 15.2.) Those companies not involved in the Buell 
expedition (A, E, G, H, I and M Companies) all show an increasing number of serviceable horses, 
226 Loud to Capt. Whittemore, 15th Infantry (with instructions to assume command of the HQ and Co’s 
of that regiment) 1 Nov., 1881 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, Roll 7, 
1881, Letter No.447, p.70.
227 MacKenzie to AAG, DoM, 1 Nov., 1881 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, 
M1072, Roll 7, 1881, Letter No.450, p.71; See also MacKenzie (noting Hatch’s concerns as to Buell’s 
conduct) to AAG, DoM, 15 Nov., 1881 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, RG393, M1072, 
Roll 7, 1881, Letter No.466, pp.81-82.
228 Platt to Buell, 21 Dec. 1881 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, 
M1088, Roll 44, Nov.-Dec. 1881.
229 Dudley to AAG DoNM 28 Letter No. 13, Oct., 1880, Letters sent Vol. 7 25 Oct., 1880-24 Jun., 1881 
in HQ Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863-1873 & 1880-1884, NA, RG393, M1081, Roll 
1.
230 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
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though the figures for I Company only start to improve at the end of October. (See Table 15.3.) 
This recovery in the figures can be explained through a combination of the purchase of new horses 
and the recovery of broken-down horses. However, the figures for those companies involved in the 
Buell expedition (B, C, D, F, K and L Companies) do not show consistent trends. We would expect 
to see an increase in the numbers of unserviceable horses and a decrease in serviceable horses; but 
only B and D Companies appear to follow this expected trend. F Company recorded a reduction in 
unserviceable horses and an increase in serviceable horses. The remaining companies (C, K and L) 
show an expected increase in unserviceable horses, though in the case of L Company, this increase 
is tiny and recovers very quickly. Yet these companies also show an increase in their serviceable 
horses. This can probably be explained by the recovery of broken-down horses left behind at Fort 
Cummings or Knight’s Ranch by Buell. The arrival of new horses in the absence of the expedition 
could also explain such an increase. The bi-monthly company returns for the Ninth Cavalry display 
the same trends. (See Table 15.4.)
Table 15.3 Serviceable, Unserviceable and Lost Horses to Available Men, Ninth Cavalry, September–
October 1880231
Company Month Serviceable 
Horses
Unserviceable 
Horses
Lost Horses Available Men
A August 20 16 0 42
September 24 10 2 45
October 45 7 0 55
B August 29 11 3 50
September 29 11 0 55
October 14 16 0 57
C August 29 9 0 44
September 26 9 4 44
October 34 21 4 56
D August 26 5 0 51
September 4 30 7 53
October 14 37 0 61
E August 16 12 0 51
September 17 7 4 49
October 41 7 0 53
F August 14 12 3 42
September 20 8 2 44
October 40 5 1 57
G August 39 8 0 57
September 44 3 1 57
October 62 4 0 51
H August 25 31 2 49
September 36 19 1 44
October 45 25 1 48
231 Derived from Returns From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 9th Cavalry 1873-1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 88
382 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
Company Month Serviceable 
Horses
Unserviceable 
Horses
Lost Horses Available Men
I August 23 22 0 57
September 17 22 2 57
October 20 19 0 53
K August 30 24 0 55
September 30 24 0 54
October 44 34 0 58
L August 25 14 0 57
September 20 18 1 56
October 48 14 2 54
M August 33 6 0 66
September 33 6 0 64
October 33 6 0 63
More importantly, given the previous experience of Ninth Cavalry pursuits of Victorio, we 
would expect to see an increase in the number of horses lost or broken down. Yet, there is nothing 
in Tables 15.2 to 15.4 which really stands out as being caused by hard field service in Chihuahua. 
The losses sustained by those Ninth Cavalry companies accompanying Buell do not appear to be 
particularly excessive. Some of these losses may be down to horses that had not recovered after the 
stampede near the Candelaria Mountains. 
Table 15.4 Available Men to Serviceable Horses, Ninth Cavalry, July–October 1880232
Company Available Men 
July–Aug.
Serviceable 
Horses July–Aug.
Available Men 
Sept.–Oct. 
Serviceable Horses 
Sept.–Oct. 
A 45 20 52 40
B 49 29 55 44
C 39 2? Entry 
indecipherable
53 34
D 51 17 50 14
E 45 16 49 41
F 37 16 54 30
G 51 39 41 62
H 40 25 48 45
I 54 19 52 20
K 52 30 57 30
L 48 25 53 48
M 65 33 61 33
The most striking feature of this information is that, unlike previous pursuits of Apaches during 
the Victorio Campaign, the Ninth Cavalry had not sustained heavy horse and mule casualties. In 
fact, it had continued to recover its strength during Buell’s incursion into Mexico. As noted above, 
232 Derived Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Jan./Feb. & Mar./Apr. 1880, 9th Cavalry in NA, RG94
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this can certainly be partially explained by the commitment of only half the regiment’s company 
strength to Buell’s campaign. Yet even those companies that took part in the incursion into the 
Republic of Mexico do not appear to have been badly affected by their experience. 
The relative lack of damage suffered by the Ninth Cavalry might be ascribed to their being 
better able to preserve their horses through experience; that is, as a result of their earlier campaigns 
against Victorio, they had learned to minimise their equine casualties.
However, these figures probably reflect a change in tactics and strategy by Victorio. The key 
difference is that the Buell expedition did not engage with, or even see, any Apaches. In the earlier 
period of the Victorio War, the Apache leader had deliberately ensured that the Ninth Cavalry had 
a fresh trail to follow in order to cripple or kill their horses. The relatively light casualties in broken-
down and lost horses sustained during the Buell expedition can be attributed to the Apaches’ 
shortage of ammunition. In other words, during the Buell expedition, Victorio made every effort to 
remain far ahead of his enemies and avoid all contact with US and Mexican troops. He did not try 
to distract his enemies by splitting his forces into two groups, because his did not have the ammu-
nition stocks to sustain this strategy. Thus the trails left by the Apaches were not fresh enough to 
tempt Buell’s troops into a horse-killing pursuit.
Perhaps Captain Byron Dawson, in his succinct summary of the expedition, gave the best picture 
of the frustration of the participants, when he stated that, ‘nothing worthy of mention occurred 
during the trip’.233 However, it must be noted that Buell’s expedition, while hardly firing a shot, 
apart from nervous sentinels, and sustaining only average attrition rates among its horses,234 was 
essential to the ultimate success of the Mexican operation. Victorio, low on ammunition, and faced 
by a large number of Apache scouts, simply couldn’t afford an attempt to break through the US 
army’s cordon. With the Chihuahuan militia mobilising to the south and west, he was faced with 
a semi-circular cordon running clockwise from Chihuahua City to the south, around to Grierson’s 
border guards along the Rio Grande. He had to attempt to escape these large forces massing 
against him. The Buell expedition had forced the Apaches to keep moving eastward. Grierson’s 
picket lines had also ruled out an attempt to escape from Mexico into Texas. We now have to turn 
our attention to the efforts made by Colonel Terrazas’ expedition, once US troops had been asked 
to depart Mexico, to hunt down Victorio.
233 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company B, 9th Cavalry, Sept./Oct., 1880 in NA, RG94.
234 For example, Company A, Fourth Cavalry records that one horse died on the 29 September, 1880 
and abandoned two horses on the 3 and 10 of October, 1880. Company H, Fourth Cavalry stated that 
five horses were abandoned on 4 October, (near Candelaria Mountains), 10 October, (near Guadalupe 
Mexico), 11 and 12 October, (near Fort Quitman) and the 15 October, (near Politas, Texas). (4th Cavalry 
1878-1883, Sept./Oct., 1880, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, NA, RG393, 
NA, M744, Roll 43).
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Tres Castillos, October 1880
 
Your dispatch just rec’d I present my heartiest congratulations for the extinction & destruction 
of Victorios band. It vindicates the army and will bring peace to our border. Hallelujah!
 JC Tiffany
 U.S. Indian Agent, 21 October, 1880.1
Victorio Attempts to Take Evasive Action
Despite Thrapp giving an excellent account of Colonel Joaquin Terrazas’ expedition, the writer’s 
analysis of Victorio’s motivation during this campaign is open to challenge. All the signs found by 
both the US and the Mexican expeditions suggested that Victorio had retreated to the east. Thrapp 
interprets this move as a biblical exodus to an ultimate doom.2 However, the reason Victorio had 
moved eastwards and, as we shall see, southwards, was that he was attempting to avoid both Buell’s 
and Terrazas’ forces.3 It was certainly not to meet a predetermined doom or destiny. Rather, it was 
a manoeuvre born of grim necessity. Being so low in ammunition, and having responsibility for 
his accompanying dependants, he could ill-afford an attempt to break through the loose cordon 
running from the south west round to the Rio Grande and to the north east. Choosing a specific 
point in the cordon, and bringing local superiority of numbers to bear in creating a breach, could 
not be safely attempted. Indeed Victorio, after leading his enemies to the east, was trying to slip 
south and then west towards the sanctuary of the Sierra Madre. Kaywaykla states that, just before 
Tres Castillos, his grandmother told him that they were making for the Sierra Madre, or ‘the land 
of Juh’ as she termed these mountains.4
Kaywaykla was adamant that Victorio, Nana and other senior warriors were very worried about 
their lack of ammunition, and had sent a large detachment of their younger warriors on a long-
range raiding trip in search of ammunition. Even with a full complement of warriors, the shortage 
of ammunition made the band vulnerable. Already exposed, if Victorio’s people were to be caught 
by US or Mexican forces while some of his best warriors were absent seeking ammunition supplies, 
the result could be disastrous. While the Apaches were down, they were clearly not finished. A 
respite was required. This could not be gained by trying to break through the enemies, who were 
closing in from the north and the west. Victorio was also blocked from crossing the Rio Grande 
by Grierson’s picket and patrol lines; though unbeknown to Victorio, the Tenth Cavalry, currently 
picketing the Rio Grande, were facing an outbreak of scurvy due to a lack of fresh vegetables. On 
7 October, Acting Assistant Surgeon Henderson warned Captain Carpenter that if a large supply 
1 Tiffany to Hatch 21 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.277.
2 Thrapp, 1974, pp.297-298.
3 Thrapp, 1974, pp.297-298; See also Ball, 1962, p.40.
4 Ball, 1970, p.93.
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of vegetables was not procured very quickly, he would be forced to place a large number of men ‘on 
Sick Report and send them into Fort Davis’.5
Victorio may also have faced a challenge to his leadership of those Mescalero Apaches who had 
allied themselves with him. On 14 November 1880, Captain Conrad, at Fort Stanton, reported a 
story that Victorio had shot Ca-bal-le-so6 in the Potrillo Mountains ‘about sixty days ago because 
he wanted to return here’.7 (see document file no. 129.) This would place the Mescalero leader’s 
death sometime around 16 September, and suggests that this might have been close to the attack 
on the stage coach in the Goodsight Mountains, on 6 September, and the subsequent clash with A 
Company, Fourth Cavalry, on the following day. The Apaches were reported as fleeing into Mexico 
via the Potrillo Mountains, and were not followed.8 One suspects that the raid of 6–8  September 
was an abortive attempt to push deeper into New Mexico. This had been thwarted by the unex-
pected number of troops concentrated at Fort Cummings. If this was the case, then Ca-Bal-es-so 
may have decided to leave Victorio, having lost faith in the latter’s leadership. He had every right 
to take this option; but apparently Victorio challenged his right to lead the other Mescaleros away 
with him. The argument which flared up was settled when Victorio killed Ca-bal-le-so, as one 
paper put it, for ‘insubordination’.9
Victorio must also have been aware that his authority, as a leader of his people, might have been 
somewhat undermined by their setbacks against Apache scouts in the latter part of May 1880, and 
the Tenth Cavalry in July–August 1880. Another military defeat would almost certainly cause 
him to lose the support of his Mescalero allies. The best overall solution, for the moment, would 
be to work his way around, rather than through, the opposition. To accomplish this, the Apaches, 
having managed to slip through the very loose cordon east of the Candelaria Mountains, would 
attempt to avoid all contact with their enemies. If their enemies did find a trail, then the Apaches 
had to maintain a sufficient lead to wear the enemies out before they caught up. The key factor in 
this tactic was for the Apaches to try to keep their horses in as good a condition as possible. Thus, 
as noted in the previous chapter, Victorio, once clear of his enemies, chose to camp for a number 
of days at a reliable water source (Los Lagunas-Lagunita) before moving on, as Terrazas and Buell 
moved east in search of his group. If one examines Map 16.1 the Apaches appear to have travelled, 
probably in separate groups, to the east and south, visiting a number of waterholes and lagunas 
(Lagunas Colorado, Salada, El Cuervo, Grande, and possibly El Uno; and Ojo del Carrizo and 
Tres Castillos). Visiting such water sources would allow Victorio to keep his own horses as fresh as 
possible, so that, should any of his enemies guess his whereabouts, or pick up his trail, the Apaches 
would be able to out-distance their pursuers. The raid on Samaniego’s ranch, where half of the 
stolen horses were sent west towards the Candelaria Mountains, with the balance being sent east 
towards the Sierra El Fierro, corresponds to such a plan. Victorio was, at that point, moving his 
followers from the Lagunas de Guzman and de Santa Maria to the Candelaria Mountains. On 
their arrival at the Candelaria Mountains, they would find some fresh horses waiting for them. 
5 Henderson to Carpenter, 7 Oct., 1880 & Carpenter to Beck, 7 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
6 Ca-bal-le-so was the Mescalero leader whom we last met just before the battle in Hembrillo Canyon 
when he had apparently left the Mescalero reservation to ‘negotiate’ with the independent Apaches. 
(Thrapp, 1974, pp.290-291; see also p.372 note 59).
7 Conrad, South Fork to Post Adjutant, Fort Stanton, 14 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM 
Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 1880; See also Buell to AAAG SF 3 
Dec., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.4; Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 3 Dec., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2546, p.698; Evening Review, The, Saturday 17 Jun., 1882.
8 See Chapter14.
9 The Evening Review, New Albuquerque, N.M. Saturday, 17 Jun., 1882 See also Thrapp, 1974, p.291; 
Haley, 1981, p.330.
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As the Apaches continued eastwards in an effort to out-distance their enemies, they would find 
additional fresh horses awaiting them in the vicinity of the Sierra el Fierro.
Victorio was thus reasoning that the longer he could maintain a lead over US and Mexican 
forces, the more likely these enemies would be to drop out of the campaign, due to exhaustion 
and/or lack of supplies. If successful, Victorio might gain a respite in the Sierra Madre. Here the 
Apaches could rest, secure from their enemies, and could send out parties to seek fresh supplies 
of ammunition through a combination of trading and raiding. This tactic was in marked contrast 
to Victorio’s earlier ones of overt aggression, to distract his enemies away from his families and/or 
plunder, and then wearing those enemies down in long pursuits, punctuated by periodic ‘rearguard’ 
actions, before he reformed his following, having exhausted his foes. Victorio’s adoption of such a 
different tactic is, perhaps, one of the clearest indications of the Apaches’ shortage of cartridges.
Victorio’s change in tactics also suggests that Colonel Grierson had succeeded in damaging 
the Apaches’ ability to wage war. Victorio’s warriors had clearly expended a large proportion of 
their ammunition at Tinaja de Las Palmas and Rattlesnake Springs, with the expectation that 
they would be able to gain fresh supplies when they reached the Mescalero reservation. They had 
further depleted their stocks of ammunition during raids after their retreat into Chihuahua and, 
more particularly, in their abortive attempt to move into New Mexico on the 6-7 September. In 
attempting to capture further supplies of cartridges, they also had to gamble that they would gain 
more ammunition than they expended in each attack. For example, it should be remembered that 
when Sergeant Robinson’s detachment was ambushed in Agua Chiquita Canyon, on 1 September, 
it was the mule train that had been targeted. The pack mules may have been carrying additional 
supplies of ammunition among their loads, and the failure to capture these mules would have been 
a great disappointment for the Apaches.
Colonel Terrazas takes the Offensive
While in the Sierra de Los Pinos, Terrazas had sent his scouts to the south east, to investigate a 
small lake, the Laguna El Cuervo, at the northern end of a long chain of mountains which ran 
southwards, deeper into Mexico.10 (See Map 16.1.) On the night of 8 October, a courier informed 
Terrazas that the scouts had learned that the Apaches had passed by the shores of the Laguna, 
apparently bound either for Cerro Lagrimas (Hill of Tears) or perhaps for the three hills known as 
Tres Castillos (Three Castles). The two destinations were situated, respectively, at approximately 27 
miles and 45 miles to the south west.11 On 11 October, Roman Aranda contacted Buell, informing 
him that Colonel Terrazas had broken camp at Ojo Del Cuerva [Cuerla?] the previous night, and 
was making for Ojo Del Carriso, 22 miles away, with an advance guard from his force. Aranda 
thought that no Apaches had attempted to cross the Rio Grande into Texas. If Victorio was at Ojo 
Del Carriso, Aranda estimated that Terrazas would strike him on 12 October.12 In other words, 
when Colonel Terrazas asked the US army to proceed no further into Mexico, he remained unsure 
as to their exact location. In effect, Terrazas gambled that he would be able to catch and destroy 
Victorio without any assistance from U.S. forces.
Terrazas made final preparations for his ‘search and destroy’ mission. He pruned his forces by 
90 men who, in his opinion, were not fit for further service. Brinkerhoff reported that Terrazas’ 
command was ‘on the brink of starvation & demoralisation that for these causes he [Terrazas] was 
10 Thrapp, 1974, p.300.
11 Ibid.
12 Aranda to Buell, 11 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
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Plates 16.1 and 16.2. Two photos taken on a 2005 trip to Tres Castillos. These were taken less than an hour 
before we sighted Tres Castillos, as we approached from the north east. The mountains are either the Sierra 
La Lagrima or the Sierra Los Clanes. These photos should also give a clear idea of the arid terrain that 
Terrazas’ troops crossed as they moved south in search of Victorio. (Photos: author)
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compelled to send 70 men back’.13 (see document file no. 130.) Now down to approximately 260 
men,14 he left the Sierra de Los Pinos and moved south-eastwards to the Laguna El Cuervo to pick 
up the trail of the Apaches. However, the tracks turned out to be that of a small party of Apaches 
that made for the Cerro Lagrimas. They were not the trail left by a large party.15 Terrazas was now 
unsure as to Victorio’s approximate, let alone exact, location. Undeterred, he immediately set out 
to scout the mountain ranges to the south of the Laguna El Cuervo. First, there was the Sierra del 
Carrizo, then the Cerro Lagrimas, between which lay a waterhole called Ojo del Carrizo. Further 
south lay the Sierra Comenos, the Cerro Tosishue, and, finally, the Sierra de Puerto Frios, which 
lay almost 50 miles to the south of the Laguna El Cuervo.16
The entire column marched south to Ojo del Carrizo. Once again, they found no signs of the 
Apaches. The risk for Terrazas was that the Apaches had scattered into smaller groups to frustrate 
any pursuit and were now making their way westwards towards the Candelaria Mountains or the 
Lagunas de Guzman or Santa Maria. If this was the case, Terrazas did not have the logistical 
support to maintain such a pursuit.
On 12 October 1880, at Ojo Del Carrizo, Terrazas divided his force for a second time. Mata 
Ortiz was sent southwards, to investigate the Sierra Comenas and then to march on the Cerro 
Tosishue, 15 miles to the south of their present campsite. Terrazas, with his detachment, would 
scout westwards, on to the Llano de Los Castillos (Castillos Plains).17 As Mata Ortiz moved south-
wards, Terrazas swung off to the west and the following morning:
he cut tracks of three animals, at the edge of the Llanos de Los Castillos. They came down 
from the north, appearing very fresh. While his main force camped concealed in the chaparral, 
scouts worked onto the plains until little more than a league [approximately three miles] out, 
they came across the trail of the main body of hostiles. The sign showed that they had passed 
within a few days, seeming to make for Tres Castillos.18
Terrazas issued a flurry of orders: Mata Ortiz was to be contacted and recalled; a strong detachment 
was directed to scout further into the Llanos de Los Castillos. Presumably Terrazas rested the rest 
of his men, having spent the previous night scouting for tracks. Both the scouting detachment and 
Mata Ortiz’s command rejoined him around dawn on 14 October. Mata Ortiz had found no sign 
of any Apaches, but Terrazas’ scout force returned to report a myriad of tracks on the plains but 
no sightings of Apaches.19 Issuing orders that Mata Ortiz should lead most of the column directly 
towards Tres Castillos, Terrazas, and a small detachment of 11 men, detoured to check a report of 
tracks leading from Tres Castillos towards Terrazas’ former camp at Ojo de Carrizo. This report 
proved to be erroneous, and Terrazas and his small detachment turned westwards and made with 
all speed for Tres Castillos, which they reached at 2:00 p.m. on 14 October 1880.20
13 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 28 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.369
14 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 28 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.370. Baylor reported that 
Terrazas was down to two hundred men (Nolan, Quitman citing information rec’d directly from Capt 
Baylor, to Beck, AAAG, 12 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2)
15 Thrapp, 1974, p.300
16 Thrapp, 1974, p.296 & p300
17 Thrapp, 1974, p.300; Stout, p.176
18 Thrapp, 1974, pp.300-301
19 Thrapp, 1974, p.301
20 Thrapp, 1974, p.301
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Tres Castillos, 14-15 October 1880
Despite his detour, Terrazas reached Tres Castillos well in advance of his main column. Tres 
Castillos consists of three jumbled rock outcroppings which rise to about 100 feet above the unusu-
ally flat plain which surrounds them. They run roughly north to south, and their length covers less 
than a mile. Their most important feature is the three quite substantial pools, which could normally 
be expected to be full during October, due to the summer rains.21 The southern hill is the most 
rounded, but still consists of a rugged jumble of boulders and thick shrubs. Immediately to its north 
is a small but very steep fin of rock. One then traverses an open area, before encountering the main 
hill, which forms the other two points of Tres Castillos. At a distance, these look to be separate 
hills, but are joined by a saddle between the two. Again, these hills consist of a jumble of large 
boulders with thick bushes; but they are also much steeper than the southern hill. 
Joaquin Terrazas climbed the northernmost of the three hills, and scanning the terrain, he 
spotted at least three distinct dust clouds drifting above the chaparral, approximately twelve miles 
to the south.22 After some half an hour’s study through his field glasses, he determined that the 
dust clouds were making for his location.23 He left his 11 men to further scout and familiarise 
themselves with the lie of the land. They were then to withdraw northwards for between one and 
two miles and conceal themselves behind a small rock formation24 until the Colonel could return 
with his entire force.25 
Terrazas rejoined Mata Ortiz: ‘about midway from their last camp to the Tres Castillos’.26 Both 
commanders were veteran Apache campaigners and knew that seeing the approach of approxi-
mately 250 well-armed opponents would only serve to scatter the Apaches. However, in the open 
plain, there would be no way of concealing the approach of the troops in their usual formation. 
Terrazas and Mata Ortiz determined that their force should be formed into a long column forma-
tion no more than 20 men wide. They hoped that the Apaches might be encouraged to stand and 
fight, if apparently confronted by only 20 men. If the Chihuahua troops approached at speed, the 
bulk of the force would be hidden in the dust cloud raised by the front rank. 
As the sun began to set, the Mexicans launched an attack on those Apaches who had arrived and 
camped at Tres Castillos. Terrazas estimated that two out of the three groups of Apaches whom 
he had spotted earlier that afternoon were camped at the base of the southernmost hill when the 
Mexicans attacked.27 (See Map 16.2.)
Some of the Apache warriors accompanying these groups fanned out to meet the attack. 
Terrazas’ Tarahumara Indian infantrymen responded by charging out of the column, firing as 
they went, killing at least one Apache warrior.28 As the foot soldiers fanned out to confront the 
Apaches directly, the cavalry divided into two groups. Mata Ortiz took one group around the 
north end of Tres Castillos. He was no doubt joined by the 11 men left earlier by Terrazas. At the 
21 Thrapp, 1974, p.301. We visited Tres Castillos in September 2005 and Thrapp’s description of the terrain 
is very accurate. We spotted a lot of wildfowl, a couple of hawks and a Tarantula Wasp but did not, much 
to my disappointment, spot any eagles or rattlesnakes.
22 Thrapp, 1974, p.234 & 301
23 Thrapp, 1974, pp301-302
24 This small outcrop can be seen jutting out of the flat plain to the north and slightly west of the Tres 
Castillos.
25 Thrapp, 1974, p.302. It should be noted that some literature that has Col Terrazas and his men already 
in position waiting for Victorio at Tres Castillos and manages to trap them in a box canyon could not be 
further from the truth. (See for example Wellman, 1957, pp.175-176; Longstreet, p.96)
26 Thrapp, 1974, p.302
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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same time, Terrazas swung around to the south, until both groups of cavalry met on the other side 
of the hill formation. Both groups of cavalry dropped off men behind them as they went along, 
forming a cordon blocking any easy escape for the Apaches.29 The Apaches, realising that they were 
surrounded and facing a much larger force than at first seemed to be the case, re-grouped as best 
they could on the southernmost hill of the three.30 Buell later reported being told by Mescalero 
Apache survivors of the battle that the Apaches had managed to throw back a Mexican assault after 
they were surrounded.31 Nevertheless, many of the Chihenne and Mescalero Apaches were taken 
completely by surprise, being killed or captured before they could reach cover.
The timing of Terrazas’ attack was very fortuitous. One of the striking features of the terrain 
which surrounds Tres Castillos is that it is genuinely flat, unlike much of the ground between larger 
mountain ranges in the southwestern USA and northern Chihuahua, where apparently flat ground, 
on closer inspection, is often very rough and lends itself to easy concealment. Terrazas’ assault 
managed to coincide with the arrival of the Apaches. The latter had probably not had the time to 
send a lookout up to one of the two higher peaks which make up the middle and northern hills of 
Tres Castillos. A lookout stationed on the top of one of the hills might have been able to give the 
Apaches an earlier warning of the size of the force moving against them.
Moreover, had Terrazas launched his attack 10–15  minutes earlier, he would have caught the 
Apaches still on the move out on the plain. It is clear that most of the Apaches trapped were 
mounted, as Terrazas recovered 120 horses and 38 mules after the battle. He also claimed to have 
killed 78 Apaches and taken 68 women and children prisoner. If most of the Apaches were mounted 
and on the move when Terrazas struck, they would simply have scattered back towards the thicker 
cover to the south. Here, Nana and his rearguard could have set up an ambush which, even with 
their limited supplies of ammunition, might have provided a sufficient check to Terrazas’ pursuit 
long enough to allow most of the Apaches to escape.
On the other hand, had Terrazas arrived 10–15 minutes later, the Apaches might still have had 
time to mount up and scatter. Had Victorio followed standard Apache procedure, he would have 
stationed a lookout on the highest Tres Castillos hill. Even if the Apaches had not had time to 
scatter, they would have had time to occupy the higher middle and northern hills of Tres Castillos. 
As noted above, these two hills are as rugged as their lower neighbour, yet are steeper and joined 
by a narrow saddle which runs between them at a little less than half the elevation of the two 
peaks. The Apaches may have been short of ammunition, but the archaeological evidence from the 
Conline skirmish of 5 April 1880 reveals that the Apaches were still using archery as part of their 
arsenal. They were also steep enough to dislodge large boulders and send them down into their 
attackers. Even with such weapons, Victorio and his men could have mounted a far more effective 
defence from such positions. With Terrazas’ men running low on food and morale, Apaches dug 
in on the northern peaks of Tres Castillos would have had a much better chance of holding out 
long enough to force Terrazas to withdraw through lack of supplies, or because of the arrival of 
additional Apache warriors. According to Kaywaykla, approximately 30 warriors arrived at Tres 
Castillos within twenty-four hours of the end of the battle, having successfully procured fresh 
stocks of ammunition. As it turned out, Terrazas had, with very good luck, timed his moment well 
in trapping a large number of Apaches on the southernmost hill of Tres Castillos.
At first glance, Tres Castillos appears to be a poor choice of campsite for Victorio, the hills there 
being surrounded by very flat and open plains. Yet we must consider the following: Victorio needed 
to keep his followers mounted to stay ahead of the pursuit. Tres Castillos was, at that time of year, 
an excellent source of water for a large group of Apaches and their horses and other stock. He 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Buell to AAAG SF 3 Dec., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.4.
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Plate 16.3. Looking south west, with the three peaks of the Tres Castillos clearly silhouetted against 
the mountains on the horizon. This is approximately the view Terrazas’ troops would have had as they 
approached Tres Castillos. The terrain which surrounds these hills is unusually flat. (Photo: author)
Plate 16.4. Looking north east from just below the saddle between the central and northern hills of the 
Tres Castillos. The dark green patch is the dried up laguna, the northernmost of two such lagunas on the 
east side of the Tres Castillos. Mata Ortiz’s cavalry crossed just above this laguna, moving from right to 
left. (See Diagram.) The photo again gives a clear idea of the very flat nature of the ground surrounding 
Tres Castillos. (Photo: author)
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may have had no option but to make for that point to refresh his mounts. The location had almost 
certainly been designated as the rendezvous point for those groups of Apaches foraging for fresh 
ammunition. What is also clear is that Victorio’s change in strategy had almost worked. What 
appears to have happened is that Victorio had passed southwards, to the east of Tres Castillos, 
before turning and making for these hills. Unfortunately for the Apaches, Terrazas divined 
Victorio’s probable destination and had taken a shortcut to the west to intercept the Apaches. Had 
Terrazas simply followed Victorio’s trail, he would have been at least a day behind the Apaches, and 
the Chihuahuans were already running out of supplies. Terrazas would have been forced to suspend 
his campaign, and this would have given Victorio ample time to regroup either at the Lagunas 
de Guzman and/or de Santa Maria or even in the Sierra Madre. Victorio may have selected this 
point as being safe because he had calculated that, by the time he arrived there, his pursuers would 
not have been capable of catching him. It was another element of Terrazas’ luck that, by correctly 
predicting Victorio’s destination, he had been able to bring his force to Tres Castillos in just good 
enough condition to attack the Apaches.
Kaywaykla gives a graphic account of the Mexican attack. This differs from Terrazas’ account only 
in the fact that one of the two groups of Apaches was in the process of arriving at the camp when the 
Mexicans attacked. Many of the Apaches were unaware of the attack until the Mexicans opened fire. 
Kaywaykla remembers the utter confusion as the Apaches scattered and tried to flee or take cover. 
He remained with his mother and they managed to find a temporary hiding place in a small crevice 
between two large rocks. Three Chihuahuan cavalrymen stopped right next to their refuge but failed 
to discover them. One remained behind to finish a cigarette before moving on.32 (see document file 
no. 131.) This would suggest that Gouyen and Kaywaykla were almost caught by the first effort to trap 
the Apaches. As the Chihuahuan troops tightened their cordon, mother and son found themselves 
hiding outside it, but still dangerously close to the Mexican lines. Their only choice was to move 
quietly up the eastern side of the Tres Castillos hills, away from their enemies. Here, they encoun-
tered another woman and a girl, who refused to make the attempt to escape from Tres Castillos. If, 
again, the Apaches had followed standard procedure, another rendezvous point would have been 
chosen should they be attacked, either en route to, or at, Tres Castillos. Under the cover of darkness, 
both mother and son managed to crawl undetected through the Mexican picket lines, cross the plain 
and reach cover to the west of Tres Castillos. This took several hours and Kaywaykla reports sporadic 
shots coming from Tres Castillos throughout the night.33 Kaywaykla also recalled a difficult climb at 
Tres Castillos to escape the Mexican cordon. This must have been up the saddle between the middle 
and northern hills. The rendezvous point would logically have been somewhere to the west and south 
of Tres Castillos, if the Apaches were returning towards the Lagunas de Guzman/Santa Maria, or 
the Sierra Madre, and hoping to link up with other Apache groups in that area. This may have made 
it necessary for the two fugitives either to scale the saddle, or to work their way around the northern 
end of Tres Castillos, before using the cover of darkness to pass over the plain undetected. 
Opler also briefly mentions a Mescalero named Turquoise who was with Victorio at Tres Castillos:
I outran even the bullets. I joined the Victorio bunch but was never even touched. I have been 
fired on at close range by infantry and never got a scratch. Victorio spoke to me many a time. 
When Victorio surrendered34 I was right by his side. ‘You’re a man,’ Victorio told me that day, 
‘but the end will be at sunrise.’35
32 Ball, 1970, pp.94-96: See also Kaywaykla, 1961, p.23 & p.38.
33 Ball, 1970, p.98; Kaywaykla, 1961, p.38.
34 One suspects that ‘surrendered’ may mean something more akin to ‘trapped’. 
35 Opler, 1969, p.82.
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Plate 16.5 Closer view of the Tres Castillos. Those Apaches who failed to evade Terrazas’ attack were trapped 
on the southernmost of the three hills, which is the lowest and most rounded of the three. (Photo: author)
Plate 16.6. The southernmost hill of the Tres Castillos, viewed from the east. There is an abundance of 
jumbled rocks in which the trapped Apaches could take cover. (Photo: author)
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Two points are implied in this statement. First, that Victorio survived to the morning of 15 October; 
and second that he did not attempt to evade his enemies, which might mean that he was already 
wounded when he spoke to Turquoise. Nevertheless, Turquoise also made it clear that he himself 
managed to escape after the Apaches were surrounded by the Mexican state troops.
Having successfully surrounded the two groups of Apaches, Terrazas’ men finished off or 
captured those Apaches they managed to catch in the open. Though, as noted, some Apaches 
managed to slip away during the night, the Mexicans were also largely successful in trapping the 
Apaches who had taken refuge on the southern hill. The third group of Apaches, the rearguard 
under the command of Nana, were still some distance from Tres Castillos and able to escape into 
the chaparral to the south.36 The Mexicans also succeeded in capturing most of the horses and 
mules abandoned by the Apaches as the latter took cover on the southern hill of Tres Castillos.
Thrapp, in quoting Terrazas’ report and memoirs, gives the impression that the Apaches were 
well-supplied with ammunition. Other sources suggest that this was not the case. Terrazas may be 
guilty of exaggerating the Apaches’ ability to resist to enhance the magnitude of his own victory. It 
later emerged that he was less than confident in his troops’ ability to confront Victorio, due to the 
effects of their own hunger.37 Privately, Joaquin Terrazas acknowledged to Buell that he had been 
somewhat fortunate to catch Victorio at Tres Castillos.38 This lends some weight to Brinkerhoff’s 
suggestion that Terrazas’ men were running low on both supplies and morale. Having emerged 
victorious, using troops weakened by hunger, Terrazas’ triumphant language can be more readily 
understood.
Terrazas stated that, throughout the night, the Apaches: ‘attempted to shoot their way from the 
peak, but were thrown back’39, though we should judge this in the light of Kaywaykla’s memory of 
desultory shots throughout the night. Nana’s rearguard tried to set up a diversion by lighting a large 
fire to the south at about 10:00 p.m. This was answered by another fire lit high on the hill besieged 
by the Mexicans. Terrazas diverted some men to the south, and after a brief skirmish drove off 
some Apache warriors near the blaze.40 Terrazas also reported that a ‘death-song’ was initiated 
among the trapped Apaches around midnight and continued till 2:00 a.m. The Apaches had also 
laboured throughout the night to raise up rock emplacements.41
At dawn, the Mexicans launched an all-out assault on the hill, and by 9:00 a.m.,42 all the 
remaining Apaches had been killed or captured. Captain Brinkerhoff reported that 
the killing of Victorio & a portion of his band by the Mexican force under Terasas obviated 
the necessity of dispatch from me. The information comes from Lieut Ascarate of Terasas 
command who arrived at Carrisal on the 18th I have since been informed that the Lt reports 
that the Indians exhausted their ammunition in the fight & that the killing followed in the 
heat of the charge that every warrior who did not escape during the fight was killed.43
36 Thrapp, 1974, p.302.
37 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 28 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.370.
38 Joaquin Terrazas to Genl. G.P. Buell 12 Nov., 1880 (copy of document supplied by Dan D. Aranda, Las 
Cruces, New Mexico).
39 Thrapp, 1974, p.302; See also brief comment in David L. Hughes’ ‘An Early Chapter in the life of 
Apache Bill’ pp.17-18.
40 Thrapp, 1974, pp.302-303; See also brief comment in David L. Hughes’ ‘An Early Chapter in the life of 
Apache Bill’ pp.;17-18.
41 Thrapp, 1974, p.303.
42 Stout, 1974, p.176.
43 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 20 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.273-274; See also Hatch 
to Willcox, 22 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, p.972.
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Plate 16.7. A close-up of the cover on the hill where the Apaches were trapped. The southern laguna can be 
clearly seen. (Photo: author)
Plate 16.8. Close-up of the cover on the southernmost hill of the Tres Castillos. The perspective is looking 
up the southwestern slope. (Photo: author)
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The only other snippet of information concerning the final attack is a reference to one Juan Marcos, 
who was confronted by an Apache warrior as the former charged up the hill. Marcos won this 
personal combat but no further reliable44 details can be drawn from this story.45
Terrazas claimed that some warriors and youths asked for and were given quarter. If this is the 
case, they were later reported as having been summarily executed.46 This came from Kaywaykla’s 
grandmother, who witnessed the aftermath as a captive. She, with four other female survivors, later 
managed to escape to the US after their being sold as slaves.47 
Terrazas claimed that in the final assault his men faced Apache warriors who were dug in and 
made a fierce last stand, with the Mexicans having to finish their foes off at close quarters.48 In his 
memoirs, Terrazas added a further detail:
The warriors were killed, among the rocks, remaining only two of them in a cave, well armed 
and with plenty ammunition, who, with no thought of surrender, held out for more than two 
hours before they were killed, this despite the fact that their lives were offered to them by 
means of Indians already prisoners.49
Thrapp visited the site and he reports finding a 44-40 cartridge case at the entrance.50 The cave 
is situated at the base of the southern hill, its mouth facing approximately north-west. It is quite 
small, but two men could have taken refuge there. It would have been difficult to approach, even 
from above, without giving the two Apaches a clear shot at their assailants. It is conceivable that 
one or two Apache warriors still had a good supply of ammunition, but, trapped by the attack, were 
unable to distribute their cartridges among other warriors.
The news of the defeat and death of Victorio arrived in the USA on 19 October 1880, in a 
letter from Dr Samaniego. Buell acknowledged this dispatch on the same day,51 though the news 
of Victorio’s death doesn’t seem to have reached District of New Mexico Headquarters until 20 
October.52 A day earlier, Sheridan had briefed Sherman that the latest information concerning 
Victorio was that he and his followers were ‘one hundred miles south of Quitman Mexican Troops 
in pursuit’. Sheridan had therefore concluded that the route chosen for the US President’s trip 
through New Mexico would now ‘be entirely safe’.53 Colonel Grierson received the news while in 
44 Rosson recounts this story as part of an account of the Victorio Campaign which is incomplete and 
the section on Tres Castillos does not match Thrapp’s sources. However, I think it worth noting this 
particular detail as a possible lead in tracking down other versions of Tres Castillos as, so far, we have 
only Terrazas’ and Kaywaykla’s accounts to guide us. The short bibliography names a source called the 
‘Rural Citizen 1880’ which might be a source worth tracking down.
45 Rosson, 1980, p.29.
46 Kaywaykla, 1963, p.21; Ball, 1980, p.83.
47 Ball, 1970, pp.169-170.
48 Terrazas cited in Thrapp, 1974, p.303; See also Buell to AAAG 22 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.278-282.
49 Terrazas cited in Thrapp, 1974, p.303.
50 Thrapp, 1974, p.303.
51 Buell to Terrazas, 19 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
52 Hatch to Generals Sherman and Willcox, 20 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.961; Hatch to Pope, 21 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, 
Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.969-970) nor senior US army officers until 
the 22 of Oct.. (Sheridan to the Adjutant of the Army, Washington D.C. 22 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, 
Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.725-727.
53 Sheridan to Sherman, 21 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.721.
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Plate 16.9. View to the south west from beneath the saddle between the northern and central hills of the Tres 
Castillos. After Gouyen and Kaywaykla had successfully pass through the Mexican lines, they were able to 
use the cover of darkness to cross the open land to the hills and mountains in the distance. (Photo: author)
Plate 16.10. The small cave on the western side of Tres Castillos where two Apache warriors held out for several 
hours before eventually being killed. The cave would hold two men but is surprisingly small. (Photo: author)
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camp near Van Horn Wells on 22 October.54 Lieutenant Leighton Finley, on patrol from Fresno 
Springs and Eagle Springs, noted, on arrival at the latter point on 24 October, that there was a 
rumour that Victorio had been killed by Mexican troops.55 The Army and Navy Journal included an 
unconfirmed report that Victorio had been killed on 23 October,56 but did not confirm his death 
until 30 October.57 The news of Terrazas’ success was splashed across the Grant County Herald on 
23 October, leaving southern New Mexicans in no doubt that a great victory had been won.58 (see 
document file no. 132.)
Samaniego stated that he had been informed by one of Terrazas’ officers that ‘Victorio with 50 
grown Indians and 18 women & children dead. Moreover some 70 women & children were taken 
prisoners & 250 animals recovered.’59 (see document file no. 133.) On 19 October, Henry Parker, 
Chief of Scouts, sent a telegram to his wife stating that, ‘Terrasas killed Victorio and forty-nine 
Indians, sixteen women and children, captured sixty-eight women and children.’60 These figures 
were also reported by Captain Brinkerhoff, though he warned that ‘all these reports are doubt-
less upon the truth but may be exaggerated in some particulars.’61 In fact, Terrazas ( 134) claimed 
that 62 warriors were killed out of a total of 78 slain Apaches, and that he took 68 prisoners. In 
return, he lost three killed, five seriously wounded and six slightly wounded.62 It was reported 
that the Mexicans had captured 120 horses, 38 mules and 12 ‘Jacks’.63 The Journal of the State of 
Chihuahua, dated 20 October 1880 ( 135), claimed that 62 men and 16 women and children had 
been killed, with a further 68 captured. They had also liberated two Mexican boys taken captive by 
the Apaches.64 The two Mexican boys recaptured from the Apaches turned out to have been taken 
from the vicinity of Belen, New Mexico in April 1880.65 Ten-year-old Felipe Padilla had survived 
the fight unscathed, but twelve-year-old Felix Carillo had been wounded in the leg.66
54 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 31 Dec., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-
1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168. Note: This report contained as Letter No. 3 in Letters 
sent 1881.
55 Leighton Finley Diary 6 Aug., 1880 entry Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
56 ‘Chief Victoria’s War’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 23 Oct., 1880, p.227.
57 ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 30 Oct., 1880, p.241.
58 ‘Herald Extra-Special Dispatch to The Herald – S.P. Carpenter’, The Grant County Herald, 23 Oct., 
1880.
59 Buell to AAAG SF 19 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.271; See also Hatch to Pope, 21 
Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.969.
60 ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 23 Oct., 1880.
61 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 20 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.275-276.
62 Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 22 Oct., 1880 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 2; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.303; Haley, 
1981, p.331.
Rasch adds that the Chihuahuans lost 3 killed and 12 wounded. He also states that 68 Apaches 
women and children were captured. (Rasch, 1960, p.9).
63 Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 22 Oct., 1880 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 2; Scott to Hunter, 22 Oct., 1880 attached 
to John Hay, Acting Secretary of State to Alexander Ramsey, Secretary of War, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters 
Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 1880.
Sharp reported that the Daily New Mexican stated that Victorio, 60 men, 18 women and children were 
killed. They captured 70 men, women and children and recaptured 2 Mexican children. 280 horses and 
mules were also captured. (Sharp, 1957, p.12).
64 Copy of Journal of State Of Chihuahua in Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 28 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 
3, Entry 439, pp.374-385; Rasch, 1960, pp.9-10.
65 ‘Terrassas Talks’ Daily New Mexican 30 Oct., 1880.
66 Loud to Mr Becker, Forage Agent, Belen N.M., 29 Oct., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.992.
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The Mexican casualties indicate that the battle must have been a fairly one-sided affair, which 
confirms the belief that Victorio was short of ammunition.67 Thrapp calls this more of a massacre 
than a battle.68 If the Mexicans did clear the hill by assault, it would probably have been carried 
out by some of the militiamen pinning down the Apaches, while other Mexicans closed in on each 
position in turn and finished them off. Mescalero Apaches, returning to their reservation after 
the fight, reported that the trapped Apaches fought to their last bullet and surrendered on a given 
signal. By implication the surviving warriors were then killed.69
As noted earlier, the Apaches themselves reported that all of the adolescent males were summarily 
shot after the fighting was over, and these would have contributed to the figure of 68 warriors that 
Terrazas killed at Tres Castillos. During April 1880, at Cooney’s mining camp, John Lambert 
stated that, from hiding, he had seen approximately 60 young men, ‘in reality boys’,70 in Victorio’s 
following, armed ‘with the old fashioned store gun’.71 Many of these adolescents were probably the 
same people whom Terrazas executed at Tres Castillos. Moreover, Kaywaykla estimated that, with 
several parties of warriors absent hunting or raiding, there were not as many as 68 warriors trapped 
and killed with Victorio.72 
One ultimately undisputed fact was that Victorio was among the slain. Hatch noted that the 
two Mexican boys recaptured by Terrazas had reported that Victorio had definitely been killed in 
the engagement.73 There are many versions of his death: The Apache version stated that, with three 
other warriors, he fought to his last bullet and then killed himself by driving his knife into his 
heart, his three companions sharing his fate.74
The Mexicans, however, recount a personal combat narrative. This took place between Mauricio 
Corredor, leader of the Tarahumara Indian infantry, and Victorio. The Apache leader was badly 
wounded in the exchange, and Corredor walked up and finished him off.75 Corredor was feted as 
Victorio’s killer and, over and above the 2,000 peso bounty on Victorio’s head, he was presented 
The return of the two boys was discussed at the highest levels by no less a trio as the Secretary’s of the 
Interior, of State and of War concerning their return to the United States. (See Evarts to Ramsey, 8 Nov., 
1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528); Owing to the ‘severe wounds’ received by one of the 
boys, necessitating his convalescence in Chihuahua City, they were not returned until fully recovered, 
the cost of their repatriation was borne by the United States (Luis Terrazas to Genl. Hatch 19 Nov., 1880 
in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 
1880; Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 2 Dec., 1880 in Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 6 
Dec., 1880 & Luis Terrazas to Hatch, 19 Nov., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528).
Hatch reminded the CO Fort Bliss that once the Mex. Authorities had handed back the two boys 
recaptured at Tres Castillos the latter was to make arrangements to reunite them with their families. 
(Hatch to CO Fort Bliss, 28 Dec., 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.4, Nov. 1880 – Jan. 1881, NA, 
RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.145).
67 ‘Chief Victoria’s War’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 23 Oct., 1880, p.227.
68 Thrapp, 1967, p.209.
69 Buell to AAAG SF 3 Dec., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.5; Buell to AAAG, DoNM, 3 Dec., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.698-699; Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM 
(via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, 
RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881; Thrapp, 1974, p.305 & p.374 note 17.
70 Humphries, 1988, p.160.
71 Ibid. p.160.
72 Kaywaykla, 1961, p.22 & 1963, p.20.
73 Hatch to AAG, DoM, Fort Leavenworth, 8 Nov., 1880 in Letters Sent by ‘9MD/DNM/DoNM’, NA, 
RG393, M1072, Roll 6, Jan. 1880-Aug. 1881, Letter No.574, p.366.
74 Kaywaykla, 1963, p.20; Ball, 1962, p.40 & 1970, p.102; 1980, p.50; Sonnichsen, 1973, p.210; Haley, 
1981, p.331.
75 Stout, p.176; Thrapp, 1974, p.304; Keenan, 1997, p.239
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with, ‘a fancy nickled rifle by the grateful state of Chihuahua’.76 Perez recounts an oral tradi-
tion that Corredor shot Victorio on the evening of 14 October, and during the night managed to 
creep close enough to see his body surrounded by grieving women.77 It must be noted that those 
Apaches willing to discuss this question were scathing in their dismissal of Corredor as the killer 
of Victorio.78
Historian Martin L. Crimmins reports that Victorio was picked off by a Tarahumara sniper as 
he directed his warriors from the top of a hill.79 Some accounts tell of the Apaches being trapped in 
a box canyon and wiped out.80 Gillett, portrays him as riding a white horse on the morning of 15 
October, rallying his trapped warriors, and being gunned down by the Mexicans.81
Lieutenant W.H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry, repeated a grisly story of Terrazas lining up 10 Apache 
prisoners at a time and asking them to give him Victorio’s location. In a scene more reminiscent 
of a ‘spaghetti’ western, when each prisoner refused to reveal the location, they were immediately 
shot. Finally the 38th prisoner revealed his location, and Terrazas’ orderly finished off the badly 
wounded Victorio.82
There are also traditions which argue that, while Victorio was slain, he was not killed at Tres 
Castillos. James A. McKenna records a skirmish between Victorio and some of his warriors and 
some prospectors, where Victorio was spotted by a couple of sharpshooters who shot his horse from 
under him, allegedly wounding the Apache leader. McKenna claims to have had information that 
Victorio had died of his wounds at Palomas Lake, and had been buried there, with another leader 
taking the chief ’s effects and subsequently being killed at Tres Castillos.83 There are two reasons 
to doubt this version of events. First, an Apache leader would not have appropriated another, dead 
Apache’s belongings, as their beliefs would have forbidden such an act.84 Second, if Victorio had 
been killed by American prospectors, would the Apaches have allowed one of their most implacable 
foes (Terrazas) to have enjoyed a reputation for having perpetrated such a deed?85 Cruse would have 
us believe that the battle did not take place at all. He argues that the Apaches had gone to the town 
of Santa Rosalia to trade. The Mexican inhabitants maintained a friendly visage while sending for 
Terrazas in secret. A fiesta was then staged and ended with the summary execution of Victorio.86
Of all the accounts of Victorio’s death, the last three, particularly Cruse’s, given Victorio’s strict 
rules concerning minimal fraternising with Mexicans when trading, are the least convincing. Such 
accounts are probably more a symptom of the general chagrin that must have swept the US army 
76 Thrapp, 1967, p.209; Lockwood, 1987, pp.232-233; Faulk, 1974, p.180; Sonnichsen, 1973, p.210; Smith, 
1962, p.26 & 1965, p.138, note 35; Cocker, 1999, p.231; Rasch, 1960, p.10
77 Silver City Press, 30 Jun., 1998. Perez states that Mauricio Corredor’s surname alluded to his ability as 
a runner, for which the Tarahumara Indians are famous. He adds that he came from Bocoyna and that 
his given Spanish surname was Gonzalez.
78 Ball, 1980, p.83.
79 Crimmins, 1935,  p.142; See also Wellman, 1957, p.176; Longstreet, 1970, p.96; Rister, 1928, p.216.
80 Lockwood, 1987, p.232; Faulk, 1974, p.180; Yarbrough, 1969, p.69.
81 Gillett, 1926, p.47; 1976, p.188; Crimmins, 1935, p.142.
82 Thrapp, 1974, pp.304-305; Johnson, 1957, pp.9-10; Rasch, 1960, p.10.
83 McKenna, 1963, pp.190-193; See also Simmons, 1995, El Paso Times.
84 See Loring, 2001, p.196.
85 James A. McKenna’s Black Range Tales is a highly entertaining collection of recollections of McKenna 
of his and others frontier experiences. Many of his stories feature Apaches and more particularly 
Victorio. However, where dates are mentioned concerning events they are usually wrong. For example 
he has Victorio alive in 1882 two years after he had been killed at Tres Castillos. (1963, p.188) As such 
McKenna should be treated with extreme caution as an accurate sources of events. It also has to be said 
that some of the stories have a ring of truth to them in their broad direction if not some of the detail.
86 Cruse, 1987, pp.85-86; Haley, 1981, p.331; Balmer, 1956, p.6.
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that it had been Mexicans, and state militia at that, who had finally killed Victorio.87 However, 
Thrapp is also quite correct that these stories, ‘all reflect the imagination of the writer rather than 
the facts of that grisly day’.88 The Mexicans might have known whom they were pursuing, but 
would not necessarily have known him by sight. Terrazas, in reporting his death stated:
The indian Victorio is of the dead, according to the signs by which he is known … according to 
those who tell me, those who knew him and the testimony of the captives, besides the wearing 
apparel and personal accoutrements which I have received, and which … would only be carried 
by an Indian chief of some importance.89
However, recent research by Daniel D. Aranda has unearthed material which strongly suggests 
that the Mexicans quickly identified Victorio’s body. A contemporary Chihuahua newspaper which 
clearly stated that Victorio was identified by the prominent facial scar and missing front teeth 
incurred at some point prior to the removal of the Chihennes to San Carlos in 1877.90 This rein-
forces Allan Radbourne’s argument that the photograph popularly supposed to be that of Victorio 
is not of that of the Apache leader.91 We know that Victorio was shot in the face at close-range in 
the fight which ended the Pajarito brother’s aspirations to lead the Chihenne Apaches in 1873.92 
It was possibly this wound which positively identified the Chihenne leader’s body. This scarring 
was mentioned much later in the The Arizona Silver Belt which gives a more general description of 
Victorio at the time of his demise and also mentions another facial wound dating back to the mid-
1860s:  “At the time of his death, Victorio was about 55 years old, heavy-set, broad faced, square 
under jaw, prominent cheek bones, and bore a bullet mark in the cheek received at the hand of 
Barney Conly … at Pinos Altos, N.M. in 1866.”93
However, Terrazas’ account may actually furnish us with a clue as to who killed Victorio. The 
most likely candidate for his killing may be an unfortunate un-named Mexican sergeant who was 
subsequently killed in an Apache ambush on 16 November 1880. On finding that he had been 
using Victorio’s saddle and carried: ‘a few trinkets from the body of the famed chief ’,94 the Apaches 
had hacked the sergeant’s body to pieces. One can only hope that they had not taken him alive.95
The only conclusion we can arrive at with any certainty, is that Victorio was killed at Tres 
Castillos, and that nobody knows exactly how he died. As far as his followers were concerned:
The chief had died as he would have wished – in the defense of his people. He was the greatest 
of all Apache chiefs, yes, of all Indian chiefs. He had died as he had lived, free and uncon-
querable. We knew well the fate of Mangas Coloradas and of Cochise. They, too, would have 
preferred death in battle; they would have envied Victorio. So – we were not to mourn for him. 
87 When the Daily New Mexican headlined Victorio’s death, they gave Terrazas full credit for his victory. 
The article was also quick to argue that his triumph was in part due to the efforts of the US army in the 
movements prior to Tres Castillos. (Daily New Mexican cited in Sharp, 1957, p.12).
88 Thrapp, 1974, p.304.
89 Terrazas cited in Thrapp, 1974, p.304.
90 Aranda, unpublished article.
91 Radbourne, 2004, p.74
92 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879’, p.93.
93 The Arizona Silver Belt, 29 Nov., 1890. Information courtesy of Daniel D. Aranda, email 13 September, 
2018.
94 Thrapp, 1967, p.209.
95 Thrapp, 1967, p.209; 1974, pp.309-310; Stout, p.178; Rasch, 1960, p.10.
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He had been spared the ignominy of imprisonment and slavery, and for that he would have 
been thankful to Ussen.96
The winners of the battle were certainly Joaquin Terrazas and his militiamen. Feted by fellow 
Chihuahuans, Terrazas allegedly collected $17,250 scalp bounty and $10,200 from selling the 
captives into slavery.97 Brinkerhoff had received information on 21 August, from Mexico, that the 
Governor of Chihuahua had made an offer of $2,000 for Victorio’s scalp and $250 for each warrior’s 
scalp.98 This reward had apparently been recently raised to 3,000 dollars ‘for the head of the Apache 
Chief Victoria’.99 Obviously, Terrazas would have had to distribute some proportion of the profits 
among his troops. The militiamen were also allowed to retain any booty taken at Tres Castillos. A 
grateful populace contributed a further 17,000 pesos by voluntary subscription.100 Terrazas and his 
men were honoured for their victory with a parade in Chihuahua City and generous speeches extol-
ling their virtues as citizens of the State of Chihuahua.101 This procession also involved the display 
of the Apache captives and Apache scalps suspended on poles.102 (see document file no. 136.) 
The Mexicans were not the only people in Chihuahua City celebrating the defeat of Victorio. US 
Consul Scott, in transmitting the news of Tres Castillos and the imminent arrival of the captives 
in Chihuahua City, added that some of the Apaches had escaped. He recommended the USA 
mete out the harshest punishment to them should they attempt to return to US reservations. If 
lenient measures were adopted, he argued, then the US risked losing the good will of the people of 
Chihuahua. He could not resist adding the following personal recommendation: 
I trust that the Department [of State] will recommend to the War Department and the 
Department of the Interior the immediate apprehension of the balance of this band as soon as 
they cross the border and either turn them over to the authorities of New Mexico or have the 
authorities of this State extradite and try them here.
There is an opportunity now to teach these blood-thirsty Apaches a lesson that they will 
remember, and not one of this band should be permitted to escape the halter they so richly 
deserve.103
Buell also claimed, with some justification, that while his force had not contacted the Apaches, the 
presence of so many US troops in Mexico and picketing the Rio Grande had significantly contrib-
uted to Terrazas’ victory.104
96 Kaywaykla cited in Ball, 1970, p.100; see also Roberts, p.189.
97 Thrapp, 1974, p.373 note 10; Smith, 1962, p.34; Alonso, p.99.
We should also perhaps be wary of the term ‘slavery’ in this case. It could involve conditions of cruel 
servitude, but it could also mean effective adoption into a Mexican household. (Alonso, p.44).
98 Brinkerhoff Ft Bliss to AAAG 21 Aug., 1880?, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.805; Rasch, 1960, p.10.
99 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 11 Sept., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.408; The Grant County 
Herald, 25 Sept., 1880.
100 Alonso, 1997, pp.99-100.
101 Alonso, 1997, p.100; Thrapp, 1974, pp.310-311; Rasch, 1960, p.10; Thompson, p.169.
102 ‘Greeting the Victors’ The Daily New Mexican, 2 Dec., 1880; Thrapp, 1974, pp.310-311; See also Royal 
City News Webpage.
103 Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 22 Oct., 1880 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 2; Scott to Hunter, 2nd Asst. Sec. of State, 
22 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Scott to Hunter, 22 Oct., 1880 attached to 
John Hay, Acting Secretary of State to Alexander Ramsey, Secretary of War, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters 
Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 1880.
104 Buell, HQ Fort Stanton N.M., to AAG, DoM (via AAAG DoNM), 20 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received 
by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 42, File 658-1658, Jan.-Apr. 1881.
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Tres Castillos: A Decisive Victory over the Apaches?
While the killing of Victorio and over 60 men and adolescent boys at Tres Castillos, accompanied 
by the loss of approximately 100 women and children to death, slavery or adoption, was a disaster 
for the Apaches, even this event was not necessarily as decisive as it would appear. The legend is that 
only 17 Apaches escaped from Tres Castillos, and that these were the sole survivors of the fight. 
However, there are good grounds for arguing that a large number of Apaches, following, or allied 
to, Victorio, were nowhere near, or escaped from, Tres Castillos. Under the leadership of Nana, and 
possibly of Mangus, son of Mangas Coloradas,105 Chihenne Apache warriors would launch a series 
of retaliatory attacks on Mexicans and Anglo-Americans immediately after Victorio’s death. In the 
longer term, throughout the winter of 1880 and the spring of 1881, the survivors of Victorio’s band 
would continue their guerrilla war against the US and the Republic of Mexico. Thrapp states that 
in 1883, while General Crook confronted the Chiricahua Apaches in the Sierra Madre:
Several other warriors rode into camp during the afternoon, including the important Ka-ya-ten-nae 
or ‘Looking Glass,’ as his name usually is translated, although there are other versions of what the 
Apache word meant. Although a young man, he had succeeded Victorio as war chief of the Warm 
Springs Indians, and took over his band of seventy nine, including fifty three fighting men.106
John G. Bourke reported at the time that Nana also had a personal following of 15 and, though 
he was still a man of power among the Chiricahuas, Looking-Glass appeared to be the leader.107 
Thrapp makes it quite clear that James Kaywaykla, ‘always denied that Victorio had many warriors 
with him at the final battle. Most, he believed, were on other missions.’108 He also cites a ‘scout’ 
called Riley who stated that a number of Apache warriors had killed at least 25 Mexicans in the 
aftermath of Tres Castillos, Terrazas’ force having caught ‘only the squaw camp with a few old men 
in it’.109 Terrazas himself stated that he thought that there were at least 30 ‘Indians’ still at large’.110 
Captain Brinkerhoff filed the following report on 20 October 1880:
A portion of the band number unknown is reported to have captured about 300 horses at 
or near Horniga Mexico a ranch 50 miles south east from Chihuahua on the 12th inst This 
detachment was probably not with Victorio at the time of his capture.111
On 28 October, Brinkerhoff added that:
He [Terrazas] further states that the Indians who raided Hornigo ranche Oct 12th were not in 
the fight. 9 warriors of those with Victorio escaped early in the engagement. About 30 indians 
all of Victorio’s band are still at large. The trails of the fugitives led in the direction of the 
Bosque Benito.112
105 While never reaching nor aspiring to the influence his father had exercised, the roll Mangus played 
during the Victorio Campaign is virtually unknown. However, he did command a personal following 
and was respected as a leader. He was also known to the U.S. authorities and by 1881, along with Nana, 
was presumed by the US army to be a natural successor to Victorio.
106 Thrapp, 1972, pp.159-160.
107 Bourke, 2001ii, pp.384-385.
108 Thrapp, 1974, p.374, note 1.
109 Thrapp, 1974, p.308.
110 Terrazas telegram 25 Oct., 1880, cited in Haley, 1952, p.336.
111 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 20 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.274-275.
112 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 28 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.370-371.
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Captain C.H. Conrad, Fifteenth Infantry, in charge at Fort Stanton, estimated that approximately 
44 Mescalero Apaches had been killed at Tres Castillos, with a further 20 enslaved, accounting for 
between a third and half of the overall casualties inflicted by the Mexicans. This information was 
gained from Mescaleros recently returned to the reservation.113 (see document file no. 137.) 
Kaywaykla recalled a council held before Tres Castillos, where it was revealed that many warriors 
were absent foraging for food and ammunition. Nana wanted to send more warriors out to seek 
ammunition. After some debate, a warrior called Blanco was selected, and he rounded up a group 
of warriors and departed.114 The absence of so many warriors left only 20 men, plus any warriors 
who had returned from earlier raiding expeditions. As they moved out from camp on the morning 
of 14 October, Kaywaykla implies that there were at least 400 people with Victorio.115 He was a 
young boy at the time and could have easily miscalculated the numbers. Equally, this could mean 
that while Terrazas spotted evidence of three groups, there could have been other groups who 
completely escaped his scrutiny. The Apaches might well have split into a number of groups on the 
morning of 14 October, and might have agreed to a rendezvous several days later. Daklugie, son 
of Juh, echoed Kaywaykla’s version of events, stating that most of Victorio’s warriors were absent 
raiding in search of ammunition.116 He also stated that Victorio had very few warriors with him, in 
the vanguard and ‘a few more’ with the rearguard.117 
Yet these figures remain speculation. There are no reliable estimates of numbers of Warm Springs 
and Mescalero Apaches present in the vicinity of Tres Castillos who successfully evaded Terrazas’ 
attack by avoiding the Colonel’s scrutiny in the first place.
After Tres Castillos, it was Nana who gathered up the survivors with his rearguard warriors. He 
certainly had no thought of surrender, and within a day was thinking in terms of fighting back.118 
Nana had obviously kept a couple of scouts out monitoring Colonel Terrazas’ movements. They 
had reported that a large party of militia, with most of the captured Apaches, had moved south, 
making for Chihuahua city. This was judged to be too strong to ambush. A smaller party, no doubt 
militiamen from the border region, had left Tres Castillos moving north towards their homes 
along the Rio Grande. The scouts had not managed to get close enough to determine how many 
prisoners were with the latter group, but Nana felt that he knew the country well enough to get 
ahead and attempt an ambush. A small patrol with a single Apache girl captive was ambushed and 
she managed to escape.119
Nana, in effect, mobilised as quickly as possible in order to take advantage of any opportunity 
to recover captives. Beyond the one rescue, this proved to be impossible. The Apaches re-grouped 
and, to avoid a potential ambush, Nana waited three days before returning to Tres Castillos to 
bury their slain.120 It is difficult to determine numbers, but there may have been as many as 30 
or 40 Warm Springs Apache warriors who had survived or avoided the disaster at Tres Castillos. 
Kaywaykla mentions that an additional party, who had detached themselves to hunt, caught them 
up some time after Tres Castillos. Led by Sanchez, they had separately returned to Tres Castillos 
113 Conrad to Post Adjutant, Fort Stanton, 1 Dec., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-
Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 1880; Conrad to Post Adjutant, Fort Stanton, 
N.M., 1 Dec., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.698-699;Conrad to Post Adjutant, Fort 
Stanton N.M. 1 Dec., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528; Thrapp, 1974, p.309.
114 Ball, 1970, p.90.
115 Ibid, p.91.
116 Ball, 1980, p.80 & p.83.
117 Ibid, p.83.
118 Ball, 1970, p.101.
119 Ibid, pp.101-102.
120 Ibid, p.102.
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and tracked Terrazas down towards Chihuahua City. Finding no opportunity to effect a rescue of 
the captives, they had returned to seek out Nana.121
The decisive element of defeat for the Chihenne Apaches resided not in their immediate ability 
or otherwise to continue their resistance, but in the implications of Tres Castillos for their long-
term survival. It was not just the loss of the slain and executed men and boys, but the loss of 
so many female Apaches into Mexican captivity. Not only would warrior losses be far harder to 
replace, but the skills of the women as the de facto experts in gathering and preparing foodstuffs 
and clothing had been lost. Daklugie implicitly acknowledged this fact, when he outlined his defi-
nition of genocide.122
The most immediate retaliation, in the immediate aftermath of Tres Castillos, was inflicted by 
Apache warriors in Texas.123 The Tenth Cavalry had been informed that 30 Apaches were believed 
to have escaped from Tres Castillos and were roaming along the border.124 On 28 October 1880, 
Apaches ambushed a 12-man patrol at Ojo Caliente, Texas, consisting of one sergeant, one corporal 
and ten privates from B and K Companies, Tenth Cavalry.125 Almost the first thing Sergeant 
Perry and his men knew of their assailants was a shattering volley from close range, which killed 
Corporal W. Backus, and Privates C. Burns, J. Griffin, G. Mills and J. Stanley.126 The official story 
was that the rest of the patrol made for cover and returned fire. Equally rapidly the Apaches seized 
four horses and two mules and disappeared.127 However, the bi-monthly return for K Company, 
Tenth Cavalry, tells a very different story:
Oct 26th – A detachment consisting of Corp’l Backus & 6 privates under charge of Sergt. 
Perry of Co “B”, 10th Cav with 6 p’vts of the latter co, marched to Hot Springs, for picket duty. 
On the morning of the 28th at daybreak, this camp was surprised and attacked by about 30 
Indians who came from the Mexican side of the river – Corp’l Backus and 2 pvts of Co “K” and 
2 pvts of Co “B” were killed by the Indians – the rest of the men became demoralized and scat-
tered to make their escape by running away – abandoning most of their clothing, arms, horses 
equipments & c. which were captured by the Indians and taken with them into Mexico.128
The Apaches had probably carefully scouted this detachment, possibly monitoring the its routine, 
on 27 October. They had camped behind a ridge three miles into Mexico, and had approached 
121 Ibid, p.103.
122 Ball, 1980, p.79.
123 On 27 December, 1880, Lt. Beck reported that this attack was perpetrated by the thirty Apache warriors 
detached by Victorio to search for ammunition supplies. He also dates this attack to the 15 Oct., 1880. 
(Johnson, 1957, p.10).
124 Whipple to Pope, 27 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and 
Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, pp.738-739.
125 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 29 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.386-388; Brinkerhoff 
to AAAG SF 31 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.391; Ord to Pope, 1 Nov., 1880, NA, 
RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, p.752.
It was almost immediately assumed that the attack had been perpetrated by the thirty warriors 
reported by Col. Terrazas to have been absent from Tres Castillos. (Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 29 Oct., 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.386-388).
126 Leckie, 1967, p.230, Stout, p.177, Schubert 1995 individual entries; Chronological List, p.51; Webb, 
1976, p.90; Matthews, 1993, p.42.
127 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.391-392; Leckie, 1967, 
p.230.
128 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Sept./Oct. 1880 in NA, RG94. It 
is worth noting that the largest number of fatalities inflicted by Victorio’s Apaches upon the Ninth and 
Tenth Cavalry in a single engagement amounted to five men killed at Ojo Caliente NM, 4 September, 
1879 and Ojo Caliente TX, 28 October 1880.
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their target on foot.129 At dawn on 28 October, they caught this detachment completely off guard, 
and those not immediately killed, fled. The first many of the detachment knew of their danger 
was when the Apaches ‘rose up to fire a volley.’130 Sergeant Perry escaped the attack, being outside 
the camp collecting his horse and preparing to go out on patrol.131 Private Weoley Lively of K 
Company, recalled that Corporal Backus had:
called to me to get up. He saw something in the bushes – the bushes were to my left, on the 
edge of the bank of the river and at the same time the Indians fired a volley from the bank 
of the river from behind the bushes and wounded four men in the tent. The balance of the 
men scattered and ran. I ran to where my horse was picketed and unfastened the lariat and 
mounted, when the horse was shot from under me. I then ran into the mountains and made my 
escape. I afterwards saw the Indians rounding up the herd.132
Private Thomas E. Murphy had better luck managing to mount his horse and escape. He recalled 
that the Apaches had surrounded the camp on three sides, and as Corporal Backus had put a bullet 
into his carbine and started to rise to make a challenge, the Apaches had opened fire. Those men 
sitting around the fire scattered.133 Corporal Backus and one or two of the men spotted the Apaches 
just before the attack, but were not sure if they were Mexicans or Apaches until they opened fire.134 
The Apaches chose to strike at the point when Sergeant Perry went out to relieve the sentry.135 This 
technique has clear echoes of Victorio’s attack on Morrow’s camp on 30 September 1879,136 when 
the attack was timed to coincide with calling in all but one of the pickets for breakfast.
Private Cottman thought that most of the attackers were Mexican as, from his hiding place in 
the bushes, he heard them conversing in Spanish and that they ‘looked different from any Indians 
I had ever seen,’137 though he also recalled that his attackers wore shirts, hats and most of them 
wore their hair long.138 The reference to the loss of most of their clothes strongly suggests that most 
of the survivors were rudely awakened and only had seconds to make a decision whether to choose 
‘fight’ or ‘flight’. Grierson later admitted that the Apaches had captured at least five horses and 
a corresponding amount of arms and equipment, though he tried to soften the blow by drawing 
attention to the quick response made to this attack by all of his detachments in the general area.139 
129 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
130 Baldwin to AAAG, DoP, 28 Oct., 1880 & Statement of Pvt. Thomas E. Murphy, Co.K, 10th U.S. 
Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2.
131 Baldwin to AAAG, DoP, 28 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
132 Statement of Pvt. Weoley Lively, Co. K, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 
1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
133 Statement of Pvt. Thomas E. Murphy, Co.K, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 
Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
134 Statement of Pvt’s Thomas E. Murphy, Co. K &. Joseph Cottman, Co. B, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters 
Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
135 Statement of Pvt. Joseph Cottman, Co. B, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 
Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
136 See Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879, p.221.
137 Statement of Pvt. Joseph Cottman, Co. B, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 
Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
138 Statement of Pvt. Joseph Cottman, Co. B, 10th U.S. Cavalry in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 
Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
139 Grierson, Eagle Springs to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 29 Oct., 1880 in Telegrams Sent 23 Jun.-30 Nov., 
1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, p.225, Letter No.606; Grierson to 
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In fact, Captain Baldwin reported that 10 horses, four mules and 10 Carbines and revolvers, with 
their ammunition, had been lost and that he counted and buried four dead, with a further five men 
missing, though he was confident that three of these men were not actually dead.140 Baldwin noted 
that, in fleeing, the men had abandoned their weapons.141 Charles Berger re-examined the camp 
and verified that it had been Apaches who had ambushed the picket. He also criticised Lieutenant 
Ayers’ choice of campsite for this particular detachment, and stated that the Lieutenant’s choice of 
camp for his own picket station was even more open to attack.142
Captain Baldwin mounted a pursuit, but the Apaches had immediately crossed back into 
Mexico.143 Baldwin did not pursue them into Chihuahua, because his instructions indicated that 
cross-border pursuit was strictly forbidden. The Apaches were believed to have returned to the 
Sierra Borracho.144 
A final note on this attack concerns the epic night ride by Lieutenant Flipper which his own 
memoirs strongly imply was prior to the battle at Tinaja de Las Palmas.145 However, there are a 
number of anomalies with this account which suggest that this event could not have occurred 
in July 1880. Flipper recalled that he rode to Eagle Springs to report an attack upon a picket of 
Tenth Cavalrymen where several had been killed. The first that was known of the attack was the 
arrival of two survivors “in their underclothing”146 and Flipper and two soldiers were dispatched 
on an epic 98-mile ride to Eagle Springs to alert Colonel Grierson. Flipper’s account then moves 
to an account of Tinaja De Las Palmas. It is difficult to see how Flipper could have ridden these 
distances to Eagle Springs and back to Old Fort Quitman and have time to return in time to 
rescue Grierson at Tinaja De Las Palmas. This is particularly anomalous given the poor physical 
shape he was in, by his own account, when he reported to Grierson at Eagle Springs.147 However, 
his mention of a picket being ambushed, several killed and survivors arriving at his camp in their 
underclothes appears to be a very close match to the events on the 28 October, 1880. Flipper notes 
that the men were buried where they fell and that he was asked to lead the service “after which a 
volley was fired and the buglers sounded taps.”148 We know that the five men were buried at, or very 
near, to where they fell, as these graves have been formally memorialised at Ojo Calientes, Texas. 
So it would appear that Flipper’s night-time courier duty was more likely undertaken on the night 
AAG, DoTx, 31 Dec., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31 Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, 
RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168 (Note: This latter report contained as Letter No. 3 in Letters 
sent 1881).
140 Baldwin to AAAG, DoP, 28 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records 
DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Capt Baldwin, Camp near Ojo Caliente, 28 Oct., 1880 
in Register of Letters Rec’d Mar. 23, 1878-Jan. 30, 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2, p.46, Letter No.140.
141 Baldwin to Viele, Eagle Springs, Texas, 28 Oct., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, 
HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
142 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
143 Ord to AG Chicago, 30 Oct., 1880, ‘Victorio Files’ NA, RG393, M1495, Roll 14; Bi-Monthly Company 
Muster Rolls for Company D, 10th Cavalry, Sept./Oct. 1880 in NA, RG94 Matthews, p.41.
Wellman suggests that Capt. Baldwin lost four men killed in a fight with some of Victorio’s warriors 
near Ojo Caliente, Texas, thereby preventing them returning to Victorio. As the war leader had arranged 
to meet this party at Tres Castillos he delayed his movement long enough to be caught by Col Terrazas. 
(1957, p.174) As we have seen on previous pages this interpretation of events is simply wrong. Indeed this 
story contradicts Wellman’s account of how Victorio was trapped at Tres Castillos.
144 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.392.
145 Harris, 1997, p.32 & 34. See Chapter 10.
146 Ibid, p.32
147 Ibid, p.34
148 Ibid, p.34
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of the 29/30 October to warn Grierson of the 
attack. This will have been just as potentially 
dangerous as, in the immediate aftermath of 
the attack Flipper could have had no idea of 
the subsequent activities of the Apaches who 
had perpetrated this attack.
It was at first supposed that the attackers 
were the 30 escaped Apaches reported by 
Terrazas,149 but this estimate was quickly revised to suggest a group of 20 Mescaleros150, who were 
thought to have been driven south when Buell was ordered to take four cavalry companies into the 
Sacramento Mountains on 22 September 1880.151 This story seems unlikely, as Buell was moving 
his expedition into Mexico many miles to the west of the Sacramento Mountains on that date. 
Terrazas also reported his 30 Apaches as being too far away from Ojo Caliente, Texas. However, 
it was strenuously denied that this group could have left the Mescalero reservation. Since April, 
in the aftermath of Hembrillo Canyon, the Mescaleros detained on the reservation had remained 
under strong guard.152 This is a clear example of the speculative ‘it-must-have-been’ approach used 
by the US army when attempting to calculate the numbers of Apache warriors at large, and who 
might be responsible for any attack. It also reinforces the argument that there were more Apache 
warriors at large who had not been trapped at Tres Castillos. Terrazas may well have been moni-
toring the movements of 30 Apache warriors, but quite how he managed to accomplish this after 
he had withdrawn his forces and celebrated his victory in Chihuahua City is not clear. Moreover, 
Terrazas’ statement does not rule out another group of Apaches from Victorio’s following, who 
had escaped his attention altogether. It also fails to acknowledge that Apache warriors, unencum-
bered by women and children, could travel long distances in a very short time. This could have 
been an attack by independent Mescaleros, who might have hidden in the Sacramento Mountains 
after the operation to disarm and dismount the Mescalero Apaches. However, this attack has all 
the hallmarks of a Chihenne/Chiricahua Apache-led attack. The modus operandi looks similar to 
techniques used by Victorio in his campaign against the US and Mexico. A glance at the Tenth 
Cavalry’s casualty rate in 1880, compared with that of 1879, would suggest that, in the latter period, 
149 Ord to AG Chicago 30 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
150 Pope to Whipple AAG Chicago, 29 Oct., 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 528.
151 ‘Indian Affairs’ Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 6 Nov., 1880, p.261.
152 NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, MDoM, Vol. 13, 
pp.747-748.
Lt. Henry O. Flipper, Tenth Cavalry.
He was the first African-American to graduate 
from West Point. He was credited with making 
a dangerous night ride from Old Fort Quitman 
to Eagle Springs to warn Colonel Grierson that 
Victorio had crossed the Rio Grande just prior 
to the fight at Tinaja de Las Palmas. A closer 
examination of his memoir strongly suggests 
that this incident actually occurred at the end of 
October after the attack upon the Tenth Cavalry 
detachment stationed at Ojo Caliente, Texas. 
(National Archives)
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the Mescalero Apaches chose to minimise direct conflict with the US army. In 1879, the Tenth 
Cavalry sustained two men wounded in action, whereas in 1880, between May and October, the 
Tenth Cavalry sustained 10 killed in action, and three wounded in action, plus two Pueblo scouts 
killed in action. The higher casualty rate coincides with a period when the Chihenne or Chiricahua 
Apaches, allied with Mescalero Apaches, were known to be operating in western Texas. While this 
information could be utilised to construct an argument that the Chihennes were more aggressive, 
or even courageous, than the Mescalero Apaches, this is not very convincing. A more plausible 
explanation is quite simple: the Chihennes had lost their reservation; the Mescaleros were still on 
their reservation. In other words, the Chihennes had far more to fight for than their Mescalero 
allies. For those Chihennes, including Victorio, who had chosen to fight, the San Carlos reserva-
tion was simply not an option. The attack at Ojo Caliente, Texas, was not something previously 
attempted by Mescalero Apaches during encounters with the Tenth Cavalry. The Ninth Cavalry’s 
experience of campaigning against the Warm Springs Apaches, during 1879–80, was of a number 
of episodes where Chihenne Apaches were, in favourable circumstances, more than willing to stand 
and fight against large numbers of US troops. In September and October 1880, Victorio’s followers 
had run short of ammunition. Victorio’s death did not obviate this shortage, and his warriors’ 
bold, point-blank assault, albeit in circumstances very much in their favour, netted 10 carbines and 
revolvers, plus a significant amount of ammunition. The Chihenne Apaches, so desperately short of 
munitions, simply had to take higher calculated risks in order to replenish their arms and ammuni-
tion, if they wished to continue their campaign for the return of their reservation in New Mexico. 
One suspects that Mescalero Apaches were probably present as allies of the Chihenne Apaches. 
In January 1881, Texas Rangers attacked a small camp of Mescalero Apaches, killing or scattering 
the Apaches in the ‘Last Indian Fight in Texas’. The Rangers recovered some of the slain Tenth 
Cavalrymen’s saddles from the abandoned campsite.153
Captain Baldwin may not have followed the Apaches into Mexico, but on 3 November 1880, 
Charles Berger, with 19 volunteers from B, I and K companies, Tenth Cavalry, led by Sergeant 
Diggs,154 did track this party deep into Chihuahua. (see document file no. 138.) On the first day 
of the pursuit, Berger followed the trail to a hill 18 miles into Mexico, where the Apaches had 
stopped and thrown up breastworks, to monitor any immediate pursuit. Berger estimated that the 
party was made up of 20–25 warriors. The trail then led into the Sierra de Los Pinos where Berger’s 
detachment camped, having covered some 30 miles. On the second day of his pursuit Berger found 
a strongly fortified camp at the top of the Sierra de Los Pinos, from which he judged the Apaches 
could have held off a regiment. Berger estimated that before these raiders had set off to attack the 
Tenth Cavalry, they had left their families at this strongpoint in the Sierra de Los Pinos. 
153 Gillett, 1976, p.209; See also Dimmick to Hatch 3 Feb., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.115-
116; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 204, Miscellaneous Records 1879-80, DoAz Record of events 14 Jan., 
1881-4 Sept., 1882: Loud to AAG, DoAz, 3 Feb., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 181, pp.12-13 
& p.14; McLaughlin, 5 Feb., 1881 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d 11 Oct., 1880 – 4 Feb., 1881, HQ 
Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2, p.30, Letter No.75.
154 Grierson to AAG, DoTx, 31 Dec., 1880 in Letters Sent 23 Aug.-31Dec., 1880, HQ Records DoP 
1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168 (Note: This report contained as Letter No. 3 in 
Letters sent 1881).
The men who travelled with Berger were: Co. B: Sgt. Charles Perry, Corp. Albert Tulsome, 
Trumpeter William Stanley, Blacksmith John Stewart and Privates Andrew Petry and James Riley; I 
Co. Sgt Robert Diggs, Farrier Lyam Parsons. Privates Jackson, Barlow, Charles Boyd, Andrew Drake, 
Hamson Rathis and Ben Polls; Co. K: Sgt. Lewis Conyus, Saddler John Thomas, Privates Scott Grand, 
E. Mussill. James Summers and Richard Budges. (Capt. Baldwin, 20 Nov., 1880 in in Letters Rec’d File 
19 Mar., 1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2).
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The trail then travelled to the south, and turned briefly to the west after leaving the Sierra de 
Los Pinos, before turning south along the eastern side of the Sierra Borracho.155 The Apaches had 
camped on a small mountain in the midst of this plain, 20 miles from the Sierra de Los Pinos. By 
that point, Berger estimated that they were following 30–35 ridden and 15–20 driven animals. 
The following morning, the trail was followed to the south west for another 10 miles, over very 
rough terrain, before they reached a place known as Los Tinajas, flanked by the Sierra el Fierro 
and the Sierra de Los Annons, or Arrons, Mountains. There was plenty of water, wood and game, 
and the detachment spent most of the day camped in this area. Berger reported that he had found 
the remains of a large camp of about 50 wickiups in the mountains to the west of Los Tinajas. He 
thought that this was the point where Victorio had camped for between eight and nine days after 
leaving the Laguna de Guzman with Terrazas ‘after him’.156 Having spent the nights of 5 and 6 
November being assaulted by wind, rain, hail and even snow, and with his horses threatening 
to collapse, he still followed this trail for another three miles further south, before discovering 
the raiders’ next camp. Following the trail over very rough terrain, another camp was discovered 
approximately 18 miles to the south. At this point, Berger judged that he was not gaining on the 
Apaches and turned for home. He followed his trail back to the Sierra de Los Pinos, rested his 
mounts for a day, and then made directly for Captain Baldwin’s camp on the Rio Grande. On this 
leg of his journey, he confirmed that two groups of three and one group of four Apache ponies had 
left the group travelling south east parallel to the Rio Grande. The detachment reached Captain 
Baldwin’s camp late on 9 November 1880,157 and Berger reached Fort Bliss on 13 November, from 
where Governor Terrazas was alerted to the passage of the Apaches through his territory. Berger 
was certain that none had returned to the United States.158
Lieutenant Nolan, commanding at Old Fort Quitman, predicted that these Apaches would 
move north of the border. To frustrate such an endeavour, he sent out several detachments of 
Tenth Cavalry to search along the Rio Grande for any signs that Apaches had crossed the border. 
Colonels Hatch, Buell and Terrazas were informed of these movements.159
After over a year’s hard campaigning, Victorio had finally been killed. Although, as noted 
earlier, Nana and his following would continue the fight, one of the most accomplished leaders of 
the Apache wars had come to the end of his struggle. If the following words were not uttered by 
Victorio, then they still reflect the thinking behind his resistance:
Every struggle, whether won or lost, strengthens us for the next to come. It is not good for 
people to have an easy life. They become weak and inefficient when they cease to struggle. 
Some need a series of defeats before developing the strength and courage to win a victory.160
155 If one consults the overall map of the Victorio campaign (Map. 4.1, in Watt, ‘I Will Not Surrender the 
Hair of a Horse’s Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879), the only clear link between modern maps and 
Berger’s report are the Sierra del Pino and the Sierra El Fierro. Nevertheless, these two reference points 
give a broad indication of the path taken by the Apaches. One suspects that part of what is marked as 
the Sierra El Hueso on today’s maps are the Sierra Borracho of Berger’s report.
156 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
157 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2.
158 Berger’s Report enclosed within Baldwin to Grierson, 10 Nov., 1880 in Letters Rec’d File 19 
Mar.,1878-14 Feb., 1881, HQ Records DoP 1878-1881, NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 2; Brinkerhoff to 
AAAG SF NM 14 Nov., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.616-619; Ist Lt. R.G. Smith to HQ , 
DoP, 19 Nov., 1880 in Letters Received by HQ DoNM Sept. 1865-Aug. 1890, NA, RG393, M1088, 
Roll 41, Jul.-Dec., 1880.
159 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31 Oct., 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.393-394.
160 Victorio quoted in Miller, 1995, p.260.
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It may seem strange to include this quote as a final comment on Victorio’s death. Yet if these words 
can be ascribed to the Apache leader, it does reveal a lot about the attitudes and beliefs which 
motivated him. It is worth noting that by April 1881, even some of his enemies were referring to 
Victorio as having been a ‘daring’ leader, when describing his efforts to close the Black Range to 
Anglo-American intruders.161 He had not taken the easy way out in his attempt to reach an accom-
modation with the Anglo-Americans in the early 1870s. Nor had he selected the path of least 
resistance when he eventually chose to resist Anglo-American efforts to move him and his people 
to San Carlos. There was, among some of the Apaches who chose to fight, an appreciation of the 
reality that they were unlikely to win. Yet, if we recall Opler’s comments, no matter how great 
the odds, many Chiricahua warriors thought that, if they fought hard enough, there was always a 
chance of achieving victory. According to Ball, both Juh and Nana also adopted this attitude, in 
response to a growing realisation that they were not going to prevail.162 Therefore, despite a heavy 
defeat on the Palomas River in May 1880, and setbacks at Tinaja de Las Palmas and Rattlesnake 
Springs in July–August 1880, Victorio seems to have retained the support of his followers and many 
of his allies. This has to be down to his outstanding status as a leader among his people but also 
shows their general commitment to the fight to win the return of their reservation at Ojo Caliente. 
Perhaps his role as a focal point for resistance to the Anglo-American reservation policy may help 
explain how the support of his followers lasted right up to, and beyond, his death at Tres Castillos.
161 The Grant County Herald, 2 Apr., 1881.
162 Ball, 1980, p.34.
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It is the old story, unjust treatment of the Indians by the Gov’t., promises broken, treaties 
violated and the Indians moved from one reservation to another against their will, until finally 
they break out and go on the War path and the army is called in to kill them. It is hard to fight 
against and shoot men down when you know they are in the right and are really doing what 
our fathers did in the Revolution, fighting for their country
 2nd Lieutenant, Walter Finley Ninth Cavalry
 (Letter dated Fort Bayard, 11 November, 1879)1
There are a number of reasons why the Victorio Campaign has become a relatively obscure episode 
in the history of the Apaches Wars that took place between 1860 and 1886. These factors could 
be linked by their political nature, being concerned with the distribution of resources both within 
and between different cultures. In other words, a broad definition of the politics related to this 
campaign would be recognised by any form of human society, no matter which of the myriad 
means by which societies practice politics it had chosen. Politics is about power, and how humans 
organise themselves into viable social groups. It is about conflict resolution, whether the conflict 
arises from within the social group or presents itself as an external threat. Such conflict arises 
from the attempt to distribute, and justify the distribution of, finite resources. For the Apaches, 
the small numbers of individuals involved, and the small range of roles (hunter/gatherer/raider/
warrior) available, encouraged the development of a variant of direct democracy. In this, power 
was invested in successful practitioners and innovators in the roles central to their survival. Leaders 
had to succeed in holding together their social group through persuasion, mediation and, if all else 
failed, violence. Apache leaders also had to demonstrate their ability to deal with external threats 
in the same manner.
The Apaches’ US and Mexican opponents acted according to the same principles, even if in a 
manner very different from that of these American Indians. Both countries explicitly recognised 
the concept of representative democracy, though the image and the reality of the practice could vary 
enormously. The size of US and Mexican societies precluded direct democracy; but these nations 
adopted different forms of representative democracy as the basic model to maintain social stability. 
The complex range of occupations in both societies necessitated the use of government institutions 
to provide leadership through persuasion, mediation and, if necessary, violence, in response to 
perceived internal and external threats to their social stability. Despite the complex organisation of 
government in the USA and Mexico, the basic goal of politics was the same as among the Apaches, 
just organised in a very different manner.
It is through a broad prism of ‘politics’ that we can examine various aspects of the Victorio 
Campaign. After all, as Clausewitz argued, to remove the ‘political’ from an act of war, renders that 
1 The Walter Lowry Finley Collection.
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act meaningless. A focus on politics will not cover all the factors relating to the campaign that we 
shall discuss; but it will provide a fresh insight into the motivation of many of the actors involved. 
The previous chapter recounted the death of Victorio, a central figure in the Apache resistance to 
the concentration policy devised for American Indians by the US Department of the Interior. Can 
his death be taken as an indication of his failure? The fact that his following showed no inclina-
tion to give up their campaign for the return of the reservation around Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, 
would suggest otherwise. If we examine the political goals of Victorio, Nana, Loco, Mangus and 
other Chihenne leaders, we might be able to evaluate the success or failure of their campaign for 
the return of Ojo Caliente by means of both war and peace.
Victorio and the Apache Resistance of 1876–1880 Re-evaluated
Although Victorio remained a rather elusive figure, there are indications that he and other Apache 
leaders had a clear notion of the above outline of politics. It was politics which influenced Victorio 
in his attempt to reach an accommodation with the USA in the early 1870s. It was also a political 
decision to turn from seeking accommodation to resistance. Victorio had been, in his eyes, given 
no other choice by the Department of the Interior. He clearly wanted to preserve an identity for his 
people, based around a reservation at Ojo Caliente. Whether he thought that a completely inde-
pendent way of life could be maintained is unclear. We have seen occasions when disagreements 
occurred among the Apaches over the direction of both accommodation and resistance policies. 
The outcome of such disagreements could be lethal for the losing party. Yet we have also seen that, 
when the need arose, both Victorio and Juh could settle their alleged differences and fight shoulder-
to-shoulder for a time; politics in Apache society being as varied and unpredictable as in our own 
society.
We can also ask ourselves whether the political decision to confront the USA and the Republic 
of Mexico was worth the consequences. While the US army did not ‘win’ the conflict between 
1877 and 1881, one suspects that few Apaches would claim that they had won this fight. Both 
sides had failed to achieve their political goals; one side having failed to secure their reservation 
at Ojo Caliente; the other side having failed to force the Apaches onto a reservation where they 
did not wish to live. Yet it could be argued that the resistance mounted, and the sacrifices made, 
by Victorio, Nana and their followers between 1877 and1881 was a key element of the resistance 
mounted by the Apaches between 1876 and 1886. It was this resistance which spared the Apaches 
from the ultimate logic of the Department of the Interior’s policy of concentration.
In October 1881, there was a disturbance at the Mescalero reservation, following which two men 
fled into the hills. Their flight was triggered by a rumour that their tribe were about to be removed 
to San Carlos.2 This caused a flurry of queries concerning whether a decision to effect the removal 
of the Mescaleros had already been taken. General Pope stated that if the Mescaleros were to be 
removed, then this operation should be turned over to the military. If not, he predicted that the 
men would de-camp en masse.3 General Sheridan felt obliged to register a clear protest at any effort 
2 Llewellyn, Indian Agent, Mescalero Agency to Col. G.V. Henry Camp La Luz, N.M. 18 Oct., 1881, 
NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.823.
3 Pope to AG, thro. HQ , MDoM, 29 Oct., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.824 See also various 
correspondence concerning possible removal of the Mescalero Apaches, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.835-840; See also Letters Rec’d by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1881-
1889, NA, M689, Roll 44, Correspondence and reports mainly concerning efforts to capture hostile 
Apache Indians who were terrorising the border region of the District of New Mexico, Jul.-Dec. 1881.
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to remove the Mescaleros, which certainly appears to have been rooted in recent experiences with 
the Chihenne Apaches:
if such a removal is contemplated, I desire to register my protest against it. The reservation 
of these Indians has been the hot bed of sedition, theft and murder, and I think it best not 
to transfer these evils to any new place, which would be done by transferring these Indians, 
besides they would not stay at any other place, and we would have similar troubles to those 
created by the removal of Victorio’s band over again.
The best way to deal with these indians, and get security from them, is to let them stay 
where they are and turn the Agency over to the military.4
It is quite clear that in 1881–82 the complete removal of the Apaches from Arizona and New Mexico 
was being considered by the Department of the Interior. The stated reason was the continued 
trouble with the Apaches and the difficulty of dealing with them because of their close proximity 
to the Mexican border.5 General Pope went as far as to inform Colonel MacKenzie, Commanding 
Officer, District of New Mexico, that he had learned ‘unofficially’ that the Mescaleros were to be 
removed to the ‘Cimarron near Fort Union’.6 Clearly the strong advice received from the likes of 
Pope and Sheridan prevailed; but it should also be noted that they themselves had earlier advocated 
the removal of the Mescaleros. What had happened to change their minds? In effect the resistance 
to concentration mounted by Chiricahua or Warm Springs and Mescalero Apaches had convinced 
Pope, Sheridan and most field officers that the concentration policy directed at the Apaches had 
failed.
It should be obvious that the warfare with the Apaches from 1877 to 1880 that led up to this 
intervention by the generals had largely been triggered by a political attempt to squeeze the Apaches 
onto a single reservation, in contravention of treaties signed by them with the US Government. In 
the case of Victorio, he and his people endured a great deal of provocation before a large element of 
the Warm Springs Apaches decided to fight to the finish, in an attempt to return to their reserva-
tion at Ojo Caliente. The question is, did Victorio’s resistance achieve something, even in spite of 
his death? In one sense, the deportation of the Chiricahuas to Florida in 1886, and their subsequent 
treatment, could lead one to argue that the answer was an emphatic ‘no’. 
However, looking at the question from another angle, we can ask: without the implacable resist-
ance to US concentration policy exhibited by Victorio and other Apaches between 1876 and 1886, 
would the Apache reservation system have looked the same? The long-term logic of the concentra-
tion policy seems to have been missed, probably because there was no further attempt to implement 
this policy. The concentration policy to put all the Apaches onto the San Carlos Reservation was 
not going to be the end of the process. The ultimate logic of the concentration policy was that the 
Apaches were destined for the Indian Territory. The consideration of this option in 1881–82 for the 
Mescalero Apaches does not necessarily mean that the option had not been considered, concerning 
the Apaches in general, by the US government. The reason that this policy was not carried further 
can be reduced to the fact that there was so much resistance generated by the first stage of the 
concentration policy, implemented in 1876 and 1877. It had become patently obvious what levels of 
resistance would be provoked if the next stage was implemented. To see the US army as the driving 
force behind US Indian policy, let alone as an autonomous and brutal machine for killing Indians, is 
grossly inaccurate. The army was at the forefront of resisting any further efforts at concentrating the 
Apaches upon one reservation; but the US army was but one element of the Federal Government 
of the United States. While the US army had to implement policies towards the American Indians, 
it was not formulating these policies. The Department of the Interior, through the Office of Indian 
Affairs, was the driving force behind Indian policy and, under the guise of assimilation, this policy 
was, effectively, intended to cram as many American Indians onto as little land as possible. Where 
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the American Indians were concerned, the prime policy of the Department of the Interior was to 
clear as much land for the use of civilised Americans as possible. It was this basic policy, with the 
additional ingredients of political corruption and bureaucratic rationalisation, which caused the 
Apache Wars of 1876–86. Victorio’s leadership was a key element of the resistance which succeeded 
in preventing the process of concentration proceeding to its logical conclusion.
Victorio himself remains a most elusive figure, due to his extreme caution concerning face-to-
face dealings with Americans and Mexicans. Of those who encountered him, very few recorded 
their impressions. What we do know of him from these encounters, complemented by Apache 
recollections of him collected by Eve Ball, strongly suggests a great leader.
If one combines the military records of the campaign with knowledge of the general principles of 
Apache warfare, one can put forward a very strong case for Victorio’s reputation as an unparalleled 
master of guerrilla warfare techniques.
During this campaign, he and his men quite simply ran the Ninth Cavalry Regiment into the 
ground, using strategies and tactics primarily designed to target the horses of his opponents in such 
a way as to simultaneously keep the pressure off his own logistics. This was so effective that by the 
end of May 1880, General Sherman was forced to inform Colonel Hatch that the US army could 
not spend the money required to purchase replacement horses and mules until the next appropria-
tion of funds was approved by Congress at the beginning of July 1880. The Ninth Cavalry sustained 
approximately 34.4 percent of the overall losses of US army horses in the period July 1879 to June 
1880. Not all these casualties can necessarily be laid at Victorio’s door; but a high proportion must 
have been incurred due to the hard field service imposed by Victorio. When Victorio confronted 
Grierson’s forces in western Texas in July–August 1880, an analysis of the probable intent of the 
Apaches shows this mini-campaign to have been a far closer run contest than was realized at the 
time, and one in which Grierson was quite lucky to have prevailed. When ammunition shortages 
prevented him from adopting one evasion strategy, Victorio changed his tactics and was profoundly 
unlucky to have been caught at Tres Castillos. He had come within an ace of outrunning and 
evading the large forces arrayed against him.
Nana’s, and possibly Mangus’s, continuation of the struggle after Victorio’s death also shows 
that Victorio was a graduate of a social system which was adept at promoting its talented leadership 
candidates to the top. The Warm Springs Apaches did not collapse after Victorio’s death, simply 
because there were other skilled and experienced leaders who were more than capable of continuing 
the struggle.
In acknowledging that the skill behind Apache guerrilla warfare techniques is the product of 
intelligent human beings, it must also be noted that the Apaches in general, and Victorio was no 
exception, were not infallible. Victorio was caught off guard several times during the campaign. At 
Cuchillo Negro in September 1879, he lost two warriors when the Apaches misjudged the size of 
the opposition and opted to fight instead of fleeing. Parker’s Apache scouts inflicted a disastrous 
defeat in May 1880, but the decisive support for Parker’s scouts did not materialise. In West Texas, 
Grierson managed to prevent Victorio’s attempt to pass through to the Mescalero reservation in 
July and August 1880. This rebuff probably caused the ammunition shortages, and the risk-laden 
evasion tactics, forced on Victorio in September–October 1880, which ended in the disaster at Tres 
Castillos. As guerrilla warfare experts, the Apaches can be seen as masters of their art. But they 
were not perfect.
The key political point is that the tenacity of the Apaches’ resistance certainly gave the US army 
pause for thought, and provoked them to a serious consideration of their stated goals. Thus, it can 
be argued that the Apache resistance had a measure of long-term success in staving off the full 
implications of the US concentration policy; and Victorio’s short-term goal of a return of the Ojo 
Caliente reservation came very close to fruition.
416 Horses Worn to Mere Shadows
There is very little evidence that justifies Victorio’s alleged descent into an orgy of violence and 
cruelty. He may simply represent the more general nature of Apache guerrilla warfare, where all 
sides adopted an approach to war in which there were no accepted notions of non-combatants, ille-
gitimate targets, neutrals, and similar exclusionary designations theoretically honoured by contem-
porary US and Mexican combatants. Another problem for the Apaches in this area is that they did 
not win. The old adage that ‘the winners write history’ is critical. The United States and Mexico 
were happy enough to adopt the very same ‘total warfare’ principles even as they condemned their 
use by the Apaches. Victorio may also, ironically, be a victim of his own personal success during his 
last period of resistance. Even given that many of the reports circulated at the time were exagger-
ated, it is clear that his last war killed a large number of people in the south west United States and 
northern Mexico. This number may never be fully quantified, but if one speaks to descendants of 
Mexican and American people in southern New Mexico today, one gets the distinct impression of 
a ‘folk memory’ of a dreadful period of conflict. This still survives in some of the older inhabitants 
of the state and those local historians who strive to keep the story alive. This has expanded in the 
telling over time, and is probably the root of Victorio’s particularly fearsome reputation for cruelty. 
Victorio took few prisoners; but there is little evidence of an unusually savage war, which marks his 
resistance as different from other American-Apache conflicts.
Victorio was provoked into war by the policy of concentration, a failure to supervise reserva-
tion staff, and similar unjust practices. However, given the centrality of raiding and warfare to the 
Apache life-way, it would be unsafe to argue that, if the reservation policy had been implemented 
as promised, and honest personnel appointed to staff the reservations, there would have been no 
hostilities. Even when based at Ojo Caliente, the Warm Springs Apaches had been involved in 
raiding. Had the Warm Springs Apaches been left on the reservation around Ojo Caliente, the 
chances are that Victorio and many of his followers would not have supported any subsequent 
conflict, and would almost certainly have acted directly against any militants themselves. In this 
case, the fighting would probably have been negligible and worthy only a footnote in the history of 
the Western Frontier.
The use of Apache scouts in General Crook’s campaigns of the early 1870s, and from 1882 
onwards, is well documented and acknowledged as the decisive factor in the defeat of independent 
Apaches during those years. The scouts’ contribution to the Victorio campaign is equally decisive, 
but less well known. Their presence thwarted at least one ambush in the Guzman Mountains, 
in October 1879. Most of the skirmishes during the campaign in which the US army came off 
worst can be associated with a lack of Apache scouts. It is also clear that the independent Apaches 
made efforts to avoid Apache scouts if they knew of their presence. This is particularly evident 
from Nana’s Raid in 1881. (See Volume III) Where Nana encountered Apache scouts, he fought 
rearguard actions and attempted to evade his pursuers as quickly as possible. When he stood and 
fought, the odds may have been otherwise in his favour, but part of his calculations was that there 
were no Apache scouts present. Finally, on the Palomas River in May 1880, the Apache scouts 
inflicted by far the heaviest defeat that Victorio suffered on US soil.
Political Performance of the US Army between 1876 and 1881
When the concentration policy stirred up Apache resistance, the US army was expected to deal 
with such ‘intransigence’ through a mixture of force and negotiation. Where the Army failed to do 
this successfully, there has been a tendency to deal leniently with its version of events. In certain 
instances, casualties and skirmishes have been conveniently forgotten or glossed over. At a more 
general level, we have seen that officers involved in the campaign were amazed to find its absence 
from records and the inclusion of far less important expeditions and campaigns in the record. The 
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Victorio Campaign is unique in that all but one of the recipients of the Medal of Honor had to 
wait over a decade before having their bravery officially acknowledged. Racism aside, this may 
also reflect a ‘feeling’ in the upper reaches of the US army command that the less said about the 
Victorio Campaign the better. In fact, there seems to have been a deliberate attempt to play down 
the severity of the Apache Campaigns of 1879–81 as can be seen by the omission of this campaign 
from the official list of Indian campaigns sent to the US army pensions Office.
In 1879 Pope noted that:
they [the Apaches] have not done much harm except in a small way, and that the troops are in 
the field most of the time to prevent this … they continue to break out from time to time in 
small parties or individually, and rob and steal in a small but very irritating way.7
Sherman stated in his report for 1881 that:
Whilst the troops have been kept very busy during the past year, no serious Indian or other 
war has occurred, but great progress has been made in collecting and locating Indians, hitherto 
hostile, on their proper reservations.8
Pope reiterated his original opinion at the end of the Victorio Campaign:
The raids of the Apaches into Southern New Mexico for the last two years bear no resemblance 
to an Indian War or general outbreak. They rather resemble the operations of the cow-boys and 
other bands of robbers on the frontier, or to the parties of train-robbers in Missouri. There is no 
great difficulty in dealing with them when found. The difficulty is to find them.9
A senate resolution asking for the cost to the United States of Indian wars between 1872 and 
1882 was passed on 24 January 1882.10 The response, by Robert T. Lincoln, the then Secretary of 
War, lists a number of Indian wars and gives the distinct impression that war with the Apaches 
commenced in 1881, with a cost to the Quartermaster’s Department of $43, 850;11 yet other 
elements of the report make it clear that Apache prisoners of war were being held from 1877–81.12 
7 Gen. Pope’s Report, 3 Oct., 1879 in Annual Reports of the War Department, NA, M997, Roll 33, 1879 
Vol. I-II, p.83.
8 Annual Report of General Sherman, 3 Nov., 1881 cited in Personal File Eugene D. Dimmick, NA, 
RG94, Entry 297, Box 1496.
9 General Pope Annual Report 22 Sept., 1881 cited in Personal File Eugene D. Dimmick, NA, RG94, 
Entry 297, Box 1496; Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Annual Report for Year ending 22 
Sept., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.846.
10 Papers and a report of 4 Mar., 1882, from the Secretary of War relating to a statement of expenditures 
for Indian wars and for the observation and control of Indians from 1 Jul., 1871-20 Jun., 1882; Letters 
Rec’d by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 77.
11 See Statement A Cost of Indian wars since 1872 as shown by the records of the Quartermaster General 
in Papers and a report of 4 Mar., 1882, from the Secretary of War relating to a statement of expenditures 
for Indian wars and for the observation and control of Indians from 1 Jul., 1871-20 Jun., 1882; Letters 
Rec’d by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 77, p.3.
12 See Statement B Table showing expenditures incident to Indian wars entailed upon the Subsistence 
Department of the Army during the fiscal years 1872 to 1881, inclusive, over and above the cost of 
subsisting the Army during the same periods in Papers and a report of 4 Mar., 1882, from the Secretary 
of War relating to a statement of expenditures for Indian wars and for the observation and control of 
Indians from 1 Jul., 1871-20 Jun., 1882; Letters Rec’d by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main 
Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 77, pp.3-4.
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Later in the report, the conflict with the Apaches was stated to have occurred in 1879 and 1880–81, 
with the cost of the 1879 conflict to the Quartermaster’s Department estimated at $43, 850.13 The 
exact correspondence of two figures cannot be coincidental. All this achieves is to reinforce the 
impression that some effort was being made to ‘downplay’ the impact of the Victorio Campaign on 
the US army.
In 1908, the War Department issued the criteria for several campaign badges, including an 
Indian campaign badge. The Bannock War of 1878, operations against the Northern Cheyenne in 
1878–79, and the Ute War of 1879–80 are included. There is no mention of operations against the 
Apaches in Arizona, New Mexico and Texas in 1879–81. The regulations state that a campaign 
medal will be awarded:
in any serious action with hostile Indians in which there have been killed or wounded upon the 
side of the troops; decision to be made in each case of the latter class, upon individual applica-
tion, whether the action concerned was such as to be properly considered serious within the 
meaning of the order.14
There was also a fairly widespread feeling among many field officers that Victorio was ‘in the right’. 
They felt that the Office of Indian Affairs’ policy and mismanagement had provoked the Victorio 
War.15 It is fashionable to see the US Cavalry as a mindless ‘Indian–killing’ institution;16 yet in this 
case, it can be argued that many officers felt that they had been handed a political problem that 
should never have happened. These officers were not alone. An article in the New York Times of 29 
October 1880 gave an excellent review of the effects of Victorio’s war and underlined the fact that 
had the Warm Springs Apaches been given the reservation they desired, such a war could have 
been avoided.17 
However, the most interesting aspect of the Victorio campaign, where study of the US army is 
concerned, is the range of internal and external political obstacles, and how the field commanders, 
in some cases, overcame these barriers. One gets a strong impression that the US army performed 
far better than could be reasonably have been expected in spite of these political impediments. 
‘Buffalo Soldiers’: The African-American Role in the Victorio Campaign
So far, use of the term ‘buffalo soldier’ has been kept to a minimum. Dobak and Phillips make the 
point that this label does not appear to have been widely used by the Ninth and Tenth Cavalrymen 
themselves.18 Two out of the three instances when this term was used during the Victorio Campaign 
13 See Statement C Expenditure on account of Indian wars from 1872 to 1881 in Papers and a report of 4 
Mar., 1882, from the Secretary of War relating to a statement of expenditures for Indian wars and for 
the observation and control of Indians from 1 Jul., 1871-20 Jun., 1882; Letters Rec’d by the Office of the 
Adjutant General (Main Series), 1881-1889, NA, M689, Roll 77, p.5.
14 General Orders, No. 129. War Department, Washington, 13 Aug., 1908 cited in Personal File Michael 
Cooney, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 1067; See also General Orders, No. 170. War Department, 
Washington, 15 Aug., 1907 cited in Personal File George R. Burnett, NA, RG94, Entry 297, Box 941.
15 Public Affairs Office White Sands Missile Range Website: Hembrillo Battlefield; See also General 
Crook cited by Cocker, p.217.
16 To counter such a stereotypical view see comments by General Pope. (HQ DoM, Annual Report for 
Year ending 22 Sept., 1881, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.848-849).
17 ‘The End of Victorio’, The New York Times, 29 Oct., 1880.
18 Dobak & Phillips, 2001, p.xvii & p.231.
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stem from the territorial press, and in neither case was use of the term complimentary. For the 
purposes of this conclusion, however, it is a useful blanket term.
The most important point to note is that the Victorio Campaign is the buffalo soldiers’ campaign. 
This is not to deny other US army units’ involvement in the campaign; but bar the Palomas River 
battle in May 1880, and one or two other skirmishes, the buffalo soldiers were involved all of the 
major battles, and most of the skirmishes, in the Victorio Campaign.
The paradox, as outlined in the previous volume19 is that buffalo soldier narratives tend to simul-
taneously highlight and obscure the role of the Apaches. However, if we examine the role of the 
Apaches and the African-American cavalrymen as a whole, during this the campaign, we gain a 
more robust view of both the Apaches and the Ninth and Tenth Cavalrymen. Where the buffalo 
soldiers are concerned, an overview of their performance in this campaign does tend to question 
the popular narrative, which tends to portray these troops as exemplary in all aspects of soldiering. 
This appears to have been born of a tendency to focus on particularly heroic episodes, and a gener-
alisation derived from these soldiers’ relatively low desertion and high re-enlistment rates. If we 
examine the Victorio campaign as a whole, the heroic instances remain; and comparative desertion 
rates were indeed low, though where the Ninth Cavalry was concerned the overall desertion rates 
increased noticeably between 1880 and 1881. Yet, in general, the Apaches experienced little diffi-
culty when confronting the buffalo soldiers during this period. 
There is a case to be made for saying that the Tenth Cavalry fared better against Victorio; but the 
area they were picketing was much smaller than that covered by the Ninth Cavalry. Most of the 
time, the Apaches, led by Victorio and Nana, out-manoeuvred and out-fought their buffalo soldier 
opponents. When we place the winning of the Regiment’s Medals of Honor in the context of the 
overall campaign, these medals were usually won during episodes where the Apaches had taken the 
upper hand, or were even moving in for the kill. It should also be argued that the focus on admi-
rably low desertion rates amongst the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry Regiments does not automatically 
indicate a higher discipline or fighting quality than amongst other US cavalry regiments.
So what conclusions can we draw concerning the overall performance of the buffalo soldiers? 
They were generally solid and reliable troops, whose experienced NCOs could usually be trusted to 
exercise independent command. Yet they were hamstrung by two factors: first, they were faced by 
an enemy whose principles of warfare were very difficult for US troops in general to effectively chal-
lenge without the help of Apache scouts; and second, as we have seen, they were further hampered 
in their ability to confront Apaches through both internal and external political factors. If we 
include this in our analysis of the campaign, then one does wonder at the buffalo soldiers’ ability to 
stay in the field for as long as they did, particularly as Victorio often encouraged such pursuits for 
the damage he knew the buffalo soldiers would sustain. When we consider that Victorio effectively 
rendered the Ninth Cavalry unable to continue in the field by targeting the Regiment’s horses 
and pack mules, we also have to acknowledge that the regiment was already short of horses, due 
to political factors beyond the comprehension of their Apache opponents. It should also be noted 
that this situation appears to have been a chronic complaint among the Cavalry Regiments in the 
southwest, be they black or white. 
Nor is there any suggestion that white troops had a better record against the Apaches, though 
the territorial press of the time would generally have us believe otherwise. Captain Kramer and 
his Sixth Cavalry troops were easily dealt with by Victorio’s warriors in Rocky Canon in May 
1880. The Apaches also stopped Captain Parker’s Fourth Cavalrymen with consummate ease near 
Fort Cummings in September 1880. Interestingly, both detachments were accompanied by Apache 
19 [Footnote Text ?????????????]
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scouts. Nevertheless, the key problem for the buffalo soldiers is that, despite their efforts, they did 
not inflict a defeat on either Victorio or Nana in the field.
One key aspect of the buffalo soldiers’ involvement, however, must also be acknowledged. They 
were often active and willing participants in the forced removal of American Indians from their 
ancestral lands, and modern attempts to change this view should be seen as gross distortions of 
history. The buffalo soldiers are gaining increasing recognition for their role in the American West 
in 1866–91. They have yet to receive the measured recognition they deserve for their role as key 
participants in the Victorio Campaign; but this role pitted them against people defending what was 
rightfully theirs.
Mexican Involvement in the Victorio Campaign
North of the border, the Mexican population was often caught between the Apaches and their 
Anglo-American opponents. Knowing the widespread contempt in which they were held by many 
Anglo-Americans, some were probably very content to provide trading opportunities for the 
Apaches, in order to spite their common enemy. This did not, however, make them immune from 
attack by the Apaches, through the legacy of ‘trade-hate’ relations between the Apaches and the 
Mexicans.
The involvement of the Mexican state in combating the Apaches under Victorio meant it has 
been necessary for us to examine the complex political relationship between the federal government 
of Mexico and the United States. It has also allowed us to examine the relative political autonomy 
of the State of Chihuahua vis-à-vis the federal government of Mexico. While the latter was theo-
retically organised as a federal republic, the state of Chihuahua was politically more akin to a feudal 
state. This included a role in international affairs, where the State of Chihuahua felt able to reach 
‘unofficial’ accords with actors employed by the US War Department before the federal government 
of Mexico ratified an agreement.
The military forces of the state of Chihuahua were far more effective than they are necessarily 
given credit for. They were certainly more effective than many civilian posses raised on the US side 
of the border. Alonso reveals a whole social structure that was geared towards actual service in, 
or contributions to, the maintenance of the state-level military units in Sonora and Chihuahua. 
It is quite clear that Mexico was riven with periodic political instability; yet despite such conflict, 
Mexican armed forces were, on an ad hoc basis, often far better organised and equipped than one 
would have expected in these circumstances.
The practice of collecting and handing in scalps for bounty, and the summary execution of pris-
oners, is now, and was then, seen in many quarters as distasteful in the extreme. Yet we must 
remember that these activities were not necessarily practiced in all circumstances. Both the Apaches 
and the Mexicans lived in, at least to outsiders, a bizarre relationship with each other, and were 
capable of perpetrating quite appalling acts against each other. Equally, both sides were willing to 
adopt captives, usually children, into their respective social groupings. In other words, both sides 
saw this complex relationship as a political solution that would allow the two communities to live in 
close proximity. To Victorio, such relations were fraught with danger, if one let one’s guard down; 
but trading between Apaches and Mexican towns was an essential element to both communities. 
The fact remains: Mexicans on both sides of the border played a key role in the Victorio Campaign 
and, deserve recognition for this.
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The Victorio Campaign: The Key Episode in the Apache Wars of 1876–86?
In late August 1881, the Apache Wars of popular historic perception flared up with a vengeance. 
In response to concerns about the activities of an Apache spiritual leader who was camped near 
Cibecue Creek in Arizona, Sixth Cavalrymen and Apache scouts under Colonel Carr attempted to 
affect his arrest. In the clash that followed, the Apache scouts mutinied and killed one officer and 
six troopers. The spiritual leader and a number of Apaches were also killed. The military build-up 
which followed this mutiny encouraged Juh, Naiche and many other Chiricahua warriors to leave 
with their families for Mexico.
The US army’s actions at Cibecue and after are often portrayed as being heavy-handed and 
unnecessary. However, taken in the context of the sustained fighting against Victorio, and his 
successor Nana, over the previous two years, is the army’s ‘over-reaction’ surprising? The latest 
round of fighting had only just died away. So, it seems justifiable to ask whether the rise of an 
Apache ‘prophet’, preaching a vision of white withdrawal from Apacheria, would have been taken 
so seriously if the event had not been preceded by two years of relentless guerrilla warfare. The rise 
of such a shaman merely reflected general dissatisfaction among the Apaches with their treatment 
by US federal authorities. It was these federal institutions, the Department of the Interior, which 
had decided to bring together a dangerous cocktail of Apache clans and tribes, who often saw each 
other as deadly enemies, on a single reservation. The US government had also failed to provide 
the promised resources by which those Apaches who had accepted the transition to reservation 
life could sustain themselves. Signs of increased unrest among the Apaches in general, and the 
potential effect on the Chiricahuas in particular, must have thoroughly alarmed the local US army 
command. Would their reaction have been the same if the Victorio Campaign had not occurred? 
Victorio’s resistance was a major, cumulative factor that fundamentally influenced the progress 
of events in August–September 1881 and beyond. One could go even further and argue that the 
Victorio Campaign had been the high-water mark of Chiricahua and Chihenne Apache resist-
ance to the US and Mexico. It illustrated the utter chaos that could be inflicted by fewer than 
200 Apache warriors. It was this experience that made it imperative that the US army deal with a 
similar coalition of Chiricahuas, which had gathered in the Sierra Madre by the summer of 1882.
The fact remains that while the campaigns of 1881–84 and 1885–86 are far better known and 
more frequently written about, it is only when they are viewed in conjunction with the Victorio 
Campaign that they can be seen to be the last acts in a much longer period of conflict dating back 
to 1876. The most intensive period of this warfare occurred during the attempt by Victorio and 
Nana to maintain their claim to their New Mexico homeland in 1879–81. The religious gathering 
at Cibecue was feared, by the US army, as the prelude to a repeat of the Victorio Campaign. This 
was to be avoided at all costs. In the short-term, the army failed, and the conflict did spread. In 
the long-term, however, the US army did avoid an escalation in warfare to the levels seen in the 
Victorio Campaign. Following the peace of 1883, after General Crook led his expedition into the 
Sierra Madres, there was no further raiding by the Chiricahua Apaches.20 And in 1885, the General 
showed that he was well aware of just what a victory his Sierra Madre campaign represented: 
For more than two years there was not a single depredation committed by the Apaches, the 
first time within the memory of white men that so long an interval of peace had been enjoyed 
in Arizona and New Mexico. The destruction of Victorio and a portion of his band in Mexico, 
November 20, 1880 [15th October 1880], did not stop hostilities on the part of his survivors as 
20 Crook to Assistant Adjutant General, HQ Division of the Pacific, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. 9 
Sept., 1885, NA, RG393, Part 1 Entry 187, Manuscript Reports, Dept of Arizona 1880-1885, p.14.
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was so confidently predicted at the time. The records at the Headquarters of my Department, 
incomplete as they possibly may be, show that in Arizona and New Mexico alone over fifty 
white people, men, women and children, were killed by these Indians between the time of 
Victorio’s death and September 4, 1882, when I assumed command of the Department of 
Arizona, and this apart from their constant depredations and outrages in Mexico. I knew that 
there had not been a time within fifteen {15} years that the Chiricahuas had been at peace, 
but that during this whole time they had been constantly depredating either in Mexico or in 
this country. I fully realised that the property interests in Arizona and New Mexico had enor-
mously increased since the campaign against Victorio and that we could not afford another war 
with these Indians, that would be so much more disastrous and marked by so much more of 
atrocity and destruction, owing to the increase in population and property interests and would 
also probably be of longer duration.21
The key achievement of General Crook’s Sierra Madre campaign was to persuade this new gath-
ering of Chiricahua warriors that their resistance was unsustainable. Led by Juh, Nana, Kaytennae, 
Chato, Chihuahua, Jolsanny and other seasoned leaders, these Apaches had the potential to repeat 
the chaos unleashed under the leadership of Victorio. Indeed at least two of Victorio’s key lieuten-
ants, Nana and Kaytennae, were highly influential leaders of this gathering. Crook delivered the 
political victory lacking in the Victorio Campaign and, most importantly, accomplished this before 
a repeat of that campaign could be unleashed.
Politics and the Victorio Campaign’s Relative Obscurity
As Deverell argues, there are many facets to the overarching concept of the ‘Old West’ or the ‘Wild 
West’. The element that binds these facets into a recognisable whole, to Deverell, is the exercise of 
political power by the state.22
The definition of politics advanced by Deverell is somewhat narrow compared with that 
concerning the use and distribution of resources within and between cultures used by Leftwich. 
Yet Deverell’s position is an excellent launching pad for presenting the complex history of the 
Victorio campaign. It encompasses many patterns of conflict and cooperation, both within and 
between several cultures; but what links these together is their political nature.
The campaign itself marked failed attempts by both the Apaches and the US army to achieve 
their own immediate political goals: the former failed to hold onto an independent way of life in 
territory claimed by the United States; the latter failed to achieve the successful implementation 
of US Indian policy, on behalf of the Department of the Interior, by, as Clausewitz would put it, 
‘other means’.
There were a number of other complex political relationships between various groups and insti-
tutions who became embroiled in the Victorio Campaign. They included the relations within and 
between the federal and state levels of both the United States and the Republic of Mexico. And 
there were all the political constraints imposed on the US army by dint of its membership of a 
wider political system in which it was, and still is, regarded as a servant of Congress. This role, 
to be fair to its commanders, was broadly accepted by the army. Yet it is also plain that, within 
the broader confines of this bureaucratic arrangement, members of the structure of governance 
sometimes acted with relative autonomy, particularly when they believed that the overall structure 
21 Crook to Assistant Adjutant General, HQ Division of the Pacific, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. 9 
Sept., 1885, NA, RG393, Part 1 Entry 187, Manuscript Reports, Dept of Arizona 1880-1885, pp.14-15.
22 See Deverell, 1996.
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was undermining specific policy goals they supported. The two most obvious examples of this 
were, first, the recruitment of additional Apache scouts without official sanction; and second, the 
political manoeuvring which allowed Terrazas and Buell to cooperate with each other in Mexico, 
when they clearly had no official sanction from either federal government.
There is a subtle twist to this story which may explain the relative obscurity of the Victorio 
Campaign in the history of the Apache Wars. Most of the political factors covered in this work are 
not unique to this conflict on the western frontier. What is unique is the political failure of both 
sides to achieve their short-term political goals. The Victorio War is an excellent practical example 
of the Apache strategy and tactics deployed in an unrelenting period of guerrilla warfare between 
1879 and 1881. It is also a very good example of how the US army fought, from their point of view, 
a limited war with an even more limited budget, yet still managed to generally perform better than 
could have been expected. In fact, this is a conflict between a large scale bureaucratic state organi-
sation, with many components and levels, and a small-scale meritocracy. These are good examples 
of what Emile Durkheim termed mechanical and organic societies.23 The key political driving force 
within each society concerns how individuals’ beliefs in and expressions of, solidarity, or what we 
could term ‘social loyalty’, fundamentally influence their actions. Human beings within both types 
of society wish to express or experience a feeling of social solidarity. In a mechanical society, the 
loyalty of the individual is given to the society as a whole, based on a common identity. Apache 
society was small enough to be viewed as a ‘segmented society’, where solidarity was expressed by 
membership of the family within a political structure known as the tribe.
Organic society is far more complex, and the US army became an ‘organ’ operating within the 
much wider bureaucratic organisation of the United States. Yet the United States, as a society, was 
vast in comparison to that of the Apaches. Political and social solidarity would be clearly expressed 
to the United States through a loyalty to the US Constitution. Yet a more meaningful expression 
of loyalty would be towards the particular organ of society to which an individual belonged. Thus, 
US citizens who were, for example soldiers, Indian agents or diplomats would tend to have a closer 
solidarity with their immediate colleagues in the corresponding organ of state. They would often 
be shielded from any contact with those at the top of their organ of state. An Apache warrior who 
had decided to follow Victorio did so because of his personal knowledge of Victorio’s record as a 
leader. Both systems of solidarity conferred a number of advantages and disadvantages when these 
cultures clashed.
The key advantage enjoyed by the Apaches was that their social organization enabled the swift and 
reliable coordination of, and execution of, plans. Apache warriors could react swiftly, flexibly and 
independently to changing circumstances, based on the personal ties between individual warriors. 
The disadvantage faced by the Apaches was the fragmented nature of their society, which prevented 
their banding together on a larger scale to confront the United States Their lack of numbers would 
ultimately finish their resistance to the United States. Once they adopted breech-loading rifles as 
their weapon of choice, they had to depend on a less-than-reliable network of small-scale traders 
and warfare to replenish their broken-down arms and provide additional ammunition.
This volume is littered with examples of the internal and external bureaucratic constraints and 
rivalries which acted against effective campaigning by the US army, despite the possession, by at 
least some of its field officers, of the knowledge of how to defeat the Apaches. The key advantage 
of such a large society was an attritional one; so that, even when the society neglected to channel 
sufficient resources into the promotion of its interests, the limited resources that it did have were still 
vast in comparison to the unreliable resources available to the Apaches. In truth, the damage caused 
by the Apaches, while locally quite devastating in physical, economic and psychological terms, was 
23 See Morrison, 2006, pp.160-168; Callinicos, 1999, pp.127-128; Nisbet, 1966, pp.84-85.
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not of sufficient magnitude to cause much concern for the US federal government. Nevertheless, it 
has to be noted that, in forcing the US army to temporarily run out of money, Victorio’s strategy and 
tactics almost succeeded in registering their opposition to the concentration policy with sufficient 
effect within the US Congress, the very organ of US government that could have acted decisively to 
end such a policy. Whether Congress would have acted in such a manner is open to question, but 
there were certainly many US army officers from the most junior, for example Lt Walter Finley, to 
the senior such as General George Crook who would have supported an end to concentration.
It is doubtful that Victorio understood the internal workings of US constitutional government, 
in modern parlances, his use of guerrilla warfare to lobby for a return of their Ojo Caliente reserva-
tion came very close to success.
Therefore, the Victorio campaign has probably been condemned to relative obscurity due to the 
fact that, in the short-term, none of the participants could have claimed to have achieved their 
political goals, and thus have claimed victory. In the long-term, the United States, which 1886 
had won the Apache Wars, could not point to any aspect of their war with Victorio or Nana which 
could be easily incorporated into a victory narrative. Even though the winners tend to write history, 
the campaign did not even make it into the US army pension records, and resulted in a surprised 
Thomas Cruse, who won a Medal of Honor fighting against the Apaches in 1882, discovering 
that he had not participated in an ‘official’ Indian campaign. As a result of the US army’s wish 
to forget this piece of their history, the campaign has been generally relegated to a footnote in 
western frontier history; and the writings of John Clum have contributed to this effect. As a fervent 
proponent of the concentration policy, and an equally vociferous opponent of the US army, his 
argument that relative peace prevailed between 1876 and 1881 treated with the utmost suspicion. 
At best, the Victorio Campaign garners no more than a chapter in general histories of the Apache 
Wars. It is true that Thrapp and Stout both published histories of the campaigns in 1974, but new 
archaeological and archive research have dated both works. Victorio has far greater coverage in the 
Apache testimony gathered in the 1950s and 60s by Eve Ball, though for the military historian, this 
testimony presents a stimulating, but worthwhile, challenge in reconciling it with the voluminous 
US military records. 
Finally, the history of the Victorio Campaign tells a gripping tale of a last-ditch resistance to 
US encroachment by some of the finest guerrilla fighters the world has seen. It also demonstrates 
the involvement of both African-American and Mexican actors from both sides of the border, who 
took key roles in this war, and whose contribution should not be forgotten. In hindsight, we can 
conclude that the Victorio Campaign was the last sustained attempt by the Apaches to preserve 
at least a semblance of their old way of life in territory claimed by the United States. Their failure 
to do so represented the long-term strategic victory of the US army, no matter how politically 
intangible this victory may have appeared to its commanders at the end of 1881. The US army and 
its Mexican equivalents found themselves dealing with intelligent, flexible and adaptive guerrillas 
whose principles of war made them very difficult to defeat. The attempt to concentrate the Apaches 
on one reservation, administered by (usually) thoroughly corrupt officials, provoked a sustained 
guerrilla war of a magnitude at least as great as the resistance offered by Cochise and others in the 
1860s. It showed that the Apaches were more than capable of inflicting embarrassing defeats on 
their enemies. This war effectively paralysed economic activity in the area and pushed the US army 
in New Mexico close to a complete collapse.
On this basis alone, the Victorio Campaign should be remembered as one of the most important 
periods in the Apache Wars. In terms of our fascination with the Battle of the Little Bighorn, with 
discourses of heroism, and of ‘going down fighting’,24 surely the Victorio Campaign deserves at 
24 See Scott et al, 1998, pp.337-338.
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least an acknowledgement as an epic last stand in its own right. The nature of Apache warfare may 
not lend itself to the romantic imagery of doomed Seventh Cavalrymen swamped by picturesque 
plains warriors; but realising what were the only options open to them, many Apaches chose that of 
the last stand. Such a choice was not necessarily the worst option. If one strove hard enough, and 
did not choose the path of least resistance, one might just win a better future. This was probably 
the thinking behind Victorio’s resistance to what could be termed manifest destiny. Tacitus real-
ised that opponents of the Pax Romana made excellent critics of the Roman administration of the 
Emperor Domitian, and could provide excellent metaphors to justify the reform of such regimes. 
Like Calgacus, who stood before his Caledonian warriors and declared of the Romans, ‘where they 
make a desert,25 they call it peace’, Victorio might have said of the Pax Americana, ‘where they take 
a desert, they call it democracy’. The most important historic and political lesson of the Victorio 
Campaign is that throughout its history, US imperial democracy, with the best of intentions, has 
made dreadful and avoidable mistakes when it has encountered resistance to its perceived ‘manifest 
destiny’. 
25 This is more often translated as ‘desolation’ but given the context of the Apache wars using ‘desert’ seems 
more analogous.
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Appendix I
Materials Relating to Chapter 2
 
2.1 Instructions for the Transportation and Firing of the Hotchkiss Mountain Gun
It may come as some surprise that the Hotchkiss mountain gun was manned by cavalrymen and not 
artillerymen. However, it is clear that Ninth Cavalrymen had been trained to operate these guns. 
The following instructions from the manual would suggest that the Hotchkiss gun was quite simple 
in its operation and did not require specialist artillery training.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ACTING ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, November21, 1879
The following instructions furnished these Headquarters from the Ordnance Depot at 
Cheyenne, Wyoming Territory, for the transportation and use of the Hotchkiss Mountain 
Gun, calibre 1.65, is hereby published for the information and government of all concerned, 
viz:-
HARNESSING AND TRANSPORTATION
The gun is drawn by one mule or horse, or, if need be, by two animals working in tandem
The shafts are attached to the trail of the piece, and it is believed that in ordinary country a 
single animal in the shafts will be sufficient to draw the piece. If another animal is needed he 
should be attached in front of the other, and the team be driven in tandem.
LOADING AND FIRING
When the gun is not in use the breechblock is locked in. To load the piece, throw back the 
locking bar to the rear, and draw out the breech block to the right until the bore is clear. Insert 
the cartridge in the bore from the rear: if it sticks it may be pushed in a short distance by using 
the butt of the sponge staff and giving a steady pressure. The cartridge must not be pounded in. 
Push the breech block into its place to the left, (this will drive the cartridge home), and lock it 
in by throwing the locking bar forward. The piece is fired by a lanyard and friction primer in 
the usual manner.
After firing, to reload, throw back the locking bar and draw out the breech block smartly 
to the right. If the ejector fails to throw out the empty shell push the breech block home and 
draw it out a second time. Sponge the piece carefully, insert a cartridge as before, set the breech 
block home, lock it and the piece is ready for firing.
The sponge will work hard at first, and should be wet or oiled in serving the piece. The point 
blank range is about two hundred yards. For greater range a rear sight is provided.
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The cartridges are all fixed and are ready for use. At the base of the cartridge there is a hole 
about one-eighth of an inch in diameter, situated in the center of the base. Through this hole, 
when clear of sawdust, an inner disc of copper is seen. The fulminate is between the outer base 
and this inner disc of copper and is ignited by the flame from the friction primer. This inner 
disc should not be disturbed under any circumstance, and the cartridge should be fired without any 
preparation whatsoever, as it is all fixed, ready for use, when packed in the ammunition boxes.
By command of Colonel HATCH
JOHN S. LOUD
First Lieut. And Adjutant 9th Cavalry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
2.2 List of Stores at Fort Craig to be sent to Ojo Caliente, 7 January 18801
1500 lbs Bacon Issue 2025 lbs Flour
150 lbs Beans 150 lbs Rice
100 lbs Peas 300 lbs Rio Coffee
1120 lbs ????? Sugar 21 ???? Conc. Vinegar
120 lbs Candles 120 lbs Laundry Soap
200lbs Salt Issue 10 lbs Black Pepper
150 lbs Tobacco Plug 20 lbs Breakfast Bacon
24 Cans Green Corn 10 Cans Lima Beans
10 Cans Ham 6 Cans Raspberry Jam
10 lbs Lard 12 Cans Lobsters
24 Cans Oysters 20 lbs Mackerel
10 Cans Mushrooms 15 Cans Peaches
24 Cans Green Peas 24 Pint Bottles Pickles
6 Cans Plums 6 Cans Pineapples
6 Cans Damson Preserve 25 lbs Table Salt
12 Boxes Sardines 6 lbs Corn Starch
6 Bottles Worcester Sauce 10 lbs Laundry Soda?
24 Cans Tomatoes 50 lbs ???? Sugar
12 Cakes Toilet Soap 30 lbs Tobacco ???? Asstd
24 Cans Yeast Powder 10 lbs ?????????????
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Appendix II
Materials Relating to Chapter 4
 
4.1 Summary of Gatewood’s Detachment of Apache scouts during March 1880
The number and continual manoeuvring of US army detachments and Apache raiding parties active 
during March 1880 makes it difficult to follow the movements of these groups. As Lieutenant 
Gatewood’s scout detachment features regularly at different points in this chapter, it is useful to 
have a summary of these movements.
Date Location Activity
5 March Camp Thomas, Arizona Territory Ordered to proceed to the District of New Mexico.
21 March Cienege Apache Detachment encounters and pursues, to no avail, 10 
Apache raiders.
22 March From Camp French to Wheeler’s 
Ranch
Detachment to verify rumour that Wheeler’s 
Ranch has been attacked. If report false, they are to 
investigate possibility that the Apaches are east of 
the Rio Grande.
24 March Caballo Mountains Picketing the main pass through the Caballo 
Mountains.
25 to 28 March Stationed near Las Palomas On 28 March, Lieutenant Cruse, MacPherson and 
small detachment of scouts find remains of two 
wagons and two Sixth Cavalry deserters.
4.2 Company C, Sixth Cavalry, Tour of Duty, Southwest New Mexico, April–May 18801
1 April March to Knight’s Ranch.
2 April March to Cherry Creek.
3 April Arrive Fort Bayard.
4 April In camp at Fort Bayard.
5 April March to Hudson’s Hot Springs.
6 April March to Old Fort Cummings.
7 April March to McEvers’ Ranch.
8 April March to Santa Barbara.
9 April In camp at Santa Barbara
10 April March up Rio Grande to mouth of Rio Perchas.
11 April March to Las Palomas.
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12–14 April In Camp at Las Palomas. Send detachment to Hillsboro for rations.
15 April March to Arroyo Bonita.
16 April Return to Santa Barbara.
17–18 April In camp at Santa Barbara. Send detachment to Fort Cummings.
18–30 April While based at Santa Barbara, detachments scout north to San Jose, west to McEver’s 
Ranch and Rio Las Animas, and south west as far as Old Fort Cummings.
1 May Leave Santa Barbara and pass through Fort Cummings, Hudson’s Hot Springs, 
Silver City, Gila Crossing, Keller’s Ranch, Deep Creek, Frisco River, Bush Valley, 
Blue River, Dry Creek, Duck Creek, Mangus Springs, Silver City, Cherry Creek, 
Knights Ranche….
24 May … return to Fort Bowie.
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Appendix III
Materials Relating to Chapter 10
 
10.1
Appendix 10.1
One version states that, having established his guard detachments throughout the region, the 
commander of the Tenth Cavalry was scouting the area when he spotted the Apaches, realised 
their destination, and reached it first.1 
A second version is that, in reaction to the news that Victorio was almost certain to attempt a 
crossing of the Rio Grande, Grierson was in the process of moving himself closer to his Tenth 
Cavalry detachments. As he was approaching one of his garrisons at Eagle Springs, his own small 
detachment had a brief skirmish with a single Apache. The Apache was assumed to be part of the 
predicted advance into western Texas. Captain Nolan’s Detachment of Tenth Cavalry, based at 
Fort Quitman, had also detected Victorio’s crossing and had immediately dispatched couriers to 
Captain Gilmore at Eagle Springs. Lieutenant H.O. Flipper was one of these couriers. Lieutenant 
Flipper was the first African-American to graduate from West Point, in 1877, and had been posted 
to the Tenth Cavalry in 1878.2 Flipper rode to Eagle Springs and informed Grierson of Victorio’s 
movement. He then returned to Fort Quitman in enough time to participate in the looming battle.3
It should be noted that at least one version of this battle has 75 Tenth Cavalrymen being wiped 
out by Victorio’s Apaches. Sowell, while mentioning no names, describes visiting a battlefield very 
similar to Tinaja de las Palmas, then proceeds to make up a story to fit the battle site.4
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Appendix 10.2 Tenth Cavalry Deployments, July 18805
Co. Record of Event, July 1880
A Arrive at Fort Quitman, 28 July. 
30 July march to Eighteen Mile Waterhole to relieve Colonel Grierson; thence to Eagle Springs.1
B Leave Chenati Mountains 25 July. March to Viejo Pass 27 July. Leave 29 July, with battalion 
under Captain Carpenter, for Eagle Springs. Arrive 30 July and join Grierson’s command.2
C Leave Fort Davis 25 July. Arrive Eagle Springs 29 July. Engage Apaches 30 July. Lose one man 
and five horses killed in action, one horse and one mule wounded in action.3
D Captain Keyes, two officers and 53 enlisted men to Grierson Spring in June 1880 from Fort 
Concho.4
F Captain Kennedy and 60 enlisted men to Black River, NM, in June 1880, from Fort Concho.5
Leave Lost Chance Canon, Guadalupe Mountains. 1 July march to Guadalupe Canon. Leave on 
3 July on Indian trail. Arrive at Camp Safford 26 July.
G Arrive at Eagle Springs 24 July. Engage Apaches 30 July. One Officer and one enlisted man 
wounded in action and five horses killed or wounded in action.6 
H As Company B above.7 
I Arrive at Viejo Pass 27 July. 
K Leave Fort Davis 20 July, to march to El Muerto Stage Station, then to Fresco in Carrizo 
Mountains, then back to vicinity of El Muerto on 26 July. Small detachment leaves 25 July for 
Eagle Springs, returning to company 27 July. Leave camp on 31 July for Oak Springs, Carrizo 
Mountains.8
L Camp Safford, engaged in scouting.
M Captain Norvell, two officers and 63 enlisted men to North Concho River in June 1880 from 
Fort Concho.9
Notes
1 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
2 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company B, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
3 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company C, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
4 Return for Jun. 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Concho, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 
1889, NA, M617, Roll 242.
5 Return for Jun. 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Concho, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 
1889, NA, M617, Roll 242.
6 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company G, 10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
7 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company H, 10th Cavalry Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
8 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry, Jul./Aug. 1880 in NA, RG94.
9 Return for Jun. 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Concho, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 
1889, NA, M617, Roll 242.
5 Unless otherwise footnoted this table is derived from the Record of Events Jul. & Aug. 1880 in Returns 
From Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833-1916, 10th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, 
NA, M744, Roll 96; See also Return for Jun. 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort 
Concho, Texas Jan. 1879-Jun. 1889, NA, M617, Roll 242.
